美国证券市场信息披露制度研究
摘要
美国证券市场的成功在很大程度上归因于其成功的信息披露制度。本文以美国证券市场的信息披露制度为研究对象,在前人研究成果的基础上,建立了一个激励不同层次监管者行为的框架,将美国证券市场信息披露的各种机制纳入共同的理论分析框架进行系统研究,揭示其发展和演变的规律以及有益经验。具体来说,在纵向上,本文考察了美国证券市场信息披露制度的演变,从自发交易到以自律监管为主的交易所监管,再到以政府监管为主的全面监管,总结了每个阶段的特点和发展演变的规律;在横向上,分别对美国证券市场信息披露体系中的市场中介机构、自律组织、行政监管以及司法监管的作用空间进行了研究,揭示了其激励与约束机制以及各个组成部分之间的制约与合作。通过研究,本文认为:一国证券市场信息披露制度是诸多变量共同作用的结果,并处于一个动态的演变过程之中;特定的信息披露制度只能适应特定国家特定时期的需要。最后,本文通过考察中国证券市场信息披露制度的现状,结合美国的经验,为中国证券市场信息披露制度的发展提供了一些建议。
The U.S. security markets are the most vitality, most developed and effective security markets in the world. The success of the U.S. security markets mainly depends on its successful information disclosure institution. Even the mature U.S. security markets are not perfect, many problems and scandals show up these years, and the information disclosure system needs to be improved.Chinese security markets have started quite late; They are built based on the U.S. and other mature markets’experiences; we have not set up the information disclosure institution completely, that means Chinese information disclosure system still has much more areas to be improved. Then, researching on the U.S. security markets, gathering their successful experiences and learning from their lost means a lot for developing Chinese security markets, and it has important practical significance.
The problems of the information disclosure in the U.S. security markets have been focus problems in domestic and international economic circles. The previous researches just focus on the different directions of the U.S. security markets, and they did not put all the mechanisms in the same framework and analysised systemically. This disserttation puts all of the independent information disclosure theories together, builds new theoretical framework, and uses this new framework into the research of the information disclosure in the U.S. security markets.
According to the research of historical evolution of the U.S. security markets’information disclosure institution,we investigate on the entire U.S. security markets mechanisms, research on how to open out their information disclosure system, and acquire the development evolution experience of U.S. markets to provide several theoretical draws for Chinese security markets to build up our own information disclosure system .
This dissertation discusses the U.S. security markets from its information disclosure system based on its groundwork, reviews the evolution of theoretical research and logic, elaborates on how the disclosure of information monitor issue; then this article also discusses the various components of the incentive and restraint mechanisms, their respective comparative advantages, and proves that the coordination and cooperation between mechanisms is a key component of the information disclosure institution.
Then, it discusses the setting up and evolution process of the U.S. security markets’information disclosure system by using case study and historical analysis. Through the combination analysis of the historical evolution and current situation, this article proves that the information disclosure system is the outcome of a good many variables’interactions; and it is always in a dynamic process of evolution. The U.S. security markets’information disclosure institution influences by its developed situation, legal environment, traditional system, government power and some other factors; that’s why it is always in a dynamic process of evolution, and the special standard suits for special period.
For the current point of view of the information disclosure system in the U.S. security markets, it is made up of agency organizations, Self-regulatory organizations, administrative supervision and judicial supervision. It shows as multi-level Principal-agent relationships. Author investigates each part of the information disclosure system, researches on how the motivation and restriction functions work, this paper also compares the competitive advantages of each one, then according to the theoretical framework we discuss in front, the author deeply investigates how to motivate the different types of monitors to bring out their competitive advantages to achieve the goal of monitoring.
For the agency organizations, they are the information agents of the vast number of investors, and play the extremely important role of“goalkeeper”. Under the current U.S. monitoring institution, in one hand agency organizations work for the shareholders to maximize their profits, on the other hand they are the level which are the closest level to the markets and work for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC). As companies for profits,they set up their own target index, their target is against their clients’benefits; when they solve the adverse selection and moral risk problems in the security markets, they have to face the moral risks themselves.
Research on the agency organizations is discussed around the following topics: firstly, to design a combined mechanisms with monitoring and motivation, the purposes of the combined mechanisms are enduing power and motivate the“goalkeeper”to protect investors’benefits. Secondly, set up the responsibility standards, it pushes the“goalkeeper”to perform their duty.
The Self-regulating Organizations help the U.S. security markets to reduce the trading cost on the information disclosure process and offer market reputation mechanisms and competition mechanisms; also they help on guarantee the quality of stock exchange. The historical evolution of self-regulating organizations in the U.S. security markets indicates that: in the beginning period of the developing market, due to the size of the markets is quite small and the trade is very simple the information disclosure asymmetric problem is not seriously as it seen at present, therefore the monitor on information disclosure is mainly based on self-regulation of stock exchange. But this monitor method only gives the internal limited restrictions but do not give the shareholders more power, so this leaves the necessary space for the government monitoring.
Compared with the agency organizations and self-regulating organizations, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the competitive advantage on administrative supervision and its motivation and restriction is different; that is why the action of administrative enforcement of law provide important stock information to different types of investors; meanwhile, it enhances the transparency of the security markets and enhances the confidence in the market. But the administrative supervision faces information limitation, the government administrative supervision is not perfect; therefore the administrative supervision must work with agency organization of market, self-regulation organization and judicial supervision to keep the balance of the markets.
About the security markets information asymmetry problem, government aims to build up strong relevant motivations to disclose the important information which helps investors to make investment decision. To make the administrative supervision work smoothly, it has to stand at the independent position which has independence from other government departments that could avoid the independent department influenced by some benefit groups. The rich experiences of legal enforcement could make the department perform its duty easily. More important point is, the power of administrative supervision must be strictly controlled by administrative process.
The judicial supervision is the last defense of information disclosure system and it is chief complementarily to the administrative supervision. Because the administrative supervision is influenced by budget, the officers could be seized by the special benefit groups or their personal benefit, their judge will not fair to all the parties. The main purposes of legal supervision are: firstly, to stop the illegal disclosure of information. Secondly, to compensate for the investors who loss money due to illegal information disclosure action.
All in all, through the research on the information disclosure in the U.S. security markets we find out that, the seriously incompletely and asymmetry of information is the key problem of the security markets. In the markets, government is on the leader position of the system, the self-regulating organizations are on the forward position of the mandarkets, they are under the control of government and self-regulate the markets; the agency organiations play the role of monitor and verify the information disclosed by enterprises, their professional services are the first protection barrier of the information disclosure institution in the security market . The excellent operation of the information disclosure system depends on this: the government builds up the favorable frameworkrnment, promotes the mechanisms with competitive advantages and achieves the common target. Last but not least, based on the experiences gathering from the information disclosure of U.S. security markets provides several constructive suggestions to China.
The U.S. security markets are the most vitality, most developed and effective security markets in the world. The success of the U.S. security markets mainly depends on its successful information disclosure institution. Even the mature U.S. security markets are not perfect, many problems and scandals show up these years, and the information disclosure system needs to be improved.Chinese security markets have started quite late; They are built based on the U.S. and other mature markets’experiences; we have not set up the information disclosure institution completely, that means Chinese information disclosure system still has much more areas to be improved. Then, researching on the U.S. security markets, gathering their successful experiences and learning from their lost means a lot for developing Chinese security markets, and it has important practical significance.
The problems of the information disclosure in the U.S. security markets have been focus problems in domestic and international economic circles. The previous researches just focus on the different directions of the U.S. security markets, and they did not put all the mechanisms in the same framework and analysised systemically. This disserttation puts all of the independent information disclosure theories together, builds new theoretical framework, and uses this new framework into the research of the information disclosure in the U.S. security markets.
According to the research of historical evolution of the U.S. security markets’information disclosure institution,we investigate on the entire U.S. security markets mechanisms, research on how to open out their information disclosure system, and acquire the development evolution experience of U.S. markets to provide several theoretical draws for Chinese security markets to build up our own information disclosure system .
This dissertation discusses the U.S. security markets from its information disclosure system based on its groundwork, reviews the evolution of theoretical research and logic, elaborates on how the disclosure of information monitor issue; then this article also discusses the various components of the incentive and restraint mechanisms, their respective comparative advantages, and proves that the coordination and cooperation between mechanisms is a key component of the information disclosure institution.
Then, it discusses the setting up and evolution process of the U.S. security markets’information disclosure system by using case study and historical analysis. Through the combination analysis of the historical evolution and current situation, this article proves that the information disclosure system is the outcome of a good many variables’interactions; and it is always in a dynamic process of evolution. The U.S. security markets’information disclosure institution influences by its developed situation, legal environment, traditional system, government power and some other factors; that’s why it is always in a dynamic process of evolution, and the special standard suits for special period.
For the current point of view of the information disclosure system in the U.S. security markets, it is made up of agency organizations, Self-regulatory organizations, administrative supervision and judicial supervision. It shows as multi-level Principal-agent relationships. Author investigates each part of the information disclosure system, researches on how the motivation and restriction functions work, this paper also compares the competitive advantages of each one, then according to the theoretical framework we discuss in front, the author deeply investigates how to motivate the different types of monitors to bring out their competitive advantages to achieve the goal of monitoring.
For the agency organizations, they are the information agents of the vast number of investors, and play the extremely important role of“goalkeeper”. Under the current U.S. monitoring institution, in one hand agency organizations work for the shareholders to maximize their profits, on the other hand they are the level which are the closest level to the markets and work for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC). As companies for profits,they set up their own target index, their target is against their clients’benefits; when they solve the adverse selection and moral risk problems in the security markets, they have to face the moral risks themselves.
Research on the agency organizations is discussed around the following topics: firstly, to design a combined mechanisms with monitoring and motivation, the purposes of the combined mechanisms are enduing power and motivate the“goalkeeper”to protect investors’benefits. Secondly, set up the responsibility standards, it pushes the“goalkeeper”to perform their duty.
The Self-regulating Organizations help the U.S. security markets to reduce the trading cost on the information disclosure process and offer market reputation mechanisms and competition mechanisms; also they help on guarantee the quality of stock exchange. The historical evolution of self-regulating organizations in the U.S. security markets indicates that: in the beginning period of the developing market, due to the size of the markets is quite small and the trade is very simple the information disclosure asymmetric problem is not seriously as it seen at present, therefore the monitor on information disclosure is mainly based on self-regulation of stock exchange. But this monitor method only gives the internal limited restrictions but do not give the shareholders more power, so this leaves the necessary space for the government monitoring.
Compared with the agency organizations and self-regulating organizations, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the competitive advantage on administrative supervision and its motivation and restriction is different; that is why the action of administrative enforcement of law provide important stock information to different types of investors; meanwhile, it enhances the transparency of the security markets and enhances the confidence in the market. But the administrative supervision faces information limitation, the government administrative supervision is not perfect; therefore the administrative supervision must work with agency organization of market, self-regulation organization and judicial supervision to keep the balance of the markets.
About the security markets information asymmetry problem, government aims to build up strong relevant motivations to disclose the important information which helps investors to make investment decision. To make the administrative supervision work smoothly, it has to stand at the independent position which has independence from other government departments that could avoid the independent department influenced by some benefit groups. The rich experiences of legal enforcement could make the department perform its duty easily. More important point is, the power of administrative supervision must be strictly controlled by administrative process.
The judicial supervision is the last defense of information disclosure system and it is chief complementarily to the administrative supervision. Because the administrative supervision is influenced by budget, the officers could be seized by the special benefit groups or their personal benefit, their judge will not fair to all the parties. The main purposes of legal supervision are: firstly, to stop the illegal disclosure of information. Secondly, to compensate for the investors who loss money due to illegal information disclosure action.
All in all, through the research on the information disclosure in the U.S. security markets we find out that, the seriously incompletely and asymmetry of information is the key problem of the security markets. In the markets, government is on the leader position of the system, the self-regulating organizations are on the forward position of the mandarkets, they are under the control of government and self-regulate the markets; the agency organiations play the role of monitor and verify the information disclosed by enterprises, their professional services are the first protection barrier of the information disclosure institution in the security market . The excellent operation of the information disclosure system depends on this: the government builds up the favorable frameworkrnment, promotes the mechanisms with competitive advantages and achieves the common target. Last but not least, based on the experiences gathering from the information disclosure of U.S. security markets provides several constructive suggestions to China.
引文
①参见Douglas William O.Protecting the Investor[J].Yale Rev.1934,23:521.
②转引自Loss Louis.Fundamentals of Securities Regulation[M].Boston:Little, Brown & Company, 1988:28.
①Ball R, Brown P.An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers[J].Journal of Accounting Research, 1968,6:159-178.
①See Coffee John C Jr.Market Failure and the Ecomnomic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System[J]. Virginia Law Review,1984,70:,717-722.
①Newbery v.Garland,31 Barb.121,129—30(N.Y.App.Div.1860).
②Kentucky Laws 1829—30,c. 275,§9.
③Tennessee Laws 1831,c.5,§10.
④参见戈登约翰S.《伟大的博弈:华尔街金融帝国的崛起(1653-2004)》.北京:中信出版社, 2005: 115-138.
⑤1838年,在Moffat诉Winslow案中,证券购买者起诉证券卖出者,要求废除股票买卖合同。这个起诉被纽约的大法官Cancellor驳回。他认为作假的是公司管理者。这个判例明确了公司管理者作为信息披露责任人的地位。参见Moffat V.Winslow,7 Paige Ch.124,129-130(N.Y.Ch.1938).
⑥Werner Walter,Smith Steven.Wall Street[M].New York: Columbia University Press, 1991:91-190.
①Banner Stuart.Anglo-American Securities Regulation:Cultural and Political Roots, 1690-1860[M]. New York:Cambridge University Press,1998:264-267.
②See Michie R C.The London and New York Stock Exchanges,1850-1914[M].London:Allen &Unwin, 1987:196-198.
①See Michie R C.The London and New York Stock Exchanges,1850-1914[M].London:Allen &Unwin, 1987:198.
②Shultz Birl E.Stock Exchange Procedure.New York:New York Stock Exchange Institute, 1936:17.
③Pujo Committee Report.Report of Committee Appointed Pursuant to House to Resolution 429 and 504 to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit[R]. 62 Cong.,3 Sess.,No.1593, 1913:37.
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⑥Michie R C.The London and New York Stock Exchanges,1850-1914[M].London:Allen &Unwin, 1987: 170, Table 6.2.
⑦US Congessional House Committee.Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit[R].1913:115.
①Parrish Michael E.Securities Regulation and the New Deal[M].New Haven,Conn.: Yale University press,1970:21-30.
②Nash Gerald D.Government and Business : A Case Study of State Regulation of Corporate Securities , 1850– 1933[J].Business History Review, 1964,38:148—150.
③Macey Jonathan R, Miller Geoffrey P.Origin of the Blue Sky Laws[J].Texas Law Review, 1991, 70:361.
①See Hall v. Geiger– Jones Co.,242 U.S.539,1917.
①其他几部法律是《1935年公用控股公司法》、《1939年信托契约法》、《1940年投资顾问法》以及《1940年信托公司法》。
②See The Investor's Advocate:How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation[EB/OL].(2008-05-05)[2008-06-08]. http://www.sec.gov/about/ whatwedo.shtml#org.
②Sobel Robert. NYSE :a History of the New York Stock Exchange, 1935-1975[M]. NewYork: Weybright and Talley, 1975:44.
③Seligman Joel.The Transformation of Wall Street:A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance[M].Boston:Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982: 185.
①表格S-3和表格F-3仅适用于证券被广泛交易的发行人,其中F-3供外国发行人使用。
②《1933年证券法》和《1934年证券交易法》实施以后,州《蓝天法》和州对信息披露的行政监管依然存在,形成了重复监管的体制。
③Wielgos. v. Commonwealth Edison.Co.892.F.2d 518(7th.Cir,1989).
①参见Levitt A.Renewing the Govenant with investors.Speech at The New York University Center for Law and Business.New York,May 10,2000.
①参见Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,407, at 83,174-83,175 n.20 (S.E.C. 1972).
②参见ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR-7-102(B)(I)(1974).
③参见Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,124 (SEC 1979).
④Commerce and Trade-15 United States Code Section 7245 (2006). Rules of professional responsibility for attorneys[EB/OL].(2005-01-03)[2006-04-02] http:// law.onecle. com/uscode/ 15/7245. html.
⑤同上。
①Commerce and Trade-15 United States Code Section 7245 (2006). Rules of professional responsibility for attorneys[EB/OL].(2005-01-03)[2006-04-02] http:// law.onecle. com/uscode/ 15/7245. html.
②美国联邦法规(Code of Federal Regulation),17 C.F.R.§205.3(b)(1)[EB/OL]. (2007-03-04) [2008-02-01]. http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2007/aprqtr/pdf/17cfr205.3.pdf
①参见Choi Stephen J, Fisch Jill E.How to Fix Wall Street:A Voucher Financial Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, Yale L.J.,2003,113:269.
②参见Coffee John C. The Professions and Corporate Governance[M].Oxford;New York: Oxford University Press,2006:341-342.
①参见Duyn Aline Van.Big Three Learn Lessons from Enron[N].Financial Times,2002-05-27(4).
①参见美国联邦法规(Code of Federal Regulation),17 CFR243. 100(b)(2)[EB/OL]. (2005-03-02) [2007-05-01].http://www.law.cornell. edu/cfr/cfr.php?title=17&type=chapter&value=2.
①参见美国联邦法规(Code of Federal Regulation),17 CFR Parts 240 and 249b [Release No. 34-55857; File No. S7-04-07] RIN 3235-AJ78. http://www.law.cornell. edu/cfr/cfr. php?title= 17&type= chapter&value=2.
①参见The Association for Financial Professionals(AFP).2004 Credit Rating Agencies Survey,Report of Survey Results[R/OL].(2004-1-20)[2007-03-12]. http://www.afponline.org/pub/pdf/ 2004_10_research_cra_report.pdf.
①See Securities Exchange Act of 1934.Section 19—Regulation,Resposiblities and Oversight of Self-Regulatory Organizations.
②斯蒂格利茨约瑟夫.道德风险与非市场机构:非功能性挤出或者同业监督[G]//斯蒂格利茨约瑟夫.斯蒂格利茨经济学文集第一卷(下).北京:中国金融出版社,2007:501.
①斯蒂格利茨约瑟夫.道德风险与非市场机构:非功能性挤出或者同业监督[G]//斯蒂格利茨约瑟夫.斯蒂格利茨经济学文集第一卷(下).北京:中国金融出版社,2007:501.
②Werner Walter , Smith Steven.Wall Street[G] .New York: Columbia University Press, 1991:26.
①Cain Karessa.Survey:New Effort to Strengthen Corporate Governance:Why Use SRO Listing Standards[J].Clumbia Business Law Review,2003:658-659.
①郑顺炎,卢文道,陈洁,等.实现自律监管与行政监管有机结合[N].中国证券报,2003-02-20(10).
②Section 19(b) and (c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.§§78s(b)-(c).
③Commerce and Trade - 15 USC Section 78s.Registration, responsibilities, and oversight of self-regulatory organizations(h).United States Code. [EB/OL]. (2005-03-01) [2007-09-08]. http://law.onecle.com/uscode/15/78s.html.
④Commerce and Trade - 15 USC Section 78f. National securities exchanges. United States Code. [EB/OL]. (2005-03-01) [2007-09-08]. http://law.onecle.com/uscode/15/78s.html.
①哈森托马斯李.证券法[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,2003:382.
②Technical Committee of International Organization of Securities Commissions(IOSCO). Issues Paper on Exchange Demutualization[R/OL].(2001-06-01) [2007-07-10].http://www.iosco.org/ library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD119.pdf
③Securities Exchange Act Release No. 40760 63, Fed. Reg. 70844 (8 December 1998); at 70848, 70883. (22 December 1998).
①参见纽约泛欧交易所集团宣布收购美国证券交易所(EB/OL). (2008-01-17) [2008-05-10]. http:// www. nyse.com/audience/china.html.
②Grasso Richard A.Testimony of Richard A. Grasso Before the Senate banking Commission[EB/OL]. (1999-09 -28) [2002-03-13].http://www.nyse.com/speech/NT0002458E.html>.
①以上有关数据来自纽约证券交易所网站,http://www.nyse.com/.
②See The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.NASDAQ Completes OMX Transaction to Become The NASDAQ OMX Group,Inc.,2008 Presse leases[EB/OL].(2008-04-27)[2008-06-10].http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/ news/newsroomnewsStory.aspx?textpath=pr2008\ACQPMZ200802271111PRIMZONEFULLFEED137207.htm&year=02/27/2008%2011%3a11AM.
①Davis Thad A.A New Model of Securities Law Enforcement[J]. Cumberland Law Review, 2001-2002, 32:74.
①US Securities and Exchange Commission .2007 Performance and Accountability report(R/OL). (2006-09-30)[2008-04-14]http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2007.shtml.
①SEC v. Management Dynamics,515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975).
②授权的法规包括:《1933年证券法》第20(a),《1934年证券交易法》第21(a),《1935年公共设施控股公司法》第18(a),《1939年信托债券法》第321(a),《1940年投资公司法》第42(a),《1940年投资顾问法》第209(a)以及《2002年萨班斯—奥克斯利法案》。
③参见《1933年证券法》第20(b),类似的条款参见1934年《证券交易法》、《1935年公共控股公司法》、《1939年信托契约法》、《1940年投资公司法》、《1940年投资顾问法》以及《2002年萨班斯—奥克斯利法案》。
①Levitt Arthur.A Question of Integrity:Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading(EB/OL).(1998-04-27)[2005-05-10].http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch202.txt.
①See Eichler Bateman.Hill Richards,Inc.v.Berner,472U.S.299(1985).
①参见黄振中.美国证券法上的民事责任研究(D).北京:对外经济贸易大学,2000:107.
①NERA .NERA Economic Consulting Releases Year End Report on Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation (R/OL).(2007-12-21) [2008-03-03]. http://www.nera.com/PressRelease. asp?pr_ID=3367.
②See DaviesPaul.Class-Action Pay Settlements Soar.Wall Street Journal,2006-04-07(C-3).
③同注①。
④同注①。
⑤Cornerstone.Securities Class Action Case Filings 2007: A Year in Review(R/OL). (2008-01 -03) [2008-03-01]. http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/ 2007_YIR/ 20080103-01. pdf.
①NERA.Sharehlder Class Action Settlement Expected to set Record Highs in 2005, driven in part by $6.1 billion record-breaking worldcom settlement [R/OL].(2005-07-18)[2007-06-08]. http://www. nera.com/ PressRelease.asp?pr_ID=2543.
②贝斯纳约翰H,绍斯马太,米勒杰西卡戴维森.集团诉讼中的律师:私人检察官抑或私利牟取者?.金陵法律评论,2006(1): 147.
③同上。
①参见中国上市公司市值管理研究中心和北京鹿苑天闻投资顾问有限公司.2007年中国上市公司市值年度报告(R/OL).(2008-01-10)[2008-01-30]. http://www.cnstock.com/gsbd/ 06gsyj/ 2008- 01/10/ content 2924452.htm.
②《证券法》于1998年12月29日通过,1999年7月1日起施行,修订稿于2005年10月27日通过,2006年1月1日起施行。
③《公司法》于1993年12月29日通过,1994年7月1日起施行,修订稿于2005年10月27日通过,2006年1月1日起施行。
①参见《注册会计师法》第二十五条、第三十五条、第三十九条、第四十条、第四十二条。
②参见《证券法》第二百二十六条。
③参见《中国注册会计师协会章程》第二十四条。
④参见《律师事务所从事证券法律业务管理办法》第二条。
①参见《律师从事证券法律业务规范(试行)》第37条。
②Commerce and Trade - 15 USC Section 7245.Rules of professional responsibility for attorneys. United States Code. [EB/OL]. (2005-03-01) [2007-09-08]. http://law.onecle.com/uscode/15/ 7245. html.
①中国证券监督管理委员会.中国资本市场发展报告[R].北京:中国金融出版社,2008:85.
②中国证券监督管理委员会.中国资本市场发展报告[R].北京:中国金融出版社,2008:85-86.
①吴晓锋.继虚假陈述之后内幕交易操纵市场民事赔偿案件呼之欲出.法制日报,2007-11-18(11).
②《关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事赔偿案件的若干规定》第六条。
①《最高人民法院关于审理涉及会计师事务所在审计业务活动中民事侵权赔偿案件的若干规定》第四条。
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[11] CHOI STEPHEN J.The Evidence on Securities Class Actions[EB/OL]. (2004-04-07) [2008-03-10]. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=528145.
[12] COHEN DANIAL A,DEY AIYESHA, LYS THOMAS Z.Trends in Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods [EB/OL]. (2004-01-09)[2008-03-11]. http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers. cfm?abstract_id=658782&rec=1&srcabs=475163.
[13] COHEN DANIAL A,DEY AIYESHA,LYS THOMAS Z.Trends in Earnings Management and Informativeness of Earnings Announcementsin the Pre- and Post– Sarbanes-Oxley Periods[EB/OL]. (2004-01-09) [2005-02-03].http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id_658782.
[14] GKANTINIS STAVROS.Regulation and Innovation:Comparing U.S. and European Equity Trading Markets[EB/OL].(2006-03-05)[2008-03-11]. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=887645.
[15] HELLAND ERIC.A Secondary Market Test of the Merits of Class Action Securities Litigation:Evidence from the Reputation of Corporate Directors[EB/OL]. (2004-03-17) [2008-04-10]. http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=517183&rec=1&srcabs=528145.
[16] JACKSON HOWELL.Variation In The Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence And Potential Implications[EB/OL]. (2005-08-18) [2007-08-23].http://ssrn.com abstract=839250.
[17] JORDAN CALLY, HUGHES PAMELA.Which Way for Market Institutions: the Fundamental Question of Self-regulation[EB/OL]. (2008-05-20) [2008-07-18].http://papers.ssrn.com/so l3/ papers. cfm?a bstract _id=977340.
[18] LANGEVOORT DONALD C.Deconstructing Sction 11:Offering Liability in a Continuous Disclosure Environment [EB/OL]. (2000-01-12)[2008-04-19]. http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers. cfm? Abstract _id=194752.
[19] RAPPEPOR ALAN.Hoping D&O Will CYA[EB/OL].(2007-04-23) [2008-03-04]. http://cfo.com/ article.cfm/9061994?f=related.
[20] THAKOR ANJAN V.The Unintended Consequences of Securities Litigation(EB/OL).(2005-10-26)[2008-10-05].http://www.Heartland. org/custom/semod_policybot/pdf/18330.pdf.
[21] The Association For Financial Professiona.ls Rating Agencies Survey: Accuracy, Timeliness, and Regulation,Report of Survey Results[R/OL].2002-09.[2002-12-18].http://www.AFPonline.org/reprints.
[22] WATTS R,ZIMMERMAN J.The Markets for Independence and Independent Auditors[EB/OL].https://dspace.lld.rochester.edu/retrieve/12129/Watts_Zimmerman_MarketsIndp.pdf.
[23] ZHANG IVY XIYING.Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [EB/OL]. (2007-04-08)[2007-05-10].http://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=961964.
②转引自Loss Louis.Fundamentals of Securities Regulation[M].Boston:Little, Brown & Company, 1988:28.
①Ball R, Brown P.An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers[J].Journal of Accounting Research, 1968,6:159-178.
①See Coffee John C Jr.Market Failure and the Ecomnomic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System[J]. Virginia Law Review,1984,70:,717-722.
①Newbery v.Garland,31 Barb.121,129—30(N.Y.App.Div.1860).
②Kentucky Laws 1829—30,c. 275,§9.
③Tennessee Laws 1831,c.5,§10.
④参见戈登约翰S.《伟大的博弈:华尔街金融帝国的崛起(1653-2004)》.北京:中信出版社, 2005: 115-138.
⑤1838年,在Moffat诉Winslow案中,证券购买者起诉证券卖出者,要求废除股票买卖合同。这个起诉被纽约的大法官Cancellor驳回。他认为作假的是公司管理者。这个判例明确了公司管理者作为信息披露责任人的地位。参见Moffat V.Winslow,7 Paige Ch.124,129-130(N.Y.Ch.1938).
⑥Werner Walter,Smith Steven.Wall Street[M].New York: Columbia University Press, 1991:91-190.
①Banner Stuart.Anglo-American Securities Regulation:Cultural and Political Roots, 1690-1860[M]. New York:Cambridge University Press,1998:264-267.
②See Michie R C.The London and New York Stock Exchanges,1850-1914[M].London:Allen &Unwin, 1987:196-198.
①See Michie R C.The London and New York Stock Exchanges,1850-1914[M].London:Allen &Unwin, 1987:198.
②Shultz Birl E.Stock Exchange Procedure.New York:New York Stock Exchange Institute, 1936:17.
③Pujo Committee Report.Report of Committee Appointed Pursuant to House to Resolution 429 and 504 to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit[R]. 62 Cong.,3 Sess.,No.1593, 1913:37.
④Ripley.Main Street and Wall Street[M].Boston: Little Brown & Co.,1927:187.
⑤May George O.Corporate Publicity and the Auditor[J].Journal of Accountancy,1926, 42:322.
⑥Michie R C.The London and New York Stock Exchanges,1850-1914[M].London:Allen &Unwin, 1987: 170, Table 6.2.
⑦US Congessional House Committee.Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit[R].1913:115.
①Parrish Michael E.Securities Regulation and the New Deal[M].New Haven,Conn.: Yale University press,1970:21-30.
②Nash Gerald D.Government and Business : A Case Study of State Regulation of Corporate Securities , 1850– 1933[J].Business History Review, 1964,38:148—150.
③Macey Jonathan R, Miller Geoffrey P.Origin of the Blue Sky Laws[J].Texas Law Review, 1991, 70:361.
①See Hall v. Geiger– Jones Co.,242 U.S.539,1917.
①其他几部法律是《1935年公用控股公司法》、《1939年信托契约法》、《1940年投资顾问法》以及《1940年信托公司法》。
②See The Investor's Advocate:How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation[EB/OL].(2008-05-05)[2008-06-08]. http://www.sec.gov/about/ whatwedo.shtml#org.
②Sobel Robert. NYSE :a History of the New York Stock Exchange, 1935-1975[M]. NewYork: Weybright and Talley, 1975:44.
③Seligman Joel.The Transformation of Wall Street:A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance[M].Boston:Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982: 185.
①表格S-3和表格F-3仅适用于证券被广泛交易的发行人,其中F-3供外国发行人使用。
②《1933年证券法》和《1934年证券交易法》实施以后,州《蓝天法》和州对信息披露的行政监管依然存在,形成了重复监管的体制。
③Wielgos. v. Commonwealth Edison.Co.892.F.2d 518(7th.Cir,1989).
①参见Levitt A.Renewing the Govenant with investors.Speech at The New York University Center for Law and Business.New York,May 10,2000.
①参见Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,407, at 83,174-83,175 n.20 (S.E.C. 1972).
②参见ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR-7-102(B)(I)(1974).
③参见Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,124 (SEC 1979).
④Commerce and Trade-15 United States Code Section 7245 (2006). Rules of professional responsibility for attorneys[EB/OL].(2005-01-03)[2006-04-02] http:// law.onecle. com/uscode/ 15/7245. html.
⑤同上。
①Commerce and Trade-15 United States Code Section 7245 (2006). Rules of professional responsibility for attorneys[EB/OL].(2005-01-03)[2006-04-02] http:// law.onecle. com/uscode/ 15/7245. html.
②美国联邦法规(Code of Federal Regulation),17 C.F.R.§205.3(b)(1)[EB/OL]. (2007-03-04) [2008-02-01]. http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2007/aprqtr/pdf/17cfr205.3.pdf
①参见Choi Stephen J, Fisch Jill E.How to Fix Wall Street:A Voucher Financial Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, Yale L.J.,2003,113:269.
②参见Coffee John C. The Professions and Corporate Governance[M].Oxford;New York: Oxford University Press,2006:341-342.
①参见Duyn Aline Van.Big Three Learn Lessons from Enron[N].Financial Times,2002-05-27(4).
①参见美国联邦法规(Code of Federal Regulation),17 CFR243. 100(b)(2)[EB/OL]. (2005-03-02) [2007-05-01].http://www.law.cornell. edu/cfr/cfr.php?title=17&type=chapter&value=2.
①参见美国联邦法规(Code of Federal Regulation),17 CFR Parts 240 and 249b [Release No. 34-55857; File No. S7-04-07] RIN 3235-AJ78. http://www.law.cornell. edu/cfr/cfr. php?title= 17&type= chapter&value=2.
①参见The Association for Financial Professionals(AFP).2004 Credit Rating Agencies Survey,Report of Survey Results[R/OL].(2004-1-20)[2007-03-12]. http://www.afponline.org/pub/pdf/ 2004_10_research_cra_report.pdf.
①See Securities Exchange Act of 1934.Section 19—Regulation,Resposiblities and Oversight of Self-Regulatory Organizations.
②斯蒂格利茨约瑟夫.道德风险与非市场机构:非功能性挤出或者同业监督[G]//斯蒂格利茨约瑟夫.斯蒂格利茨经济学文集第一卷(下).北京:中国金融出版社,2007:501.
①斯蒂格利茨约瑟夫.道德风险与非市场机构:非功能性挤出或者同业监督[G]//斯蒂格利茨约瑟夫.斯蒂格利茨经济学文集第一卷(下).北京:中国金融出版社,2007:501.
②Werner Walter , Smith Steven.Wall Street[G] .New York: Columbia University Press, 1991:26.
①Cain Karessa.Survey:New Effort to Strengthen Corporate Governance:Why Use SRO Listing Standards[J].Clumbia Business Law Review,2003:658-659.
①郑顺炎,卢文道,陈洁,等.实现自律监管与行政监管有机结合[N].中国证券报,2003-02-20(10).
②Section 19(b) and (c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.§§78s(b)-(c).
③Commerce and Trade - 15 USC Section 78s.Registration, responsibilities, and oversight of self-regulatory organizations(h).United States Code. [EB/OL]. (2005-03-01) [2007-09-08]. http://law.onecle.com/uscode/15/78s.html.
④Commerce and Trade - 15 USC Section 78f. National securities exchanges. United States Code. [EB/OL]. (2005-03-01) [2007-09-08]. http://law.onecle.com/uscode/15/78s.html.
①哈森托马斯李.证券法[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,2003:382.
②Technical Committee of International Organization of Securities Commissions(IOSCO). Issues Paper on Exchange Demutualization[R/OL].(2001-06-01) [2007-07-10].http://www.iosco.org/ library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD119.pdf
③Securities Exchange Act Release No. 40760 63, Fed. Reg. 70844 (8 December 1998); at 70848, 70883. (22 December 1998).
①参见纽约泛欧交易所集团宣布收购美国证券交易所(EB/OL). (2008-01-17) [2008-05-10]. http:// www. nyse.com/audience/china.html.
②Grasso Richard A.Testimony of Richard A. Grasso Before the Senate banking Commission[EB/OL]. (1999-09 -28) [2002-03-13].http://www.nyse.com/speech/NT0002458E.html>.
①以上有关数据来自纽约证券交易所网站,http://www.nyse.com/.
②See The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.NASDAQ Completes OMX Transaction to Become The NASDAQ OMX Group,Inc.,2008 Presse leases[EB/OL].(2008-04-27)[2008-06-10].http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/ news/newsroomnewsStory.aspx?textpath=pr2008\ACQPMZ200802271111PRIMZONEFULLFEED137207.htm&year=02/27/2008%2011%3a11AM.
①Davis Thad A.A New Model of Securities Law Enforcement[J]. Cumberland Law Review, 2001-2002, 32:74.
①US Securities and Exchange Commission .2007 Performance and Accountability report(R/OL). (2006-09-30)[2008-04-14]http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2007.shtml.
①SEC v. Management Dynamics,515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975).
②授权的法规包括:《1933年证券法》第20(a),《1934年证券交易法》第21(a),《1935年公共设施控股公司法》第18(a),《1939年信托债券法》第321(a),《1940年投资公司法》第42(a),《1940年投资顾问法》第209(a)以及《2002年萨班斯—奥克斯利法案》。
③参见《1933年证券法》第20(b),类似的条款参见1934年《证券交易法》、《1935年公共控股公司法》、《1939年信托契约法》、《1940年投资公司法》、《1940年投资顾问法》以及《2002年萨班斯—奥克斯利法案》。
①Levitt Arthur.A Question of Integrity:Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading(EB/OL).(1998-04-27)[2005-05-10].http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch202.txt.
①See Eichler Bateman.Hill Richards,Inc.v.Berner,472U.S.299(1985).
①参见黄振中.美国证券法上的民事责任研究(D).北京:对外经济贸易大学,2000:107.
①NERA .NERA Economic Consulting Releases Year End Report on Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation (R/OL).(2007-12-21) [2008-03-03]. http://www.nera.com/PressRelease. asp?pr_ID=3367.
②See DaviesPaul.Class-Action Pay Settlements Soar.Wall Street Journal,2006-04-07(C-3).
③同注①。
④同注①。
⑤Cornerstone.Securities Class Action Case Filings 2007: A Year in Review(R/OL). (2008-01 -03) [2008-03-01]. http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/ 2007_YIR/ 20080103-01. pdf.
①NERA.Sharehlder Class Action Settlement Expected to set Record Highs in 2005, driven in part by $6.1 billion record-breaking worldcom settlement [R/OL].(2005-07-18)[2007-06-08]. http://www. nera.com/ PressRelease.asp?pr_ID=2543.
②贝斯纳约翰H,绍斯马太,米勒杰西卡戴维森.集团诉讼中的律师:私人检察官抑或私利牟取者?.金陵法律评论,2006(1): 147.
③同上。
①参见中国上市公司市值管理研究中心和北京鹿苑天闻投资顾问有限公司.2007年中国上市公司市值年度报告(R/OL).(2008-01-10)[2008-01-30]. http://www.cnstock.com/gsbd/ 06gsyj/ 2008- 01/10/ content 2924452.htm.
②《证券法》于1998年12月29日通过,1999年7月1日起施行,修订稿于2005年10月27日通过,2006年1月1日起施行。
③《公司法》于1993年12月29日通过,1994年7月1日起施行,修订稿于2005年10月27日通过,2006年1月1日起施行。
①参见《注册会计师法》第二十五条、第三十五条、第三十九条、第四十条、第四十二条。
②参见《证券法》第二百二十六条。
③参见《中国注册会计师协会章程》第二十四条。
④参见《律师事务所从事证券法律业务管理办法》第二条。
①参见《律师从事证券法律业务规范(试行)》第37条。
②Commerce and Trade - 15 USC Section 7245.Rules of professional responsibility for attorneys. United States Code. [EB/OL]. (2005-03-01) [2007-09-08]. http://law.onecle.com/uscode/15/ 7245. html.
①中国证券监督管理委员会.中国资本市场发展报告[R].北京:中国金融出版社,2008:85.
②中国证券监督管理委员会.中国资本市场发展报告[R].北京:中国金融出版社,2008:85-86.
①吴晓锋.继虚假陈述之后内幕交易操纵市场民事赔偿案件呼之欲出.法制日报,2007-11-18(11).
②《关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事赔偿案件的若干规定》第六条。
①《最高人民法院关于审理涉及会计师事务所在审计业务活动中民事侵权赔偿案件的若干规定》第四条。
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