企业并购反垄断审查比较研究
|
摘要
本文以中国反垄断法为视角,运用比较法的研究方法,充分借鉴和研读美国、欧盟成文法和判例法的司法判例及其执法实践,以期望为正确解读和适用中国反垄断法之相关术语及其法律规范提供有益参考。客观上,中国制定的反垄断法移植了欧美成熟的成文法,其所具有的先进性已毋庸质疑。但是,也必须看到作为经济立法的反垄断法,是以发达的市场经济为基础的。作为经济基础的市场竞争机制及其评估体系则是保障市场充分竞争和运行的前提,而反垄断法的根本目的和任务就是为实施此前提的法律手段。法律移植的作用已被举世公认,而大量移植西方发达国家,尤其是欧盟和美国法的法律术语和行文规范亦无可厚非。但是,基于我国目前社会主义初级阶段的市场经济体制,能否承载如此先进而抽象的法律规范则是不可回避的现实
正如马克思所言,经济基础决定上层建筑,而上层建筑又反作用于经济基础。作为上层建筑的反垄断法,在既缺乏完全市场经济基础及其经济学理论支撑,又尚无前例可循的情况下,国务院执法机构如何去执行反垄断审查则是本文要研究的根本目的。况且,鉴于反垄断法依法保护“国有经济占控制地位的关系国民经济命脉和国家安全的行业以及依法实施专营专卖的行业”的利益,至于在企业并购中的反垄断审查以何标准以及如何去落实,进而实现“预防和制止垄断行为,保护市场公平竞争,提高经济运行效率,维护消费者利益和社会公共利益,促进社会主义市场健康发展”的立法目的则是本文的研究意义。有鉴于此,笔者以中国执法机构的行政裁决为例,就反垄断法领域的基础法理依据、相关概念的界定以及适用要件等重点问题进行比较研究,本文将实体部分分为下列六章分别予以阐述。
第一章中国法律框架下并购的规制
此章主要依据中国现行有效的反垄断法及其相关法律、行政法规以及部门规章等,对并购概念的内涵与外延进行界定,并以此为法律依据并结合国内外的相关学术或学说进行分类,进而为下文展开分析与研究奠定基础。
第二章反垄断并购审查中相关市场界定
相关市场,是反垄断法学理中最为基础的概念之一,也是评价竞争的先决条件。因为只有界定了相关市场,即在特定的商品或者服务的产品范围和地域范围内,对相关企业的竞争行为进行评价后才能判定该行为是否产生阻碍或限制竞争的违法性后果,从而决定适用反垄断法予以规制。因此,分析和研读西方经济学的相关理论以及将该理论纳入到司法实践中的先例则可为抽象的法律规范的具体适用提供参考。
第三章反垄断法制度调整下的不竞争条款。
总体而言,企业并购的根本目的无非是整合资源、增强竞争优势,从而实现经济效益最大化。因此,诸如实现此目的首要方法则是保证彼此联合、共谋,首先不进行内部竞争,而是藉此有效阻击其他竞争对手。而作为首部美国制定的成文反垄断法,正是针对此类违法行为而指定的。对于不竞争条款的必要性与合法性,欧美执法机构及司法裁判创立和发展了系列原则和适用条件,并由此形成了形式和实质判断标准。相对于中国反垄断法的定性原则来明示列举法律禁止的垄断协议而言,欧美为弥补法律规范的僵滞而制定了系列指南则更加具有针对性和可操作性。而依目前现状,恰好为执行中国《反垄断法》而制定实施细则或司法解释提供了参照标准。
第四章、企业并购中反垄断审查的破产企业抗辩制度。
该制度首次创设于美国司法判例,是针对企业在并购中针对执法机构的反垄断审查而提出的有效抗辩制度。相对于倾向保护具有控制地位的国有企业而言,发达国家似乎更关注于通过维护完全竞争的市场机制来提高效率,促进经济发展。对于并购企业援引破产抗辩制度来获得反垄断审查的豁免,则非常谨慎。尽管司法裁判在衡平股东债权人以及当地社区就业等公共利益中酌情考量相关因素而准予抗辩,但是政府执法机构则更多地基于维护市场竞争秩序的考虑,从而制定了严格的适用条件以避免该并购损害竞争。目前,此制度尚未在中国《反垄断法》中得以正式确立。因此,对于此机制的研究对于弥补立法空白具有积极的意义。
第五章、中国贸易管制措施与国外反垄断的冲突。
如同大多数主要经济体一样,中国也是世界贸易组织的成员国。依据国际公法及世界贸易组织规则,即成员国有义务依据该规则,开放市场并促进自由贸易竞争。而事实上却是,由于缺乏统一的国际竞争法,各主要成员国包括中国依据其国内反垄断法针对国际卡特尔、跨国关购以及其他有关贸易管制措施而造成的限制竞争的行为,采取域外适用该国垄断法从而引起法律适用冲突。如何借鉴欧美国家的相关立法规定,在维护国内市场公平竞争的同时,又能尽量避免或减少冲突从而促进利用外资,则不失为双赢之举。并且随着史多的中国企业走向世界,如何应对外国反垄断法的审查,更有必要了解相关国家的法律规则,从而为企业家的并购交易提供可以预见的指南。
第六章、反垄断审查与国家安全。
国家安全审查制度的确立源于美国立法针对外资并购其本国企业而设立的且有别于反垄断审查的专门制度。而对于在《反垄断法》中,特别规定国家安全审查的制度的立法也不多见。众所周知,国家安全概念既无法律界定,又似乎太过宽泛,尤其是在企业并购的经济活动中显示了意识形态的阴影,由此使得法律固有的可预见性和透明性变得模糊起来,进而增加了企业并购成本,并为跨国并购者所诟病。有鉴于此,中国国务院最近颁布了关于《建立外国投资者并购境内企业安全审查制度》的通知,决定建立外国投资者并购境内企业安全审查部际联席会议制度,具体承担并购安全审查工作,并明确了并购安全审查的范围、内容、工作机制和程序。对于国外相关制度的比较研究,为中国立法和执法机构提供参考依据从而完善该制度,同时也更有助于并购企业了解和遵守规则。
This dissertation, by virtue of comparative law methodology, attempts to study and analyze the leading, precedent cases as well as the practice of enforcement agencies subject to the statutory, case laws of the United States and European Union for the purpose of providing some conducive reference to the interpretation and application of the relevant terms and legal norms of the Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China. There is no doubt about the sophisticated legislation of the Anti-monopoly Law of China even though, as matter of fact, it has followed & transplanted, to large extent, a number of statutory rules and provisions from the U.S and the EU. However, it's worthy to be noted that as an economic legislation, the anti-monopoly law depends greatly on the developed market economy. As the integral part of economic basis, the mechanism of competition of the market and its appraisal system are the prerequisite to safeguard the perfect competition and operation, which is to be implemented as the ultimate aim and target of the antitrust law. It has been well known world wide that the significance of transplant of law. As one of such means to introduce some of the terms and norms from the U.S. and EU legislations into China anti-monopoly law, it shall be unquestionable by all means. But the reality is unavoidable, i.e. whether or not the current socialist market economy mechanism is in consistency with the advanced and abstract legal rules.
Just as advocated by Karl Marx, the superstructure depends on the economic foundation and the latter is to interact with the former. Being part of the superstructure, in the absence of perfect market economic basis, the relevant economic theories as well as no precedent case to follow, how the enforcement agency of the State Council of the Peoples'Republic of China implement the scrutiny of anti-monopoly remains the top core of this dissertation. Furthermore, with a view of protection of "the industries in relation to national economic lifeblood, national security and the industries to which exclusive operation and sale are implemented subject to law with their dominance in terms of the state-owned economy ", how can the Anti-monopoly Law of China materialize the mission of " preventing & prohibiting monopoly conduct, protecting the market for competition, increasing efficiency of economic operation, safeguarding the interest of consumers and public interests, and enhancing sound development of the socialist market economy " in case no specific criteria is available to adopt in the scrutiny of anti-monopoly? With such in mind, the author determined to make thorough study, with comparative approach, on the exampling of some decisions made by the enforcement Agency of China with integration of fundamental jurisprudence, relevant definitions and the conditions of application etc in the field of anti-monopoly laws. Hereunder this dissertation is to be divided into five chapters to make analysis respectively in detail.
Chapter 1. Legal Frame Governing Merger and Acquisition in China
In this Chapter, the basic definition and type of the merger and acquisition have been classified in accordance with the positive laws in China as well as some doctrines from different jurisdictions, which are to be intended to lay a solid theoretical foundation for the entire analysis hereunder.
Chapter 2. The Definition and Classification of Relevant Market
Inter alia, as one of the fundamental concepts in the doctrine of antitrust law, the relevant market is the pre-condition to assess the outcome of competition. Where the relevant market is defined, i.e. within the specific products market and the geographic market, the impact created by the merger can be appraised whether or not it creates restraint or impedes the outcome of competition as illegal test to which the anti-monopoly law shall be applied accordingly. Hence, analysis of the related economic theory in the Western Countries and its adoption as part rules of law in the precedent case will undoubtedly provide a visual picture for the application of the abstract legal rules.
Chapter 3. Non-competition Clause
In general, the ultimate target of the mergers by the undertakings is to maximize the profit by consolidation of the resources and strengthen the market power for completion. Therefore in order to achieve such goal, it's essential to take any measures, including not limited to the chief means of consolidation or conspiracy in view of non-competition between the mergers, to strike other competitors. The statutory anti-trust law for the first time was passed in the United States against such kind of anticompetitive behavior. With respect to the rationale and legitimacy, a package of principles and application conditions has been established by enforcement agencies and the courts with which the procedural measurements and substantial criteria had been constituted eventually. In comparison with the qualitative rules to illustrate explicit monopolistic agreement which is prohibited by the Anti-monopoly Law of China, it seems that the package of principles and guidelines reformulated in the U.S. and EU are becoming more pertinent& operable, which is deemed as supplementary to improve the stagnated statutory code. As consequence, it may, to some extent, provide some conducive reference to the Chinese relevant authorities to prepare for either the guidelines or the judicial interpretation in case of need.
Chapter 4. The Failing Company Defense on Merger and Acquisition
The Failing Company Defense was established in the precedent case in the United States, which might be granted exemption from the antitrust review subject to given conditions of bankruptcy. Obviously comparing with the intended tendency to rather protect the dominant state-owned enterprises, the developed countries seem to focus more preferably on maintaining the perfect competition order so as to improve the efficiency and promote the economic development. Therefore upon citation of failing company defense by the mergers, the prudent caution shall be given duly. Irrespective of the due consideration was granted by the court, within its discretion, to the equity of weighing the shareholders, creditors and employment surrounding local community while affirming such defense, the enforcement Agency in the United States would rather construe all the pre-conditions in a strict way while taking a whole consideration of protection of the competition other than damage the competition by the proposed merger. Up to date, such kind of mechanism is not established. In view of the existing loophole in the legislation, it's of great significance to study this deeply.
Chapter 5. Conflict between Foreign Trade Control and Foreign Antitrust Law
China is also one of the Contracting Parties to the WTO as other leading economic communities. Pursuant to the public international law and WTO rules and protocols, the Member State is obliged to open its market and liberalize trade competition subject to the commitment made. Ironically as a paradox, in the absence of unified international competition law, most of the Member States including China extend extra-territory application of domestic antitrust law to the international cartels, cross border mergers and other conduct of foreign trade control, which may create anticompetitive outcome. As result of the extra-territory application, the conflicts of laws will inevitably take place. Evidently, the strategy of win-win supposed to be the best option in case China is able to attach more foreign investment by avoiding or lessening the conflicts while maintaining the perfect competition in the domestic market through drawing lesson from the various jurisdictions. With more and more Chinese enterprises going abroad to engage in merger and acquisition, the importance of guidance on the examination of antitrust in foreign countries are becoming increasingly recognized by the enterprisers
Chapter 6. The Antitrust Scrutiny and National Security on Merger and Acquisition
The review of national security was created in the United States upon approval of particular Act against the foreign merger with its domestic undertakings, which is different from the anti-trust review. Whereas it's also hardly to find a clause of national security scrutiny upon the proposed merger by the foreign investors. As it's well known that the concept of national security is too broad to be defined by the law. Without definition, by shadow of ideology, it does make the inherent foreseeability and transparency of the law to become ambiguous, which has been criticized & complained by many foreign investors. In consideration to the current status, the State Council of the PRC promulgated the latest Notice concerning the setup of the system of security review of the merger of the domestic enterprise by the foreign investors in which the Joint Conference of Intra-Minitries was established to implement the examination subject to the stipulated sphere, contents, mechanism and procedures. Other than complaint, the due recognition has to be given to this administrative regulation. At least, it enhanced the transparency of rule of law in China particularly for proposed merger by foreign investors.
正如马克思所言,经济基础决定上层建筑,而上层建筑又反作用于经济基础。作为上层建筑的反垄断法,在既缺乏完全市场经济基础及其经济学理论支撑,又尚无前例可循的情况下,国务院执法机构如何去执行反垄断审查则是本文要研究的根本目的。况且,鉴于反垄断法依法保护“国有经济占控制地位的关系国民经济命脉和国家安全的行业以及依法实施专营专卖的行业”的利益,至于在企业并购中的反垄断审查以何标准以及如何去落实,进而实现“预防和制止垄断行为,保护市场公平竞争,提高经济运行效率,维护消费者利益和社会公共利益,促进社会主义市场健康发展”的立法目的则是本文的研究意义。有鉴于此,笔者以中国执法机构的行政裁决为例,就反垄断法领域的基础法理依据、相关概念的界定以及适用要件等重点问题进行比较研究,本文将实体部分分为下列六章分别予以阐述。
第一章中国法律框架下并购的规制
此章主要依据中国现行有效的反垄断法及其相关法律、行政法规以及部门规章等,对并购概念的内涵与外延进行界定,并以此为法律依据并结合国内外的相关学术或学说进行分类,进而为下文展开分析与研究奠定基础。
第二章反垄断并购审查中相关市场界定
相关市场,是反垄断法学理中最为基础的概念之一,也是评价竞争的先决条件。因为只有界定了相关市场,即在特定的商品或者服务的产品范围和地域范围内,对相关企业的竞争行为进行评价后才能判定该行为是否产生阻碍或限制竞争的违法性后果,从而决定适用反垄断法予以规制。因此,分析和研读西方经济学的相关理论以及将该理论纳入到司法实践中的先例则可为抽象的法律规范的具体适用提供参考。
第三章反垄断法制度调整下的不竞争条款。
总体而言,企业并购的根本目的无非是整合资源、增强竞争优势,从而实现经济效益最大化。因此,诸如实现此目的首要方法则是保证彼此联合、共谋,首先不进行内部竞争,而是藉此有效阻击其他竞争对手。而作为首部美国制定的成文反垄断法,正是针对此类违法行为而指定的。对于不竞争条款的必要性与合法性,欧美执法机构及司法裁判创立和发展了系列原则和适用条件,并由此形成了形式和实质判断标准。相对于中国反垄断法的定性原则来明示列举法律禁止的垄断协议而言,欧美为弥补法律规范的僵滞而制定了系列指南则更加具有针对性和可操作性。而依目前现状,恰好为执行中国《反垄断法》而制定实施细则或司法解释提供了参照标准。
第四章、企业并购中反垄断审查的破产企业抗辩制度。
该制度首次创设于美国司法判例,是针对企业在并购中针对执法机构的反垄断审查而提出的有效抗辩制度。相对于倾向保护具有控制地位的国有企业而言,发达国家似乎更关注于通过维护完全竞争的市场机制来提高效率,促进经济发展。对于并购企业援引破产抗辩制度来获得反垄断审查的豁免,则非常谨慎。尽管司法裁判在衡平股东债权人以及当地社区就业等公共利益中酌情考量相关因素而准予抗辩,但是政府执法机构则更多地基于维护市场竞争秩序的考虑,从而制定了严格的适用条件以避免该并购损害竞争。目前,此制度尚未在中国《反垄断法》中得以正式确立。因此,对于此机制的研究对于弥补立法空白具有积极的意义。
第五章、中国贸易管制措施与国外反垄断的冲突。
如同大多数主要经济体一样,中国也是世界贸易组织的成员国。依据国际公法及世界贸易组织规则,即成员国有义务依据该规则,开放市场并促进自由贸易竞争。而事实上却是,由于缺乏统一的国际竞争法,各主要成员国包括中国依据其国内反垄断法针对国际卡特尔、跨国关购以及其他有关贸易管制措施而造成的限制竞争的行为,采取域外适用该国垄断法从而引起法律适用冲突。如何借鉴欧美国家的相关立法规定,在维护国内市场公平竞争的同时,又能尽量避免或减少冲突从而促进利用外资,则不失为双赢之举。并且随着史多的中国企业走向世界,如何应对外国反垄断法的审查,更有必要了解相关国家的法律规则,从而为企业家的并购交易提供可以预见的指南。
第六章、反垄断审查与国家安全。
国家安全审查制度的确立源于美国立法针对外资并购其本国企业而设立的且有别于反垄断审查的专门制度。而对于在《反垄断法》中,特别规定国家安全审查的制度的立法也不多见。众所周知,国家安全概念既无法律界定,又似乎太过宽泛,尤其是在企业并购的经济活动中显示了意识形态的阴影,由此使得法律固有的可预见性和透明性变得模糊起来,进而增加了企业并购成本,并为跨国并购者所诟病。有鉴于此,中国国务院最近颁布了关于《建立外国投资者并购境内企业安全审查制度》的通知,决定建立外国投资者并购境内企业安全审查部际联席会议制度,具体承担并购安全审查工作,并明确了并购安全审查的范围、内容、工作机制和程序。对于国外相关制度的比较研究,为中国立法和执法机构提供参考依据从而完善该制度,同时也更有助于并购企业了解和遵守规则。
This dissertation, by virtue of comparative law methodology, attempts to study and analyze the leading, precedent cases as well as the practice of enforcement agencies subject to the statutory, case laws of the United States and European Union for the purpose of providing some conducive reference to the interpretation and application of the relevant terms and legal norms of the Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China. There is no doubt about the sophisticated legislation of the Anti-monopoly Law of China even though, as matter of fact, it has followed & transplanted, to large extent, a number of statutory rules and provisions from the U.S and the EU. However, it's worthy to be noted that as an economic legislation, the anti-monopoly law depends greatly on the developed market economy. As the integral part of economic basis, the mechanism of competition of the market and its appraisal system are the prerequisite to safeguard the perfect competition and operation, which is to be implemented as the ultimate aim and target of the antitrust law. It has been well known world wide that the significance of transplant of law. As one of such means to introduce some of the terms and norms from the U.S. and EU legislations into China anti-monopoly law, it shall be unquestionable by all means. But the reality is unavoidable, i.e. whether or not the current socialist market economy mechanism is in consistency with the advanced and abstract legal rules.
Just as advocated by Karl Marx, the superstructure depends on the economic foundation and the latter is to interact with the former. Being part of the superstructure, in the absence of perfect market economic basis, the relevant economic theories as well as no precedent case to follow, how the enforcement agency of the State Council of the Peoples'Republic of China implement the scrutiny of anti-monopoly remains the top core of this dissertation. Furthermore, with a view of protection of "the industries in relation to national economic lifeblood, national security and the industries to which exclusive operation and sale are implemented subject to law with their dominance in terms of the state-owned economy ", how can the Anti-monopoly Law of China materialize the mission of " preventing & prohibiting monopoly conduct, protecting the market for competition, increasing efficiency of economic operation, safeguarding the interest of consumers and public interests, and enhancing sound development of the socialist market economy " in case no specific criteria is available to adopt in the scrutiny of anti-monopoly? With such in mind, the author determined to make thorough study, with comparative approach, on the exampling of some decisions made by the enforcement Agency of China with integration of fundamental jurisprudence, relevant definitions and the conditions of application etc in the field of anti-monopoly laws. Hereunder this dissertation is to be divided into five chapters to make analysis respectively in detail.
Chapter 1. Legal Frame Governing Merger and Acquisition in China
In this Chapter, the basic definition and type of the merger and acquisition have been classified in accordance with the positive laws in China as well as some doctrines from different jurisdictions, which are to be intended to lay a solid theoretical foundation for the entire analysis hereunder.
Chapter 2. The Definition and Classification of Relevant Market
Inter alia, as one of the fundamental concepts in the doctrine of antitrust law, the relevant market is the pre-condition to assess the outcome of competition. Where the relevant market is defined, i.e. within the specific products market and the geographic market, the impact created by the merger can be appraised whether or not it creates restraint or impedes the outcome of competition as illegal test to which the anti-monopoly law shall be applied accordingly. Hence, analysis of the related economic theory in the Western Countries and its adoption as part rules of law in the precedent case will undoubtedly provide a visual picture for the application of the abstract legal rules.
Chapter 3. Non-competition Clause
In general, the ultimate target of the mergers by the undertakings is to maximize the profit by consolidation of the resources and strengthen the market power for completion. Therefore in order to achieve such goal, it's essential to take any measures, including not limited to the chief means of consolidation or conspiracy in view of non-competition between the mergers, to strike other competitors. The statutory anti-trust law for the first time was passed in the United States against such kind of anticompetitive behavior. With respect to the rationale and legitimacy, a package of principles and application conditions has been established by enforcement agencies and the courts with which the procedural measurements and substantial criteria had been constituted eventually. In comparison with the qualitative rules to illustrate explicit monopolistic agreement which is prohibited by the Anti-monopoly Law of China, it seems that the package of principles and guidelines reformulated in the U.S. and EU are becoming more pertinent& operable, which is deemed as supplementary to improve the stagnated statutory code. As consequence, it may, to some extent, provide some conducive reference to the Chinese relevant authorities to prepare for either the guidelines or the judicial interpretation in case of need.
Chapter 4. The Failing Company Defense on Merger and Acquisition
The Failing Company Defense was established in the precedent case in the United States, which might be granted exemption from the antitrust review subject to given conditions of bankruptcy. Obviously comparing with the intended tendency to rather protect the dominant state-owned enterprises, the developed countries seem to focus more preferably on maintaining the perfect competition order so as to improve the efficiency and promote the economic development. Therefore upon citation of failing company defense by the mergers, the prudent caution shall be given duly. Irrespective of the due consideration was granted by the court, within its discretion, to the equity of weighing the shareholders, creditors and employment surrounding local community while affirming such defense, the enforcement Agency in the United States would rather construe all the pre-conditions in a strict way while taking a whole consideration of protection of the competition other than damage the competition by the proposed merger. Up to date, such kind of mechanism is not established. In view of the existing loophole in the legislation, it's of great significance to study this deeply.
Chapter 5. Conflict between Foreign Trade Control and Foreign Antitrust Law
China is also one of the Contracting Parties to the WTO as other leading economic communities. Pursuant to the public international law and WTO rules and protocols, the Member State is obliged to open its market and liberalize trade competition subject to the commitment made. Ironically as a paradox, in the absence of unified international competition law, most of the Member States including China extend extra-territory application of domestic antitrust law to the international cartels, cross border mergers and other conduct of foreign trade control, which may create anticompetitive outcome. As result of the extra-territory application, the conflicts of laws will inevitably take place. Evidently, the strategy of win-win supposed to be the best option in case China is able to attach more foreign investment by avoiding or lessening the conflicts while maintaining the perfect competition in the domestic market through drawing lesson from the various jurisdictions. With more and more Chinese enterprises going abroad to engage in merger and acquisition, the importance of guidance on the examination of antitrust in foreign countries are becoming increasingly recognized by the enterprisers
Chapter 6. The Antitrust Scrutiny and National Security on Merger and Acquisition
The review of national security was created in the United States upon approval of particular Act against the foreign merger with its domestic undertakings, which is different from the anti-trust review. Whereas it's also hardly to find a clause of national security scrutiny upon the proposed merger by the foreign investors. As it's well known that the concept of national security is too broad to be defined by the law. Without definition, by shadow of ideology, it does make the inherent foreseeability and transparency of the law to become ambiguous, which has been criticized & complained by many foreign investors. In consideration to the current status, the State Council of the PRC promulgated the latest Notice concerning the setup of the system of security review of the merger of the domestic enterprise by the foreign investors in which the Joint Conference of Intra-Minitries was established to implement the examination subject to the stipulated sphere, contents, mechanism and procedures. Other than complaint, the due recognition has to be given to this administrative regulation. At least, it enhanced the transparency of rule of law in China particularly for proposed merger by foreign investors.
引文
''Article 31, "Where a foreign investor participates in the concentration ofbusiness operators by merging or acquiring a domestic enteiprise or by any other means, and national security is involved, besides the asscssmenl on the concentration of business operators in accordance with this Law, the assessment on national security shall also be conducted according to the relevant provisions of the State."
20 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/28/us-huawei-idUSTRE70R6K220110128.
21'Wang Xiaoye, the Interpretation on the Anti-trust Law of PRC, Intellectual Property Right Press,2008.
Ernest Gellhom, William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics in a nutshell,4th ed, West Group 1994, pp 353-354.
"" Article 173, the Company Law of the PRC
24 Article 85, Securities Law of the Peoples'Republic of China
29 Clayton Act §7,15 USC §18.
30 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, Council Regulation (EC) No.139/2004
''Article 27, the Anti-monopoly Law of the PRC.
32 See EU, Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law ([1997]OJ C372/5); The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, issued on Aug 19,2010; The Guidelines on the defunition of the relevant market, issued by the Anti-monopoly Committee of the State Council of the PRC,2009.
33Article 12, Anti-monopoly Law of PRC, "The "undertakings" as referred to in this Law means a natural person, legal person, and other organizations engaging in production or business of goods or provision of services. The "relevant market" as referred to in this Law means the goods scope or geographical area of which the undertakings conduct the competition within a specific period in respect of a particular goods or service (hereinafter referred to as the "products"'in general)."
34See cases 40/73,suiker,Unie v Commission(1975)ECR 1663,(1976)lCMLR 295
36 Earl.W Kintner, Federal Antitrust law Vol.IV,p339
37Standard Oil Co.v.United States.221 U.S.1,55,61—62,75(1911).
38.United States v.Cohumbia Steel Co.334 U S 495.510.515,537(1948)
39Paul A.Samuelson,William D.Nordhaus,Economics,17ed,McGraw-Hill Company.Inc,2003,p149
40 See Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic analysis after Kodak, s Supreme Ct. Econ.Rev.43, 71-85(1993).
41 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United Stales,345 U.S.594 (1953)
42 If we actually know the elasticity of demand (that is, the degree of buyer responsiveness at present prices) and assume that the current price is at the profit-maximizing level, we could figure out the firm's marginal cost and then compare it with price, although the marginal cost thus inferred could differ from that at competitive levels of output. See Landes & Posner, note 1, at pp939-943.
45 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,345 U.S.594 (1953)
44 United Slates v. E.I. de Pont de Nemours & Co.351 U.S.377(1956).
45 Daniel J. GifFord and Leo.1. Raskind, Federal Ant/trust Law:case and materials, pp366-388; and Hcrber Hovcnkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy the Law of Competition and Its Practice (1994), pp99-100
46 United States v.E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,351 U.S.377 (1956)
47 Ibid, at page 351 U.S.393
48 Id., at page 353 U.S.649
49 See http://supreme.justia.com/us/353/586/case.html
50 Ibid, Page 353 U. S.587
51 Id., Page 353 U. S.594
52Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States,337 U. S.293,337 U. S.299, Section 3 of the Act, with which the Court was concerned in Standard Oil. makes unlawful certain agreements "... where the effect... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat.731,15 U.S.C. (1946 ed.)§14. (Emphasis added.)
53 Supra. Page 353 U. S.594
54 Brown Shoe Co., lnc v. United States,370 U.S.294 (1962)
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid, Page 370 U.S.321
57Ibid, Page 370 U. S.325
58Id., Page 370 U. S.328
59Ibid, Page 370 U.S.326
60Information available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/370/294/case.html
.61lbid,
62Ibid.Page 370U.S 335
63 George R.Hall & Charles,F.Phillips,Antimerger Criteria:Power,Concentration Foreclosure,and Size.9 Vill. L.Rcv.211.219-20(1964).
64G.E.hall & ROsemary Hall ,A Line of Commerce:market Defunition in Anti-Merger Cases 52 Cases 52 Iowa L.Rev. 406:426(1964).
67See R. Pito+sky,.New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, pp1818-30.
68 See United Slates v. Baker Hughes (1990); United Stales v. Waste Management, Inc. (1984)
70Ernest Gellhom, William E. Kovacic, Antitrust law and Economics in a nutshell, West Group.1994, p97
'COMMISSION NOTICE on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law ((97/C 372/03)
72Edurne,Navaro,Varona...,Merger Control in the European Union:law econmics and practice 2nd ed.Oxford University Press,Pp89-90
75Case ⅳ/M190 1992 O.J. L356/1
80 See Wang Xiaoye, the Interpretation of the Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China, Intellectual Right Press,2008, pp82-87; Shang Ming, Anti-Monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China:Interpretations and Applications, Law Press China,2007, pp49-56.
81Paul A.Sdmuclson,William D,Nordhaus,Economiics.18th Edition,McGraw-Hill Companies,Inc,2005,p187-188
87 See Comer v. Burton.Lingo Co.,'24 Tex. Civ. App.251,58 S. W.969 (1900) (three lumber dealers bought Out a fourth in furtherance of their own combination to suppress competition). See also Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson.'209 U.S.423,430-31.28 S. Ct.572.574,52 L. Ed.865 (1908) a small compress company leased its plant and good will to a larger company having compresses in many states and covenanted that it would not "engage in the compressing of cotton within 50 miles of any plant operated by the [buyer]." and would render every assistance in discouraging unreasonable and unnecessary competition"; the court found that this lease was obtained in furtherance of a plan by the buyer to establish a wide monopoly by a series of similar leases and held that the lease was void by the Sherman Act. an Oklahoma act and the common Law.
ss See Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., v. FTC,657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir.1981).
S9 See e. g., Yamaha Motor,657 F.2d at 981.
90 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.18. Under U. S. law:limited non-.compete restrictions arc generally considered ancillary to the sale of a business where such restrictions are necessary to protect a purchaser's ability to obtain the benefit of its acquisition and to capture the related goodwill.
91 See, e. g., EADS, Case COMP/M.1745, Commission decision of May 11,2000, Para.213 (aeronautics); Canal+ZLagardre/Canatsatellite, Case COMP/JV.40 and Case COMP/JV.47, Commission decision of June 22,2000 (media), Para.61; and Amcor/Danisco/Ahlstrom, Case COMP/M,2441, Commission decision of June 1 I,2001, Para. 28 (packaging).
92Ancillary Restraints Notice, Para.36.
93See, e. g., Harrisons and Crosfield/Akzo. Case IV/M.310, Commission decision of April 29,1993, pam.38 (chemicals).
94 For example, Senator Sherman said of Section 1 of the Act:It declares that certain contracts are against public policy, null and void. It docs not announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well recognized principles of the common law... It deals only with unlawful combinations, unlawful by the code of any law of any civilized nation of ancient or modern times... see 21 Cong. Rec.2456-2457 (1890), reprinted in 1 Kintner, The Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes 114,117 (1978).
100 Handler, Pitofsky, Goldschmid and Wood, Trade Regulation: Cases and Materials (4th ed.1997), at 40.
101 Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, E3 U. Chi. L. Rev.355 (1954), at 375; Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1965) at 42.
102 Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies,23 U. Chi. L. Rev.353 (1954). at 375; Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America:The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1965) at 42.
103 Id,.
104 Dewey. The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy,41 Va. L. Rev.759,771-74 (1955); See also Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America:The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act, at 42.
105 Attwood v. Lamont,3 K.B.571 (C. A.1920). See also United States Standard Oil Co. v. United States.221 U.S. 1,51,31 S. Ct.502,55 L. Ed.619 (191]); Minnesota: State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade,107 Minn.506,523-25,121 N.W. 395.(1909).
106 Mitchel v. Reynolds,1 P. Wins.181,24 Eng. Rep.347 (Q. B.,1711). Excerpts from this ease arc reprinted in Handler, Trade Regulation, at 37-39. The full decision can be found in Oliphant, Cases on Trade Regulation 34-42 (1923). The details of this case are discussed in Letwin, Law and Economic Policy, at 42-43.
107 E.g., Sullivan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems 22-23 (4th ed. LEXIS 1999) ("Mitchell v. Reynolds thus established the'ancillary restraint'doctrine at common lam':a contract not to compete which is ancillary to an otherwise lawful main puipose, such as the sale of a business or employment contact, is lawful when specifically limited in scope, time and geographic area.'); Handler, Trade Regulation, at 39 and n.51. See also Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber,106 N. Y.473,481-82,13 N.E.419 (1887).
108 E.g., Handler, Trade Regulation, at 39 and 51; Sullivan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems (4th ed. LEXIS 1999), Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy,41 Va. I,. Rev.759,760,773 (1955). See also State v. DuluthBd. of Trade,107 Minn.506,523-24,121 N.W.395 (1909) (numerous cases cited).
109 See Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., [1894] App. Cas.535, where a general restraint was sustained as being reasonably necessary for the protection of the purchaser. See also:England:Hitchcock v. Coker,112 Eng. Rep.167,175 (1837).
110 Homer v. Graves,7 Bing.735,743,131 Eng. Rep.284,287 (C. P.,1831) ("Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the party, can be of no benefit to either, it can only be oppressive; and, if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law, unreasonable. ") in this case, the Handler authors report, "[t] he court held that a restraint upon a dentist's assistant not to practice within 100 miles of his employer's town was unreasonably broad." Handler, Trade Regulation, at 40.
111 Sullivan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure:Cases. Materials, Problems (LEXIS 4th ed. 1999).
112 Id,.
113 See Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (1955). Thorelli notes that prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act it was generally believed that there was "no federal common law in'the United States.
114 see also Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor,87 U.S.64,66-67,22 L. Ed.315,20 Wail.64 (1873) (The court said that it was a "well settled rule of law that an agreement in general restraint of trade is illegal and void, but an agreement which operates merely in partial restraint of trade is good, providing it be not unreasonable and there be a consideration to support it. ")
122 Health Professionals, Ltd. v. Johnson,339 Ⅲ. App.3d 1021,791 N. E.2d 1179,274111. Dee.768 (Ⅲ. App. 2003) (Illinois Antitrust Act follows federal law on noncompetition covenants, generally treating them under rule of reason); Bristol Window and Door v. Hoogenstyn,650 N. W.2d 670,250 Mich. App.478 (Mich. App.2002) (rule of reason applied to noncompetition covenants challenged under Michigan antitrust act). 43 Illinois Brick v. Illinois,431 U.S.720 (1970).
123 Illinois Brick v. Illinois,431 U.S.720 (1970).
124 Id,.
125"'Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States.175 U.S.211,20S. Ct.96,44 L. Ed.136 (1899).
127United States v.Trans-Missouri Freight Association 、166 U.S.290，17 Sup.Ct.540.
127Page 175 U.S.235
129Id.Page 175 U.S.226
130United States v.Addyston Pipe and Steel Co..85 F.271,282(CA6 1898).aff'd as modified,175 U.S.211(1899).
131175 U.S. at 211.
132 See e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.',441 U.S.1 (1979) (upholding joint venture creating blanket license notwithstanding that issuance of the license required a kind of price fixing); National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents,468 U.S.85 (1984) (applying the rule of reason and condemning a "naked" oulput restriction agreement created by members of an efficient joint venture).
133See, e. g. Supreme Court:Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States,334 U. S. i10,68 S. Ct.947,92 L. Ed.1245, petition for clarification denied,334 U.S.831,68 S. Ct.1343,92 L. Ed.1758 (1948), overruled on other grounds, 467 U.S.752,104S. Ct.273t,81 I.. Ed.2d 628, (1984); Second Circuit:Bradford v. New York Times Co.,501 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.1974); Third Circuit: Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,387 F. Supp.252 (D. N.J.1975), aff'd,533 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.),cert.denied,429 U.S.860,97 S. Ct.161,50 L. Ed.2d 137 (1976) (covenant ancillary to contract for sale of property); Fourth Circuit: Compton v. Metal Prods., Inc.,453 F.2d 38 (4th Cir.1971), cert, denied,406 U. S.968,92 S. Ct.2414,32 L. Ed.2d 667 (1972); Fifth Circuit:Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Sigma Sys. Corp.,600 F.2d241 (Sth Cir.), cert, denied,419 U.S.1070,95 S. Ct.657,42 L. Ed.2d 666 (1974)-Seventh Circuit: Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.,660F.2d255 (7th Cir.1981), cert, denied,455 U.S.921,102 S. Ct.1277,71 L. Ed. 2d461 (1982); Eighth Circuit:United States v. Empire Gas Corp.,393 F. Supp.903 (W. D. Mo.]975), aff'd,537 F. 2d 296 (8th Cir.1976), cert, denied,429 U.S.1122,97 S. Ct.1158,51 L. Ed.2d 572 (1977); Ninth Circuit:Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp.718 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.1983) (post-employment restrictions); Tenth Circuit:Cinelli v.American Home Prods. Corp.,785 F.2d 264 (10th Cir.1986) (dismissal of antitrust claim proper where agreement not to compete following termination of employment resulted only in forfeiture of deferred compensation); Eleventh Circuit: Consultant Designers, Inc. v. Butler Serv Croup,Inc.,720 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.1983 (restrictions limiting the business in which former employees could compete upon termination upheld as having no adverse effect on competition); New Hampshire: Concord Orthopedics'Prof. Ass'n v. Forbes,142 N.H.440.702 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1997) (convenant not to compete in employment context upheld).
134 Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.,660 F.2d 255,265 (7thCir.1981), cert, denied,455 U.S.921 (1982).
135See Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co..16 F.304,308 (7th Cir.1902) (upholding the reasonableness of an employment contract within 1500 miles of the employer's place of business).
l36See Snap-On Tools Corp. u FTC.321 F.2d 825,837 (7th Cir.1963)
137See Northwest Power Products v. Omark Industries,576 F.2d 83,90 (5th Cir.1978), cert, denied,439 U.S.1116, 99S. Ct.1021,59 L. Ed.2d 75 (1979)
138.Yamaha Motor Co.,Lid..v.FTC.657F.2d971(8thCir.1981).
139 433 U.S.36,97 S. Ct.2519,53 L. Ed.2d 568 (1977).
140See. e.g., Renter/BASF, Case IV/28.996, Commission decision of July 26,1976 (1976 O.J.L.254/40); Sedame/Precilec and Tyler/Linde, Xlth Report on Competition Policy (1981), paras.95-96:and Remia and others v. Commission, Case 42/84,1985 E. C.R.25.55. For a review of the treatment of ancillary restrictions in mergers and joint ventures before the adoption of the Merger Regulation, see Donald L. Holley, Ancillary Restrictions in Mergers and.him Ventures,1990 Fordham Corp. I., lust.423 (Barry E. Hawk. ed.,1991), pp.427-430
141 Renter/BASF 1976 O.J. L 254,/40. para. 113.
142Nutricia/Zuid-Hollandse Conservenfahriek 1983 O.J.L.376/22.
143Commssion Notice regarding l'estrictions ancillary to conccntrations,1990 O.J.C203/5.
144Commission Noticc on restrictions directly reIated and necessary lo concentrations,200t O.J.C 188/5.
145Commission1 Notice on restictions directIy related and necessary to concentrations,2005 O.J.C 56/／24.
146"Scc Rccital 21,Merger Regulation.
147Scc Recital 21.Mergcr Regulation.
148Sec RecitaI 21,Merger Regulation.
1492001 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.2. The Commission's decision to implement such a significant policy change without prior consultation attracted critical comment. A draft Notice published in i999 for consultation purposes had made no mention of the Commission's intention to end its assessment of ancillary restraints in the merger process. Sec Rachel Brandenburgcr and Thomas Jansscns, European Merger Control:do the Checks and Balances Need to be Re-Set? 2001 Fordham Corp. L. hist. (Barry E. Hawk. ed.,2002).
1502001 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.3.
1512001 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.2.
152Id,.
153 Lagardre and Canal-[-v. Commission ("Lagardrc'Canal-k"), Case T-251/00,2002 E. C.R.11-4825.
154 Canal+-/Lagardrc/Canalsatellite, Case COMP/JV.40 and Case C OMP/JV.47, Commission decision of June 22,2000 (media).
155 Lagardre/Canal+supra, para.90 ("when the parties to a concentration notify the Commission of contractual clauses as restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration, they must be deemed to form an integral part o| the notification of the concentration. In the case o(?) a clear and precise request{ailing within the competence of the Commission, the latter must provide an adequate reply"(?)
156 Recital 2t, Merger Regulation.
157Id,.
158 Ancillary Restraints Nodc'e. para.2
159 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.6.
160 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.2.
161Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.18.
162Id,.
163Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.19.
164 Id,.
165 See, e.g.,Los Angeles Mem 7 Coliseum Commission v NFL,726d F.2d 1381,1395 (9th Cir.1984); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.,660 F.2d 255,265 (7th C|r.1981); United Slates v. Empire Gas Corp.,537 F.2d 296,307(8th Cir.1976).
166Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.12,19
167 See, e.g., O'Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc..12t F.3d t060 (7th Cir.1997) (covenant not to compete did not violate Section 1 as it was never enforced against the plaintiff). There is no need, however, for the co-conspirators to have identical motives so long as they have a commitment to a scheme that has an anticompetitive effect as the objective, Spectators'Comtnun. Network, Inc. v. Colonial Country Club,253 F.3d 215 (5th Cir.2001)
168 Http://www. usdoj, gov/'atr/cases/f] 900/; 1905. Html
169 http://www, usdoj, go/atr/public/4bz3h. html
170 See Remia and Others v. Commission. Case 42/84, t985 E. C. R.2545, para.20-Metropole Television (M6), Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux, France Telecom and Television Franaise 1 SA (TF1) v Commission, Case T-112/99,2001 E. C. R.11-2459, para.106.
171 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.13. See, e. g., RT1 7. Case IV/M.878:Commission decision of February 14, 1997. para.12 (Commission declined to treat as ancillary an arrangement between two joint venture partners that was unrelated to the notified operation):and Vodafone/BT/Airtel JV, Case COMP/M.1863, Commission decision of December 18.2000. para.20 (telecommunications).
l72See generally §12.03 supra, which discusses numerous cases in which the Supreme court has applied the rule Of reason to combinations that created precompetitive effects. See SCFC ILC. Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc.36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir.1994), cert, denied,515 U. S.1152. i15 S. Ct.2600.132 L. Ed.2d846 (1995); See also Louisiana Smoked Prods., Inc. v. Savoie's Sausage and Food Prods., Inc. La.96-1716,696 So.2d 1373 (La. 1997) (Louisiana statute prohibiting noncompetition agreements limited to employment agreements).
173 See note 44
174 See note 59,60.
175 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.20.
1'6 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.25. See, e. g., Tesco/Catteau, Case 1V/M.301. Commission decision of February 4,1993, para.14 (food retail); KNP BT/Bunzl/Wilhelm Seiler, Case IV/M.884, Commission decision of December 14,1997, para.19 (sale and distribution of graphic paper); Kingflsher/Grosslabor, Case IV/M.1482, Commission decision of April 12.1999, para.27 (retail of various non-food/drink products):Ahold/ICA Frbnndet/ Canica, Case COMP/M.1832. Com-mission decision of April 6,2000, para.26 (retail and wholesale/procurement of daily consumer goods):and Philips/'Agilent, Case COMP/M.2256. Commission decision of March 2.2001, para.41 (precision instruments).
177The Court of First Instance has reaffirmed that the "examination of the objective necessity of a restriction in relation to the main operation cannot but be relatively abstract," and that "(it) is not a question of analyzing whether, in the light of the competitive situation on the relevant market, the restriction is indispensable to the commercial success o-the main operation but of determining whether, in the specific context of the main operation, the restriction is necessary to implement that operation. If without the restriction the main operation is difficult or even impossible to implement, the restriction may be regarded as necessary for its implementation." See MeiTopole Television (M6), Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, France Telecom and Television Franaise 1 SA (TF1) v. Commission, Case 2'-112/99,2001 E. C. R. lt-2459, para.109.
rs See, e. g.,VALEO/ITT Industries, Case IV/M.1245, Commission decision of July 30,1998, para.59; MMP/AFP Case IV/M.1442, Commission decision of March 3,1999 para.17; Cargill/Banks, Case COMP/M.2330, Commissions decision of March 9,200t, para.30; and Goldman Sachs/Messer Gresham, Case COMP/M.227, Commission decision of March 20,2001, para.11.
179 See, e. g., BT/AT'T, Case IV/JV.15, Commission decision of March 30,1999, paras.207-214; and Stora Enso/AssiDomn/JV, Case COMP/M.2243, Commission decision of December 22.2000, para 49,56, and 57
180 Seenote44.
181 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.13. This is consistent with U. S. law governing ancillary restraints, which requires that such restraints be the least restrictive option that still permits the parties to achieve the pro-competitive benefits of their transaction.
182 United States v. Empire Gas Corp.,537 F.2d 296.307 (8th Cir.1976), cert, denied.429 U.S.1122 (1977).
184See note 68.
185Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.20. See too Nestle/Dalgety, Case 1V/M.1127, Commission decision of April 2,1958, para.33; Clayton Dubilier and Rice/Iteltel, Case COMP/M.2077 (Commission decision of September 1.
195Case COMP/M.2066, Commission decision of November 7.2000. paras.11-12. See also Mannesmann Demag/Delavat Stork. Case IV/M.535. Commission decision of December 21,1994, para.22 (three-year post-term non-competition clause approved)
196 Case COMP/M.2066, Commission decision of November 7,2000, paras.11-12. See also Mannesmann Demag/Deiaval Stork, Case IV/M 535, Commission decision of December 21,1994, para.22 (three-year post-term non-competition clause approved).
197 See note7.
198 See note52.
204 Cann v. Morris,122 Ariz.517,596 P.2d43 (Ct. App.1979)
205 Pennwalt Corp. v. Warkentin,190 Cal. App.3d485,235 Cai. Rptr.484 (1987).
206 Seenote95.
207 Id,.
208 Id,.
209 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.23. See, e. g., CDC/Bunco Urquijo/JV Case COMP/M.1979, Commission decision of August 4,2000, para.18 (no justification provided for restrictions covering activities not transferred to a joint venture); and Vodafone Group pic/Eircell, Case COMP/M.2305, Commission decision of March 2,2001 para. 22 (notifying, parties withdrew restriction, that prohibited a seller from competing with a divested business outside its existing scope).
210 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.39.
211AT&T/Phi lips, Case 1V/M.651, Commission decision of February 5,1996, para. VII (communications). Generally, the Commission is willing to accept that "improved versions or updates of products as well as successor models" are covered by a non-competition clause. Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.23
212 see note 95,http://www. usdoj, gov/atr/cases/f1900/t905, htm.
213 Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd., v. FTC,657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir.1981).
214 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.16
215 See note66.
216 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.09 See KNP/Bunzl/Wilhelm Sciler, Case IV/M.884, Commission decision of December 14,1997, para.17; KingFisher/Grosslabor, Case IV/M.1482, Commission decision of April 19,..1999, para.27:Dow/Enichem Polyurethane, Case C ON'FP'M.2355, Commission decision of April 6,2001 para.28; and CDC/Banco Urquijo/JV, Case COMP/M.1979.
217 Tesco/Calteau, Case IV/M.301, Commission decision of February 4,1993, para.12(non-competition provisions that extended beyond the territorial operations of acquired grocery outlets in the French departments o(?) Nord. Pas-de--Calais. Aisne and,.Somme, and Belgian provinces lying along r. he northeast French border were not approved) See also Scottish and Newcastle.Group Danone, Case COMP/M.1925. Commission decision of July 11, 2000. para.28 (food/beverages).
218 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para,37. See Lufthansa/Menzies/LGS/.JV, Case COMP. m.1913. COMMISSION DECISION of Aug 29,2000; PARA.18:AND STORA ENSO/Assidomn/jv, Case Comp/.M.2243, Commission decision of December 22,3000, para.49.
219 see 54, Lektm-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co..660 F.2d 255,265 (7th Cir.1981). cert, denied.-155 U.S.921 (t982).
220 See Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co.,116 F.304,308 (7th Cir.1902) (upholding the reasonableness of an employment contract within 1500 miles of the employer's place of business).
221 See Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC,321 F.2d
222 Fowle v. Park.131 U.S.88,9 Sup. Ct.658.33 I.. Ed.67; Carrerv. Ailing (C.C.) 43 Fed.208; Rousillon v. Rousillon,14 Ch. 1)iv.331; Nordenfelt v. Ammunition Co. [1894] App. Cas.535. Underwood v. Barker.68 Law J. Ch. 201; Kramer v. Old,119 N. C. I,25 S. E.813,34 L. R. A.389,56 Am. St. Rep.650; Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L.R.9 Eq. 345-Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Schou [1892] 3 Ch.447; Match Co. v. Roehen 1.06 N. Y.473,13 N.E.419, 60 Am. Rep.464) Herreshoff v. Boutineau,17 R. I.3,19 Atl.712,8 L. R.A.'469,33 Am. St. Rep.850; Electric Co. v. Hawkes,171 Mass.101,50 N.E.509,41 L. R. A.189,68 Am. St. Rep.403.
223See note 109, United States v. Empire Gas Corp.,537 F.2d 296,307 (8th Cir.1976), cert, denied,429 U.S. I 122 (1977).
224 see note 95, Http://www. usdoj, gov/atr/cases/1900/1905, htm.
225 See note 65-Yamaha Motor Co.. Ltd.. v:FTC.657 F. id 971 (8th Cir.1981)
226 see note 129, Ace Tackless Corp. v. American Tackless Corp.,1957 Trade Cas. (CCH) P68,640 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
227 Yost v. Patrick,245 Ala.975:17 So.2d 240 (1944)
228 See note 132 Pemnvalt Corp. v. Warkentin,190 Cal. App,3d 485235 Cal. Rptr.484 (1987).
234Se Yamaha Motor Co,.v,FTC(.657 F.2d 971(8th cir 1981).
238 ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook, Prepared for the Fifth Annual ICN Conference in Cape Town, ICN Merger Working Group:Investigation and Analysis Subgroup, April 2006, P8.
239Provisions on Merger and Acquisition of a Domestic Enterprise by Foreign Investors were promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce in 2006
240 International Shoe Co. v. FTC,280 U.S.29l,297-98(1930)
241 In China, it is so-called "bankruptcy defense
245^Amanda L. Wait, Surviving the Shipwreck: A proposal to Revive the Failing Division Defense, William and Mary Review: 2003(10).
246United States Steel Corp. v. FTC,426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir.1970)
247Citizen Pub. Co. v. United States,394 U.S.131,138(1969)
248FTC v. Harbour Group Invs. L.P. (D.D.C No.19,1990)
251Kali+Salz/MDK/Trenhand(case Ⅳ/M308)(1994)OJ L186/38
252Case ⅣM308[1994]OJ L186/304 CMLR 526.
255Case COMP/M2314)(2001)[2002]OJ L132/45
256 Shang Ming, Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China: Interpretations and Applications, Law Press China 2007,pp251-252
257 Wang Xiaoye, Interpretations on Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China. Intellectual PropertyPress 2008, p187
258 http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle'zctb/200907/20090706409831.html
259See Decrcc NO.12.2009 issued by the Ministry of.Commerce,which is co be cffectde on January 1.20l0.
260 Shen Wenjuan& Huang Zhiliang. The Current Situation and Future of Agreement on Antitrust measures. Journal of International Trade,2002(1).
261 Howard Atller, David F Laing, Applicalion Laws to Merger and Joint Ventures in a Global Economy (1), European Business Law Review, March 1997, p.82
262:As the major member state of EU, Germany has to keep paee with EU concerning competitive laws. Yet, it is necessary to introduce its unique regulations on the extraterritorial reach of antitrust law.
263American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.213 U.S.347(1909).
267See http://eur-lex.curopa.eu/LexUriScrv/LexUriScrv.do?uri=CELEX:61969C0048:EN:PDF
268 Ibid, part C
269 Europemballage. Corporation and Continental Can Co. Inc. v Commission case 6/72 [1973] CMLR
Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, World Affairs Press,1992, p.283.
273 Sub-cited from Su Changhc, From National Security to World Security-Realism and Beyond, in Europe, Vol.1, 1997.
274 Zhang Jianhua edited, The Urgent Issues That China Confronted, Economic Daily Press,1998, P.143.
275 Wang Yizhou Edited, International Security In The Ear Of Globalization, Shanghai People Press,1999, P.37.
276 Sub-Cited Fom Liu Weidong, Research On The Concept And Characters Of National Security, In World Geography Research, Vol.2,2002.
277 Sub-Cited Fom Li Shaojun, General Introduction On International Politics, Shanghai People Press,2002, P.148.
278Liu Yuejin, Research On The Basis Meaning, Emergence And Development of National Security, in Journal Of North China Electric Power University, Vol.4,2001.
279Zhang Jiangshan, On The Basic Factors of National Security, in Journal Of Railway Police College, Vol.3,2001.
280Zi Bin, The Choice And Security Of State:The Evolution And Reconstruction Of View of National Security In The Process Of Globalization, Shanghai Sanlian Press,2005, PP.13-14.
281 Huang Weiwen and Liu Jie, New Theory Of National Security, Shishi Press,2004, P.160.
282 Lu Zhongwei, Non-Traditional Theory Of Security, Shishi Press,2003, P.15.
283Zi Bin, The Choice And Security Of State:The Evolution And Reconstruction Of View of National Security In The Process Of Globalization, Shanghai Sanlian Press,2005, PP.13-14.
284 U.S. Business Week,4 December 2001, P.38.
285 Marx and Engels Selected Works, Vol.4, People Press,1972, P.246.
286Zi Bin, The Choice And Security of State:The Evolution And Reconstruction of View of National Security In The Process Of Globalization, Shanghai Sanlian Press,2005, P.256.
287 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory Of International Politics, Shanghai People Press,2003, pp.124-175.
288 Cheng Yi, Etc., Edited, Economy Factor In International Factor, University Of Hua/hong Normal Press,2001, P.5.
289 Deng Xiaoping Selected Works, Vol.3, People Press,1993, P.89.
Ashley Tellis, et al., Measuring National Power In The Postindustrial Age, New China Press,2000. PP.26-27.
291 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes of The Wealth Of Nations, Vol.2, The Commercial Pies 1979, PP.93,36,40,175.
292 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes of The Wealth of Nations, Vol.2, The Commercial Press, 1979, PP.93,36,40,175.
293 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes of The Wealth Of Nations, Vol.2, The Commercial Press, 1979, PP.93,36,40,175.
294 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations, Vol.2, The Commercial Press, 1979, PP.93,36,40,175.
295 Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, The Commerce Press.1961, P.39.
296 Friedrich List, The National System Of Political Economy, The Commerce Press,1961, pp.128,118.
297Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, The Commerce Press,1961. pp.128.118.
298Friedrich List, the National System of Political Economy, the Commerce Press,1961, P.156.
299Cao Jianliao,the Conflicls of System and National Economic Security,Economy and Science Press,2002.P26.
301Liberal Theory, Policy Review April-May,2002, published by the Hoover Institution.
302 Reuters,24/10/2004.
303 Liberal Theory, Policy Review April-May,2002, published by the Hoover Institution.
304 The State of the Union 1998.
Liberal Theory, Policy Review April-May,2002, published by the Hoover Institution.
306See Liberal Theory, Policy Review April-May,2002, published by the Hoover Institution.
308Regarding the details, the author has analyzed in Chapter Ⅱ.
See Section 2.1.7. of Chapter Ⅱ in details regarding the rules of application under the Guidelines of the US.
311 Shang Ming, Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China:Interpretations and Applications, Law Press China,2007, p267.
312 See Wang Xiaoye, Interpretation of the Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China, Intellectual Property Press,2008, p193.
316 Information available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/j/201001/20100106747363.html
317Sec supra, pp60-62
[1]Phillip Areeda. Louis Kaplow. Problems, Text, and Cases,5ed. Aspen Publishers, Inc,1997
[2]Ernest Gellhorn, William E. Kovacic,4th ed, Antitrust law and economics in a nutshell, West Group 1994.
[3]International Bar Association, EC merger Control:A major Reform in Progress, Richmond Law & Tax Ltd.,2007.
[4]Edurne Navarro Varona... [et al.]2nd ed., Merger Control in the European Union: law, economics and practice, Oxford University Press 2005.
[5]Shang Ming, ed., Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China: Interpretations and Applications, Law Press China,2007
[6]Wang Xiaoye, ed., Interpretations of the Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples' Republic of China, Intellectual Property Press 2008.
[7]Cook, CJ and Kerse, CS, EC Merger Control,3rd edn, London:Sweet & Maxwell, 2000)
[8]Verloop, P, Merger Control in the EU, The Hague:Kluwer,1999
[9]Verloop, P and Landes V, Merger Control in Europe: EU, Member States and Accession States, The Hague:Kluwer Law International,2003.
[10]Posner, R.A. Antitrust:cases, economic notes and other materials, West Publishing, end ed.,1981
[11]Amanda L. Wait, "Surviving the Shipwreck:A Proposal to Revive the Failing Company Defense", William and Mary Review,2003 (10)
[12]ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook, Prepared for the Fifth Annual ICN Conference in Cape Town, ICN Merger Working Group:Investigation and Analysis Subgroup, April 2006.
[13]William A. McEachern, Economics: A Contemporary Introduction, Thomson South-Western 2006.
[14]Paul A. Samuelson, William D.Nordhaus, Economics,18th edn, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.2007
[15]Internet Resources for Reference:
[16]http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
[17]http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/
[18]http://supreme.justia.com
[19]http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/index.shtm
[20]http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/mcrger-enforcement.html
[21]www.mergers-china.com
20 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/28/us-huawei-idUSTRE70R6K220110128.
21'Wang Xiaoye, the Interpretation on the Anti-trust Law of PRC, Intellectual Property Right Press,2008.
Ernest Gellhom, William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics in a nutshell,4th ed, West Group 1994, pp 353-354.
"" Article 173, the Company Law of the PRC
24 Article 85, Securities Law of the Peoples'Republic of China
29 Clayton Act §7,15 USC §18.
30 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, Council Regulation (EC) No.139/2004
''Article 27, the Anti-monopoly Law of the PRC.
32 See EU, Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law ([1997]OJ C372/5); The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, issued on Aug 19,2010; The Guidelines on the defunition of the relevant market, issued by the Anti-monopoly Committee of the State Council of the PRC,2009.
33Article 12, Anti-monopoly Law of PRC, "The "undertakings" as referred to in this Law means a natural person, legal person, and other organizations engaging in production or business of goods or provision of services. The "relevant market" as referred to in this Law means the goods scope or geographical area of which the undertakings conduct the competition within a specific period in respect of a particular goods or service (hereinafter referred to as the "products"'in general)."
34See cases 40/73,suiker,Unie v Commission(1975)ECR 1663,(1976)lCMLR 295
36 Earl.W Kintner, Federal Antitrust law Vol.IV,p339
37Standard Oil Co.v.United States.221 U.S.1,55,61—62,75(1911).
38.United States v.Cohumbia Steel Co.334 U S 495.510.515,537(1948)
39Paul A.Samuelson,William D.Nordhaus,Economics,17ed,McGraw-Hill Company.Inc,2003,p149
40 See Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic analysis after Kodak, s Supreme Ct. Econ.Rev.43, 71-85(1993).
41 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United Stales,345 U.S.594 (1953)
42 If we actually know the elasticity of demand (that is, the degree of buyer responsiveness at present prices) and assume that the current price is at the profit-maximizing level, we could figure out the firm's marginal cost and then compare it with price, although the marginal cost thus inferred could differ from that at competitive levels of output. See Landes & Posner, note 1, at pp939-943.
45 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,345 U.S.594 (1953)
44 United Slates v. E.I. de Pont de Nemours & Co.351 U.S.377(1956).
45 Daniel J. GifFord and Leo.1. Raskind, Federal Ant/trust Law:case and materials, pp366-388; and Hcrber Hovcnkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy the Law of Competition and Its Practice (1994), pp99-100
46 United States v.E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,351 U.S.377 (1956)
47 Ibid, at page 351 U.S.393
48 Id., at page 353 U.S.649
49 See http://supreme.justia.com/us/353/586/case.html
50 Ibid, Page 353 U. S.587
51 Id., Page 353 U. S.594
52Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States,337 U. S.293,337 U. S.299, Section 3 of the Act, with which the Court was concerned in Standard Oil. makes unlawful certain agreements "... where the effect... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat.731,15 U.S.C. (1946 ed.)§14. (Emphasis added.)
53 Supra. Page 353 U. S.594
54 Brown Shoe Co., lnc v. United States,370 U.S.294 (1962)
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid, Page 370 U.S.321
57Ibid, Page 370 U. S.325
58Id., Page 370 U. S.328
59Ibid, Page 370 U.S.326
60Information available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/370/294/case.html
.61lbid,
62Ibid.Page 370U.S 335
63 George R.Hall & Charles,F.Phillips,Antimerger Criteria:Power,Concentration Foreclosure,and Size.9 Vill. L.Rcv.211.219-20(1964).
64G.E.hall & ROsemary Hall ,A Line of Commerce:market Defunition in Anti-Merger Cases 52 Cases 52 Iowa L.Rev. 406:426(1964).
67See R. Pito+sky,.New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, pp1818-30.
68 See United Slates v. Baker Hughes (1990); United Stales v. Waste Management, Inc. (1984)
70Ernest Gellhom, William E. Kovacic, Antitrust law and Economics in a nutshell, West Group.1994, p97
'COMMISSION NOTICE on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law ((97/C 372/03)
72Edurne,Navaro,Varona...,Merger Control in the European Union:law econmics and practice 2nd ed.Oxford University Press,Pp89-90
75Case ⅳ/M190 1992 O.J. L356/1
80 See Wang Xiaoye, the Interpretation of the Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China, Intellectual Right Press,2008, pp82-87; Shang Ming, Anti-Monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China:Interpretations and Applications, Law Press China,2007, pp49-56.
81Paul A.Sdmuclson,William D,Nordhaus,Economiics.18th Edition,McGraw-Hill Companies,Inc,2005,p187-188
87 See Comer v. Burton.Lingo Co.,'24 Tex. Civ. App.251,58 S. W.969 (1900) (three lumber dealers bought Out a fourth in furtherance of their own combination to suppress competition). See also Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson.'209 U.S.423,430-31.28 S. Ct.572.574,52 L. Ed.865 (1908) a small compress company leased its plant and good will to a larger company having compresses in many states and covenanted that it would not "engage in the compressing of cotton within 50 miles of any plant operated by the [buyer]." and would render every assistance in discouraging unreasonable and unnecessary competition"; the court found that this lease was obtained in furtherance of a plan by the buyer to establish a wide monopoly by a series of similar leases and held that the lease was void by the Sherman Act. an Oklahoma act and the common Law.
ss See Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., v. FTC,657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir.1981).
S9 See e. g., Yamaha Motor,657 F.2d at 981.
90 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.18. Under U. S. law:limited non-.compete restrictions arc generally considered ancillary to the sale of a business where such restrictions are necessary to protect a purchaser's ability to obtain the benefit of its acquisition and to capture the related goodwill.
91 See, e. g., EADS, Case COMP/M.1745, Commission decision of May 11,2000, Para.213 (aeronautics); Canal+ZLagardre/Canatsatellite, Case COMP/JV.40 and Case COMP/JV.47, Commission decision of June 22,2000 (media), Para.61; and Amcor/Danisco/Ahlstrom, Case COMP/M,2441, Commission decision of June 1 I,2001, Para. 28 (packaging).
92Ancillary Restraints Notice, Para.36.
93See, e. g., Harrisons and Crosfield/Akzo. Case IV/M.310, Commission decision of April 29,1993, pam.38 (chemicals).
94 For example, Senator Sherman said of Section 1 of the Act:It declares that certain contracts are against public policy, null and void. It docs not announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well recognized principles of the common law... It deals only with unlawful combinations, unlawful by the code of any law of any civilized nation of ancient or modern times... see 21 Cong. Rec.2456-2457 (1890), reprinted in 1 Kintner, The Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes 114,117 (1978).
100 Handler, Pitofsky, Goldschmid and Wood, Trade Regulation: Cases and Materials (4th ed.1997), at 40.
101 Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, E3 U. Chi. L. Rev.355 (1954), at 375; Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1965) at 42.
102 Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies,23 U. Chi. L. Rev.353 (1954). at 375; Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America:The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1965) at 42.
103 Id,.
104 Dewey. The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy,41 Va. L. Rev.759,771-74 (1955); See also Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America:The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act, at 42.
105 Attwood v. Lamont,3 K.B.571 (C. A.1920). See also United States Standard Oil Co. v. United States.221 U.S. 1,51,31 S. Ct.502,55 L. Ed.619 (191]); Minnesota: State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade,107 Minn.506,523-25,121 N.W. 395.(1909).
106 Mitchel v. Reynolds,1 P. Wins.181,24 Eng. Rep.347 (Q. B.,1711). Excerpts from this ease arc reprinted in Handler, Trade Regulation, at 37-39. The full decision can be found in Oliphant, Cases on Trade Regulation 34-42 (1923). The details of this case are discussed in Letwin, Law and Economic Policy, at 42-43.
107 E.g., Sullivan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems 22-23 (4th ed. LEXIS 1999) ("Mitchell v. Reynolds thus established the'ancillary restraint'doctrine at common lam':a contract not to compete which is ancillary to an otherwise lawful main puipose, such as the sale of a business or employment contact, is lawful when specifically limited in scope, time and geographic area.'); Handler, Trade Regulation, at 39 and n.51. See also Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber,106 N. Y.473,481-82,13 N.E.419 (1887).
108 E.g., Handler, Trade Regulation, at 39 and 51; Sullivan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems (4th ed. LEXIS 1999), Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy,41 Va. I,. Rev.759,760,773 (1955). See also State v. DuluthBd. of Trade,107 Minn.506,523-24,121 N.W.395 (1909) (numerous cases cited).
109 See Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., [1894] App. Cas.535, where a general restraint was sustained as being reasonably necessary for the protection of the purchaser. See also:England:Hitchcock v. Coker,112 Eng. Rep.167,175 (1837).
110 Homer v. Graves,7 Bing.735,743,131 Eng. Rep.284,287 (C. P.,1831) ("Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the party, can be of no benefit to either, it can only be oppressive; and, if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law, unreasonable. ") in this case, the Handler authors report, "[t] he court held that a restraint upon a dentist's assistant not to practice within 100 miles of his employer's town was unreasonably broad." Handler, Trade Regulation, at 40.
111 Sullivan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure:Cases. Materials, Problems (LEXIS 4th ed. 1999).
112 Id,.
113 See Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (1955). Thorelli notes that prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act it was generally believed that there was "no federal common law in'the United States.
114 see also Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor,87 U.S.64,66-67,22 L. Ed.315,20 Wail.64 (1873) (The court said that it was a "well settled rule of law that an agreement in general restraint of trade is illegal and void, but an agreement which operates merely in partial restraint of trade is good, providing it be not unreasonable and there be a consideration to support it. ")
122 Health Professionals, Ltd. v. Johnson,339 Ⅲ. App.3d 1021,791 N. E.2d 1179,274111. Dee.768 (Ⅲ. App. 2003) (Illinois Antitrust Act follows federal law on noncompetition covenants, generally treating them under rule of reason); Bristol Window and Door v. Hoogenstyn,650 N. W.2d 670,250 Mich. App.478 (Mich. App.2002) (rule of reason applied to noncompetition covenants challenged under Michigan antitrust act). 43 Illinois Brick v. Illinois,431 U.S.720 (1970).
123 Illinois Brick v. Illinois,431 U.S.720 (1970).
124 Id,.
125"'Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States.175 U.S.211,20S. Ct.96,44 L. Ed.136 (1899).
127United States v.Trans-Missouri Freight Association 、166 U.S.290，17 Sup.Ct.540.
127Page 175 U.S.235
129Id.Page 175 U.S.226
130United States v.Addyston Pipe and Steel Co..85 F.271,282(CA6 1898).aff'd as modified,175 U.S.211(1899).
131175 U.S. at 211.
132 See e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.',441 U.S.1 (1979) (upholding joint venture creating blanket license notwithstanding that issuance of the license required a kind of price fixing); National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents,468 U.S.85 (1984) (applying the rule of reason and condemning a "naked" oulput restriction agreement created by members of an efficient joint venture).
133See, e. g. Supreme Court:Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States,334 U. S. i10,68 S. Ct.947,92 L. Ed.1245, petition for clarification denied,334 U.S.831,68 S. Ct.1343,92 L. Ed.1758 (1948), overruled on other grounds, 467 U.S.752,104S. Ct.273t,81 I.. Ed.2d 628, (1984); Second Circuit:Bradford v. New York Times Co.,501 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.1974); Third Circuit: Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,387 F. Supp.252 (D. N.J.1975), aff'd,533 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.),cert.denied,429 U.S.860,97 S. Ct.161,50 L. Ed.2d 137 (1976) (covenant ancillary to contract for sale of property); Fourth Circuit: Compton v. Metal Prods., Inc.,453 F.2d 38 (4th Cir.1971), cert, denied,406 U. S.968,92 S. Ct.2414,32 L. Ed.2d 667 (1972); Fifth Circuit:Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Sigma Sys. Corp.,600 F.2d241 (Sth Cir.), cert, denied,419 U.S.1070,95 S. Ct.657,42 L. Ed.2d 666 (1974)-Seventh Circuit: Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.,660F.2d255 (7th Cir.1981), cert, denied,455 U.S.921,102 S. Ct.1277,71 L. Ed. 2d461 (1982); Eighth Circuit:United States v. Empire Gas Corp.,393 F. Supp.903 (W. D. Mo.]975), aff'd,537 F. 2d 296 (8th Cir.1976), cert, denied,429 U.S.1122,97 S. Ct.1158,51 L. Ed.2d 572 (1977); Ninth Circuit:Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp.718 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.1983) (post-employment restrictions); Tenth Circuit:Cinelli v.American Home Prods. Corp.,785 F.2d 264 (10th Cir.1986) (dismissal of antitrust claim proper where agreement not to compete following termination of employment resulted only in forfeiture of deferred compensation); Eleventh Circuit: Consultant Designers, Inc. v. Butler Serv Croup,Inc.,720 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.1983 (restrictions limiting the business in which former employees could compete upon termination upheld as having no adverse effect on competition); New Hampshire: Concord Orthopedics'Prof. Ass'n v. Forbes,142 N.H.440.702 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1997) (convenant not to compete in employment context upheld).
134 Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.,660 F.2d 255,265 (7thCir.1981), cert, denied,455 U.S.921 (1982).
135See Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co..16 F.304,308 (7th Cir.1902) (upholding the reasonableness of an employment contract within 1500 miles of the employer's place of business).
l36See Snap-On Tools Corp. u FTC.321 F.2d 825,837 (7th Cir.1963)
137See Northwest Power Products v. Omark Industries,576 F.2d 83,90 (5th Cir.1978), cert, denied,439 U.S.1116, 99S. Ct.1021,59 L. Ed.2d 75 (1979)
138.Yamaha Motor Co.,Lid..v.FTC.657F.2d971(8thCir.1981).
139 433 U.S.36,97 S. Ct.2519,53 L. Ed.2d 568 (1977).
140See. e.g., Renter/BASF, Case IV/28.996, Commission decision of July 26,1976 (1976 O.J.L.254/40); Sedame/Precilec and Tyler/Linde, Xlth Report on Competition Policy (1981), paras.95-96:and Remia and others v. Commission, Case 42/84,1985 E. C.R.25.55. For a review of the treatment of ancillary restrictions in mergers and joint ventures before the adoption of the Merger Regulation, see Donald L. Holley, Ancillary Restrictions in Mergers and.him Ventures,1990 Fordham Corp. I., lust.423 (Barry E. Hawk. ed.,1991), pp.427-430
141 Renter/BASF 1976 O.J. L 254,/40. para. 113.
142Nutricia/Zuid-Hollandse Conservenfahriek 1983 O.J.L.376/22.
143Commssion Notice regarding l'estrictions ancillary to conccntrations,1990 O.J.C203/5.
144Commission Noticc on restrictions directly reIated and necessary lo concentrations,200t O.J.C 188/5.
145Commission1 Notice on restictions directIy related and necessary to concentrations,2005 O.J.C 56/／24.
146"Scc Rccital 21,Merger Regulation.
147Scc Recital 21.Mergcr Regulation.
148Sec RecitaI 21,Merger Regulation.
1492001 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.2. The Commission's decision to implement such a significant policy change without prior consultation attracted critical comment. A draft Notice published in i999 for consultation purposes had made no mention of the Commission's intention to end its assessment of ancillary restraints in the merger process. Sec Rachel Brandenburgcr and Thomas Jansscns, European Merger Control:do the Checks and Balances Need to be Re-Set? 2001 Fordham Corp. L. hist. (Barry E. Hawk. ed.,2002).
1502001 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.3.
1512001 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.2.
152Id,.
153 Lagardre and Canal-[-v. Commission ("Lagardrc'Canal-k"), Case T-251/00,2002 E. C.R.11-4825.
154 Canal+-/Lagardrc/Canalsatellite, Case COMP/JV.40 and Case C OMP/JV.47, Commission decision of June 22,2000 (media).
155 Lagardre/Canal+supra, para.90 ("when the parties to a concentration notify the Commission of contractual clauses as restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration, they must be deemed to form an integral part o| the notification of the concentration. In the case o(?) a clear and precise request{ailing within the competence of the Commission, the latter must provide an adequate reply"(?)
156 Recital 2t, Merger Regulation.
157Id,.
158 Ancillary Restraints Nodc'e. para.2
159 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.6.
160 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.2.
161Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.18.
162Id,.
163Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.19.
164 Id,.
165 See, e.g.,Los Angeles Mem 7 Coliseum Commission v NFL,726d F.2d 1381,1395 (9th Cir.1984); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.,660 F.2d 255,265 (7th C|r.1981); United Slates v. Empire Gas Corp.,537 F.2d 296,307(8th Cir.1976).
166Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.12,19
167 See, e.g., O'Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc..12t F.3d t060 (7th Cir.1997) (covenant not to compete did not violate Section 1 as it was never enforced against the plaintiff). There is no need, however, for the co-conspirators to have identical motives so long as they have a commitment to a scheme that has an anticompetitive effect as the objective, Spectators'Comtnun. Network, Inc. v. Colonial Country Club,253 F.3d 215 (5th Cir.2001)
168 Http://www. usdoj, gov/'atr/cases/f] 900/; 1905. Html
169 http://www, usdoj, go/atr/public/4bz3h. html
170 See Remia and Others v. Commission. Case 42/84, t985 E. C. R.2545, para.20-Metropole Television (M6), Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux, France Telecom and Television Franaise 1 SA (TF1) v Commission, Case T-112/99,2001 E. C. R.11-2459, para.106.
171 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.13. See, e. g., RT1 7. Case IV/M.878:Commission decision of February 14, 1997. para.12 (Commission declined to treat as ancillary an arrangement between two joint venture partners that was unrelated to the notified operation):and Vodafone/BT/Airtel JV, Case COMP/M.1863, Commission decision of December 18.2000. para.20 (telecommunications).
l72See generally §12.03 supra, which discusses numerous cases in which the Supreme court has applied the rule Of reason to combinations that created precompetitive effects. See SCFC ILC. Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc.36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir.1994), cert, denied,515 U. S.1152. i15 S. Ct.2600.132 L. Ed.2d846 (1995); See also Louisiana Smoked Prods., Inc. v. Savoie's Sausage and Food Prods., Inc. La.96-1716,696 So.2d 1373 (La. 1997) (Louisiana statute prohibiting noncompetition agreements limited to employment agreements).
173 See note 44
174 See note 59,60.
175 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.20.
1'6 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.25. See, e. g., Tesco/Catteau, Case 1V/M.301. Commission decision of February 4,1993, para.14 (food retail); KNP BT/Bunzl/Wilhelm Seiler, Case IV/M.884, Commission decision of December 14,1997, para.19 (sale and distribution of graphic paper); Kingflsher/Grosslabor, Case IV/M.1482, Commission decision of April 12.1999, para.27 (retail of various non-food/drink products):Ahold/ICA Frbnndet/ Canica, Case COMP/M.1832. Com-mission decision of April 6,2000, para.26 (retail and wholesale/procurement of daily consumer goods):and Philips/'Agilent, Case COMP/M.2256. Commission decision of March 2.2001, para.41 (precision instruments).
177The Court of First Instance has reaffirmed that the "examination of the objective necessity of a restriction in relation to the main operation cannot but be relatively abstract," and that "(it) is not a question of analyzing whether, in the light of the competitive situation on the relevant market, the restriction is indispensable to the commercial success o-the main operation but of determining whether, in the specific context of the main operation, the restriction is necessary to implement that operation. If without the restriction the main operation is difficult or even impossible to implement, the restriction may be regarded as necessary for its implementation." See MeiTopole Television (M6), Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, France Telecom and Television Franaise 1 SA (TF1) v. Commission, Case 2'-112/99,2001 E. C. R. lt-2459, para.109.
rs See, e. g.,VALEO/ITT Industries, Case IV/M.1245, Commission decision of July 30,1998, para.59; MMP/AFP Case IV/M.1442, Commission decision of March 3,1999 para.17; Cargill/Banks, Case COMP/M.2330, Commissions decision of March 9,200t, para.30; and Goldman Sachs/Messer Gresham, Case COMP/M.227, Commission decision of March 20,2001, para.11.
179 See, e. g., BT/AT'T, Case IV/JV.15, Commission decision of March 30,1999, paras.207-214; and Stora Enso/AssiDomn/JV, Case COMP/M.2243, Commission decision of December 22.2000, para 49,56, and 57
180 Seenote44.
181 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.13. This is consistent with U. S. law governing ancillary restraints, which requires that such restraints be the least restrictive option that still permits the parties to achieve the pro-competitive benefits of their transaction.
182 United States v. Empire Gas Corp.,537 F.2d 296.307 (8th Cir.1976), cert, denied.429 U.S.1122 (1977).
184See note 68.
185Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.20. See too Nestle/Dalgety, Case 1V/M.1127, Commission decision of April 2,1958, para.33; Clayton Dubilier and Rice/Iteltel, Case COMP/M.2077 (Commission decision of September 1.
195Case COMP/M.2066, Commission decision of November 7.2000. paras.11-12. See also Mannesmann Demag/Delavat Stork. Case IV/M.535. Commission decision of December 21,1994, para.22 (three-year post-term non-competition clause approved)
196 Case COMP/M.2066, Commission decision of November 7,2000, paras.11-12. See also Mannesmann Demag/Deiaval Stork, Case IV/M 535, Commission decision of December 21,1994, para.22 (three-year post-term non-competition clause approved).
197 See note7.
198 See note52.
204 Cann v. Morris,122 Ariz.517,596 P.2d43 (Ct. App.1979)
205 Pennwalt Corp. v. Warkentin,190 Cal. App.3d485,235 Cai. Rptr.484 (1987).
206 Seenote95.
207 Id,.
208 Id,.
209 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.23. See, e. g., CDC/Bunco Urquijo/JV Case COMP/M.1979, Commission decision of August 4,2000, para.18 (no justification provided for restrictions covering activities not transferred to a joint venture); and Vodafone Group pic/Eircell, Case COMP/M.2305, Commission decision of March 2,2001 para. 22 (notifying, parties withdrew restriction, that prohibited a seller from competing with a divested business outside its existing scope).
210 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.39.
211AT&T/Phi lips, Case 1V/M.651, Commission decision of February 5,1996, para. VII (communications). Generally, the Commission is willing to accept that "improved versions or updates of products as well as successor models" are covered by a non-competition clause. Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.23
212 see note 95,http://www. usdoj, gov/atr/cases/f1900/t905, htm.
213 Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd., v. FTC,657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir.1981).
214 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.16
215 See note66.
216 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para.09 See KNP/Bunzl/Wilhelm Sciler, Case IV/M.884, Commission decision of December 14,1997, para.17; KingFisher/Grosslabor, Case IV/M.1482, Commission decision of April 19,..1999, para.27:Dow/Enichem Polyurethane, Case C ON'FP'M.2355, Commission decision of April 6,2001 para.28; and CDC/Banco Urquijo/JV, Case COMP/M.1979.
217 Tesco/Calteau, Case IV/M.301, Commission decision of February 4,1993, para.12(non-competition provisions that extended beyond the territorial operations of acquired grocery outlets in the French departments o(?) Nord. Pas-de--Calais. Aisne and,.Somme, and Belgian provinces lying along r. he northeast French border were not approved) See also Scottish and Newcastle.Group Danone, Case COMP/M.1925. Commission decision of July 11, 2000. para.28 (food/beverages).
218 Ancillary Restraints Notice, para,37. See Lufthansa/Menzies/LGS/.JV, Case COMP. m.1913. COMMISSION DECISION of Aug 29,2000; PARA.18:AND STORA ENSO/Assidomn/jv, Case Comp/.M.2243, Commission decision of December 22,3000, para.49.
219 see 54, Lektm-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co..660 F.2d 255,265 (7th Cir.1981). cert, denied.-155 U.S.921 (t982).
220 See Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co.,116 F.304,308 (7th Cir.1902) (upholding the reasonableness of an employment contract within 1500 miles of the employer's place of business).
221 See Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC,321 F.2d
222 Fowle v. Park.131 U.S.88,9 Sup. Ct.658.33 I.. Ed.67; Carrerv. Ailing (C.C.) 43 Fed.208; Rousillon v. Rousillon,14 Ch. 1)iv.331; Nordenfelt v. Ammunition Co. [1894] App. Cas.535. Underwood v. Barker.68 Law J. Ch. 201; Kramer v. Old,119 N. C. I,25 S. E.813,34 L. R. A.389,56 Am. St. Rep.650; Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L.R.9 Eq. 345-Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Schou [1892] 3 Ch.447; Match Co. v. Roehen 1.06 N. Y.473,13 N.E.419, 60 Am. Rep.464) Herreshoff v. Boutineau,17 R. I.3,19 Atl.712,8 L. R.A.'469,33 Am. St. Rep.850; Electric Co. v. Hawkes,171 Mass.101,50 N.E.509,41 L. R. A.189,68 Am. St. Rep.403.
223See note 109, United States v. Empire Gas Corp.,537 F.2d 296,307 (8th Cir.1976), cert, denied,429 U.S. I 122 (1977).
224 see note 95, Http://www. usdoj, gov/atr/cases/1900/1905, htm.
225 See note 65-Yamaha Motor Co.. Ltd.. v:FTC.657 F. id 971 (8th Cir.1981)
226 see note 129, Ace Tackless Corp. v. American Tackless Corp.,1957 Trade Cas. (CCH) P68,640 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
227 Yost v. Patrick,245 Ala.975:17 So.2d 240 (1944)
228 See note 132 Pemnvalt Corp. v. Warkentin,190 Cal. App,3d 485235 Cal. Rptr.484 (1987).
234Se Yamaha Motor Co,.v,FTC(.657 F.2d 971(8th cir 1981).
238 ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook, Prepared for the Fifth Annual ICN Conference in Cape Town, ICN Merger Working Group:Investigation and Analysis Subgroup, April 2006, P8.
239Provisions on Merger and Acquisition of a Domestic Enterprise by Foreign Investors were promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce in 2006
240 International Shoe Co. v. FTC,280 U.S.29l,297-98(1930)
241 In China, it is so-called "bankruptcy defense
245^Amanda L. Wait, Surviving the Shipwreck: A proposal to Revive the Failing Division Defense, William and Mary Review: 2003(10).
246United States Steel Corp. v. FTC,426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir.1970)
247Citizen Pub. Co. v. United States,394 U.S.131,138(1969)
248FTC v. Harbour Group Invs. L.P. (D.D.C No.19,1990)
251Kali+Salz/MDK/Trenhand(case Ⅳ/M308)(1994)OJ L186/38
252Case ⅣM308[1994]OJ L186/304 CMLR 526.
255Case COMP/M2314)(2001)[2002]OJ L132/45
256 Shang Ming, Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China: Interpretations and Applications, Law Press China 2007,pp251-252
257 Wang Xiaoye, Interpretations on Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China. Intellectual PropertyPress 2008, p187
258 http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle'zctb/200907/20090706409831.html
259See Decrcc NO.12.2009 issued by the Ministry of.Commerce,which is co be cffectde on January 1.20l0.
260 Shen Wenjuan& Huang Zhiliang. The Current Situation and Future of Agreement on Antitrust measures. Journal of International Trade,2002(1).
261 Howard Atller, David F Laing, Applicalion Laws to Merger and Joint Ventures in a Global Economy (1), European Business Law Review, March 1997, p.82
262:As the major member state of EU, Germany has to keep paee with EU concerning competitive laws. Yet, it is necessary to introduce its unique regulations on the extraterritorial reach of antitrust law.
263American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.213 U.S.347(1909).
267See http://eur-lex.curopa.eu/LexUriScrv/LexUriScrv.do?uri=CELEX:61969C0048:EN:PDF
268 Ibid, part C
269 Europemballage. Corporation and Continental Can Co. Inc. v Commission case 6/72 [1973] CMLR
Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, World Affairs Press,1992, p.283.
273 Sub-cited from Su Changhc, From National Security to World Security-Realism and Beyond, in Europe, Vol.1, 1997.
274 Zhang Jianhua edited, The Urgent Issues That China Confronted, Economic Daily Press,1998, P.143.
275 Wang Yizhou Edited, International Security In The Ear Of Globalization, Shanghai People Press,1999, P.37.
276 Sub-Cited Fom Liu Weidong, Research On The Concept And Characters Of National Security, In World Geography Research, Vol.2,2002.
277 Sub-Cited Fom Li Shaojun, General Introduction On International Politics, Shanghai People Press,2002, P.148.
278Liu Yuejin, Research On The Basis Meaning, Emergence And Development of National Security, in Journal Of North China Electric Power University, Vol.4,2001.
279Zhang Jiangshan, On The Basic Factors of National Security, in Journal Of Railway Police College, Vol.3,2001.
280Zi Bin, The Choice And Security Of State:The Evolution And Reconstruction Of View of National Security In The Process Of Globalization, Shanghai Sanlian Press,2005, PP.13-14.
281 Huang Weiwen and Liu Jie, New Theory Of National Security, Shishi Press,2004, P.160.
282 Lu Zhongwei, Non-Traditional Theory Of Security, Shishi Press,2003, P.15.
283Zi Bin, The Choice And Security Of State:The Evolution And Reconstruction Of View of National Security In The Process Of Globalization, Shanghai Sanlian Press,2005, PP.13-14.
284 U.S. Business Week,4 December 2001, P.38.
285 Marx and Engels Selected Works, Vol.4, People Press,1972, P.246.
286Zi Bin, The Choice And Security of State:The Evolution And Reconstruction of View of National Security In The Process Of Globalization, Shanghai Sanlian Press,2005, P.256.
287 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory Of International Politics, Shanghai People Press,2003, pp.124-175.
288 Cheng Yi, Etc., Edited, Economy Factor In International Factor, University Of Hua/hong Normal Press,2001, P.5.
289 Deng Xiaoping Selected Works, Vol.3, People Press,1993, P.89.
Ashley Tellis, et al., Measuring National Power In The Postindustrial Age, New China Press,2000. PP.26-27.
291 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes of The Wealth Of Nations, Vol.2, The Commercial Pies 1979, PP.93,36,40,175.
292 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes of The Wealth of Nations, Vol.2, The Commercial Press, 1979, PP.93,36,40,175.
293 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes of The Wealth Of Nations, Vol.2, The Commercial Press, 1979, PP.93,36,40,175.
294 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations, Vol.2, The Commercial Press, 1979, PP.93,36,40,175.
295 Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, The Commerce Press.1961, P.39.
296 Friedrich List, The National System Of Political Economy, The Commerce Press,1961, pp.128,118.
297Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, The Commerce Press,1961. pp.128.118.
298Friedrich List, the National System of Political Economy, the Commerce Press,1961, P.156.
299Cao Jianliao,the Conflicls of System and National Economic Security,Economy and Science Press,2002.P26.
301Liberal Theory, Policy Review April-May,2002, published by the Hoover Institution.
302 Reuters,24/10/2004.
303 Liberal Theory, Policy Review April-May,2002, published by the Hoover Institution.
304 The State of the Union 1998.
Liberal Theory, Policy Review April-May,2002, published by the Hoover Institution.
306See Liberal Theory, Policy Review April-May,2002, published by the Hoover Institution.
308Regarding the details, the author has analyzed in Chapter Ⅱ.
See Section 2.1.7. of Chapter Ⅱ in details regarding the rules of application under the Guidelines of the US.
311 Shang Ming, Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China:Interpretations and Applications, Law Press China,2007, p267.
312 See Wang Xiaoye, Interpretation of the Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China, Intellectual Property Press,2008, p193.
316 Information available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/j/201001/20100106747363.html
317Sec supra, pp60-62
[1]Phillip Areeda. Louis Kaplow. Problems, Text, and Cases,5ed. Aspen Publishers, Inc,1997
[2]Ernest Gellhorn, William E. Kovacic,4th ed, Antitrust law and economics in a nutshell, West Group 1994.
[3]International Bar Association, EC merger Control:A major Reform in Progress, Richmond Law & Tax Ltd.,2007.
[4]Edurne Navarro Varona... [et al.]2nd ed., Merger Control in the European Union: law, economics and practice, Oxford University Press 2005.
[5]Shang Ming, ed., Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples'Republic of China: Interpretations and Applications, Law Press China,2007
[6]Wang Xiaoye, ed., Interpretations of the Anti-monopoly Law of the Peoples' Republic of China, Intellectual Property Press 2008.
[7]Cook, CJ and Kerse, CS, EC Merger Control,3rd edn, London:Sweet & Maxwell, 2000)
[8]Verloop, P, Merger Control in the EU, The Hague:Kluwer,1999
[9]Verloop, P and Landes V, Merger Control in Europe: EU, Member States and Accession States, The Hague:Kluwer Law International,2003.
[10]Posner, R.A. Antitrust:cases, economic notes and other materials, West Publishing, end ed.,1981
[11]Amanda L. Wait, "Surviving the Shipwreck:A Proposal to Revive the Failing Company Defense", William and Mary Review,2003 (10)
[12]ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook, Prepared for the Fifth Annual ICN Conference in Cape Town, ICN Merger Working Group:Investigation and Analysis Subgroup, April 2006.
[13]William A. McEachern, Economics: A Contemporary Introduction, Thomson South-Western 2006.
[14]Paul A. Samuelson, William D.Nordhaus, Economics,18th edn, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.2007
[15]Internet Resources for Reference:
[16]http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
[17]http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/
[18]http://supreme.justia.com
[19]http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/index.shtm
[20]http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/mcrger-enforcement.html
[21]www.mergers-china.com