风险社会视角下的灾害损失补偿体系研究
摘要
灾害损失补偿是一个古老的话题。政治经济学家们从“文明和福利”责任的视角,研究政府对灾害损失所应承担的职责,而市场经济学家们从风险损失转移和分散的视角,对灾害损失融资机制进行不断创新。但是,现代化社会的时代特征是“风险社会”,与工业化、全球化、技术革新等相伴而生的灾害风险呈现出越来越频发的趋势,灾害风险所带来的经济、社会和人口损失也在不断“放大”。风险社会不仅改变了人类所面临灾害风险的形态,也改变了灾害损失补偿机制所依赖的传统法则。本文试图围绕灾害风险的这些改变,探讨灾害损失补偿在政府和市场的博弈关系上应做出的新选择,以构建一个灾害损失补偿的新体系。
风险社会改变了人类面临的灾害风险的性质和状态,使得灾害风险呈现出突变性、弥散性、模糊性和巨损性的新特征,小概率的巨灾风险越来越多地发生,自然灾害与工业灾害、环境灾害、恐怖袭击等社会性灾害交织发生,界限越来越模糊,灾害在区际间、在国际范围内的扩散也呈趋势。这些突出的新特征使传统意义上的政府职责显得乏力,也使传统意义上的风险转移和分摊机制失效。我们重新审视灾害风险的性质,将灾害定义为不可抗力造成对相当大的一部分人口范围(公共体)构成严重剥夺的过程和现象。当灾害造成“公共体”共同面临的巨额损失时,不可能用完全的私人市场机制来分担风险损失,因此我们提出建立一个公共部门(P)-市场(M)-公众(P)为一体的灾害损失补偿模式,这也是一个将灾害风险的可保性极大延展的灾害损失融资模式。
提出这种设想的依据是灾害风险是一种公共风险,这种公共风险不仅有着私人的影响,更有着对国家安全和政府公信力的影响。灾害是对“公共体”的严重剥夺,这种剥夺不仅是资源的剥夺,还是资源配置关系(主要表现为交换权利关系)的剥夺,因此灾害的本质是对资源及资源配置机制的破坏。那么当剥夺发生之后,既要对灾害承受公共体的资源进行修复,也要对公共体资源配置关系进行重置,这就是我们所要研究的灾害损失补偿的任务。它是一个广义的概念,不仅是对被破坏的公共体进行损失度量和经济补偿,对原有资源被剥夺后形成的洼地进行填平,更重要的是实施一系列的经济、政治、环境、人文措施,恢复政府和社会组织的市场主体功能,重建经济运行的机制,重构资源配置机能。灾害损失补偿不仅要实现效率和公平的目标,还要实现系统补偿的目标,即对资源环境系统的损失补偿。
从国家安全的角度考虑,针对灾害风险的变化趋势,以及灾害本身所具有的公共风险性质,建立新的灾害风险管理制度,已是国家经济社会发展必须解决、不宜久拖的重要事情。我们主张重新认识风险可保性和大数法则这些灾害损失补偿的传统法则,以现代技术和现代思维的变革延展可保风险和大数法则,实现灾害损失补偿的架构设置。在这种设置里,政府将不仅是充当管理者的职能,而且充当灾害风险的“最终保险人”的角色,并以扩展的市场法则参与到保险、再保险以及整个资本市场,形成一个宏观、开放的保险公共体。
在这个一体化的公共体里：从公众的角度来看,公众是私人产品的需求者,也是私人风险的承担者,政府与公众的联系,以公众的参与为纽带,而公众与市场的联系,则是以风险合同为纽带；从市场的角度来看,市场是公众风险的集合机制,是一个以保险合同为纽带集结起来的公共体；从政府的角度来看,政府是公众的另一种集合机制,它是以法律和伦理(社会契约)为纽带建立起来公共体。政府可以而且应该在应对灾害风险这样非私人风险时,为公众提供公共产品,这是公共选择的需要,也是政府系统形成的本源。政府可以以保险、再保险、灾害风险基金、巨灾债券等方式介入市场,成为损失融资的市场主体。
这里面临的一个问题是,政府的角色是双重的,即政府不仅是制度的提供者,是市场的监管者,是“裁判员”,同时也是某些保险产品、担保产品、债券产品的供给者,是市场的主体,是“运动员”。政府同时承担着裁判员与运动员的双重角色,身份不明确,职责不清楚,往往会使其该履行的职责没有履行,而不该干预的事情又过多地干预。但是,这并非政府作为两种主体而必然产生的矛盾,而恰恰是政府两类主体的角色不明晰所带来的矛盾。
论文可能的创新之处和不足
1、对灾害损失补偿的研究,通常是从保险学的角度研究损失融资机制在市场上的运用,公共管理学也从政府管理的视角研究灾害性公共危机的应急,而本文以具有前瞻性的风险社会理论考察灾害的时代特征,并从国家风险管理层面来考虑构建政府与市场一体化的灾害损失补偿体系；
2、经济学意义上的灾害损失补偿通常以对自然灾害的研究为主,本文则着力描述在风险社会的背景下,自然灾害与社会性灾害的模糊性加强,因而主张不对灾害的自然性和社会性进行严格区分,而将灾害损失补偿定义为对包括工业灾害、环境灾害等在内的各种现代化灾害风险的损失补偿。
3、传统意义上的灾害损失补偿主要关注对灾害直接经济损失的补偿,本文将灾害损失定义为“公共体”资源剥夺以及资源配置关系的破坏,将灾害损失补偿的内涵从经济损失补偿拓展到系统“恢复力”的层面,并试图建立一个系统的、兼顾公平和效率的损失补偿模型。
但是,由于本人学术能力和识见的局限,上述一体化灾害损失补偿模型仅从框架上进行了界定和定性的分析,没有用计量的方法进行充分论证和分析；P-M-P模式在实际操作中如何实现系统化的补偿,特别是应用到中国所面临的地震、台风、洪水、干旱等频发灾害风险,如何实现方案的量化设计,还有待进一步明确。这些问题尚需进一步的研究,在今后的工作和学习中,我将继续不断修正、完善本文的一些想法。
Hazard loss compensation is an old topic. The plutonomists, from the perspective of "civilization and benefit", have researched the responsibilities of the government on hazard loss, whole the market economists innovate the hazard loss financing mechanism from the perspective of risk loss transfer loss and diversification. However, the modern society is characterized by "risk society", with hazard risks accompanying with the industrialization, globalization and technical reform have been more and more frequently, the economic, social and population losses brought by the hazard risk are also being "magnified" continuously. Risk society does not only change the morphology of risks faced by people, but also changes the traditional rule on which the hazard loss compensation mechanism relies. This paper strives to discuss the new selection for the hazard loss compensation in the game relation of government and market around these changes of hazard risk, so as to construct a new system of hazard loss compensation system.
Risk society changes the nature and state of hazard risks faced by people, making the hazard risks characterized by mutation, dispersivity, fussiness and massive loss, the catastrophe risks of small probability have been occurring more and more, the natural hazard and industrial hazard, environmental hazard and social hazard like terrorist attack occur alternately, with a fuzzier and fuzzier risk, hazards are also spreading regionally and internationally. These highlighting new characteristics make the traditional government functions weak and also invalid the traditional risk transfer and sharing mechanism. We re-examine the risk nature and define hazard as a process of phenomenon constituting serious deprival to a great portion of population (public bodies) by force majeure. When hazard cause the "public bodies" to face massive losses jointly, it is possible to use a completely private market mechanism to share the risk loss, therefore, we propose to establish a hazard loss compensation model integrating public department (P), market (M) and the public (P), which is also a hazard loss financing mode to greatly expand the insurability of hazard risk.
The basis to put forward this idea is a public risk, which does not only influence the private, but also influences the national security and government credibility. Hazard is serious deprival of "public bodies", such deprival is not only limited to resources, but also the resource allocation relation (mainly manifested in exchange entitlement relation). Therefore, the nature of hazard is to destroy the resource and resource allocation mechanism. Then when deprival occurs, it is not only required to repair the resources of the public bodies borne by the hazard, but also reallocate the resource allocation relation of the public bodies, and this is the task of hazard loss compensation that we will research. It is a broad concept, not only to measure the loss of and make compensation for the public bodies destroyed, level the lowland after the original resources are deprived, but more importantly, to implement a series of economic, political, environmental and humanistic measures, restore the market subject function of the government and social organization, reconstruct the economic operation mechanism and restructure the resource allocation mechanism. Hazard loss compensation is not only to realize the objective of efficiency and fairness, but also the objective of system compensation, i.e. the compensation for the loss of resource environment system.
Considered from the aspect of national security, change trend of hazard risk and the public risk nature of the hazard itself, it has been an important thing that must be solved and should not delayed in the economy and society of a nation to establish a new hazard risk management system. We propose to re-recognize risk insurability and the traditional laws of the hazard loss compensation like law of large numbers, expand the insurable risks and the law of large numbers with the reform of modern technology and modern thinking to realize the structural setting of hazard loss compensation. The government will not only play the role of manager, but also the role of "final insurer" of hazard risk and participates in the insurance, reinsurance and the overall capital market with the expanded law of market to form a macro and open insurance public body.
In this integrated public body, from the aspect of the public, public is the demander of private products, but also the undertaker of private risk, the connection between the government and public can be linked by the public participation, while the connection between public and market is linked by the risk contract; from the aspect of market, market is a collective mechanism of public risk, and another public body gathered with insurance contract as the link; from the aspect of government, government is another gathering mechanism of the public, which is a public body established with law and morality (social deed). The government can and should provide public products for the public when dealing with the non-private risks like hazard risk, which is the demand of public selection and also the source of formation of government system. The government can interfere with the market in the form of insurance, reinsurance, hazard risk fund and catastrophe bonds to become the market subject or loss financing.
A problem here is that the government plays double roles, i.e. the government is not only the establisher of system, supervisor of market, a "judge", but also the provider of some insurance products, insured products, bond supplier, market subject and "player". The government also plays the double roles of judge and player simultaneously with an unclear identity and responsibilities and will often not perform the due responsibilities, while interfere with those that should not be interfered with too much. However, this is the inevitable contradiction occurring to the government as two subjects, but on the contrary, it is the contradiction by the ambiguous of two subject roles of the government.
The possible innovations and shortcomings in this paper
1. In terms of research on disaster loss compensation, the general approach is to study the operation of loss financing mechanism in the market, and the science of public management also focuses on the research on the management and response from the perspective of government management. In this paper, we investigated the change of disasters with times from the perspective of risk society, and considered building the government-market-integrated disaster loss compensation methods;
2. In insurance, the research on disaster loss compensation is focused on the natural disasters. In the paper, we mainly described the ambiguity of natural disasters and natural disasters, and proposed not to strictly distinguish the disasters in naturality and sociality, but defined the disaster loss compensation as a loss compensation for various modern disaster hazards including industrial and environmental disasters.
3. The disaster loss compensation research in the conventional sense mainly focuses on the compensation for the direct economic loss caused by disasters. In this paper, we defined the disaster loss compensation as a compensation for resources and resources allocation mechanism, hoping to establish a systematic loss compensation model stressing both efficiency and justice, to extend the innovation of disaster loss compensation from the level of economic loss to the level of systematic "resilience".
However, due to the limitations in my academic ability, knowledge and experience, the integrated disaster loss compensation model above was only defined and analyzed qualitatively from the framework, but not demonstrated fully and analyzed with a quantitative method. It needs a clear solution on how to make P=M-P model realize systematic compensation in actual operation, and especially realize the quantitative design of programs when it is applied in the frequent disasters like earthquake, typhoon, floor and drought in China. These problems need to be further researched. In my future work and study, I will keep correcting and perfecting some ideas I proposed in this paper.
风险社会改变了人类面临的灾害风险的性质和状态,使得灾害风险呈现出突变性、弥散性、模糊性和巨损性的新特征,小概率的巨灾风险越来越多地发生,自然灾害与工业灾害、环境灾害、恐怖袭击等社会性灾害交织发生,界限越来越模糊,灾害在区际间、在国际范围内的扩散也呈趋势。这些突出的新特征使传统意义上的政府职责显得乏力,也使传统意义上的风险转移和分摊机制失效。我们重新审视灾害风险的性质,将灾害定义为不可抗力造成对相当大的一部分人口范围(公共体)构成严重剥夺的过程和现象。当灾害造成“公共体”共同面临的巨额损失时,不可能用完全的私人市场机制来分担风险损失,因此我们提出建立一个公共部门(P)-市场(M)-公众(P)为一体的灾害损失补偿模式,这也是一个将灾害风险的可保性极大延展的灾害损失融资模式。
提出这种设想的依据是灾害风险是一种公共风险,这种公共风险不仅有着私人的影响,更有着对国家安全和政府公信力的影响。灾害是对“公共体”的严重剥夺,这种剥夺不仅是资源的剥夺,还是资源配置关系(主要表现为交换权利关系)的剥夺,因此灾害的本质是对资源及资源配置机制的破坏。那么当剥夺发生之后,既要对灾害承受公共体的资源进行修复,也要对公共体资源配置关系进行重置,这就是我们所要研究的灾害损失补偿的任务。它是一个广义的概念,不仅是对被破坏的公共体进行损失度量和经济补偿,对原有资源被剥夺后形成的洼地进行填平,更重要的是实施一系列的经济、政治、环境、人文措施,恢复政府和社会组织的市场主体功能,重建经济运行的机制,重构资源配置机能。灾害损失补偿不仅要实现效率和公平的目标,还要实现系统补偿的目标,即对资源环境系统的损失补偿。
从国家安全的角度考虑,针对灾害风险的变化趋势,以及灾害本身所具有的公共风险性质,建立新的灾害风险管理制度,已是国家经济社会发展必须解决、不宜久拖的重要事情。我们主张重新认识风险可保性和大数法则这些灾害损失补偿的传统法则,以现代技术和现代思维的变革延展可保风险和大数法则,实现灾害损失补偿的架构设置。在这种设置里,政府将不仅是充当管理者的职能,而且充当灾害风险的“最终保险人”的角色,并以扩展的市场法则参与到保险、再保险以及整个资本市场,形成一个宏观、开放的保险公共体。
在这个一体化的公共体里：从公众的角度来看,公众是私人产品的需求者,也是私人风险的承担者,政府与公众的联系,以公众的参与为纽带,而公众与市场的联系,则是以风险合同为纽带；从市场的角度来看,市场是公众风险的集合机制,是一个以保险合同为纽带集结起来的公共体；从政府的角度来看,政府是公众的另一种集合机制,它是以法律和伦理(社会契约)为纽带建立起来公共体。政府可以而且应该在应对灾害风险这样非私人风险时,为公众提供公共产品,这是公共选择的需要,也是政府系统形成的本源。政府可以以保险、再保险、灾害风险基金、巨灾债券等方式介入市场,成为损失融资的市场主体。
这里面临的一个问题是,政府的角色是双重的,即政府不仅是制度的提供者,是市场的监管者,是“裁判员”,同时也是某些保险产品、担保产品、债券产品的供给者,是市场的主体,是“运动员”。政府同时承担着裁判员与运动员的双重角色,身份不明确,职责不清楚,往往会使其该履行的职责没有履行,而不该干预的事情又过多地干预。但是,这并非政府作为两种主体而必然产生的矛盾,而恰恰是政府两类主体的角色不明晰所带来的矛盾。
论文可能的创新之处和不足
1、对灾害损失补偿的研究,通常是从保险学的角度研究损失融资机制在市场上的运用,公共管理学也从政府管理的视角研究灾害性公共危机的应急,而本文以具有前瞻性的风险社会理论考察灾害的时代特征,并从国家风险管理层面来考虑构建政府与市场一体化的灾害损失补偿体系；
2、经济学意义上的灾害损失补偿通常以对自然灾害的研究为主,本文则着力描述在风险社会的背景下,自然灾害与社会性灾害的模糊性加强,因而主张不对灾害的自然性和社会性进行严格区分,而将灾害损失补偿定义为对包括工业灾害、环境灾害等在内的各种现代化灾害风险的损失补偿。
3、传统意义上的灾害损失补偿主要关注对灾害直接经济损失的补偿,本文将灾害损失定义为“公共体”资源剥夺以及资源配置关系的破坏,将灾害损失补偿的内涵从经济损失补偿拓展到系统“恢复力”的层面,并试图建立一个系统的、兼顾公平和效率的损失补偿模型。
但是,由于本人学术能力和识见的局限,上述一体化灾害损失补偿模型仅从框架上进行了界定和定性的分析,没有用计量的方法进行充分论证和分析；P-M-P模式在实际操作中如何实现系统化的补偿,特别是应用到中国所面临的地震、台风、洪水、干旱等频发灾害风险,如何实现方案的量化设计,还有待进一步明确。这些问题尚需进一步的研究,在今后的工作和学习中,我将继续不断修正、完善本文的一些想法。
Hazard loss compensation is an old topic. The plutonomists, from the perspective of "civilization and benefit", have researched the responsibilities of the government on hazard loss, whole the market economists innovate the hazard loss financing mechanism from the perspective of risk loss transfer loss and diversification. However, the modern society is characterized by "risk society", with hazard risks accompanying with the industrialization, globalization and technical reform have been more and more frequently, the economic, social and population losses brought by the hazard risk are also being "magnified" continuously. Risk society does not only change the morphology of risks faced by people, but also changes the traditional rule on which the hazard loss compensation mechanism relies. This paper strives to discuss the new selection for the hazard loss compensation in the game relation of government and market around these changes of hazard risk, so as to construct a new system of hazard loss compensation system.
Risk society changes the nature and state of hazard risks faced by people, making the hazard risks characterized by mutation, dispersivity, fussiness and massive loss, the catastrophe risks of small probability have been occurring more and more, the natural hazard and industrial hazard, environmental hazard and social hazard like terrorist attack occur alternately, with a fuzzier and fuzzier risk, hazards are also spreading regionally and internationally. These highlighting new characteristics make the traditional government functions weak and also invalid the traditional risk transfer and sharing mechanism. We re-examine the risk nature and define hazard as a process of phenomenon constituting serious deprival to a great portion of population (public bodies) by force majeure. When hazard cause the "public bodies" to face massive losses jointly, it is possible to use a completely private market mechanism to share the risk loss, therefore, we propose to establish a hazard loss compensation model integrating public department (P), market (M) and the public (P), which is also a hazard loss financing mode to greatly expand the insurability of hazard risk.
The basis to put forward this idea is a public risk, which does not only influence the private, but also influences the national security and government credibility. Hazard is serious deprival of "public bodies", such deprival is not only limited to resources, but also the resource allocation relation (mainly manifested in exchange entitlement relation). Therefore, the nature of hazard is to destroy the resource and resource allocation mechanism. Then when deprival occurs, it is not only required to repair the resources of the public bodies borne by the hazard, but also reallocate the resource allocation relation of the public bodies, and this is the task of hazard loss compensation that we will research. It is a broad concept, not only to measure the loss of and make compensation for the public bodies destroyed, level the lowland after the original resources are deprived, but more importantly, to implement a series of economic, political, environmental and humanistic measures, restore the market subject function of the government and social organization, reconstruct the economic operation mechanism and restructure the resource allocation mechanism. Hazard loss compensation is not only to realize the objective of efficiency and fairness, but also the objective of system compensation, i.e. the compensation for the loss of resource environment system.
Considered from the aspect of national security, change trend of hazard risk and the public risk nature of the hazard itself, it has been an important thing that must be solved and should not delayed in the economy and society of a nation to establish a new hazard risk management system. We propose to re-recognize risk insurability and the traditional laws of the hazard loss compensation like law of large numbers, expand the insurable risks and the law of large numbers with the reform of modern technology and modern thinking to realize the structural setting of hazard loss compensation. The government will not only play the role of manager, but also the role of "final insurer" of hazard risk and participates in the insurance, reinsurance and the overall capital market with the expanded law of market to form a macro and open insurance public body.
In this integrated public body, from the aspect of the public, public is the demander of private products, but also the undertaker of private risk, the connection between the government and public can be linked by the public participation, while the connection between public and market is linked by the risk contract; from the aspect of market, market is a collective mechanism of public risk, and another public body gathered with insurance contract as the link; from the aspect of government, government is another gathering mechanism of the public, which is a public body established with law and morality (social deed). The government can and should provide public products for the public when dealing with the non-private risks like hazard risk, which is the demand of public selection and also the source of formation of government system. The government can interfere with the market in the form of insurance, reinsurance, hazard risk fund and catastrophe bonds to become the market subject or loss financing.
A problem here is that the government plays double roles, i.e. the government is not only the establisher of system, supervisor of market, a "judge", but also the provider of some insurance products, insured products, bond supplier, market subject and "player". The government also plays the double roles of judge and player simultaneously with an unclear identity and responsibilities and will often not perform the due responsibilities, while interfere with those that should not be interfered with too much. However, this is the inevitable contradiction occurring to the government as two subjects, but on the contrary, it is the contradiction by the ambiguous of two subject roles of the government.
The possible innovations and shortcomings in this paper
1. In terms of research on disaster loss compensation, the general approach is to study the operation of loss financing mechanism in the market, and the science of public management also focuses on the research on the management and response from the perspective of government management. In this paper, we investigated the change of disasters with times from the perspective of risk society, and considered building the government-market-integrated disaster loss compensation methods;
2. In insurance, the research on disaster loss compensation is focused on the natural disasters. In the paper, we mainly described the ambiguity of natural disasters and natural disasters, and proposed not to strictly distinguish the disasters in naturality and sociality, but defined the disaster loss compensation as a loss compensation for various modern disaster hazards including industrial and environmental disasters.
3. The disaster loss compensation research in the conventional sense mainly focuses on the compensation for the direct economic loss caused by disasters. In this paper, we defined the disaster loss compensation as a compensation for resources and resources allocation mechanism, hoping to establish a systematic loss compensation model stressing both efficiency and justice, to extend the innovation of disaster loss compensation from the level of economic loss to the level of systematic "resilience".
However, due to the limitations in my academic ability, knowledge and experience, the integrated disaster loss compensation model above was only defined and analyzed qualitatively from the framework, but not demonstrated fully and analyzed with a quantitative method. It needs a clear solution on how to make P=M-P model realize systematic compensation in actual operation, and especially realize the quantitative design of programs when it is applied in the frequent disasters like earthquake, typhoon, floor and drought in China. These problems need to be further researched. In my future work and study, I will keep correcting and perfecting some ideas I proposed in this paper.
引文
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① 李达,《经济学大纲》,武汉大学出版社1985年版,第35页。
① Stone, James.1973. A Theory of Capacity and the Insurance of Catastrophe Risks. Journal of Risk and Insurance.40. 231-243(Part I) and 339-355(PartⅡ).
② Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell.1997. Catastrophe Insurance When Capital is Limited:A Comparison of Public and Private Approaches. Paper prepared for Pacific Rim Insurance Conference:Singapore 4-6 Sept.1997.
③ Christophe Courbage and Patrick M. Liedtke.2002. On insurability, its limits and extensions. Working Paper.
① Christian Gollier.2005. Some Aspects of The Economics of Catastrophe Risk Insurance. CESIFO Working Paper.
② 胡炳志,《徐荣坤可保风险与不可保风险的经济学分析》《中国保险管理干部学院学报》,2002-12-15
③ 周志刚,风险可保性理论与巨灾风险的国家管理,复旦大学博士学位论文,2005年。
④ 曾立新,巨灾风险融资机制与政府干预研究,对外经济贸易大学博士学位论文,2006年。
⑤ 姚庆海,巨灾损失补偿机制研究,中国人民银行金融研究所博士学位论文,2006年
① 刘谊、刘星,《公共风险的经济学意义及防范》,《财经科学》2003年第6期。
① Henri Louberge, Developments in Risk and Insurance Economics:the Past 25 Years, in:Handbook of Insurance, edited by Georges Dionne, Kluwer Academic Publishers,2000, P19.
①] 酒井泰宏,《风险经济学：现状与课题》,《财经问题研究》2004年第5期,刘昌黎译。原文发表于滋贺大学《彦根论丛》第342号(风险特集),2003年6月发行。
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