上市公司控制权变更：理论与实证分析
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摘要
从静态上看，控制权表现为控制权的结构和状态；在动态上表现为一系列控制权变更的过程和机制。控制权作为现代企业的“基因”，控制权有效配置是解决公司治理的核心和关键，强化控制权机制是完善公司治理现实选择和战略趋向。本文遵循主体结构—行为—绩效的逻辑思路，以我国上市公司控制权变更为切入点，系统深入地研究了我国上市公司控制权变更问题。
本文紧紧围绕我国上市公司控制权变更进行研究。其内容共分四大部分：
第一部分为控制权变更的理论假说综述及其相关模型，包括第二章和第三章。其主旨在于为进行我国上市公司控制权变更研究作好理论铺垫，并为以后章节的实证研究提供理论支持。第二章简要介绍了新制度经济学、新古典产权学派、超产权理论、利益相关者理论和公司治理理论有关公司控制权的理论源流；重点介绍了控制权变更的增效假说及其相关理论模型，为分析我国上市公司控制权变更作了充分的理论准备。第三章主要从制度过渡到本文模型分析。笔者从控制权的形成和机理的角度出发，剖析了控制权变更的宏观福利效应和微观经济效率，重点是应用博弈论剖析了控制权变更过程中的收益分配模型、收益侵占的不完全信息动态博弈模型、董事会独立性和总经理控制权监督的博弈模型，对控制权变更过程中各相关主体行为及其结果从理论角度求解。
第二部分为第四章，目的在于对我国上市公司控制权变更的现状进行全面了解，从实际出发把握我国上市公司控制权变更的原因，并对控制权变更作了国际对比分析。本章在综合文献基础上，对我国上市公司控制权变更的现状进行了全面概括和实证描述，指出了高管人员变更的公开原因，紧接着又深入分析了其他相关因素和控制权变更的相关关系，并对影响控制权变更的主要因素进行了主成分分析，以便深层挖掘影响我国上市公司控制权变更的内在根据。随后分析了美国公司并购现状和原因的分析，指出了我国上市公司控制权变更的潜在治理冲突和未来演变趋势。
第三部分为我国上市公司控制权变更的实证分析，包括第五章、第六章、第七章和第八章共四章内容，实证是该部分的最大特征，统计样本选取注重其代表性和时序发展特征，统计指标全面和多角度反映研究对象，运用统计软件和多种检验手段建立模型，以便最大限度提高研究结论的可靠性、代表性和有效性。其中第五章和第六章是在相关利益者的理论框架下，将控制权变更发生的上市公司的相关利益者等主体行为(大股东和相关利益者保护)、领导权结构(董事会和总经理职位设置)和董事会特性(董事构成、董事会规模和董事会行为)与控制权变更状态的相互关系和治理效率进行了深入研
浙江大学博士学位论文上市公司控制权变更:理论与实证分析
究;第七章和第八章是将影响我国上市公司控制权发生变更的股权结构(包括公司股权
结构和前十大股东股权集中度)、控制权变更前后企业绩效(财务绩效和市场绩效)呈
现在读者面前，并进行了多角度验证分析。
第四部分为结论和展望。这是本文的出发点和落脚点，围绕上市公司控制权变更的
目标，笔者进一步分析了造成我国上市公司控制权变更的因素及其存在的问题，进而提
出了优化控制权变更合约的制度安排和政策建议。本章从控制权合约安排的不同理论视
角，总结了本文的实证研究成果，并从相关利益者理论标准出发针对我国上市公司控制
权变更中存在的问题及其成因，笔者提出了相关的政策建议。
本文的主要研究结论如下:
第一，股权结构是影响我国上市公司控制权变更的关键因素之一
本文的实证研究说明了股权集中和股权结构对控制权变更的影响，同时也说明了法
人机构股东在公司治理中的重要作用，国家作为股东的低效，以及过于分散的股权结构
可能产生的问题。
1.大中型国有企业内部控制机制的改造要通过国有股权的分散、引入其他大股
东.包括机构投资者来实现。国家逐步卖出它所持有的上市公司的股权是一种帕累托进
步，有利于资源合理配置和社会福利的提高。
2.如果所有权需要分散(多样化)，那么中国大中型企业是不是需要像英美模式那
种极为分散的所有制结构呢?我们的结果似乎暗示否定的回答。实证结果显示，个人股
东对公司控制权变更几乎没有任何显著影响，至少在中国的现状是这样。在许多回归等
式中，个人股东所占比重的系数是显著的负数，表明市场对个人股东不看好。很明显，
中国上市公司存在“免费搭车”的难题。个人股东既无激励(动力)又无能力来监督和影
响企业高层经理的行为。因此，所有权在一定程度上的集中是必要的。这似乎说明了加
紧培育机构股东的重要性。比较研究表明，OECD国家中，股权和控制权也正逐渐地集
中在金融和非金融机构投资人手中。这一趋势的动力来源于所有权的集中作为公司直接
控制的手段的好处。在一个国家法制不够完善，不能保护外部投资者的利益的情况下变
更(在中国和其他转型的发展中国家中也存在)，大型机构投资者和战略投资者(股东)在
控制权中的作用尤其重要。
3.研究结果说明股权集中与公司控制权变更存在负相关关系。说明股权集中与我
国?
From the static eyes on, control rights were the structures and situations; however, from the dynamic eyes on, they were rings of procedures and mechanisms of control rights transferring. As the "genes" of modern companies, control rights' having been effectively distributed was the key and core of solving the corporate governance, and strengthening the control rights mechanisms was the practical choices and strategic trends of improving the corporate governance. In the dissertation, control rights transferring of listed companies was systematically studied with logic path of structure-conduct-performance, and the main contents were presented as follows.
Part 1 was the theoretical hypothesis and relate models of control rights transferring. Chapter 2 and 3 were included. In this part, in order to analyze and support the control rights transferring of listed companies in our country, all kinds of theories of different schools on control rights were reviewed. Theoretical originals on the control rights of neoclassical institution economy and neoclassical property school and beyond property theory and the stakeholders theory and corporate governance were briefly introduced. Subsequently, improving efficiency hypothesis of control rights transferring and its theoretical model were mainly pointed out. In part 3, from the beginning of behaving and mechanism of control rights, macro welfare effect and micro economical efficiency were analyzed. Returns distributions models and returns being expropriated games model in time of imperfect information and boards independence and CEO being monitored game model were chiefly studied in views of games theory in order to rec
eiving the theoretical answers of relate principal parts conducts and results.
Chapter 4 was included in part 2, the situations and causes of control rights transferring of listed companies of our country were comprehensively and practically grasped, and things at home and abroad were compared. At the base of documents, public causes of senior manager transferring were described and included, and relations of related factors and control rights transferring were deeply analysed. Critical factors were analysed with Key components methods in order to more deeply understand inside causes of transferring. Sequentially, situations and causes of American companies mergers and acquisitions were pointed and potential conflicts and future changing trends were put forwards.
Four chapters including Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 were consisted of Part 3 as empirical analysis. In order to improve reliability and classic and effectiveness of research conclusions to the greatest extents, Characteristics of statistic samples and time periods were emphasized in the studies and the kinds of statistical software and test tools were used in the periods of models being built. In the Chapter 5 and 6, in the framework of the stakeholder theory, the governance efficiency and relations between control rights transferring and principal bodies (large stockholders and the stakeholders protection) and leadership structures (post designated of boards and CEO) and characteristic of boards (board composition and board size and board behaviors) of the stakeholders of listed companies samples were deeply analyzed. At the same time, in the Chapter 7 and 8, affecting factors including the stock property structure and enterprises performances (financial performance and market perfor
mance) before and after the control rights transferring were handed out in the face of readers and they were tested in the kinds of angles.
As the beginning and base of the dissertation, conclusions and extents were arranged in the part 4. In the circle of purposes of control rights transferring, institutions arrangement and policies suggestions of perfecting contracts of control rights transferring were put forwards. From the different theoretical eyes on the control rights transferring, empirical research achievements were concluded and compared with questions and causes of control
本文紧紧围绕我国上市公司控制权变更进行研究。其内容共分四大部分：
第一部分为控制权变更的理论假说综述及其相关模型，包括第二章和第三章。其主旨在于为进行我国上市公司控制权变更研究作好理论铺垫，并为以后章节的实证研究提供理论支持。第二章简要介绍了新制度经济学、新古典产权学派、超产权理论、利益相关者理论和公司治理理论有关公司控制权的理论源流；重点介绍了控制权变更的增效假说及其相关理论模型，为分析我国上市公司控制权变更作了充分的理论准备。第三章主要从制度过渡到本文模型分析。笔者从控制权的形成和机理的角度出发，剖析了控制权变更的宏观福利效应和微观经济效率，重点是应用博弈论剖析了控制权变更过程中的收益分配模型、收益侵占的不完全信息动态博弈模型、董事会独立性和总经理控制权监督的博弈模型，对控制权变更过程中各相关主体行为及其结果从理论角度求解。
第二部分为第四章，目的在于对我国上市公司控制权变更的现状进行全面了解，从实际出发把握我国上市公司控制权变更的原因，并对控制权变更作了国际对比分析。本章在综合文献基础上，对我国上市公司控制权变更的现状进行了全面概括和实证描述，指出了高管人员变更的公开原因，紧接着又深入分析了其他相关因素和控制权变更的相关关系，并对影响控制权变更的主要因素进行了主成分分析，以便深层挖掘影响我国上市公司控制权变更的内在根据。随后分析了美国公司并购现状和原因的分析，指出了我国上市公司控制权变更的潜在治理冲突和未来演变趋势。
第三部分为我国上市公司控制权变更的实证分析，包括第五章、第六章、第七章和第八章共四章内容，实证是该部分的最大特征，统计样本选取注重其代表性和时序发展特征，统计指标全面和多角度反映研究对象，运用统计软件和多种检验手段建立模型，以便最大限度提高研究结论的可靠性、代表性和有效性。其中第五章和第六章是在相关利益者的理论框架下，将控制权变更发生的上市公司的相关利益者等主体行为(大股东和相关利益者保护)、领导权结构(董事会和总经理职位设置)和董事会特性(董事构成、董事会规模和董事会行为)与控制权变更状态的相互关系和治理效率进行了深入研
浙江大学博士学位论文上市公司控制权变更:理论与实证分析
究;第七章和第八章是将影响我国上市公司控制权发生变更的股权结构(包括公司股权
结构和前十大股东股权集中度)、控制权变更前后企业绩效(财务绩效和市场绩效)呈
现在读者面前，并进行了多角度验证分析。
第四部分为结论和展望。这是本文的出发点和落脚点，围绕上市公司控制权变更的
目标，笔者进一步分析了造成我国上市公司控制权变更的因素及其存在的问题，进而提
出了优化控制权变更合约的制度安排和政策建议。本章从控制权合约安排的不同理论视
角，总结了本文的实证研究成果，并从相关利益者理论标准出发针对我国上市公司控制
权变更中存在的问题及其成因，笔者提出了相关的政策建议。
本文的主要研究结论如下:
第一，股权结构是影响我国上市公司控制权变更的关键因素之一
本文的实证研究说明了股权集中和股权结构对控制权变更的影响，同时也说明了法
人机构股东在公司治理中的重要作用，国家作为股东的低效，以及过于分散的股权结构
可能产生的问题。
1.大中型国有企业内部控制机制的改造要通过国有股权的分散、引入其他大股
东.包括机构投资者来实现。国家逐步卖出它所持有的上市公司的股权是一种帕累托进
步，有利于资源合理配置和社会福利的提高。
2.如果所有权需要分散(多样化)，那么中国大中型企业是不是需要像英美模式那
种极为分散的所有制结构呢?我们的结果似乎暗示否定的回答。实证结果显示，个人股
东对公司控制权变更几乎没有任何显著影响，至少在中国的现状是这样。在许多回归等
式中，个人股东所占比重的系数是显著的负数，表明市场对个人股东不看好。很明显，
中国上市公司存在“免费搭车”的难题。个人股东既无激励(动力)又无能力来监督和影
响企业高层经理的行为。因此，所有权在一定程度上的集中是必要的。这似乎说明了加
紧培育机构股东的重要性。比较研究表明，OECD国家中，股权和控制权也正逐渐地集
中在金融和非金融机构投资人手中。这一趋势的动力来源于所有权的集中作为公司直接
控制的手段的好处。在一个国家法制不够完善，不能保护外部投资者的利益的情况下变
更(在中国和其他转型的发展中国家中也存在)，大型机构投资者和战略投资者(股东)在
控制权中的作用尤其重要。
3.研究结果说明股权集中与公司控制权变更存在负相关关系。说明股权集中与我
国?
From the static eyes on, control rights were the structures and situations; however, from the dynamic eyes on, they were rings of procedures and mechanisms of control rights transferring. As the "genes" of modern companies, control rights' having been effectively distributed was the key and core of solving the corporate governance, and strengthening the control rights mechanisms was the practical choices and strategic trends of improving the corporate governance. In the dissertation, control rights transferring of listed companies was systematically studied with logic path of structure-conduct-performance, and the main contents were presented as follows.
Part 1 was the theoretical hypothesis and relate models of control rights transferring. Chapter 2 and 3 were included. In this part, in order to analyze and support the control rights transferring of listed companies in our country, all kinds of theories of different schools on control rights were reviewed. Theoretical originals on the control rights of neoclassical institution economy and neoclassical property school and beyond property theory and the stakeholders theory and corporate governance were briefly introduced. Subsequently, improving efficiency hypothesis of control rights transferring and its theoretical model were mainly pointed out. In part 3, from the beginning of behaving and mechanism of control rights, macro welfare effect and micro economical efficiency were analyzed. Returns distributions models and returns being expropriated games model in time of imperfect information and boards independence and CEO being monitored game model were chiefly studied in views of games theory in order to rec
eiving the theoretical answers of relate principal parts conducts and results.
Chapter 4 was included in part 2, the situations and causes of control rights transferring of listed companies of our country were comprehensively and practically grasped, and things at home and abroad were compared. At the base of documents, public causes of senior manager transferring were described and included, and relations of related factors and control rights transferring were deeply analysed. Critical factors were analysed with Key components methods in order to more deeply understand inside causes of transferring. Sequentially, situations and causes of American companies mergers and acquisitions were pointed and potential conflicts and future changing trends were put forwards.
Four chapters including Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 were consisted of Part 3 as empirical analysis. In order to improve reliability and classic and effectiveness of research conclusions to the greatest extents, Characteristics of statistic samples and time periods were emphasized in the studies and the kinds of statistical software and test tools were used in the periods of models being built. In the Chapter 5 and 6, in the framework of the stakeholder theory, the governance efficiency and relations between control rights transferring and principal bodies (large stockholders and the stakeholders protection) and leadership structures (post designated of boards and CEO) and characteristic of boards (board composition and board size and board behaviors) of the stakeholders of listed companies samples were deeply analyzed. At the same time, in the Chapter 7 and 8, affecting factors including the stock property structure and enterprises performances (financial performance and market perfor
mance) before and after the control rights transferring were handed out in the face of readers and they were tested in the kinds of angles.
As the beginning and base of the dissertation, conclusions and extents were arranged in the part 4. In the circle of purposes of control rights transferring, institutions arrangement and policies suggestions of perfecting contracts of control rights transferring were put forwards. From the different theoretical eyes on the control rights transferring, empirical research achievements were concluded and compared with questions and causes of control
引文
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