高管薪酬公平对公司绩效的影响研究
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摘要
高管薪酬是否公平不仅影响社会对公平的认知,还会直接影响到公司管理层的管理行为并最终影响公司绩效,因此,高管薪酬公平测度及其经济后果的研究是理论界亟待回答的重要问题。然而,目前理论界有关高管薪酬公平的研究存在两个方面的局限性。第一,研究视角上的局限性。随着公平与效率矛盾的进一步凸显,越来越多的学者开始关注高管薪酬的公平问题,但目前高管薪酬公平方面的研究,还主要集中在高管与员工的薪酬差距即高管薪酬的内部公平研究方面,对高管薪酬个人公平、外部公平的研究鲜有涉猎。第二,研究方法上的单调性。国内外大部分学者在研究高管薪酬、薪酬差距影响因素问题时,对影响因素的层次没有加以区分,个体层面的高管人力资本特征、组织层面的公司经济特征、公司治理特征以及市场层面的地区、行业特征往往均集中在同一个层面,通过多元回归模型进行实证检验。这种将异层次变量置于单一层次进行回归的分析方法容易导致层次谬误偏差。
在分析以往研究局限性的基础上,本研究选择从结果公平视角探讨高管薪酬公平问题。在界定高管薪酬公平内涵的基础上,将高管薪酬公平划分为高管薪酬个人公平、高管薪酬内部公平与高管薪酬外部公平三个维度。在采用额外薪酬(也称做残差薪酬)测量不同层次高管薪酬不公平程度的时候,对以往的研究进行了两个方面的改进。一是改进了研究方法。在梳理国内外高管薪酬、薪酬差距影响因素重要文献基础上,将高管薪酬、薪酬差距的各个影响因素加以分层,然后根据人力资本理论、委托代理理论、社会比较理论、管理者权力理论等推导出合理薪酬、合理薪酬差距以及合理薪酬业绩分位比的影响因素,并在此基础上构建了高管薪酬个人公平、内部公平以及外部公平测度的跨层次模型。二是以往的研究者将全部额外薪酬作为高管薪酬不公平程度的替代变量,但由于理论界还没有一个统一的高管薪酬决定模型,模型中也许有忽略变量,全部将额外薪酬作为高管薪酬的不公平程度有可能高估了不公平程度,因而本研究将额外薪酬按照四分之一分位法进行了分类,额外薪酬排名在前四分之一的定义为正差额外薪酬,额外薪酬排名在后四分之一的定义为负差额外薪酬,排名处于中间的定义为合理薪酬。正差和负差额外薪酬均表示高管薪酬不公平。
完成高管薪酬公平跨层次模型的建构之后,本研究利用锦标赛理论、组织公平理论、相对剥削理论、人才甄选等理论就高管薪酬公平对公司绩效的影响机理进行了理论分析并提出相关假设。以2007年至2011年沪深两市A股上市公司组织样本及其对应的高管个体样本作为研究样本,利用阶层线性模型对影响高管薪酬个人公平、内部公平、外部公平的因素进行了跨层次实证分析,并通过模型得出残差,分组就高管薪酬公平对公司绩效的影响进行了多元回归分析。为避免数据内生性以及遗漏变量问题,通过采用滞后一期的公司绩效变量、增加变量、重新分组等方法对实证研究进行了稳健性检验。论文最后概括了研究的主要结论,并提出相关政策建议,同时点出研究中存在的局限性以及未来研究展望。
综合来看,本研究主要得到以下结论：
第一,不同阶层的因素对高管薪酬公平变异的解释力度不同。通过高管薪酬公平的跨层次实证研究发现,薪酬个人公平方面,由个体层面高管人力资本特征所解释的合理高管薪酬的总变异和由组织层面公司经济特征所解释的合理高管薪酬的总变异接近相等。薪酬内部公平方面,大约有2/3的合理薪酬差距是由不同公司所处的市场环境即组间差异造成,仅有不到1/3的合理薪酬差距是由组织层面上的公司经济特征即组内差异所决定。薪酬外部公平方面,有4/5的合理薪酬业绩分位比是由公司之间的差异即组内差异造成的,仅有不到1/5的合理薪酬业绩分位比是由公司外部市场环境之间的差异即组间差异造成。
第二,企业的所有制形式、行业性质对高管薪酬的外部公平性有显著的影响。跨层次模型实证结果发现,与非国有企业相比,央企在业绩较低的情况下,仍然支付了较高的高管薪酬,对公司高管的支付水平偏高。但与非国有企业相比,地方国企的薪酬业绩分位比没有显著差异。与非垄断行业相比,垄断行业在业绩较低的情况下,仍然支付了较高的高管薪酬,对公司高管的支付水平偏高。
第三,不同维度的高管薪酬公平对公司绩效有着不同的影响。代表高管薪酬个人公平的合理高管薪酬变量对公司绩效有显著的正向影响,表明公司高管薪酬的支付如果能体现高管的能力和投入,会使高管个人感到薪酬支付公平,薪酬满意度会上升,从而对其工作绩效产生正面影响。但代表高管薪酬内部公平的合理薪酬差距变量以及代表高管薪酬外部公平的合理薪酬业绩分位比变量对公司绩效均无显著影响。高管个人公平是自身投入和获得之间的比较,更易得到管理者的认同,而高管薪酬内部公平和外部公平更强调与其他参照对象的比较,可能不易得到管理者的认同,这也许是不同维度高管薪酬公平对公司绩效影响作用不同的潜在原因。
第四,从薪酬内部公平来讲,薪酬差距过大未必能带来高的公司绩效,但薪酬差距过小却势必会影响公司绩效。本研究的实证结果发现,组织内部如果实际薪酬差距低于合理薪酬差距,会对公司绩效产生显著的负向影响,但如果组织内部实际薪酬差距高于合理薪酬差距,虽然会对公司绩效产生正向影响,但并不显著。由于我国长期以来实行的是以平均主义为特征的薪酬制度,拉大薪酬差距虽然会给管理层带来激励效应,但由于过大的薪酬差距在国内易导致组织内部员工不公平感的产生,因而在两种不同方向力量的作用下,正差额外薪酬差距对公司绩效没有显著影响。
第五,从薪酬外部公平来讲,正差、负差额外薪酬业绩分位比均会对公司绩效产生正向影响。正差额外薪酬业绩分位比对公司绩效具有显著的正向影响作用,表明当一个公司高管层的薪酬业绩分位比高于合理薪酬业绩分位比时,下行比较使得经理人提高自我评价,薪酬的激励作用可以促使管理层更有动力来改进管理效率,提高公司业绩。负差额外薪酬业绩分位比对公司绩效同样具有显著的正向影响作用,可能的原因是,当管理层薪酬业绩分位比显著低于同行业、同地区、同所有制其他管理层的薪酬业绩分位比时,为了避免影响自身的市场价值,管理层更有动机努力提高公司业绩以改变投资者对他们能力的看法。
本研究主要的研究创新点如下：
1.基于社会比较理论、激励理论、分配公平理论,界定了“高管薪酬公平”的内涵与维度,丰富和拓展了激励理论和委托代理理论的研究范畴。本研究在界定高管薪酬公平内涵的基础上,将高管薪酬公平划分为高管薪酬个人公平、高管薪酬内部公平、高管薪酬外部公平三个维度,以企业作为分配主体,探讨了初次分配中如何协调生产要素的提供与薪酬支付之间的合理关系,丰富了微观层面分配结果公平的研究成果,拓展了激励理论和委托代理理论的研究范畴。
2.在分析变量嵌套关系的基础上,构建了我国上市公司高管薪酬个人公平、内部公平以及外部公平的跨层次研究模型。在比较各种薪酬公平测度方法的基础上,本研究选择采用经验研究法中的额外薪酬方法来测度高管薪酬的各类公平,在分析变量嵌套关系的基础上,利用跨层次分析方法构建了高管薪酬公平测度模型,有效地校正了将异层次变量置于单一层次进行回归分析所导致的偏差。
3.运用“薪酬公平测度模型”,揭示了高管薪酬公平对公司绩效的影响作用与实现途径。“薪酬公平测度模型”提供了企业依据高管的人力资本状况、公司经济情况以及企业所处行业和地区情况制定“公平薪酬”的有效工具。本研究以中国上市公司为样本,分别就高管薪酬的个人公平、内部公平和外部公平对公司绩效的影响进行了实证分析,这将有助于组织根据自身情况有针对性地采取措施来提高初次分配的结果公平,从而提高组织绩效。
The fairness of executive pay issue affects not only the social perception of fairness, but also directly affects the managerial behavior and ultimately affects the company's performance. Therefore, the executive pay equity measurement and its economic consequences become an urgent research topic. However, the current literature about executive pay equity has two aspects of limitations. First, the limitation on research perspectives. With the highlight of the conflict between equity and efficiency, more and more researchers are starting to focus on executive pay equity research. However, the current executive pay equity research mainly focus on the internal executive pay equity issues, the research on individual executive pay equity and external executive pay equity are still insufficient. Second, the monotonicity of research methodology. The majority of both home and abroad researchers did not make a clear distinguish between different level variables. Executives human capital characteristics at individual level, economic characteristics and corporate governance features at organizational level, and region, industry characteristics at market level were all put into the same level to do multiple regression analysis. The method of putting cross-level variables into a single-level may lead to leads to level fallacy bias.
Based on the analysis of the previous research limitations, this dissertation intended to investigate executive pay equity from the perspective of the result equity. After defining the meaning of executive pay equity, the dissertation divided the executive pay equity into three dimensions, which is individual executive pay equity, internal executive pay equity and external executive pay equity. By applying the excess pay (also called residual pay) method to measure the inequity of executive pay, there were two improvements made. The first improvement was in research methodology. By reviewing the main literatures on factors affecting executive pay and pay gap, the dissertation divided the various factors into different levels. Based on the reasonable affecting factors of pay, pay gap and pay performance percentile, which were deducted from human capital theory, agency theory, social comparison theory and managers power theory, the dissertation adopts hierarchical linear model to construct separately the executive individul pay equity, internal pay equity, and external pay equity measurement models. Second, the previous researchers treated all the excess pay as a proxy for executive pay inequity. However, due to the fact that there are no universal determining model for executive pay, and there may be missing variables in the model, treating all excess pay as executive pay inequity might overestimate the extent of inequity, thus the dissertation adopted quartile method to divide the excess pay into different groups. Excess pay lying in the fourth quartile was named as positive excess pay, excess pay lying in the first quartile was named as negative excess pay, the excess pay lying in the middle was named as reasonable pay. Both of positive and negative excess pay represent the inequity of executive pay.
After the constructing of executive pay measurement hierarchical linear model, the dissertation applied tournament theory, organizational justice theory, the relative deprivation theory, personnel selection theory to do the theoretical analysis and proposed relevant hypotheses. Taking the Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed company data and executive data during2007to2011as research sample, the dissertation used HLM to study the cross-level factors affecting individual executive pay equity, internal executive pay equity, and external executive pay equity. Using the residuals obtained from the HLM, the dissertation ran multiple regression analysis of the impact of different dimensions of executive pay equity on corporate performance. To avoid data endogenous and missing variables problems, the dissertation performed robust rest by using the lagged performance data, adding additional variable and regrouping. At last, the dissertation concluded the main conclusions, proposed related policy recommendations, and also pointed out the limitations of the research and the future research prospects.
In general, the research comes to the following conclusions.
First, factors from different levels have different explanation power in executive pay equity variance. Through cross-level analysis, the dissertation found that the human capital characteristics in individual level and the economic features in organizational level had almost equal explanation power in explaining the variances in individual pay equity. Two thirds of the variances in internal pay equity could be explained by the differences between market environments, ie the between-group variance. Only one third of the variances could be explained by the differences between companies, ie the within-group variance. Four fifths of the variances in external pay equity could be explained by the differences between companies, ie the within-group variance. Only one fifth of the variances could be explained by the differences between market environments, ie the between-group variance.
Second, the ownership, nature of the industry have significant influence on the external executive pay equity. The Empirical results of hierarchical linear model indicate that compared with non-state-owned enterprises, central government controlled enterprises paid a high executive pay in the case of low performance, the company's executives pay levels were high. However, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the pay performance percentile ratio of local government controlled state-owned enterprises was not significantly different. Compared with non-monopoly enterprises, monopolies still paid a high executive pay in the case of low performance, the company's executive pay levels were high.
Third, the different dimensions of executive pay equity have different effects on corporate performance. The reasonable executive pay which represents individual executive pay equity has significant positive influence on corporate performance. It indicates that if the executive pay can reflect the ability and commitment the executive has, it will make executive feel pay equity, the satisfaction of pay will go up, thus result a positive impact on job performance. But the reasonable pay gap which represents the internal executive pay equity and the reasonable pay performance percentile ratio which represents the external executive pay equity have no significant impact on corporate performance. The individual executive pay equity regards comparing personal efforts and personal gains, which is easier to get approved by management. However, the internal executive pay equity and external pay equity focus on comparing the executives with other references, it is less likely to get approved by management. This may be the potential reason why different dimensions of executive pay equity have different effects on corporate performance.
Fourth, as far as the internal pay equity is concerned, large pay gap may not be able to bring high performance, but small pay gap will inevitably affect corporate performance. The empirical results show that if the actual pay gap within the organization is below the reasonable gap, company performance will be significant negative affected. However, if the actual pay gap within the organization is larger than the reasonable pay gap, although the company performance will be positively affected, but not significantly. Since China has long been characterized by practicing egalitarianism pay system, the larger pay gap will bring the management incentive effect, thus resulting an increase in corporate performance, but due to the arising of inequity feeling inside the organization, the positive excess pay gap has no significant impact on corporate performance.
Fifth, as far as the external pay equity is concerned, both the positive and the negative pay performance percentile ratio have significant impact on firm performance. Empirical results found that positive pay performance percentile ratio has a significant positive effect on corporate performance. This indicates that when a company's pay performance percentile ratio is higher than reasonable pay performance percentile ratio, downside comparison allows managers to improve self-evaluation; the incentive may motivate mangers to improve management efficiency and push up the company performance. The research found that the negative pay performance percentile ratio also has a significant positive influence on corporate performance. The possible reason is that when management pay performance percentile ratio was significantly lower than the rivals, in order to avoid affecting their market value, the management will do more efforts to improve the performance of the company to change investors' views of their abilities.
The main contributions of the research are as follows.
1. Based on social comparison theory, incentive theory, distribution justice theory, the dissertation defined the meaning and dimensions of'executive pay equity', enriched and expanded the research area of incentive theory and principal-agent theory. After defining the definition of executive pay equity, the dissertation divided the executive pay equity into three dimensions, which is individual executive pay equity, internal executive pay equity and external executive pay equity. From the perspective of business entity, the dissertation discusses how to coordinate the reasonable relationship between the providers of production factors and the remuneration payment in the process of initial distribution. The research enriches the distribution results equity literature of micro-level, and expands the literature on incentive theory and principal-agent theory.
2. Based on the analysis of nested variables, the dissertation constructed the hierarchical linear model to measure the executive pay equity. Comparing the various methods of measurement of pay equity, the research uses the excess pay method in empirical research to measure the various executive pay equity. Based on the analysis of nested variables, the dissertation used cross-level analysis to construct hierarchical linear model to measure different dimensions of executive pay equity. This methodology can effectively rectify the variance arising from regressing different level variables on the same level.
3. By applying the'executive pay equity measurement model', the research revealed the impact of executive pay equity on corporate performance and the implementation channel."Executive pay equity measurement model'provided an efficient tool to formulate "equity pay", based on the executive human capital characteristics, the economic features of the company, and the zone and industry where the company lies. By using the China listed company as sample, the dissertation applies the pay equity measurement model separately to study the impact of individual executive pay equity, internal executive pay equity and external executive pay equity on corporate performance. This will help the organizations to take proper actions to improve the results equity of the initial distribution, thus improve the organizational performance.
在分析以往研究局限性的基础上,本研究选择从结果公平视角探讨高管薪酬公平问题。在界定高管薪酬公平内涵的基础上,将高管薪酬公平划分为高管薪酬个人公平、高管薪酬内部公平与高管薪酬外部公平三个维度。在采用额外薪酬(也称做残差薪酬)测量不同层次高管薪酬不公平程度的时候,对以往的研究进行了两个方面的改进。一是改进了研究方法。在梳理国内外高管薪酬、薪酬差距影响因素重要文献基础上,将高管薪酬、薪酬差距的各个影响因素加以分层,然后根据人力资本理论、委托代理理论、社会比较理论、管理者权力理论等推导出合理薪酬、合理薪酬差距以及合理薪酬业绩分位比的影响因素,并在此基础上构建了高管薪酬个人公平、内部公平以及外部公平测度的跨层次模型。二是以往的研究者将全部额外薪酬作为高管薪酬不公平程度的替代变量,但由于理论界还没有一个统一的高管薪酬决定模型,模型中也许有忽略变量,全部将额外薪酬作为高管薪酬的不公平程度有可能高估了不公平程度,因而本研究将额外薪酬按照四分之一分位法进行了分类,额外薪酬排名在前四分之一的定义为正差额外薪酬,额外薪酬排名在后四分之一的定义为负差额外薪酬,排名处于中间的定义为合理薪酬。正差和负差额外薪酬均表示高管薪酬不公平。
完成高管薪酬公平跨层次模型的建构之后,本研究利用锦标赛理论、组织公平理论、相对剥削理论、人才甄选等理论就高管薪酬公平对公司绩效的影响机理进行了理论分析并提出相关假设。以2007年至2011年沪深两市A股上市公司组织样本及其对应的高管个体样本作为研究样本,利用阶层线性模型对影响高管薪酬个人公平、内部公平、外部公平的因素进行了跨层次实证分析,并通过模型得出残差,分组就高管薪酬公平对公司绩效的影响进行了多元回归分析。为避免数据内生性以及遗漏变量问题,通过采用滞后一期的公司绩效变量、增加变量、重新分组等方法对实证研究进行了稳健性检验。论文最后概括了研究的主要结论,并提出相关政策建议,同时点出研究中存在的局限性以及未来研究展望。
综合来看,本研究主要得到以下结论：
第一,不同阶层的因素对高管薪酬公平变异的解释力度不同。通过高管薪酬公平的跨层次实证研究发现,薪酬个人公平方面,由个体层面高管人力资本特征所解释的合理高管薪酬的总变异和由组织层面公司经济特征所解释的合理高管薪酬的总变异接近相等。薪酬内部公平方面,大约有2/3的合理薪酬差距是由不同公司所处的市场环境即组间差异造成,仅有不到1/3的合理薪酬差距是由组织层面上的公司经济特征即组内差异所决定。薪酬外部公平方面,有4/5的合理薪酬业绩分位比是由公司之间的差异即组内差异造成的,仅有不到1/5的合理薪酬业绩分位比是由公司外部市场环境之间的差异即组间差异造成。
第二,企业的所有制形式、行业性质对高管薪酬的外部公平性有显著的影响。跨层次模型实证结果发现,与非国有企业相比,央企在业绩较低的情况下,仍然支付了较高的高管薪酬,对公司高管的支付水平偏高。但与非国有企业相比,地方国企的薪酬业绩分位比没有显著差异。与非垄断行业相比,垄断行业在业绩较低的情况下,仍然支付了较高的高管薪酬,对公司高管的支付水平偏高。
第三,不同维度的高管薪酬公平对公司绩效有着不同的影响。代表高管薪酬个人公平的合理高管薪酬变量对公司绩效有显著的正向影响,表明公司高管薪酬的支付如果能体现高管的能力和投入,会使高管个人感到薪酬支付公平,薪酬满意度会上升,从而对其工作绩效产生正面影响。但代表高管薪酬内部公平的合理薪酬差距变量以及代表高管薪酬外部公平的合理薪酬业绩分位比变量对公司绩效均无显著影响。高管个人公平是自身投入和获得之间的比较,更易得到管理者的认同,而高管薪酬内部公平和外部公平更强调与其他参照对象的比较,可能不易得到管理者的认同,这也许是不同维度高管薪酬公平对公司绩效影响作用不同的潜在原因。
第四,从薪酬内部公平来讲,薪酬差距过大未必能带来高的公司绩效,但薪酬差距过小却势必会影响公司绩效。本研究的实证结果发现,组织内部如果实际薪酬差距低于合理薪酬差距,会对公司绩效产生显著的负向影响,但如果组织内部实际薪酬差距高于合理薪酬差距,虽然会对公司绩效产生正向影响,但并不显著。由于我国长期以来实行的是以平均主义为特征的薪酬制度,拉大薪酬差距虽然会给管理层带来激励效应,但由于过大的薪酬差距在国内易导致组织内部员工不公平感的产生,因而在两种不同方向力量的作用下,正差额外薪酬差距对公司绩效没有显著影响。
第五,从薪酬外部公平来讲,正差、负差额外薪酬业绩分位比均会对公司绩效产生正向影响。正差额外薪酬业绩分位比对公司绩效具有显著的正向影响作用,表明当一个公司高管层的薪酬业绩分位比高于合理薪酬业绩分位比时,下行比较使得经理人提高自我评价,薪酬的激励作用可以促使管理层更有动力来改进管理效率,提高公司业绩。负差额外薪酬业绩分位比对公司绩效同样具有显著的正向影响作用,可能的原因是,当管理层薪酬业绩分位比显著低于同行业、同地区、同所有制其他管理层的薪酬业绩分位比时,为了避免影响自身的市场价值,管理层更有动机努力提高公司业绩以改变投资者对他们能力的看法。
本研究主要的研究创新点如下：
1.基于社会比较理论、激励理论、分配公平理论,界定了“高管薪酬公平”的内涵与维度,丰富和拓展了激励理论和委托代理理论的研究范畴。本研究在界定高管薪酬公平内涵的基础上,将高管薪酬公平划分为高管薪酬个人公平、高管薪酬内部公平、高管薪酬外部公平三个维度,以企业作为分配主体,探讨了初次分配中如何协调生产要素的提供与薪酬支付之间的合理关系,丰富了微观层面分配结果公平的研究成果,拓展了激励理论和委托代理理论的研究范畴。
2.在分析变量嵌套关系的基础上,构建了我国上市公司高管薪酬个人公平、内部公平以及外部公平的跨层次研究模型。在比较各种薪酬公平测度方法的基础上,本研究选择采用经验研究法中的额外薪酬方法来测度高管薪酬的各类公平,在分析变量嵌套关系的基础上,利用跨层次分析方法构建了高管薪酬公平测度模型,有效地校正了将异层次变量置于单一层次进行回归分析所导致的偏差。
3.运用“薪酬公平测度模型”,揭示了高管薪酬公平对公司绩效的影响作用与实现途径。“薪酬公平测度模型”提供了企业依据高管的人力资本状况、公司经济情况以及企业所处行业和地区情况制定“公平薪酬”的有效工具。本研究以中国上市公司为样本,分别就高管薪酬的个人公平、内部公平和外部公平对公司绩效的影响进行了实证分析,这将有助于组织根据自身情况有针对性地采取措施来提高初次分配的结果公平,从而提高组织绩效。
The fairness of executive pay issue affects not only the social perception of fairness, but also directly affects the managerial behavior and ultimately affects the company's performance. Therefore, the executive pay equity measurement and its economic consequences become an urgent research topic. However, the current literature about executive pay equity has two aspects of limitations. First, the limitation on research perspectives. With the highlight of the conflict between equity and efficiency, more and more researchers are starting to focus on executive pay equity research. However, the current executive pay equity research mainly focus on the internal executive pay equity issues, the research on individual executive pay equity and external executive pay equity are still insufficient. Second, the monotonicity of research methodology. The majority of both home and abroad researchers did not make a clear distinguish between different level variables. Executives human capital characteristics at individual level, economic characteristics and corporate governance features at organizational level, and region, industry characteristics at market level were all put into the same level to do multiple regression analysis. The method of putting cross-level variables into a single-level may lead to leads to level fallacy bias.
Based on the analysis of the previous research limitations, this dissertation intended to investigate executive pay equity from the perspective of the result equity. After defining the meaning of executive pay equity, the dissertation divided the executive pay equity into three dimensions, which is individual executive pay equity, internal executive pay equity and external executive pay equity. By applying the excess pay (also called residual pay) method to measure the inequity of executive pay, there were two improvements made. The first improvement was in research methodology. By reviewing the main literatures on factors affecting executive pay and pay gap, the dissertation divided the various factors into different levels. Based on the reasonable affecting factors of pay, pay gap and pay performance percentile, which were deducted from human capital theory, agency theory, social comparison theory and managers power theory, the dissertation adopts hierarchical linear model to construct separately the executive individul pay equity, internal pay equity, and external pay equity measurement models. Second, the previous researchers treated all the excess pay as a proxy for executive pay inequity. However, due to the fact that there are no universal determining model for executive pay, and there may be missing variables in the model, treating all excess pay as executive pay inequity might overestimate the extent of inequity, thus the dissertation adopted quartile method to divide the excess pay into different groups. Excess pay lying in the fourth quartile was named as positive excess pay, excess pay lying in the first quartile was named as negative excess pay, the excess pay lying in the middle was named as reasonable pay. Both of positive and negative excess pay represent the inequity of executive pay.
After the constructing of executive pay measurement hierarchical linear model, the dissertation applied tournament theory, organizational justice theory, the relative deprivation theory, personnel selection theory to do the theoretical analysis and proposed relevant hypotheses. Taking the Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed company data and executive data during2007to2011as research sample, the dissertation used HLM to study the cross-level factors affecting individual executive pay equity, internal executive pay equity, and external executive pay equity. Using the residuals obtained from the HLM, the dissertation ran multiple regression analysis of the impact of different dimensions of executive pay equity on corporate performance. To avoid data endogenous and missing variables problems, the dissertation performed robust rest by using the lagged performance data, adding additional variable and regrouping. At last, the dissertation concluded the main conclusions, proposed related policy recommendations, and also pointed out the limitations of the research and the future research prospects.
In general, the research comes to the following conclusions.
First, factors from different levels have different explanation power in executive pay equity variance. Through cross-level analysis, the dissertation found that the human capital characteristics in individual level and the economic features in organizational level had almost equal explanation power in explaining the variances in individual pay equity. Two thirds of the variances in internal pay equity could be explained by the differences between market environments, ie the between-group variance. Only one third of the variances could be explained by the differences between companies, ie the within-group variance. Four fifths of the variances in external pay equity could be explained by the differences between companies, ie the within-group variance. Only one fifth of the variances could be explained by the differences between market environments, ie the between-group variance.
Second, the ownership, nature of the industry have significant influence on the external executive pay equity. The Empirical results of hierarchical linear model indicate that compared with non-state-owned enterprises, central government controlled enterprises paid a high executive pay in the case of low performance, the company's executives pay levels were high. However, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the pay performance percentile ratio of local government controlled state-owned enterprises was not significantly different. Compared with non-monopoly enterprises, monopolies still paid a high executive pay in the case of low performance, the company's executive pay levels were high.
Third, the different dimensions of executive pay equity have different effects on corporate performance. The reasonable executive pay which represents individual executive pay equity has significant positive influence on corporate performance. It indicates that if the executive pay can reflect the ability and commitment the executive has, it will make executive feel pay equity, the satisfaction of pay will go up, thus result a positive impact on job performance. But the reasonable pay gap which represents the internal executive pay equity and the reasonable pay performance percentile ratio which represents the external executive pay equity have no significant impact on corporate performance. The individual executive pay equity regards comparing personal efforts and personal gains, which is easier to get approved by management. However, the internal executive pay equity and external pay equity focus on comparing the executives with other references, it is less likely to get approved by management. This may be the potential reason why different dimensions of executive pay equity have different effects on corporate performance.
Fourth, as far as the internal pay equity is concerned, large pay gap may not be able to bring high performance, but small pay gap will inevitably affect corporate performance. The empirical results show that if the actual pay gap within the organization is below the reasonable gap, company performance will be significant negative affected. However, if the actual pay gap within the organization is larger than the reasonable pay gap, although the company performance will be positively affected, but not significantly. Since China has long been characterized by practicing egalitarianism pay system, the larger pay gap will bring the management incentive effect, thus resulting an increase in corporate performance, but due to the arising of inequity feeling inside the organization, the positive excess pay gap has no significant impact on corporate performance.
Fifth, as far as the external pay equity is concerned, both the positive and the negative pay performance percentile ratio have significant impact on firm performance. Empirical results found that positive pay performance percentile ratio has a significant positive effect on corporate performance. This indicates that when a company's pay performance percentile ratio is higher than reasonable pay performance percentile ratio, downside comparison allows managers to improve self-evaluation; the incentive may motivate mangers to improve management efficiency and push up the company performance. The research found that the negative pay performance percentile ratio also has a significant positive influence on corporate performance. The possible reason is that when management pay performance percentile ratio was significantly lower than the rivals, in order to avoid affecting their market value, the management will do more efforts to improve the performance of the company to change investors' views of their abilities.
The main contributions of the research are as follows.
1. Based on social comparison theory, incentive theory, distribution justice theory, the dissertation defined the meaning and dimensions of'executive pay equity', enriched and expanded the research area of incentive theory and principal-agent theory. After defining the definition of executive pay equity, the dissertation divided the executive pay equity into three dimensions, which is individual executive pay equity, internal executive pay equity and external executive pay equity. From the perspective of business entity, the dissertation discusses how to coordinate the reasonable relationship between the providers of production factors and the remuneration payment in the process of initial distribution. The research enriches the distribution results equity literature of micro-level, and expands the literature on incentive theory and principal-agent theory.
2. Based on the analysis of nested variables, the dissertation constructed the hierarchical linear model to measure the executive pay equity. Comparing the various methods of measurement of pay equity, the research uses the excess pay method in empirical research to measure the various executive pay equity. Based on the analysis of nested variables, the dissertation used cross-level analysis to construct hierarchical linear model to measure different dimensions of executive pay equity. This methodology can effectively rectify the variance arising from regressing different level variables on the same level.
3. By applying the'executive pay equity measurement model', the research revealed the impact of executive pay equity on corporate performance and the implementation channel."Executive pay equity measurement model'provided an efficient tool to formulate "equity pay", based on the executive human capital characteristics, the economic features of the company, and the zone and industry where the company lies. By using the China listed company as sample, the dissertation applies the pay equity measurement model separately to study the impact of individual executive pay equity, internal executive pay equity and external executive pay equity on corporate performance. This will help the organizations to take proper actions to improve the results equity of the initial distribution, thus improve the organizational performance.
引文
① 来源：《中国投资》2010年11月8日,网址:http://www.cs.com.cn/gppd/25/201011/t20101108_2658886.html
② 记者：王书昆(2008).把提高效率同促进社会公平结合起来——访著名经济学家卫兴华教授[J].新视野.2008(02)：11-14.
① 温福星.阶层线性模型的原理与应用[M].北京,中国轻工业出版社.2009：P28.
① Edvinsson.L and Malone M.S. Intellectual Capital:Realizing Your Company's True Value by Finding Its Hidden Brainpower [M]. New York:Harper Business.1997:10-11.
① 该部分内容已经在《科技与管理》2011年第4期公开发表。
① 本部分内容已经在《现代管理科学》2010年第4期公开发表。
① 本部分内容已经在《山东社会科学》2012年第6期公开发表。
① 本部分内容已经在《山东社会科学》2013年第6期公开发表。
① 生态学谬误是指根据集合单位的分析结果做出关于个体的断言。这一问题的要害是混淆了不同层次主体的行为模式。
② 邱皓政译.多层次模型分析导论[M].重庆：重庆大学出版社.2007：译序Ⅲ。
③ 邱皓政译.多层次模型分析导论[M].重庆：重庆大学出版社.2007：P1.
① 管理者权力理论认为,由于受到CEO的影响,董事会在制定高管薪酬套餐时,并没有将最大化股东利益放在首位,在高管有能力影响自己的薪酬情境下,高管薪酬契约本身成为代理问题的一部分。Bebchuk,L.A.J. M. Fried, et al. Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation [J]. National Bureau of Economic Research.2002 vol 69(3):751-846.
①社会惰化(Social loafing)也称为社会惰化作用或社会逍遥,是指个人与群体其他成员一起完成某种事情时,或个人活动时有他人在场,往往个人所付出的努力比单独时偏少,不如单干时出力多,个人的活动积极性与效率下降的现象,也称之为社会惰化作用,也叫社会干扰、社会致弱、社会逍遥、社会懈怠。Shepperd, J. A.. Productivity loss in performance groups:A motivation analysis [J]. Psychological bulletin. 1993 vol 113(1):67.
②特雷弗等在美国《管理学会杂志》曾经发表了一篇文章,文章里面指出,薪酬不均不等于薪酬不公平。总的薪酬差距由两部分组成：一部分是可用投入差异来解释的薪酬差距DEP,一部分是不可以用投入差异来解释的薪酬差距DUP。但以工作业绩、能力、工作职位等代表的员工投入差异所带来的薪酬差异不一定都能在实际的总薪酬差距中得以反映。具体可以参见第三章图3-4：薪酬差距、与投入有关的薪酬差距以及与投入无关的薪酬差距。Trevor, C. O., G. Reilly, et al. Reconsidering Pay Dispersion's Effect on the Performance of Interdependent Work:Reconciling Sorting and Pay Inequality[J], Academy of Management Journal.2012 Vol 55(3): 585-610.
① 美国学者克里斯托(Crystal)教授：“公司也有组织名誉感,如果支付给该公司CEO的薪酬低于高管薪酬的平均水平,那么对该公司的名誉就是一个打击。与公司的董事会成员谈及该问题,他很可能告诉你‘我们公司没有问题,和其他公司一样好。当然,我们不会那么小气在平均薪酬水平之下支付我们高管的薪酬。这种致命的想法导致了‘棘轮效用’的出现。即如果该公司高管的薪酬低于平均水平,则增加该高管的薪酬至平均水平;如果刚好达到了平均水平,则至少要超过平均水平。如果超过了平均水平,则一般也不会降低到平均水平。这些高管薪酬的上涨导致下一个年度高管薪酬平均薪酬的上涨,然后再一轮地促使高管薪酬的上涨”。Crystal,G. S.In search of excess:The overcompensation of American executives [M]. Norton.1991：221.
① 资料来源http://finance.jrj.com.cn/opinion/2009/05/2711475104006.shtml
① 伍尔德里奇著,费剑平译.计量经济学导论[M].中国人民大学出版社.2010：221.
1 本章部分实证内容已经在《统训与决策》2014年第5期公开发表。
① 所谓均值回转特征,是指当一种现象较大幅度偏离其历史平均水平的时候,其以后的发展会向历史平均水平趋近。王强.中国上市公司行业盈利状况的均值回转特征研究[J].市场周刊,2010(1)：59-60+16.
① 资料来源：人民网,网址http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0528/c1004-21635224.html
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② 记者：王书昆(2008).把提高效率同促进社会公平结合起来——访著名经济学家卫兴华教授[J].新视野.2008(02)：11-14.
① 温福星.阶层线性模型的原理与应用[M].北京,中国轻工业出版社.2009：P28.
① Edvinsson.L and Malone M.S. Intellectual Capital:Realizing Your Company's True Value by Finding Its Hidden Brainpower [M]. New York:Harper Business.1997:10-11.
① 该部分内容已经在《科技与管理》2011年第4期公开发表。
① 本部分内容已经在《现代管理科学》2010年第4期公开发表。
① 本部分内容已经在《山东社会科学》2012年第6期公开发表。
① 本部分内容已经在《山东社会科学》2013年第6期公开发表。
① 生态学谬误是指根据集合单位的分析结果做出关于个体的断言。这一问题的要害是混淆了不同层次主体的行为模式。
② 邱皓政译.多层次模型分析导论[M].重庆：重庆大学出版社.2007：译序Ⅲ。
③ 邱皓政译.多层次模型分析导论[M].重庆：重庆大学出版社.2007：P1.
① 管理者权力理论认为,由于受到CEO的影响,董事会在制定高管薪酬套餐时,并没有将最大化股东利益放在首位,在高管有能力影响自己的薪酬情境下,高管薪酬契约本身成为代理问题的一部分。Bebchuk,L.A.J. M. Fried, et al. Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation [J]. National Bureau of Economic Research.2002 vol 69(3):751-846.
①社会惰化(Social loafing)也称为社会惰化作用或社会逍遥,是指个人与群体其他成员一起完成某种事情时,或个人活动时有他人在场,往往个人所付出的努力比单独时偏少,不如单干时出力多,个人的活动积极性与效率下降的现象,也称之为社会惰化作用,也叫社会干扰、社会致弱、社会逍遥、社会懈怠。Shepperd, J. A.. Productivity loss in performance groups:A motivation analysis [J]. Psychological bulletin. 1993 vol 113(1):67.
②特雷弗等在美国《管理学会杂志》曾经发表了一篇文章,文章里面指出,薪酬不均不等于薪酬不公平。总的薪酬差距由两部分组成：一部分是可用投入差异来解释的薪酬差距DEP,一部分是不可以用投入差异来解释的薪酬差距DUP。但以工作业绩、能力、工作职位等代表的员工投入差异所带来的薪酬差异不一定都能在实际的总薪酬差距中得以反映。具体可以参见第三章图3-4：薪酬差距、与投入有关的薪酬差距以及与投入无关的薪酬差距。Trevor, C. O., G. Reilly, et al. Reconsidering Pay Dispersion's Effect on the Performance of Interdependent Work:Reconciling Sorting and Pay Inequality[J], Academy of Management Journal.2012 Vol 55(3): 585-610.
① 美国学者克里斯托(Crystal)教授：“公司也有组织名誉感,如果支付给该公司CEO的薪酬低于高管薪酬的平均水平,那么对该公司的名誉就是一个打击。与公司的董事会成员谈及该问题,他很可能告诉你‘我们公司没有问题,和其他公司一样好。当然,我们不会那么小气在平均薪酬水平之下支付我们高管的薪酬。这种致命的想法导致了‘棘轮效用’的出现。即如果该公司高管的薪酬低于平均水平,则增加该高管的薪酬至平均水平;如果刚好达到了平均水平,则至少要超过平均水平。如果超过了平均水平,则一般也不会降低到平均水平。这些高管薪酬的上涨导致下一个年度高管薪酬平均薪酬的上涨,然后再一轮地促使高管薪酬的上涨”。Crystal,G. S.In search of excess:The overcompensation of American executives [M]. Norton.1991：221.
① 资料来源http://finance.jrj.com.cn/opinion/2009/05/2711475104006.shtml
① 伍尔德里奇著,费剑平译.计量经济学导论[M].中国人民大学出版社.2010：221.
1 本章部分实证内容已经在《统训与决策》2014年第5期公开发表。
① 所谓均值回转特征,是指当一种现象较大幅度偏离其历史平均水平的时候,其以后的发展会向历史平均水平趋近。王强.中国上市公司行业盈利状况的均值回转特征研究[J].市场周刊,2010(1)：59-60+16.
① 资料来源：人民网,网址http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0528/c1004-21635224.html
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