我国中小股份制银行股东关联贷款研究
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摘要
随着企业在金融市场间接融资比重的不断提高,企业与银行间的关联交易逐步发展起来。关联贷款作为银企间关联交易的主要表现形式之一,在某种程度上能够降低银企间的交易成本,但更多地是给银行贷款造成了很大风险。近年来,股东关联贷款问题严重影响着我国中小股份制银行(以下简称中小银行)的发展,虽然许多学者已经对关联贷款问题进行了一定的研究,但是系统地研究我国中小银行股东关联贷款的文献却不多见。
本文主要的研究线索是,从关联贷款的理论基础出发,分析银行关联贷款的一般性和中小银行关联贷款的特殊性,最后重点研究我国中小银行股东关联贷款的形成根源和各种现实传导路径,具体研究内容如下:
首先,本文从关联贷款与信息不对称的缓解、关联贷款与利益掠夺以及关联贷款的形成机制三个角度进行文献综述,进而引出本文的研究对象,即我国中小银行股东关联贷款问题。
其次,本文从交易成本理论、产权制度理论和公司治理理论三个方面阐述关联贷款的理论基础,随后分析银行关联贷款的一般性,接下来分别从正反两个方面论证了中小银行关联贷款区别于大银行的特殊性所在。
再次,在文章的主体部分,通过建立理论模型,本文设计了我国中小银行股东关联贷款行为过程中股东与银行经理双方的收益函数,分析结果表明:我国中小银行股东关联贷款问题的形成根源在于大股东的控制地位以及因此而产生的对银行经理的解雇威胁;在模型的求解过程中,本文同时分析了股东关联贷款行为对中小银行利益相关者的影响;接下来,进一步研究上述形成根源最终导致股东关联贷款形成的各种现实传导路径;此外,我们通过对民生银行股东关联贷款案例的分析,进一步指出我国中小银行股东关联贷款的风险所在。
最后,本文分别从中小银行内部和外部两个方面提出治理我国中小银行股东关联贷款问题的相关政策建议。
With the increasing proportion of indirect financing in financial market, related transactions between enterprises and banks have developed gradually. Considered as one of the primary representations of related transactions, related lending can to some extent reduce transaction cost between banks and enterprises, but it more often caused much risk to bank loan. In recent years, the problem of related lending to shareholders has seriously influenced Chinese small and medium-sized joint-stock banks' (small and medium-sized banks for short below) development, though many scholars have done some research on the problem of related lending, it is difficult to find the literatures which systematically study Chinese small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders.
The main research clue of this dissertation is from theoretical foundation to the universality and the particularity, and finally to the root and various conducting ways of small and medium-sized banks' related lending. The concrete research contents are as follows:
Firstly, this dissertation makes a literature review from three different angles, namely, related lending and asymmetric information mitigation, related lending and interest entrenchment and formation mechanism of related lending, sequentially we introduce research project of this dissertation, namely, the problem of Chinese small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders.
Secondly, this dissertation expounds theoretical foundation of related lending from three aspects, namely, transaction cost theory, property right theory and corporate governance theory, subsequently this dissertation analyzes the universality of related lending, then from both positive and negative side, we expound the particularity of small and medium-sized banks' related lending which is different from large banks.
Thirdly, in the principal part of this dissertation. through theoretical model, this dissertation designs revenue functions of both bank manager and shareholder in the process of small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders. Analysis results indicate that the root of Chinese small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders lies in the controlling power of large shareholders and hence the firing menace to bank manager. In the process of solving the theoretical model, meanwhile we analyze the influence of related lending to shareholders on interrelated interestors of small and medium-sized banks. And then we do further research and point out various realistic conducting ways through which the above root will finally result in related lending to shareholders. In addition, we analyze the case of Minsheng Bank' related lending to shareholders and further indicate the risk of Chinese small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders.
Finally this dissertation puts forward some related policy recommendations to deal with related lending to shareholders from both inside and outside of small and medium-sized banks.
本文主要的研究线索是,从关联贷款的理论基础出发,分析银行关联贷款的一般性和中小银行关联贷款的特殊性,最后重点研究我国中小银行股东关联贷款的形成根源和各种现实传导路径,具体研究内容如下:
首先,本文从关联贷款与信息不对称的缓解、关联贷款与利益掠夺以及关联贷款的形成机制三个角度进行文献综述,进而引出本文的研究对象,即我国中小银行股东关联贷款问题。
其次,本文从交易成本理论、产权制度理论和公司治理理论三个方面阐述关联贷款的理论基础,随后分析银行关联贷款的一般性,接下来分别从正反两个方面论证了中小银行关联贷款区别于大银行的特殊性所在。
再次,在文章的主体部分,通过建立理论模型,本文设计了我国中小银行股东关联贷款行为过程中股东与银行经理双方的收益函数,分析结果表明:我国中小银行股东关联贷款问题的形成根源在于大股东的控制地位以及因此而产生的对银行经理的解雇威胁;在模型的求解过程中,本文同时分析了股东关联贷款行为对中小银行利益相关者的影响;接下来,进一步研究上述形成根源最终导致股东关联贷款形成的各种现实传导路径;此外,我们通过对民生银行股东关联贷款案例的分析,进一步指出我国中小银行股东关联贷款的风险所在。
最后,本文分别从中小银行内部和外部两个方面提出治理我国中小银行股东关联贷款问题的相关政策建议。
With the increasing proportion of indirect financing in financial market, related transactions between enterprises and banks have developed gradually. Considered as one of the primary representations of related transactions, related lending can to some extent reduce transaction cost between banks and enterprises, but it more often caused much risk to bank loan. In recent years, the problem of related lending to shareholders has seriously influenced Chinese small and medium-sized joint-stock banks' (small and medium-sized banks for short below) development, though many scholars have done some research on the problem of related lending, it is difficult to find the literatures which systematically study Chinese small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders.
The main research clue of this dissertation is from theoretical foundation to the universality and the particularity, and finally to the root and various conducting ways of small and medium-sized banks' related lending. The concrete research contents are as follows:
Firstly, this dissertation makes a literature review from three different angles, namely, related lending and asymmetric information mitigation, related lending and interest entrenchment and formation mechanism of related lending, sequentially we introduce research project of this dissertation, namely, the problem of Chinese small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders.
Secondly, this dissertation expounds theoretical foundation of related lending from three aspects, namely, transaction cost theory, property right theory and corporate governance theory, subsequently this dissertation analyzes the universality of related lending, then from both positive and negative side, we expound the particularity of small and medium-sized banks' related lending which is different from large banks.
Thirdly, in the principal part of this dissertation. through theoretical model, this dissertation designs revenue functions of both bank manager and shareholder in the process of small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders. Analysis results indicate that the root of Chinese small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders lies in the controlling power of large shareholders and hence the firing menace to bank manager. In the process of solving the theoretical model, meanwhile we analyze the influence of related lending to shareholders on interrelated interestors of small and medium-sized banks. And then we do further research and point out various realistic conducting ways through which the above root will finally result in related lending to shareholders. In addition, we analyze the case of Minsheng Bank' related lending to shareholders and further indicate the risk of Chinese small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders.
Finally this dissertation puts forward some related policy recommendations to deal with related lending to shareholders from both inside and outside of small and medium-sized banks.
引文
[1]Berger,and Udell,1995:Relationship lending and lines of credit in small firth finance.Journal of Business (68).351-381
[1]Berger,Udell,2002:Small business credit availability and relationship lending:the importance of bank organizational structure.The Economic Journal,February.
[2]张捷.中小企业关系型借贷与银行组织结.经济研究,2002年第6期.
[1]科斯.《企业.市场.法律》中文版[M].上海:上海三联书店,1990.
[2]Allen N.Berger and Gregory F.Udell.Small business credit availability and relationship leading:the importance of bank organizational structure[J].Forthcoming in Economic Journal.2002.
[3]黄泰岩,杨万东.国外经济学热点前沿(第2辑)[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2005.
[4]Steven A.Sharp.Asymmetric Information,Bank Lending,and Implicit Contracts:A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships[J].Journal of Finance,1990,(45):1069-1087.
[5]Stanley D.Longhofer,Joao A.C.Santos.The Importance of Bank Seniority for Relationship Lending[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2000,(9):57-59.
[6]Lamoreaux,Naomi.Insider Lending:Banks,Personal Connections,and Economic Development in Industrial New England[M].New York:Cambridge University Press.1996.
[7]Keister,Lisa.Insider Lending and Economic Transition:The Structure,Function,Performance Impact of Finance Companies in Chinese Business Groups[J].William Davidson Institute Working Paper #195.1997.
[8]Perotti,Enrico C.,and Gelfer,Stanislav.Red Barons or Robber Barons? Governance and Financing in Russian Financial Industrial Groups[J].Discussion Paper No.58.London:LBS/CIS-Middle Europe Centre,July 1999.
[9]La Porta,Rafael;Lopez-de-Silanes,Florencio;and Zamarripa,Guillermo.Related Lending.[J]Quarterly Joumal of Economics,118(1):231-68,2003.
[10]Luc Laeven.Insider Lending and Bank Ownership:The Case of Russia[J].Journal of Comparative Economics 29,2001.
[11]Raghuram G.Rajan and Luigi Zingales.Which Capitalism? Lessons From the East Asian Crisis[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1998.
[12]赵勇.国有商业银行分拆上市后的不当关联交易问题研究[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2004,(5).
[13]史宏.商业银行对内部人和股东关联交易风险控制研究[J].国际金融研究,2005,(10).
[14]王征雁,黄贤福.银行控制股东关联贷款及法律规范的“利益冲突”范式[J],西南金融,2005,(4).
[15]Allen N.Berger and Gregory F.Udell.Small Business Credit Avail-ability and Relationship Lending:The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure[J].The Economic Journal,112 (February),2002:32-53.
[16]Berger,and Udell.Relationship Lending and Llines of Credit in Small Firth Finance[J].Journal of Business(68),1995.
[17]张捷.中小企业关系型借贷与银行组织结[J].经济研究,2002,(6).
[18](美)蒋中一.数理经济学[M].(刘学译)北京:商务印书馆,1999.
[19]徐振东.论在银行公司治理中实现三权制衡[J].国际金融研究,2003,(9).
[20]陈学彬.论金融机构激励约束机制[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2006.
[21]陈学彬,张文.完善我国商业银行激励约束机制的博弈分析[J].国际金融研究,2003,(3).
[22]夏冠军.商业银行的特殊性对其公司治理的影响[J].浙江金融,2005,(7).
[23]历志钢.民生银行42亿关联贷款曝光[N].财经,2007,3,19.
[24]中国银行业监督管理委员会.《商业银行与内部人和股东关联交易管理办法》,2004.
[1]Berger,Udell,2002:Small business credit availability and relationship lending:the importance of bank organizational structure.The Economic Journal,February.
[2]张捷.中小企业关系型借贷与银行组织结.经济研究,2002年第6期.
[1]科斯.《企业.市场.法律》中文版[M].上海:上海三联书店,1990.
[2]Allen N.Berger and Gregory F.Udell.Small business credit availability and relationship leading:the importance of bank organizational structure[J].Forthcoming in Economic Journal.2002.
[3]黄泰岩,杨万东.国外经济学热点前沿(第2辑)[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2005.
[4]Steven A.Sharp.Asymmetric Information,Bank Lending,and Implicit Contracts:A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships[J].Journal of Finance,1990,(45):1069-1087.
[5]Stanley D.Longhofer,Joao A.C.Santos.The Importance of Bank Seniority for Relationship Lending[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2000,(9):57-59.
[6]Lamoreaux,Naomi.Insider Lending:Banks,Personal Connections,and Economic Development in Industrial New England[M].New York:Cambridge University Press.1996.
[7]Keister,Lisa.Insider Lending and Economic Transition:The Structure,Function,Performance Impact of Finance Companies in Chinese Business Groups[J].William Davidson Institute Working Paper #195.1997.
[8]Perotti,Enrico C.,and Gelfer,Stanislav.Red Barons or Robber Barons? Governance and Financing in Russian Financial Industrial Groups[J].Discussion Paper No.58.London:LBS/CIS-Middle Europe Centre,July 1999.
[9]La Porta,Rafael;Lopez-de-Silanes,Florencio;and Zamarripa,Guillermo.Related Lending.[J]Quarterly Joumal of Economics,118(1):231-68,2003.
[10]Luc Laeven.Insider Lending and Bank Ownership:The Case of Russia[J].Journal of Comparative Economics 29,2001.
[11]Raghuram G.Rajan and Luigi Zingales.Which Capitalism? Lessons From the East Asian Crisis[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1998.
[12]赵勇.国有商业银行分拆上市后的不当关联交易问题研究[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2004,(5).
[13]史宏.商业银行对内部人和股东关联交易风险控制研究[J].国际金融研究,2005,(10).
[14]王征雁,黄贤福.银行控制股东关联贷款及法律规范的“利益冲突”范式[J],西南金融,2005,(4).
[15]Allen N.Berger and Gregory F.Udell.Small Business Credit Avail-ability and Relationship Lending:The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure[J].The Economic Journal,112 (February),2002:32-53.
[16]Berger,and Udell.Relationship Lending and Llines of Credit in Small Firth Finance[J].Journal of Business(68),1995.
[17]张捷.中小企业关系型借贷与银行组织结[J].经济研究,2002,(6).
[18](美)蒋中一.数理经济学[M].(刘学译)北京:商务印书馆,1999.
[19]徐振东.论在银行公司治理中实现三权制衡[J].国际金融研究,2003,(9).
[20]陈学彬.论金融机构激励约束机制[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2006.
[21]陈学彬,张文.完善我国商业银行激励约束机制的博弈分析[J].国际金融研究,2003,(3).
[22]夏冠军.商业银行的特殊性对其公司治理的影响[J].浙江金融,2005,(7).
[23]历志钢.民生银行42亿关联贷款曝光[N].财经,2007,3,19.
[24]中国银行业监督管理委员会.《商业银行与内部人和股东关联交易管理办法》,2004.