中国上市公司所有权结构与投资行为研究
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摘要
所有权结构在公司治理中的作用与效率问题一直是公司财务领域的重要研究课题之一,可谓成果累累、百家争鸣。所有权结构的不同表现形式,不仅代表了各利益相关方对投资收益现金流的分配权,而且还涵盖了以所有权结构为基础的剩余索取权和剩余控制权的配置。自上世纪九十年代以来,随着公司治理研究地理范畴的扩展和古典经济学中股东同质性假设的突破,集中型所有权结构下,直接或间接拥有公司控制权的大股东与小股东之间的利益冲突逐步成为公司治理领域的核心问题之一,而由大股东对控制权私有收益的追求动机、形成与分配于公司财务政策的影响,随着公司治理核心问题的转移,开始受到越来越多的关注。
从控制权私有收益的度量及其影响因素出发,刻画控制性股东对小股东利益的侵占问题,一直是上述领域研究的重要线索,但是相对于控制性股东通过证券回购、资产转移和利用转移定价进行内部交易等方式对中小股东直接的利益侵占而言,由控制性股东对控制权私有收益的追求而产生的非效率财务决策行为,尤其是非效率投资行为,对公司价值,从而对小股东利益带来的损害,可能更为严重,更值得关注。本文将研究的目标定位于我国转型经济宏观背景下,所有权结构对上市公司投资行为及其投资绩效影响,以探讨大股东对控制权私有收益的追求、形成与分配对公司投资的影响机理,并进一步从更短的价值链洞悉所有权结构与公司价值关系的迷雾。具体而言,研究内容可以分为如下九个部分:
第一章为绪论。主要介绍本文的研究缘起、研究理论和现实意义、主要相关概念的界定、研究内容、研究方法以及研究的特色与创新。
第二章为文献综述。在回顾投资理论演进历史的基础上,对两类代理问题下所有权结构于企业投资行为的影响的相关文献进行评述。
第三章是制度背景分析。本章结合我国转轨经济的宏观背景,探讨了我国企业的投融资体制的演变、证券市场发展情况、上市公司的治理结构特征以及相关的投资法律环境。
第四章是基于所有权结构的控制权结构特征分析。本章引入了海洋博弈模型,对上市公司的控制权配置和股权制衡机制进行了分析,并通过计算机模拟运算,运用基于海洋博弈的Shapley指数对我国不同终极所有权属性下的上市公司控制权结构特征进行了实证分析,为后续研究奠定方法和实践基础。
第五章是规范研究。利用Myers-Majluf(1984)的分析框架,对垄断型所有权结构和制衡型所有权结构这两种典型的集中型所有权结构下大股东控制的公司投资行为进行了分析,探讨了控制权私有收益与上市公司非效率投资行为之间的关系,并在此基础上对分散型所有权结构、制衡型所有权结构和垄断型所有权结构下的公司价值差异进行了比较。
第六章是实证研究。本章基于门槛面板模型,试图通过较为客观控制度区间分类方法,揭示大股东控制度与非效率投资行为之间的非线性关系,并进一步分析了终极所有权性质、股权制衡对上市公司非效率投资行为的影响。
第七章是经济后果检验。在第六章的研究基础上,运用边际Q对上市公司的投资绩效进行了衡量,进一步讨论了大股东控制度、终极所有权性质和股权制衡度对上市公司投资绩效的影响。
第八章为政策建议。本章在以上各部分的基础上,针对我国上市公司治理和投资中存在的问题,有针对性的提出了自己的一些建议。
第九章为总结和研究展望。在这一部分中,总结了以上各章的研究结论,并对论文研究的局限性和下一步研究方向,提出了自己的看法。
本文的创新之处主要体现在以下几个方面:
①本文结合我国上市公司股权结构特点,在测量大股东控制度和股权制衡度时,采用了基于海洋博弈的Shapley权利指数,对大股东与小股东区别对待。这将有助于弥补当前国内相关研究对我国上市公司股权制衡度和大股东对上市公司的实际控制度等重要公司治理特征变量的测度方法上的缺陷。同时,本文采用计算机模拟的计算方法也大大提高了计算效率,突破了基于海洋博弈的Shapley指数的应用瓶颈。
②本文的理论研究发现,控制性股东对控制权私有收益的追求并不一定带来公司价值的贬损,当控制性股东获取的控制权私有收益足够小时,反而可能有利于公司价值的增加。因此,控制权私有收益有其存在的积极意义,这与Leff(1964)关于腐败在经济体系之中的作用的论断“在特定条件下,腐败可能有利于经济增长”有类似之处,为学术界对控制权私有收益的认识提供了新的视角。
③现有研究对股权集中度对企业投资行为影响的区间效应的区间分界点和区间数量的确定带有很大的主观性色彩,于此存在较大的争议。本文通过门槛面板模型,研究大股东持股比例与非效率投资行为之间的非线性关系,并通过终极控制权性质的分类回归比较不同终极控制权下,上述非线性关系的不同表现。这不仅可以避免现有研究中,人为划分股东控制度区间所带来的主观性,而且还有利于缓解Vogt(1994)模型中引入交叉变量所带来的较为严重的多重共线性问题,提高检验结果的稳定性和非线性关系的检验效率。
The function and efficiency of ownership structure in corporate governance is an important issue in corporate finance studies. The type of ownership structure stands for not only the cash flow that one can get, but also the residual claim rights and residual control rights. After 90th in the last century, as the area of corporate governance studied expanding, and the hypothesis that all the shareholders are the same breaking, the conflicts among large shareholders and minority shareholders in concentrated ownership structure become the core issue in corporate governance. With the changing of the core issue in corporate governance, more and more attention has been put into the issue how the pursuit, formation and distribution of private benefits of control by large shareholder will affect the finance policy in corporate.
The aim of the study focuses on how ownership structure will affect corporate investment under the background of transition and rising economy for three reasons:①To answer the question that what is the most efficiency ownership structure, most scholars has put their effort on the relationship between the ownership structure and corporate value. The results of these studies are widely divergent although abundant. Corporate value is the sum value of the asset in place and the discounted of future cash flow (Myers, 1977), thus, investment is the link between ownership structure and corporate value in the perspective of value creating. The study of the relationship between ownership structure and investment will help us to clear the fog.②More and more studies have revealed that the controlling resources arise from current capital and real asset are the important source of private benefits of control(Pagano and Roel,1998). The collocation and scale of controlling resources is related to how the controlling shareholders get private benefits of control. Further, the corporate investment is highly associated with private benefits of control.③Comparing with the expropriation of controlling shareholder, the minority shareholders’benefits will be damaged more by the inefficiency finance policy, which arising from controlling shareholders’pursuit of private benefits of control. So the inefficiency finance policy should be put more attention to (Martin and Peter, 2007).
This paper includes of nine chapters, and the contents are listed below:
Chapter 1 is introduction. It proposes the issue, the angle and the methods of the research, introducing the“relative principle”, and thus offers the theory foreshadowing and the analytical prerequisite for the following research.
Chapter 2 is review of literatures. After reviewed the developing of investment theory, two kinds of agent problem and how it will affect corporate investment is reviewed and commented.
Chapter 3 is the analysis of system background. This part discussed the evolvement of investment and finance system of the corporate in China, the developing of securities market, the governance characteristic of listed companies and the law frames of the investment of listed companies.
Chapter 4 is the analysis of controlling structure based on ownership structure. This part introduces oceanic games model, and analyses how the control right will allocate in listed companies, including the power balance mechanism. Also we set Shapley-Shubik index based on oceanic games, and computes shareholders’power in listed companies of different ultimate ownership by computer simulation, which laid the groundwork for the next study in method and practice.
Chapter 5 is normative study. It utilize the analysis framework of Myers-Majluf(1984), to analyze the corporate investment behavior under the control of large shareholders in monopolistic ownership structure and balance-power ownership structure. On the other hand, it analyze the relationship between private benefits of control and inefficient investment in listed companies, and compare the corporate values in different ownership structure, such as dispersible ownership structure, balance-power ownership structure and monopolistic ownership structure.
Chapter 6 is empirical study. This part divides the controlling degree of the largest shareholders to 3 sections exogenously by threshold panel model, then it analyze the nonlinear relationship between the controlling degree of the largest shareholders and inefficient investment. Further, this part does the above analyze in four different ultimate ownership, including central government controlling, province government controlling, county government controlling and non-government controlling.
Chapter 7 is the test of economic result. This part evaluates the listed companies’investment return by Marginal Q and EVA (economic value added). Also it utilize the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators which is suitable for the model including endogenous variables and“large N, small T”sample. Based on the studies in chapter 6, this part studies how the ownership structure including large shareholder control, identity of ultimate ownership and power-balance among large shareholders will affect corporate investment return.
Chapter 8 is policy advice. Under the analysis of the chapters above, this part put forward some policies to weaken the inefficient investment in listed companies, including improving corporate governance, mend the law system and so on. Chapter 9 is summarizer. This part discusses the shortcomings of this paper and shows the directions of study in the future.
The new point of this paper includes:
①This paper utilize the oceanic games model which is based on cooperation game theory。Based on the oceanic games model, this paper analyzes the allocation of shareholders’power and the mechanism of power-balance in listed companies. And this paper also studies empirically the power index of listed companies’shareholders and power-balance situation in China by Shapley-Shubik index based on oceanic games. Comparing to the various power computing methods in present, oceanic games considers not only all the shareholders, including large shareholders and minority shareholders, but also the different roles of large and minority shareholders, simulates the power allocations in listed firms accurately. We also improve the traditional computing methods of Shapley-Shubik,accurately and efficient.
②The influence of the controlling shareholders’pursuit for private benefits of control on corporate finance policy is an important issue which will be worth studying in present and future, but most of these studies in present considered the private benefits of control to be a negative role in corporate governance and focus overly on its negative influence on corporate value and minority shareholders’benefits, especially in domestic. In this paper, we found that private benefits of control may be necessary for controlling shareholder, and it is a compensation for controlling shareholders’liquidity loses and monitor cost, sometimes private benefits of control may be positive for investment efficiency and corporate value, and minority shareholders will benefits from it. Just as Leff(1964) has said that corruption may help facilitate economic development when very inefficient bureaucracies are in the way. So we renew the understanding of private benefits of control, and suggest that private benefits of control can be divided into necessary private benefits of control and extra private benefits of control.
③As the nonlinear relationship between ownership structure and corporate investment, the methods that employ in present to find the threshold is subjective and controversial. This paper studies the nonlinear relationship by threshold panel model, which is objective and efficient. This method also improves the stability of the empirical result and also avoids the multilinear.
从控制权私有收益的度量及其影响因素出发,刻画控制性股东对小股东利益的侵占问题,一直是上述领域研究的重要线索,但是相对于控制性股东通过证券回购、资产转移和利用转移定价进行内部交易等方式对中小股东直接的利益侵占而言,由控制性股东对控制权私有收益的追求而产生的非效率财务决策行为,尤其是非效率投资行为,对公司价值,从而对小股东利益带来的损害,可能更为严重,更值得关注。本文将研究的目标定位于我国转型经济宏观背景下,所有权结构对上市公司投资行为及其投资绩效影响,以探讨大股东对控制权私有收益的追求、形成与分配对公司投资的影响机理,并进一步从更短的价值链洞悉所有权结构与公司价值关系的迷雾。具体而言,研究内容可以分为如下九个部分:
第一章为绪论。主要介绍本文的研究缘起、研究理论和现实意义、主要相关概念的界定、研究内容、研究方法以及研究的特色与创新。
第二章为文献综述。在回顾投资理论演进历史的基础上,对两类代理问题下所有权结构于企业投资行为的影响的相关文献进行评述。
第三章是制度背景分析。本章结合我国转轨经济的宏观背景,探讨了我国企业的投融资体制的演变、证券市场发展情况、上市公司的治理结构特征以及相关的投资法律环境。
第四章是基于所有权结构的控制权结构特征分析。本章引入了海洋博弈模型,对上市公司的控制权配置和股权制衡机制进行了分析,并通过计算机模拟运算,运用基于海洋博弈的Shapley指数对我国不同终极所有权属性下的上市公司控制权结构特征进行了实证分析,为后续研究奠定方法和实践基础。
第五章是规范研究。利用Myers-Majluf(1984)的分析框架,对垄断型所有权结构和制衡型所有权结构这两种典型的集中型所有权结构下大股东控制的公司投资行为进行了分析,探讨了控制权私有收益与上市公司非效率投资行为之间的关系,并在此基础上对分散型所有权结构、制衡型所有权结构和垄断型所有权结构下的公司价值差异进行了比较。
第六章是实证研究。本章基于门槛面板模型,试图通过较为客观控制度区间分类方法,揭示大股东控制度与非效率投资行为之间的非线性关系,并进一步分析了终极所有权性质、股权制衡对上市公司非效率投资行为的影响。
第七章是经济后果检验。在第六章的研究基础上,运用边际Q对上市公司的投资绩效进行了衡量,进一步讨论了大股东控制度、终极所有权性质和股权制衡度对上市公司投资绩效的影响。
第八章为政策建议。本章在以上各部分的基础上,针对我国上市公司治理和投资中存在的问题,有针对性的提出了自己的一些建议。
第九章为总结和研究展望。在这一部分中,总结了以上各章的研究结论,并对论文研究的局限性和下一步研究方向,提出了自己的看法。
本文的创新之处主要体现在以下几个方面:
①本文结合我国上市公司股权结构特点,在测量大股东控制度和股权制衡度时,采用了基于海洋博弈的Shapley权利指数,对大股东与小股东区别对待。这将有助于弥补当前国内相关研究对我国上市公司股权制衡度和大股东对上市公司的实际控制度等重要公司治理特征变量的测度方法上的缺陷。同时,本文采用计算机模拟的计算方法也大大提高了计算效率,突破了基于海洋博弈的Shapley指数的应用瓶颈。
②本文的理论研究发现,控制性股东对控制权私有收益的追求并不一定带来公司价值的贬损,当控制性股东获取的控制权私有收益足够小时,反而可能有利于公司价值的增加。因此,控制权私有收益有其存在的积极意义,这与Leff(1964)关于腐败在经济体系之中的作用的论断“在特定条件下,腐败可能有利于经济增长”有类似之处,为学术界对控制权私有收益的认识提供了新的视角。
③现有研究对股权集中度对企业投资行为影响的区间效应的区间分界点和区间数量的确定带有很大的主观性色彩,于此存在较大的争议。本文通过门槛面板模型,研究大股东持股比例与非效率投资行为之间的非线性关系,并通过终极控制权性质的分类回归比较不同终极控制权下,上述非线性关系的不同表现。这不仅可以避免现有研究中,人为划分股东控制度区间所带来的主观性,而且还有利于缓解Vogt(1994)模型中引入交叉变量所带来的较为严重的多重共线性问题,提高检验结果的稳定性和非线性关系的检验效率。
The function and efficiency of ownership structure in corporate governance is an important issue in corporate finance studies. The type of ownership structure stands for not only the cash flow that one can get, but also the residual claim rights and residual control rights. After 90th in the last century, as the area of corporate governance studied expanding, and the hypothesis that all the shareholders are the same breaking, the conflicts among large shareholders and minority shareholders in concentrated ownership structure become the core issue in corporate governance. With the changing of the core issue in corporate governance, more and more attention has been put into the issue how the pursuit, formation and distribution of private benefits of control by large shareholder will affect the finance policy in corporate.
The aim of the study focuses on how ownership structure will affect corporate investment under the background of transition and rising economy for three reasons:①To answer the question that what is the most efficiency ownership structure, most scholars has put their effort on the relationship between the ownership structure and corporate value. The results of these studies are widely divergent although abundant. Corporate value is the sum value of the asset in place and the discounted of future cash flow (Myers, 1977), thus, investment is the link between ownership structure and corporate value in the perspective of value creating. The study of the relationship between ownership structure and investment will help us to clear the fog.②More and more studies have revealed that the controlling resources arise from current capital and real asset are the important source of private benefits of control(Pagano and Roel,1998). The collocation and scale of controlling resources is related to how the controlling shareholders get private benefits of control. Further, the corporate investment is highly associated with private benefits of control.③Comparing with the expropriation of controlling shareholder, the minority shareholders’benefits will be damaged more by the inefficiency finance policy, which arising from controlling shareholders’pursuit of private benefits of control. So the inefficiency finance policy should be put more attention to (Martin and Peter, 2007).
This paper includes of nine chapters, and the contents are listed below:
Chapter 1 is introduction. It proposes the issue, the angle and the methods of the research, introducing the“relative principle”, and thus offers the theory foreshadowing and the analytical prerequisite for the following research.
Chapter 2 is review of literatures. After reviewed the developing of investment theory, two kinds of agent problem and how it will affect corporate investment is reviewed and commented.
Chapter 3 is the analysis of system background. This part discussed the evolvement of investment and finance system of the corporate in China, the developing of securities market, the governance characteristic of listed companies and the law frames of the investment of listed companies.
Chapter 4 is the analysis of controlling structure based on ownership structure. This part introduces oceanic games model, and analyses how the control right will allocate in listed companies, including the power balance mechanism. Also we set Shapley-Shubik index based on oceanic games, and computes shareholders’power in listed companies of different ultimate ownership by computer simulation, which laid the groundwork for the next study in method and practice.
Chapter 5 is normative study. It utilize the analysis framework of Myers-Majluf(1984), to analyze the corporate investment behavior under the control of large shareholders in monopolistic ownership structure and balance-power ownership structure. On the other hand, it analyze the relationship between private benefits of control and inefficient investment in listed companies, and compare the corporate values in different ownership structure, such as dispersible ownership structure, balance-power ownership structure and monopolistic ownership structure.
Chapter 6 is empirical study. This part divides the controlling degree of the largest shareholders to 3 sections exogenously by threshold panel model, then it analyze the nonlinear relationship between the controlling degree of the largest shareholders and inefficient investment. Further, this part does the above analyze in four different ultimate ownership, including central government controlling, province government controlling, county government controlling and non-government controlling.
Chapter 7 is the test of economic result. This part evaluates the listed companies’investment return by Marginal Q and EVA (economic value added). Also it utilize the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators which is suitable for the model including endogenous variables and“large N, small T”sample. Based on the studies in chapter 6, this part studies how the ownership structure including large shareholder control, identity of ultimate ownership and power-balance among large shareholders will affect corporate investment return.
Chapter 8 is policy advice. Under the analysis of the chapters above, this part put forward some policies to weaken the inefficient investment in listed companies, including improving corporate governance, mend the law system and so on. Chapter 9 is summarizer. This part discusses the shortcomings of this paper and shows the directions of study in the future.
The new point of this paper includes:
①This paper utilize the oceanic games model which is based on cooperation game theory。Based on the oceanic games model, this paper analyzes the allocation of shareholders’power and the mechanism of power-balance in listed companies. And this paper also studies empirically the power index of listed companies’shareholders and power-balance situation in China by Shapley-Shubik index based on oceanic games. Comparing to the various power computing methods in present, oceanic games considers not only all the shareholders, including large shareholders and minority shareholders, but also the different roles of large and minority shareholders, simulates the power allocations in listed firms accurately. We also improve the traditional computing methods of Shapley-Shubik,accurately and efficient.
②The influence of the controlling shareholders’pursuit for private benefits of control on corporate finance policy is an important issue which will be worth studying in present and future, but most of these studies in present considered the private benefits of control to be a negative role in corporate governance and focus overly on its negative influence on corporate value and minority shareholders’benefits, especially in domestic. In this paper, we found that private benefits of control may be necessary for controlling shareholder, and it is a compensation for controlling shareholders’liquidity loses and monitor cost, sometimes private benefits of control may be positive for investment efficiency and corporate value, and minority shareholders will benefits from it. Just as Leff(1964) has said that corruption may help facilitate economic development when very inefficient bureaucracies are in the way. So we renew the understanding of private benefits of control, and suggest that private benefits of control can be divided into necessary private benefits of control and extra private benefits of control.
③As the nonlinear relationship between ownership structure and corporate investment, the methods that employ in present to find the threshold is subjective and controversial. This paper studies the nonlinear relationship by threshold panel model, which is objective and efficient. This method also improves the stability of the empirical result and also avoids the multilinear.
引文
白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,宋敏,张俊喜. 2005.我国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2: 81-91.
邓建平,曾勇. 2004.大股东控制和控制权私人收益[J].中国软科学,10:50-58.
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