基于互惠性偏好的委托代理理论及其对和谐经济的贡献
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摘要
我国正在构建社会主义和谐社会,经济的和谐是和谐社会的重要方面,经济和谐隐含着经济行为主体之间的公平互惠,也隐含着经济行为主体的利他偏好。古典经济学对经济行为主体的基本假设是纯粹理性的经济人,正是基于这样的假设,古典经济学认为经济行为主体是单纯追求个人利益最大化的、自利的行为人,这在一定程度上强化了社会经济关系中的矛盾和冲突,不利于和谐社会的构建。近年来,行为经济学和实验经济学的研究表明,经济行为主体是有限理性的,正是基于这一前提,经济行为主体存在利他偏好,经济行为主体之间存在公平、互惠与合作,而这些正是构建和谐社会的内在要求。本文运用行为经济学、信息经济学、演化博弈理论等理论和方法,研究有限理性的经济行为主体的利他偏好以及基于这种偏好下的互惠行为。在前人研究的基础上,将行为经济学的公平互惠理论与信息经济学的委托代理理论相结合,构建基于公平互惠理论的委托代理模型,用以研究个体之间互惠性的存在机制,并运用演化博弈理论的演化稳定策略研究个体互惠性向群体互惠性转化的可能性以及稳定性,同时,运用结构方程模型,实证地研究和分析团队、企业中互惠行为的存在性和实现机制。这样,就从行为经济学和信息经济学的角度提供了构建和谐社会的微观经济理论基础,从而促进和谐社会的建设。
首先,本论文归纳整理了行为经济学和实验经济学关于互惠性偏好的理论研究成果。公平互惠的思想最早可以从斯密的著述中看到,后来,西蒙提出了有限理性理论,奠定了行为经济学的理论基础,又经过卡尼曼和特维斯基的不断探索,通过将心理学研究和经济学研究有机融合,提出了前景理论和心理账户理论,行为经济学由此步入成长阶段,对互惠性偏好理论的研究也取得了令人瞩目的成果,拉宾、泰勒及伯尔顿更是对公平互惠理论建立了具体的数学模型,使得这项研究不断深化。所有这些,都为本论文的研究奠定了理论基础,提供了理论模型和分析方法,本论文正是在此基础上,借助行为经济学和实验经济学的研究成果,将互惠性偏好理论植入信息经济学的委托代理理论,进而分析现实社会的公平、互惠与和谐。
其次,本文在前人研究成果的基础上,将公平博弈概念植入现有的委托代理模型,得到了一个考虑代理人表现出“互惠性”非理性行为的新的委托代理模型。研究发现,现有的标准委托代理模型给出的最优合约不是帕累托最优的,植入公平博弈后的委托代理模型能够给委托人带来比标准委托代理理论的最优合约更高的利润水平。这种将行为经济学与现有激励理论相结合的研究,可以解释许多有特色的企业文化的形成,特别是互惠环境下企业的人性化管理。这是本论文最主要的创新点,也是本论文的立论之基。
再次,本文基于行为经济学互惠性偏好的基础性假设,分析个体之间行为博弈的效果,并运用演化博弈理论研究个体经济行为向群体经济行为的演化路径。研究表明,存在互惠性偏好的个体之间的行为博弈能够改善博弈双方的经济利益,并且存在群体经济行为从自利型向互惠型演化的演化稳定策略。这一研究为和谐社会的构建提供了微观经济理论基础,即互惠环境下和谐社会的构建分为两个层次:个体行为的和谐和群体行为的和谐,在个体行为和谐的基础上,运用演化博弈理论,可以实现群体行为乃至社会行为的和谐,从而合理确定构建和谐社会的路径演化机理,为构建和谐社会提供科学的微观理论基础。
最后,本文运用结构方程模型,分别对互惠环境下研发型团队的技术创新能力、互惠性偏好与企业绩效的相关性以及互惠性对企业核心能力的效应进行实证检验。检验表明,团队中成员之间的互惠性行为有效提高了团队的向心力和凝聚力,有效改善了团队的经济效益;雇主的互惠性动机和互惠性行为显著提高了雇员的忠诚度和敬业度,雇主的互惠性管理策略通过雇员的互惠性行为,显著提高了企业的运作绩效;互惠性偏好直接增强了员工心理契约的稳定性,从而通过一系列管理路径的传导机制,最终提高了企业的核心竞争力。因此,互惠性偏好应该作为一种新的管理理念和管理行为来实施,其对我国企业运作的激励功能在未来的战略实施中将日益得到体现。
China is constructing a socialist harmonious society, in which economic harmony is an important aspect of the harmonious society. The economic harmony implicitly includes not only the fairness and reciprocity among economic behavior individuals, but also the altruism preference. In classical economics, the basic assumption on economic behavior individuals is that they are purely rational economic persons. Based on this assumption, the classic economic theory holds that economic behavior individuals purely look for maximizing their personal interests and are selfish. This, to some extent, intensifies the contradiction and conflicts and hampers the construction of the harmonious society. Recently, research in behavioral economics and experimental economics indicate that economic behavior individuals are bounded rationale. According to this assumption, economic individuals have altruism preference, and fairness, reciprocity and cooperation exist among them, which make up the internal components of constructing the harmonious society. In this thesis, theories and methods such as behavioral economics, information economics, evolutionary game theory etc are applied to study economic behavior individuals’altruism preference with bounded rationality and their reciprocity behaviors based on this preference. Stemmed from the literature, the fairness and reciprocity theory in behavioral economics is integrated with the principal-agent theory in information economics to construct a principal-agent model based on reciprocity theory so as to study the mechanism in which reciprocity exists among individuals. The evolutionary stable strategy in evolutionary game theory is applied to study the possibility and stability of transferring from individual reciprocity to group reciprocity. At the same time, structural equation modeling is applied to do empirical study on the existing and enabling mechanism of reciprocity within teams and companies. Consequently, a microeconomic theory basis is developed to construct a harmonious society and thus promoting the construction of the harmonious society.
Fist, this thesis summarized the theoretical production of reciprocity preference of behavioral economics and experimental economics. The thought of fairness and reciprocity can be originally sourced from the write of Simth. Subsequently, Simon put forward the theory of limited rationality. He established the theoretical foundation of behavioral economics. By the effort of Kahneman and Tversky, which combined the research of psychology and economics, prospect theory and mental accounting theory be put forward. Hence, behavioral economics step into a growth stage, and make the studies on the theory of reciprocity preference come to flourish. Rabin, Thaler and Bolton constructed the mathematical model about the theory of reciprocity preference, which deepened the research. All of those research established the theoretical foundation of this thesis, and provided the theoretical model and analysis method. Based on those research, in virtue of the theoretical research production of behavioral economics and experimental economics, this thesis incorporate the theory of reciprocity preference into the principal-agent theory of information economics. Accordingly, this thesis analyzed the fairness, reciprocity and harmoniousness in the real society. Second, based on the literature, in this thesis the concept of fairness game is transplanted into the current principal-agent model to formulate a new principal-agent model, in which the agent shows irrational behavior of reciprocity. The study indicates that, the optimal contract resulting from the current standard principal-agent model is not a state of Pareto optimality. The new model can bring higher level of profit. The study of integrating behavioral economics with current motivation theory can explain the formation of many featured cultures, especially the human-based management of companies in reciprocal environment.
Third, based on the basic assumption of reciprocity preference in behavioral economics, this thesis analyzes the effects of behavioral game among individuals. Evolutionary game theory is applied to study the evolutionary path from individual economic behavior to group economic behavior. The study shows that the behavioral gaming between individuals having reciprocity preferences can improve the economic interests of the two gaming parties. Further, there exists the evolutionary stable strategy transferring the group economic behavior from egoism to reciprocity. This study provides microeconomic theory basis for the construction of the harmonious society, that is, the construction of the harmonious society in a reciprocal environment can be divided into two levels: individual behavioral harmony and group behavioral harmony. Based on the individual behavioral harmony, with the application of evolutionary theory, the group behavior harmony and even the social behavior harmony can be accomplished. Consequently, the path evolutionary mechanism of constructing the harmonious society can be reasonably established and provides the microeconomic theory basis for the construction of the harmonious society.
Lastly, in this thesis structural equation modeling is applied to conduct empirical testing on R&D teams’technology innovation capacity in a reciprocal environment, reciprocity preference and its relevance to company performance, and the reciprocity of companies’core competitiveness. The results showed that, the reciprocity behavior among team members can effectively increase the centripetal force and cohesion of the team, as well as improving the team’s economic effect; The reciprocity motives and behaviors of employers can significantly increase the loyalty and efforts of their employees. The reciprocal management strategies of the employers, through reciprocal behaviors of the employees, can significantly improve the operational performance of their companies. The reciprocal preference can directly increase the stability of the employee’s psychological contract. With the transmitting mechanism of a series of management paths, the core competitiveness of the company can finally be improved. Therefore, the reciprocal preference should be implemented as a new management concept and as a new management action, and its motivation function on China’s company operations will be reflected in the future’s implementation strategies .
首先,本论文归纳整理了行为经济学和实验经济学关于互惠性偏好的理论研究成果。公平互惠的思想最早可以从斯密的著述中看到,后来,西蒙提出了有限理性理论,奠定了行为经济学的理论基础,又经过卡尼曼和特维斯基的不断探索,通过将心理学研究和经济学研究有机融合,提出了前景理论和心理账户理论,行为经济学由此步入成长阶段,对互惠性偏好理论的研究也取得了令人瞩目的成果,拉宾、泰勒及伯尔顿更是对公平互惠理论建立了具体的数学模型,使得这项研究不断深化。所有这些,都为本论文的研究奠定了理论基础,提供了理论模型和分析方法,本论文正是在此基础上,借助行为经济学和实验经济学的研究成果,将互惠性偏好理论植入信息经济学的委托代理理论,进而分析现实社会的公平、互惠与和谐。
其次,本文在前人研究成果的基础上,将公平博弈概念植入现有的委托代理模型,得到了一个考虑代理人表现出“互惠性”非理性行为的新的委托代理模型。研究发现,现有的标准委托代理模型给出的最优合约不是帕累托最优的,植入公平博弈后的委托代理模型能够给委托人带来比标准委托代理理论的最优合约更高的利润水平。这种将行为经济学与现有激励理论相结合的研究,可以解释许多有特色的企业文化的形成,特别是互惠环境下企业的人性化管理。这是本论文最主要的创新点,也是本论文的立论之基。
再次,本文基于行为经济学互惠性偏好的基础性假设,分析个体之间行为博弈的效果,并运用演化博弈理论研究个体经济行为向群体经济行为的演化路径。研究表明,存在互惠性偏好的个体之间的行为博弈能够改善博弈双方的经济利益,并且存在群体经济行为从自利型向互惠型演化的演化稳定策略。这一研究为和谐社会的构建提供了微观经济理论基础,即互惠环境下和谐社会的构建分为两个层次:个体行为的和谐和群体行为的和谐,在个体行为和谐的基础上,运用演化博弈理论,可以实现群体行为乃至社会行为的和谐,从而合理确定构建和谐社会的路径演化机理,为构建和谐社会提供科学的微观理论基础。
最后,本文运用结构方程模型,分别对互惠环境下研发型团队的技术创新能力、互惠性偏好与企业绩效的相关性以及互惠性对企业核心能力的效应进行实证检验。检验表明,团队中成员之间的互惠性行为有效提高了团队的向心力和凝聚力,有效改善了团队的经济效益;雇主的互惠性动机和互惠性行为显著提高了雇员的忠诚度和敬业度,雇主的互惠性管理策略通过雇员的互惠性行为,显著提高了企业的运作绩效;互惠性偏好直接增强了员工心理契约的稳定性,从而通过一系列管理路径的传导机制,最终提高了企业的核心竞争力。因此,互惠性偏好应该作为一种新的管理理念和管理行为来实施,其对我国企业运作的激励功能在未来的战略实施中将日益得到体现。
China is constructing a socialist harmonious society, in which economic harmony is an important aspect of the harmonious society. The economic harmony implicitly includes not only the fairness and reciprocity among economic behavior individuals, but also the altruism preference. In classical economics, the basic assumption on economic behavior individuals is that they are purely rational economic persons. Based on this assumption, the classic economic theory holds that economic behavior individuals purely look for maximizing their personal interests and are selfish. This, to some extent, intensifies the contradiction and conflicts and hampers the construction of the harmonious society. Recently, research in behavioral economics and experimental economics indicate that economic behavior individuals are bounded rationale. According to this assumption, economic individuals have altruism preference, and fairness, reciprocity and cooperation exist among them, which make up the internal components of constructing the harmonious society. In this thesis, theories and methods such as behavioral economics, information economics, evolutionary game theory etc are applied to study economic behavior individuals’altruism preference with bounded rationality and their reciprocity behaviors based on this preference. Stemmed from the literature, the fairness and reciprocity theory in behavioral economics is integrated with the principal-agent theory in information economics to construct a principal-agent model based on reciprocity theory so as to study the mechanism in which reciprocity exists among individuals. The evolutionary stable strategy in evolutionary game theory is applied to study the possibility and stability of transferring from individual reciprocity to group reciprocity. At the same time, structural equation modeling is applied to do empirical study on the existing and enabling mechanism of reciprocity within teams and companies. Consequently, a microeconomic theory basis is developed to construct a harmonious society and thus promoting the construction of the harmonious society.
Fist, this thesis summarized the theoretical production of reciprocity preference of behavioral economics and experimental economics. The thought of fairness and reciprocity can be originally sourced from the write of Simth. Subsequently, Simon put forward the theory of limited rationality. He established the theoretical foundation of behavioral economics. By the effort of Kahneman and Tversky, which combined the research of psychology and economics, prospect theory and mental accounting theory be put forward. Hence, behavioral economics step into a growth stage, and make the studies on the theory of reciprocity preference come to flourish. Rabin, Thaler and Bolton constructed the mathematical model about the theory of reciprocity preference, which deepened the research. All of those research established the theoretical foundation of this thesis, and provided the theoretical model and analysis method. Based on those research, in virtue of the theoretical research production of behavioral economics and experimental economics, this thesis incorporate the theory of reciprocity preference into the principal-agent theory of information economics. Accordingly, this thesis analyzed the fairness, reciprocity and harmoniousness in the real society. Second, based on the literature, in this thesis the concept of fairness game is transplanted into the current principal-agent model to formulate a new principal-agent model, in which the agent shows irrational behavior of reciprocity. The study indicates that, the optimal contract resulting from the current standard principal-agent model is not a state of Pareto optimality. The new model can bring higher level of profit. The study of integrating behavioral economics with current motivation theory can explain the formation of many featured cultures, especially the human-based management of companies in reciprocal environment.
Third, based on the basic assumption of reciprocity preference in behavioral economics, this thesis analyzes the effects of behavioral game among individuals. Evolutionary game theory is applied to study the evolutionary path from individual economic behavior to group economic behavior. The study shows that the behavioral gaming between individuals having reciprocity preferences can improve the economic interests of the two gaming parties. Further, there exists the evolutionary stable strategy transferring the group economic behavior from egoism to reciprocity. This study provides microeconomic theory basis for the construction of the harmonious society, that is, the construction of the harmonious society in a reciprocal environment can be divided into two levels: individual behavioral harmony and group behavioral harmony. Based on the individual behavioral harmony, with the application of evolutionary theory, the group behavior harmony and even the social behavior harmony can be accomplished. Consequently, the path evolutionary mechanism of constructing the harmonious society can be reasonably established and provides the microeconomic theory basis for the construction of the harmonious society.
Lastly, in this thesis structural equation modeling is applied to conduct empirical testing on R&D teams’technology innovation capacity in a reciprocal environment, reciprocity preference and its relevance to company performance, and the reciprocity of companies’core competitiveness. The results showed that, the reciprocity behavior among team members can effectively increase the centripetal force and cohesion of the team, as well as improving the team’s economic effect; The reciprocity motives and behaviors of employers can significantly increase the loyalty and efforts of their employees. The reciprocal management strategies of the employers, through reciprocal behaviors of the employees, can significantly improve the operational performance of their companies. The reciprocal preference can directly increase the stability of the employee’s psychological contract. With the transmitting mechanism of a series of management paths, the core competitiveness of the company can finally be improved. Therefore, the reciprocal preference should be implemented as a new management concept and as a new management action, and its motivation function on China’s company operations will be reflected in the future’s implementation strategies .
引文
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