公司治理、经理人动机与费用粘性关系研究
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摘要
费用（成本）管理是企业管理的重要内容，对费用（成本）习性（cost behavior）的研究有助于企业内部经理人进行成本费用决策、外部投资者及相关机构进行企业绩效预测。费用粘性（cost stickiness）作为费用习性的一种表现，其研究根源在于对经理人以传统成本习性模型为基础所作决策是否足够准确的考虑。本文研究的出发点正是基于经理人对费用粘性的影响，如何激励经理人更多地进行积极的成本管理，制约其消极的成本决策。
经理人的费用决策关乎企业的成败兴衰，然而，经理人的动机才是其费用决策背后的真正推动力，经理人的不同动机与费用习性之间有着必然的联系，而公司治理设计的初衷正是想实现股东对经理人的监督与制衡。因此，本文针对公司治理、经理人动机与费用粘性的关系进行研究，厘清了不同经理人动机对费用习性的影响路径，为企业通过费用比率进行经理人绩效考核提供了更为全面的理论指导，对如何加强公司治理以制约经理人自利动机从而减轻代理问题，如何加强费用控制以提高公司价值具有现实指导意义。
在对本研究涉及的理论基础和国内外关于费用粘性特征、成因、影响因素及其经济后果的文献进行回顾和述评的基础上，本文从对费用粘性产生的成因和影响因素进行理论分析入手，首先研究了经理人最优决策动机、盈余管理动机、自利动机三种不同动机对费用粘性的影响，研究发现，经理人最优决策动机会导致较高水平的费用粘性；具有保盈动机的样本公司，费用的对称性表现得更明显；而具有新股发行动机的公司，费用表现出反粘性的特征；经理人自利动机对费用粘性水平有积极的影响，具体而言，并购重组事件是经理人自利动机付诸实施的前提条件，充足的自由现金流和较长的经理人任期是经理人自利动机实施的必备条件，而经理人薪酬结构中变动性比例的增加会刺激经理人自利动机的实施，这些因素均对费用粘性产生显著的正向影响。其次本文考察了公司治理对经理人自利动机的制约作用，研究表明，较高的公司治理强度有利于抑制经理人的自利动机，从而降低经理人自利动机下形成的费用粘性，提高公司价值；而公司治理水平低的公司，经理人自利动机比较明显，费用粘性也相对较高。进一步，经理人在最优决策动机下形成的费用粘性将对公司价值的增长传递积极的信号；而在自利动机下形成的费用粘性，表明费用管理的低效率，将对公司价值的增长传递消极的信号。最后是本文的研究结论，并为我国企业经理人能科学合理进行成本管理决策给出了政策建议。
Cost management is an important part of enterprise management. The study oncost behavior helps mangers to make cost decision, investors and others to forecastcorporate performance. As a kind of manifestation of cost behavior, the research oncost stickiness is rooted in considering the accuracy of mangers’ decisions based ontraditional cost behavior model. The starting point of this paper is that how tomotivate manger more positively cost management and restrict their less negative costdecision based on the hypothesis that mangers have impact on cost stickiness.
Cost management is related to the success and failure of enterprise, but themangers incentive is the real force behind cost management. Different incentives ofmangers have different impact on cost behavior, and the purpose of the design ofcorporate governance is to achieve checks and balance of shareholders to mangers.Therefore, this paper studies the relationship between corporate governance, mangersincentives and cost stickiness. The results help us to understand the ways of mangersdifferent incentives on cost stickiness and provide more comprehensive theoreticalsupports for application of expense ratio. And these conclusions have practicalsignificance on how to strengthen corporate governance in order to restrict themanagers’ self-interest incentive and reduce the agency problem and how tostrengthen cost control to enhance the value of companies.
Based on the theoretical basis and the literature review about characteristics,causes, in and economic consequences of cost stickiness, this paper first research theessential caused and influencing factors by theoretical analysis, then study the impactof optimal-decision incentive, earnings management incentive and the Self-interestincentive on cost stickiness. We find that (1) companies that manger haveoptimal-decision incentive exhibit cost stickiness significantly;(2) companiesreporting small positive earnings exhibit a more symmetric cost behavior andcompanies that manger have incentives to add and distribute stocks exhibit costanti-stickiness;(3)the self-interest incentive of managers has a significant positiveimpact on cost stickiness. Specifically, the merger and acquisition events provideopportunity for managers with self-interest incentive; sufficient free cash flow and alonger tenure are necessary for managers to achieve their own interests; and morefixed pay in managers’ compensation would stimulate managers’ self-incentives.Furthermore, we examine the constraints of corporate governance on the managers’ self-interest incentive. And results show that strong governances can restrictmanagers’ self-interest incentives, resulting in a lower level of cost stickiness; andmanagers’ self-interest incentives is obvious in weak governance companies withhigher level of cost stickiness. Furthermore, the study found that the relation betweenthe level of corporate governance and the value of companies is significantly positive.From that we can see, the cost stickiness resulted by mangers’ optimal-decisionincentive will deliver a positive signal of the growth of the value of company, and thecost stickiness resulted by mangers’ self-interest incentive shows the inefficient costmanagement and delivers a negative signal of the growth of the value of company.Finally, we conclude our study and make suggestion for mangers’ scientific andrational cost management decision-making.
经理人的费用决策关乎企业的成败兴衰，然而，经理人的动机才是其费用决策背后的真正推动力，经理人的不同动机与费用习性之间有着必然的联系，而公司治理设计的初衷正是想实现股东对经理人的监督与制衡。因此，本文针对公司治理、经理人动机与费用粘性的关系进行研究，厘清了不同经理人动机对费用习性的影响路径，为企业通过费用比率进行经理人绩效考核提供了更为全面的理论指导，对如何加强公司治理以制约经理人自利动机从而减轻代理问题，如何加强费用控制以提高公司价值具有现实指导意义。
在对本研究涉及的理论基础和国内外关于费用粘性特征、成因、影响因素及其经济后果的文献进行回顾和述评的基础上，本文从对费用粘性产生的成因和影响因素进行理论分析入手，首先研究了经理人最优决策动机、盈余管理动机、自利动机三种不同动机对费用粘性的影响，研究发现，经理人最优决策动机会导致较高水平的费用粘性；具有保盈动机的样本公司，费用的对称性表现得更明显；而具有新股发行动机的公司，费用表现出反粘性的特征；经理人自利动机对费用粘性水平有积极的影响，具体而言，并购重组事件是经理人自利动机付诸实施的前提条件，充足的自由现金流和较长的经理人任期是经理人自利动机实施的必备条件，而经理人薪酬结构中变动性比例的增加会刺激经理人自利动机的实施，这些因素均对费用粘性产生显著的正向影响。其次本文考察了公司治理对经理人自利动机的制约作用，研究表明，较高的公司治理强度有利于抑制经理人的自利动机，从而降低经理人自利动机下形成的费用粘性，提高公司价值；而公司治理水平低的公司，经理人自利动机比较明显，费用粘性也相对较高。进一步，经理人在最优决策动机下形成的费用粘性将对公司价值的增长传递积极的信号；而在自利动机下形成的费用粘性，表明费用管理的低效率，将对公司价值的增长传递消极的信号。最后是本文的研究结论，并为我国企业经理人能科学合理进行成本管理决策给出了政策建议。
Cost management is an important part of enterprise management. The study oncost behavior helps mangers to make cost decision, investors and others to forecastcorporate performance. As a kind of manifestation of cost behavior, the research oncost stickiness is rooted in considering the accuracy of mangers’ decisions based ontraditional cost behavior model. The starting point of this paper is that how tomotivate manger more positively cost management and restrict their less negative costdecision based on the hypothesis that mangers have impact on cost stickiness.
Cost management is related to the success and failure of enterprise, but themangers incentive is the real force behind cost management. Different incentives ofmangers have different impact on cost behavior, and the purpose of the design ofcorporate governance is to achieve checks and balance of shareholders to mangers.Therefore, this paper studies the relationship between corporate governance, mangersincentives and cost stickiness. The results help us to understand the ways of mangersdifferent incentives on cost stickiness and provide more comprehensive theoreticalsupports for application of expense ratio. And these conclusions have practicalsignificance on how to strengthen corporate governance in order to restrict themanagers’ self-interest incentive and reduce the agency problem and how tostrengthen cost control to enhance the value of companies.
Based on the theoretical basis and the literature review about characteristics,causes, in and economic consequences of cost stickiness, this paper first research theessential caused and influencing factors by theoretical analysis, then study the impactof optimal-decision incentive, earnings management incentive and the Self-interestincentive on cost stickiness. We find that (1) companies that manger haveoptimal-decision incentive exhibit cost stickiness significantly;(2) companiesreporting small positive earnings exhibit a more symmetric cost behavior andcompanies that manger have incentives to add and distribute stocks exhibit costanti-stickiness;(3)the self-interest incentive of managers has a significant positiveimpact on cost stickiness. Specifically, the merger and acquisition events provideopportunity for managers with self-interest incentive; sufficient free cash flow and alonger tenure are necessary for managers to achieve their own interests; and morefixed pay in managers’ compensation would stimulate managers’ self-incentives.Furthermore, we examine the constraints of corporate governance on the managers’ self-interest incentive. And results show that strong governances can restrictmanagers’ self-interest incentives, resulting in a lower level of cost stickiness; andmanagers’ self-interest incentives is obvious in weak governance companies withhigher level of cost stickiness. Furthermore, the study found that the relation betweenthe level of corporate governance and the value of companies is significantly positive.From that we can see, the cost stickiness resulted by mangers’ optimal-decisionincentive will deliver a positive signal of the growth of the value of company, and thecost stickiness resulted by mangers’ self-interest incentive shows the inefficient costmanagement and delivers a negative signal of the growth of the value of company.Finally, we conclude our study and make suggestion for mangers’ scientific andrational cost management decision-making.
引文
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