海洋渔业灾害保险运营及融资模式研究
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摘要
海洋渔业在我国国民经济中占有重要地位，然而海洋渔业是国际上公认的风险最大的产业之一，自然灾害和意外事故所造成的海洋渔业的从业人员死亡率高、经济损失大。我国在1983年开始海洋渔业保险，先后尝试了商业保险模式和互助保险模式，但海洋渔业灾害的巨灾特征使得海洋渔业灾害保险面临融资困境，保险市场发展缓慢。本文在界定海洋渔业灾害保险的研究范畴后，通过供给与需求分析，运营与融资的模式分析，国外运营与融资经验分析，试图优化山东省海洋渔业灾害保险的运营与融资模式，为山东省海洋渔业经济的稳定发展提供有效保障。
在综合运用了文献研究法、模型分析法、案例分析法以及调查研究法对海洋渔业灾害的保险融资和运作模式进行分析后，得到以下结论：
（1）传统渔业保险应该伴随现代渔业的产业扩展，在承保范围和承保方式上及时做出调整。作为渔业保险的重要组成部分，海洋渔业灾害保险主要针对海洋自然灾害及意外事故所造成的全产业经济损失，在一般风险层次上侧重商业保险模式；而在巨灾风险层次上，做出巨灾保险的准备。
（2）海洋渔业灾害保险的可保性并没有统一的认识，但从合法性和经济/技术可行性两方面的保险可保性决策来看，只要合理利用价格可保性、时间可保性、地域可保性、多样可保性、选择性风险转移可保性、分保可保性、共保可保性，海洋渔业灾害的巨灾保险的可保性就具有更大的可行性。
（3）保险机构对风险暴露下的可获盈利非常敏感，从而导致保险市场形成供给和需求驱动的常规周期。导致疲软周期的供给诱因包括市场和政府两个方面，市场因素包括市场化发展水平、市场结构、行业投资收益、供给主体的规模和市场竞争力、供给的产品及产品结构；政府因素包括政府补贴不足、救灾的挤出效应以及法律缺失。需求诱因来主要包括准公共物品属性、渔民收入、心理因素、产品因素。
（4）在海洋渔业灾害保险相关利益者的博弈中，保费与赔付比率是形成保险市场的关键变量，为了保证有效供给和需求，这一比率必须低于海洋渔业灾害发生的概率，同时高于受灾率与保费投资收益乘数的比率。在动态演化中，保险机构与金融中介和合作与否取决于初始合作比例与违约成本占比，当初始合作比例均大于或小于对方违约成本占比时，博弈均衡有明确的结果，否则最终的均衡取决于保险市场与再保险市场的损失控制成本和调整速度。政府的财政补贴决策取决于保险经营与不经营的收益差和渔民的投保效用，由于渔民效用通常低于收益差，所以海洋渔业保险需要政府补贴。
（5）海洋渔业灾害保险可以借助政府融资和市场融资两种途径。虽然政府融资具有执行优势，但存在反向激励、政治偏好、激励机制、寻租等问题，市场融资具有效率优势，但存在信用风险、交易成本、结构性缺陷、损失指数、单边市场、定价困难、监管限制等问题。根据融资工具的时间适用性，可以借助流动性缺口分析有效的整合，实现供给主体多元化，保险市场结构优化和融资规模保障。
（6）日本的渔业保险属于政府主导下的互保模式，融资主要来源于政府财政和保险市场。美国的农业保险采取的是政府支持下的市场模式，承保具有层次性，融资主要来源于保险市场和资本市场。日本和美国的经验对于我国发展海洋渔业灾害保险的借鉴意义在于立法保障、渔业互保、政府补贴、市场融资与阶段演化。
（7）山东省目前采取的渔业保险模式类似日本模式，主要通过渔业互保协会经营，承保险种包括渔民互保、渔船互保和其他互保。面临的主要问题是缺少立法保障，承保范围过窄，运营管理多头，融资渠道单一，财政补贴力度不足。为了发展海洋渔业灾害保险，山东省应坚持政策性原则、效率原则、可负担性原则，围绕一个行政主线的双螺旋动态发展路径，逐步构建一个主体多元、结构合理的高效运营体系，并匹配一个渠道多样、成本低廉的快速融资机制。
本文的创新点主要体现在以下两个方面：
（1）在研究内容上，基于我国的渔业产业体系和主要海洋灾害类型，清晰界定了海洋渔业灾害保险的内容、范围和层次，有助于建立统一、明确的海洋渔业保险的研究体系，克服研究口径不一致的问题；并从融资的角度扩展了风险可保性的概念，根据融资效果差异评价了政府融资工具的差异和市场融资工具的差异，为决策者选择融资工具提供了客观的信息框架，并基于政府融资和市场融资的对比分析，构建了一个综合融资模式。
（2）在研究方法上，建立了海洋渔业灾害保险运营模式障碍分析的宏微观结合的研究方法。从供给与需求方面分析海洋渔业灾害保险运营模式下的宏观环境，从利益相关者角度探讨主要利益相关者在同一运营框架下的演化博弈，结合宏观与微观结论提高运营及融资模式的实际操作性、社会接受性和地区适应性。
Marine fisheries is an important component of China national economy, however, it is alsointernationally recognized as one of the greatest risk industries. Natural disasters and accidents causedhigh mortality of marine fisheries practitioners and economic losses. China's marine fisheries insurancebegan in1983, commercial insurance and mutual insurance have been used in turn. Because of thefinancing dilemma leading by the catastrophe characteristics, the insurance market for marine fisheriesdisasters has been developing at low speed. In order to optimize the operating and financing mode ofmarine fisheries disaster insurance and promote the stable development of marine fisheries economy inShandong Province, an research scope of marine fisheries disaster insurance is clearly defined firstly,then, the related operating and financing problems are discussed from the aspects such as operatingobstacle, operating mode, financing tools and foreign experiences.
Some meaningful conclusions are attained as follow by documentary analysis, game analysis, caseanalysis and survey analysis.
Firstly, the traditional fishery insurance should promptly adjust its coverage and underwriting withthe industial extension of the modern fisheries. As an important part of the fisheries insurance, themarine fisheries disaster insurance also needs to cover the direct loss of above five industries caused bymarine fisheries disasters and accidents. The insurance can be divided into two levels, i.e. general riskinsurance and catastrophe risk insurance, based on economic loss and frequency. Some preparationsmust be made for catastrophe insurance beside of the commercial insurance for the general riskinsurance.
Secondly, there exists controversy on insurability for marine fisheries disaster insurance. From thenature of the decision-making of insurance, the insurability depends on legitimacy and economic/technical feasibility. Marine fisheries disaster insurance, even for the one in the catastrophe level can beinsurable if prices insurability, time insurability, geographical insurability, diverse insurability, selectiverisk transfer insurability, reinsurance insurability and co-insurance insurability can be reasonably usedin combination.
Thirdly, insurance institutions are very sensitive to the availability earnings for the exposed risk,which forms the market cycle driven by insurance supply and demand. The supply reasons for the weakcycle are divided into two parts. One part is market reason explained by market development level,market structure, investment income, supply scale and market competitiveness and product defects, theother part is government reason explained by government subsidies shortage, crowding-out effect and legal deficiency. The demand reasons for the weak cycle are quasi-public goods properties, fishermenincome, fishermen mentality and product expectation.
Fourthly, taking into the game on the marine fisheries disaster insurance, premium and payout ratiois a key variable in the formation of the insurance market. This ratio has to be lower than marinefisheries disaster’s probability, and be higher than impaired population proportion and investmentincome multiplier ratio in order to ensure effective supply and demand. In the evolutionary game, thecooperation between insurance and financial institutions depends on the initial cooperation ratio anddefault cost proportion. If initial cooperation ratios are higher (lower) than default cost proportions forboth two players, the game leads to cooperative equilibrium (non-cooperative equilibrium). If not, thefinal equilibrium depends on costs of loss control and adjustment speed. On the other hand,decision-making for the government on financial subsidies will depends on yield spreads for insuranceinstitutions and insured utility for fishermen.
Fifthly, there are two financing ways for marine fisheries disaster insurance, government financingand market financing in detail. Though government financing has an advantage in the execution, it faceschallenges in reverse incentives, political preferences, incentive mechanism and rent-seeking problems.However, market financing has an advantage in the efficiency, but it faces challenges in credit risk,transaction costs, structural defects, loss index, single market, pricing difficulties and regulatoryrestrictions. According to the time applicability time of the financing tools, a comprehensive financingframework can be integrated based on the liquidity gap analysis, which owns diverse subjects, optimizesmarket structure and ensures financing scale.
Sixthly, Japan's fisheries insurance is a government-led mutual insurance. The insurance covers awide range, and collects funds from the government financial and insurance market. Differently,agricultural insurance in the United States is a government-support commercial insurance. Theinsurance is divided into general insurance and catastrophe insurance, and collects funds from theinsurance market and financial market. The significance of the foreign experiences lies in legislation,mutual insurance, government subsidies, market financing and stage evolution.
Finally, Shandong province, being rich in marine fisheries resources, is developing rapidly in thefisheries economy. But at the same time, it also faces the serious marine disasters. The current fisheriesinsurance is similar to Japan, in which mutual insurance organizations offer the insurances that coverpersonal safety, fishing boats and some others. The main problems exist in scarcity of legislation,narrow coverage, operations management bulls, single financing channels and insufficient financialsubsidies. In order to develop the marine fisheries disaster insurance in Shandong province, thegovernment should adhere to the principles of policy, efficiency and affordability, and progressively setup an efficient operating system with a rapid financing mechanism, according to the developing waywith an administrative mainline and double helix moving.
The innovation of this paper can be listed as follow.
Firstly, a content and scope of marine fisheries disaster insurance is clearly defined based on thenew industry system and main marine disasters of China fisheries, which can help to set up a unifiedand categorical research framework, and overcome the problem of inconsistent research caliber. At thesame time, the conception of risk insurability is extended from the view of financing. The differencesare discussed based on the financing effect for both government financing tools and the market ones,which provides an objective basis for the decision-makers to choose the fit tools. And a comprehensivefinancing mode is established by integrating government financing tools and market financing tools.
Secondly, an operating obstacle analysis method with the combination of macro and micro views forthe marine fisheries disaster insurance is established. Macro obstacles of the operating mode can beclear using the supply and demand analysis, and micro ones can be clear by Evolutionary Game of theKey stakeholders. The combination of macro and micro conclusions can promote reality operability,social acceptance and regional adaptation for the operational and financing.
在综合运用了文献研究法、模型分析法、案例分析法以及调查研究法对海洋渔业灾害的保险融资和运作模式进行分析后，得到以下结论：
（1）传统渔业保险应该伴随现代渔业的产业扩展，在承保范围和承保方式上及时做出调整。作为渔业保险的重要组成部分，海洋渔业灾害保险主要针对海洋自然灾害及意外事故所造成的全产业经济损失，在一般风险层次上侧重商业保险模式；而在巨灾风险层次上，做出巨灾保险的准备。
（2）海洋渔业灾害保险的可保性并没有统一的认识，但从合法性和经济/技术可行性两方面的保险可保性决策来看，只要合理利用价格可保性、时间可保性、地域可保性、多样可保性、选择性风险转移可保性、分保可保性、共保可保性，海洋渔业灾害的巨灾保险的可保性就具有更大的可行性。
（3）保险机构对风险暴露下的可获盈利非常敏感，从而导致保险市场形成供给和需求驱动的常规周期。导致疲软周期的供给诱因包括市场和政府两个方面，市场因素包括市场化发展水平、市场结构、行业投资收益、供给主体的规模和市场竞争力、供给的产品及产品结构；政府因素包括政府补贴不足、救灾的挤出效应以及法律缺失。需求诱因来主要包括准公共物品属性、渔民收入、心理因素、产品因素。
（4）在海洋渔业灾害保险相关利益者的博弈中，保费与赔付比率是形成保险市场的关键变量，为了保证有效供给和需求，这一比率必须低于海洋渔业灾害发生的概率，同时高于受灾率与保费投资收益乘数的比率。在动态演化中，保险机构与金融中介和合作与否取决于初始合作比例与违约成本占比，当初始合作比例均大于或小于对方违约成本占比时，博弈均衡有明确的结果，否则最终的均衡取决于保险市场与再保险市场的损失控制成本和调整速度。政府的财政补贴决策取决于保险经营与不经营的收益差和渔民的投保效用，由于渔民效用通常低于收益差，所以海洋渔业保险需要政府补贴。
（5）海洋渔业灾害保险可以借助政府融资和市场融资两种途径。虽然政府融资具有执行优势，但存在反向激励、政治偏好、激励机制、寻租等问题，市场融资具有效率优势，但存在信用风险、交易成本、结构性缺陷、损失指数、单边市场、定价困难、监管限制等问题。根据融资工具的时间适用性，可以借助流动性缺口分析有效的整合，实现供给主体多元化，保险市场结构优化和融资规模保障。
（6）日本的渔业保险属于政府主导下的互保模式，融资主要来源于政府财政和保险市场。美国的农业保险采取的是政府支持下的市场模式，承保具有层次性，融资主要来源于保险市场和资本市场。日本和美国的经验对于我国发展海洋渔业灾害保险的借鉴意义在于立法保障、渔业互保、政府补贴、市场融资与阶段演化。
（7）山东省目前采取的渔业保险模式类似日本模式，主要通过渔业互保协会经营，承保险种包括渔民互保、渔船互保和其他互保。面临的主要问题是缺少立法保障，承保范围过窄，运营管理多头，融资渠道单一，财政补贴力度不足。为了发展海洋渔业灾害保险，山东省应坚持政策性原则、效率原则、可负担性原则，围绕一个行政主线的双螺旋动态发展路径，逐步构建一个主体多元、结构合理的高效运营体系，并匹配一个渠道多样、成本低廉的快速融资机制。
本文的创新点主要体现在以下两个方面：
（1）在研究内容上，基于我国的渔业产业体系和主要海洋灾害类型，清晰界定了海洋渔业灾害保险的内容、范围和层次，有助于建立统一、明确的海洋渔业保险的研究体系，克服研究口径不一致的问题；并从融资的角度扩展了风险可保性的概念，根据融资效果差异评价了政府融资工具的差异和市场融资工具的差异，为决策者选择融资工具提供了客观的信息框架，并基于政府融资和市场融资的对比分析，构建了一个综合融资模式。
（2）在研究方法上，建立了海洋渔业灾害保险运营模式障碍分析的宏微观结合的研究方法。从供给与需求方面分析海洋渔业灾害保险运营模式下的宏观环境，从利益相关者角度探讨主要利益相关者在同一运营框架下的演化博弈，结合宏观与微观结论提高运营及融资模式的实际操作性、社会接受性和地区适应性。
Marine fisheries is an important component of China national economy, however, it is alsointernationally recognized as one of the greatest risk industries. Natural disasters and accidents causedhigh mortality of marine fisheries practitioners and economic losses. China's marine fisheries insurancebegan in1983, commercial insurance and mutual insurance have been used in turn. Because of thefinancing dilemma leading by the catastrophe characteristics, the insurance market for marine fisheriesdisasters has been developing at low speed. In order to optimize the operating and financing mode ofmarine fisheries disaster insurance and promote the stable development of marine fisheries economy inShandong Province, an research scope of marine fisheries disaster insurance is clearly defined firstly,then, the related operating and financing problems are discussed from the aspects such as operatingobstacle, operating mode, financing tools and foreign experiences.
Some meaningful conclusions are attained as follow by documentary analysis, game analysis, caseanalysis and survey analysis.
Firstly, the traditional fishery insurance should promptly adjust its coverage and underwriting withthe industial extension of the modern fisheries. As an important part of the fisheries insurance, themarine fisheries disaster insurance also needs to cover the direct loss of above five industries caused bymarine fisheries disasters and accidents. The insurance can be divided into two levels, i.e. general riskinsurance and catastrophe risk insurance, based on economic loss and frequency. Some preparationsmust be made for catastrophe insurance beside of the commercial insurance for the general riskinsurance.
Secondly, there exists controversy on insurability for marine fisheries disaster insurance. From thenature of the decision-making of insurance, the insurability depends on legitimacy and economic/technical feasibility. Marine fisheries disaster insurance, even for the one in the catastrophe level can beinsurable if prices insurability, time insurability, geographical insurability, diverse insurability, selectiverisk transfer insurability, reinsurance insurability and co-insurance insurability can be reasonably usedin combination.
Thirdly, insurance institutions are very sensitive to the availability earnings for the exposed risk,which forms the market cycle driven by insurance supply and demand. The supply reasons for the weakcycle are divided into two parts. One part is market reason explained by market development level,market structure, investment income, supply scale and market competitiveness and product defects, theother part is government reason explained by government subsidies shortage, crowding-out effect and legal deficiency. The demand reasons for the weak cycle are quasi-public goods properties, fishermenincome, fishermen mentality and product expectation.
Fourthly, taking into the game on the marine fisheries disaster insurance, premium and payout ratiois a key variable in the formation of the insurance market. This ratio has to be lower than marinefisheries disaster’s probability, and be higher than impaired population proportion and investmentincome multiplier ratio in order to ensure effective supply and demand. In the evolutionary game, thecooperation between insurance and financial institutions depends on the initial cooperation ratio anddefault cost proportion. If initial cooperation ratios are higher (lower) than default cost proportions forboth two players, the game leads to cooperative equilibrium (non-cooperative equilibrium). If not, thefinal equilibrium depends on costs of loss control and adjustment speed. On the other hand,decision-making for the government on financial subsidies will depends on yield spreads for insuranceinstitutions and insured utility for fishermen.
Fifthly, there are two financing ways for marine fisheries disaster insurance, government financingand market financing in detail. Though government financing has an advantage in the execution, it faceschallenges in reverse incentives, political preferences, incentive mechanism and rent-seeking problems.However, market financing has an advantage in the efficiency, but it faces challenges in credit risk,transaction costs, structural defects, loss index, single market, pricing difficulties and regulatoryrestrictions. According to the time applicability time of the financing tools, a comprehensive financingframework can be integrated based on the liquidity gap analysis, which owns diverse subjects, optimizesmarket structure and ensures financing scale.
Sixthly, Japan's fisheries insurance is a government-led mutual insurance. The insurance covers awide range, and collects funds from the government financial and insurance market. Differently,agricultural insurance in the United States is a government-support commercial insurance. Theinsurance is divided into general insurance and catastrophe insurance, and collects funds from theinsurance market and financial market. The significance of the foreign experiences lies in legislation,mutual insurance, government subsidies, market financing and stage evolution.
Finally, Shandong province, being rich in marine fisheries resources, is developing rapidly in thefisheries economy. But at the same time, it also faces the serious marine disasters. The current fisheriesinsurance is similar to Japan, in which mutual insurance organizations offer the insurances that coverpersonal safety, fishing boats and some others. The main problems exist in scarcity of legislation,narrow coverage, operations management bulls, single financing channels and insufficient financialsubsidies. In order to develop the marine fisheries disaster insurance in Shandong province, thegovernment should adhere to the principles of policy, efficiency and affordability, and progressively setup an efficient operating system with a rapid financing mechanism, according to the developing waywith an administrative mainline and double helix moving.
The innovation of this paper can be listed as follow.
Firstly, a content and scope of marine fisheries disaster insurance is clearly defined based on thenew industry system and main marine disasters of China fisheries, which can help to set up a unifiedand categorical research framework, and overcome the problem of inconsistent research caliber. At thesame time, the conception of risk insurability is extended from the view of financing. The differencesare discussed based on the financing effect for both government financing tools and the market ones,which provides an objective basis for the decision-makers to choose the fit tools. And a comprehensivefinancing mode is established by integrating government financing tools and market financing tools.
Secondly, an operating obstacle analysis method with the combination of macro and micro views forthe marine fisheries disaster insurance is established. Macro obstacles of the operating mode can beclear using the supply and demand analysis, and micro ones can be clear by Evolutionary Game of theKey stakeholders. The combination of macro and micro conclusions can promote reality operability,social acceptance and regional adaptation for the operational and financing.
引文
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