高管团队的社会资本、激励机制与公司绩效
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摘要
本研究以上海证券交易所在2006年之前就已经上市的主板上市公司为研究对象,根据典型抽样原则选择的样本总量为110家,在将ST、SST类公司等异常样本剔除后剩余有效样本总量为107家,在理论分析和实证研究的基础上对企业高管团队的社会资本、激励机制(主要是总裁年薪和股票期权)对企业经营绩效的影响进入了深入系统的研究。在进行实证研究时,本文主要以上市公司的绝对经营绩效指标和相对经营绩效指标为因变量,以企业高管团队拥有的社会资本和总裁年薪为因变量,以企业的行业特征、地域特征、高管团队的人口特征等为控制变量,通过多元线性回归模型和二元Logistic回归模型对企业高管团队的社会资本、总裁年薪对企业经营绩效的影响进行了定量研究,并在此基础上提炼出来了相关的研究结论和政策建议。
本研究在构建理论分析框架的基础上提出了五大假设。这五大假设分别是：企业高管拥有的社会资本与企业经营绩效之间呈显著的正相关关系(假设1)；企业高管薪酬与企业经营绩效之间呈显著的正相关关系(假设2)；企业高管拥有的社会资本与其在企业中的激励强度之间呈显著的正相关关系(假设3)；企业高管人员的薪酬水平与企业中的国有股比例之间呈显著的负相关关系(假设4)；终极控制人性质为国有的上市公司高管的激励因素中更加注重社会资本获得(假设5)。
为了构建本研究的实证检验模型,本研究对高管团队、社会资本等变量进行了量化处理。高管团队包括了企业总裁、运营总裁或常务副总裁(如无常务副总裁则为排名第一的副总裁)和财务总监这三大关键核心职位的高层管理人员(如果这些人员同时兼任董事长或其他董事会成员者仍将纳入本研究的考察范围),其余管理人员则不纳入本研究的考察范围。社会资本采用了以规范化、社会化和制度化方式积累起来的社会关系网络进行测度,具体是以网络广泛度(即高管团队曾经担任过的高管职位数量)、网络达高度(即高管团队担任过的最高职位的声望分数)和网络声望幅度(即高管团队可联络到的最高和最低的声望分数之差)三个指标通过因子分析综合成一个表征社会资本的综合变量。这三个表征社会资本水平的指标将从上市公司的公开信息(主要是上市公司定期披露的年度报告、半年度报告和季度报告等)中获取源数据后再进行相应处理。当无法直接从现有的公开披露信息中获取时,将采取公开渠道(主要是利用百度(www.baidu.com)和谷歌(www.google.com)等搜索引擎通过关键词检索以及其他正式出版物获得的相关权威信息)能够获得的其他替代指标的方式进行分析和处理。由此可以发现,本研究中采用的社会资本概念已经是能够用量化指标进行测度的操作化定义,其分析层次与宏观和中观层面的社会资本定义不同,属于微观层次的个体所拥有的社会资本水平。由于上市公司披露的数据中基本上只有年薪数据,而没有奖金和津贴等方面的数据,至于隐性收入方面的数据则更是无从获取。因此,本研究中采用的高管薪酬数据仅指上市公司高管人员获得的年薪收入部分,同时将股权和期权以虚拟变量的形式纳入本研究的计量模型。为了全面反映企业的经营绩效,本研究中所采用的企业绩效指标包括了绝对业绩指标和相对业绩指标。绝对业绩指标主要包括每股息税后利润、每股收入和每股复合绩效,相对业绩指标主要包括每股息税后利润增长率、每股收入增长率和每股复合绩效增长率。之所以采用复合绩效这一加权指标,而且每股收入及每股收入增长率所占的权重为60%,主要是考虑到年度收入总额是个相对比较客观的业绩数据,不容易受财务制度、会计核算方法以及信息披露方式的影响。在此基础上,引入样本企业的基本特征以及高管人员的人口特征等控制变量,构建相应的实证研究模型,检验企业高管团队拥有的社会资本、高管年薪等因素对企业绝对经营绩效和相对经营绩效的影响。
在理论分析和实证研究相结合的基础上,本文的主要研究结论如下。一是企业高管拥有的社会资本与企业经营绩效之间呈显著的正相关关系,从而使得本研究的假设1得到了验证；二是企业高管薪酬与企业经营绩效之间存在着显著的正相关关系,从而使得本研究的假设2得到了验证；三是企业高管拥有的社会资本与其在企业中的激励强度之间呈显著的正相关关系,从而使得本研究的假设3得到了验证；四是企业高管人员的薪酬水平与企业中的国有股比例之间呈显著的负相关关系,从而使得本研究的假设4得到了验证；五是终极控制人性质为国有的上市公司高管的激励因素中更加注重社会资本获得,从而使得本研究的假设5得到了验证。这些研究结论将对优化企业高管的激励机制,完善企业治理理论、优化委托代理理论、丰富社会资本理论等提供了非常有价值的参考和借鉴。
本研究的创新之处主要体现在如下方面。一是本研究提出了企业高管社会资本的计量模型。本研究在借鉴企业激励理论以及社会资本理论的基础上,结合我国沪市上市公司的信息披露特点,构建了企业高管拥有的社会资本的计量模型,同时采用因子分析等计量技术,将社会资本变量纳入企业经营绩效的实证研究模型。在笔者所接触的范围内,这在国内外现有的相关研究中尚属首次。二是本研究将社会资本纳入了激励机制的内生变量。在国内外原有的研究成果中,更多地基于激励理论考察了企业高管的激励要素,包括人口特征(有些研究中还包括了人力资本特征)、薪酬制度以及股票期权等,但是几乎没有相关的研究成果在激励理论框架下系统地考察社会资本要素。本研究将社会资本纳入了企业高管激励机制的内生变量,从而为考察转型期中国企业高管人员的激励机制、完善转型期的企业治理结构提供了理论借鉴和实践指南。三是本研究构建了不完全契约理论的激励优化模型。本研究在理论探讨和实证分析的基础上,构建了基于不完全契约理论的激励优化模型。在转型期的中国,除了原有的人口特征、薪酬制度和股票期权等激励因素外,社会资本的重要性日益凸显。本研究在理论探讨和实证分析的基础上,进一步优化了企业高管激励模型。该模型的构建将为后续激励理论和企业治理结构的完善提供参考和借鉴。四是本研究首创了社会资本超额收益理论。虽然国内外关于社会资本理论的研究很多,但是系统地研究企业高管社会资本超额收益与其组织的经营绩效以及激励机制之间的关系尚属首次。因此,本研究在理论分析和实证研究的基础上,首创社会资本超额收益理论,将具备着非常重要的理论价值和实践意义。
当然,由于受时间、精力和学识等因素的制约,本研究也存在着一定的不足。概括起来,这些不足主要体现在如下方面。一是实证研究的样本总量还有很大的提升空间,最理想的情况应该是全样本研究。二是研究结论的普适性还存在着一定的局限。由于本研究的样本企业全部是上市公司,能否将研究结论推广到上市公司和非上市公司尚需进一步实证检验。三是社会资本的作用机制尚待完善。本研究探讨了高管薪酬、高管团队拥有的社会资本对企业经营绩效的影响,但是却未能对企业高管拥有的社会资本对企业经营绩效发挥作用的微观机理进行深入研究(例如,社会资本到底是对争取政府资源从而对企业经营绩效产生正向影响,还是通过市场规模的扩大从而对企业经营绩效产生正向影响等,很难根据现有的数据对其进行精确量化)。
从全文的结构看,第一章为导论部分(包括了研究的宏观背景、研究意义、主要研究内容、研究方法、研究的创新之处和研究的不足之处),第二章为相关理论和实证研究综述,第三章为社会资本与高管激励—一个理论分析框架,第四章为高管团队社会资本、激励机制与公司绩效描述统计,第五章为企业高管社会资本与经营绩效的实证研究,第六章为企业高管薪酬制度与经营绩效的实证研究,第七章为研究结论、政策建议及进一步研究展望。
This paper adopts the main-board public companies listed before2006as research objects, and selects the effective samples of107companies after deducing the ST and SST abnormal samples from total110samples collected in accordance with classic sampling principle. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper systematically researches into the impact of public company senior management team social capital and incentive mechanism (mainly president's annual salary and stock option) on enterprise's operational performance. This paper adopts the public companies'absolute operational performance index, relative operational performance index, the total social capital possessed by senior management team and their annual salary as dependent variables and takes enterprise's industrial feature, regional feature and senior management team's population feature as controlled variables. By adopting linear multiple regression model and logistic bivariate regression model, this paper implements quantitative study on senior management team's social capital and president's annual salary's influence on enterprise's operational performance. Meanwhile, on the basis of the research result, this paper draws the research conclusion and puts forward suggestions on policy.
This research puts forward five hypotheses on the basis of building theoretical analysis framework, namely:the significant positive correlation between social capital possessed by senior management team and enterprise's operational performance (Hypothesis1), the significant positive correlation between senior management team's salary and enterprise's operational performance (Hypothesis2), the significant positive correlation between social capital possessed by senior management team and enterprise's incentive mechanism strength (Hypothesis3), the significant negative correlation between senior management team's salary and state-owned share ratio (Hypothesis4), and state-owned public enterprise's incentive mechanism for senior managers focus more on the acquisition of social capital (Hypothesis5).
In order to build the empirical analysis model for this research, this paper quantizes senior management team, social capital and other variables. The senior management team includes president, CEO and COO or deputy president (the very first ranking vice president in case of no deputy vice president) and CFO. The senior management team of these three core positions, rather than other positions, will be regarded as the evaluation range of this research. In case that one of these positions serves as the president, other people in the board can be regarded within the range of this research. The social capital adopts social network relationship accumulated through standardization, socialization and systemization. To be specific, the research adopts the network popularity, which means the number of total senior managing positions this team has served in, network height, which means this management team's reputation score in the highest position, and network reputation range, which means the value difference between the highest score and lowest score, to form the social capital's comprehensive variable through factor analysis. These three indexes to indicate social capital level will be generated from information source, mainly the annual reports, half-year reports, and seasonal reports, issued by public companies. In case that such information is not accessible from issued information source, this paper will adopt public channels, mainly information queried from Baidu.com, Google.com and other formal publications, to get relevant information substitution. Judged from it, the social capital adopted in this paper is able to use quantitative index for operational definition, and its analytical level is different from the social capital of macro level and medium level. Instead, it means the individual's social capitation possession in a micro level. Since the information source issued by public companies only include annual salary rather than bonus and allowance, the invisible income will be inaccessible. Therefore, the salary data for senior management team in this research means the annual salary part of them, while stock right and option right will be taken into the evaluation model in the form of virtual variables. In order to indicate the comprehensive operational performance, the performance index adopted by this research includes absolute performance indicator and relative performance indicator. Absolute performance indicator includes profit per share, revenue per share and combined performance. Relative performance indicator includes growth rate of profit per share, growth rate of revenue per share and growth rate of the combined performance. The weight of the revenue per share and growth rate of the revenue per share is60%and the weight of profit per share and growth rate of the profit per share is40%. The reason of adopting this weighted index is that annual total income is an objective performance data that cannot be easily influenced by finance system, accounting method or information launch way. Based on it, this paper introduces the enterprise's basic features, senior management team's individual feature and other controlled variables to establish empirical research model for the sake of analyzing the influence of senior management team's social capital and annual salary on enterprise's absolute operational performance and relative operational performance.
On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper gains the below conclusions:firstly, there is a significant positive correlation between senior management team's social capital and enterprise's operational performance, which proves the Hypothesis1. Secondly, there is a significant positive correlation between senior management team's salary and enterprise's operational performance, which proves the Hypothesis2. Thirdly, there is a significant positive correlation between management team's social capital and enterprise's motivation strength, which proves the Hypothesis3. Fourthly, there is a significant negative correlation between senior management team's salary and state-own share ratio, which proves the Hypothesis4. Fifthly, the state-owned public enterprise's senior managing team motivation system focuses more on the acquisition of social capital, which proves the Hypothesis5. These research results shall provide valuable reference to optimizing incentive mechanism for senior management team, improving corporate governance theory, enhance the principle-agent theory and enriching social capital theory.
The innovations of this research lie in following aspects:firstly, the paper puts forward the evaluation mode for senior management team's social capital. This paper, on the basis of enterprise motivation theory and social capital theory, after combining the information launch features of public companies in Shanghai Stock Market and Shenzhen Stock Market, establishes the evaluation model for senior management team's social capital. Meanwhile, this paper adopts factor analysis and other calculation technique to integrate social capital into operational performance. According to author's experience, it's the first research of this kind in China. Secondly, this research takes social capital as incentive mechanism's endogenous variables, while most domestic and international researches focus on evaluating senior manager's motivation factors including population features and or human capital features based on motivation theory. This paper, by adopting endogenous variable in incentive mechanism for senior managers, provides theoretical reference and practice guidance to evaluating senior manager incentive mechanism during transactional period and improving enterprise managing structure during transactional period. Thirdly, this research establishes the optimized motivation model based on Incomplete Contract Theory. This paper, on the basis of theoretical research and empirical analysis, establishes the optimized motivation model based on Incomplete Contract Theory. The transactional period in china, in addition to original population feature, salary system and stock option motivations, social capital becomes more and more significant. This research, based on theoretical researches and empirical analysis, further optimizes motivation model for senior managers. The establishment of this model shall provide reference and guidance to improving motivation theory and enterprise managing structure. Fourthly, this research is the first one of this kind to put forward the excess income of social capital theory. Thought there a number of domestic and international researches on social capital, this paper is the first one to systematically introduce the relationship among social capital excess income, enterprise's operational performance and incentive mechanism. Therefore, this research, on the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical research, creates the social capital excess income theory, which will be of great theoretical and practical significance.
However, due to limitation in time, energy and knowledge, there are some defects of this research. Generally speaking, the defects are mainly as below: firstly, the sample quantity of empirical research has much room for improvement, and the most ideal case shall be full sample research. Secondly, the conclusion of this research cannot be widely adopted. Since all samples of this research are public companies, it needs further test to check whether this research result is adaptable to both public companies and private companies. Thirdly, the function of social capital needs further improvement. This research analyzes the influence of senior manager's salary and senior managing team's social capital on enterprise's operational performance. However, it fails to research into the functional micro mechanism of senior management team's social capital in improving enterprise's operational performance. For example whether social capital is effective in gaining government resource to causes positive influence to enterprise's operational performance or is effective in enlarging market to causes positive influence in enterprise's operational performance is still hard to be determined accurately based on current data.
Judged from the structure of this paper, the Chapter1is the introduction, which includes the macro background, research significance, research content, research method, innovations and defects of this research. The Chapter2introduces the relevant theories and empirical researches. Chapter3establishes a theoretical analysis framework for social capital and senior managers incentive mechanism. Chapter4statistics senior management team's social capital, incentive mechanism and enterprise's performance. Chapter5implements empirical research on senior manger's social capital and operational performance. Chapter6implements empirical research on senior manager salary system and operational performance. Chapter7includes research result, policy suggestion and expectation for further researches.
本研究在构建理论分析框架的基础上提出了五大假设。这五大假设分别是：企业高管拥有的社会资本与企业经营绩效之间呈显著的正相关关系(假设1)；企业高管薪酬与企业经营绩效之间呈显著的正相关关系(假设2)；企业高管拥有的社会资本与其在企业中的激励强度之间呈显著的正相关关系(假设3)；企业高管人员的薪酬水平与企业中的国有股比例之间呈显著的负相关关系(假设4)；终极控制人性质为国有的上市公司高管的激励因素中更加注重社会资本获得(假设5)。
为了构建本研究的实证检验模型,本研究对高管团队、社会资本等变量进行了量化处理。高管团队包括了企业总裁、运营总裁或常务副总裁(如无常务副总裁则为排名第一的副总裁)和财务总监这三大关键核心职位的高层管理人员(如果这些人员同时兼任董事长或其他董事会成员者仍将纳入本研究的考察范围),其余管理人员则不纳入本研究的考察范围。社会资本采用了以规范化、社会化和制度化方式积累起来的社会关系网络进行测度,具体是以网络广泛度(即高管团队曾经担任过的高管职位数量)、网络达高度(即高管团队担任过的最高职位的声望分数)和网络声望幅度(即高管团队可联络到的最高和最低的声望分数之差)三个指标通过因子分析综合成一个表征社会资本的综合变量。这三个表征社会资本水平的指标将从上市公司的公开信息(主要是上市公司定期披露的年度报告、半年度报告和季度报告等)中获取源数据后再进行相应处理。当无法直接从现有的公开披露信息中获取时,将采取公开渠道(主要是利用百度(www.baidu.com)和谷歌(www.google.com)等搜索引擎通过关键词检索以及其他正式出版物获得的相关权威信息)能够获得的其他替代指标的方式进行分析和处理。由此可以发现,本研究中采用的社会资本概念已经是能够用量化指标进行测度的操作化定义,其分析层次与宏观和中观层面的社会资本定义不同,属于微观层次的个体所拥有的社会资本水平。由于上市公司披露的数据中基本上只有年薪数据,而没有奖金和津贴等方面的数据,至于隐性收入方面的数据则更是无从获取。因此,本研究中采用的高管薪酬数据仅指上市公司高管人员获得的年薪收入部分,同时将股权和期权以虚拟变量的形式纳入本研究的计量模型。为了全面反映企业的经营绩效,本研究中所采用的企业绩效指标包括了绝对业绩指标和相对业绩指标。绝对业绩指标主要包括每股息税后利润、每股收入和每股复合绩效,相对业绩指标主要包括每股息税后利润增长率、每股收入增长率和每股复合绩效增长率。之所以采用复合绩效这一加权指标,而且每股收入及每股收入增长率所占的权重为60%,主要是考虑到年度收入总额是个相对比较客观的业绩数据,不容易受财务制度、会计核算方法以及信息披露方式的影响。在此基础上,引入样本企业的基本特征以及高管人员的人口特征等控制变量,构建相应的实证研究模型,检验企业高管团队拥有的社会资本、高管年薪等因素对企业绝对经营绩效和相对经营绩效的影响。
在理论分析和实证研究相结合的基础上,本文的主要研究结论如下。一是企业高管拥有的社会资本与企业经营绩效之间呈显著的正相关关系,从而使得本研究的假设1得到了验证；二是企业高管薪酬与企业经营绩效之间存在着显著的正相关关系,从而使得本研究的假设2得到了验证；三是企业高管拥有的社会资本与其在企业中的激励强度之间呈显著的正相关关系,从而使得本研究的假设3得到了验证；四是企业高管人员的薪酬水平与企业中的国有股比例之间呈显著的负相关关系,从而使得本研究的假设4得到了验证；五是终极控制人性质为国有的上市公司高管的激励因素中更加注重社会资本获得,从而使得本研究的假设5得到了验证。这些研究结论将对优化企业高管的激励机制,完善企业治理理论、优化委托代理理论、丰富社会资本理论等提供了非常有价值的参考和借鉴。
本研究的创新之处主要体现在如下方面。一是本研究提出了企业高管社会资本的计量模型。本研究在借鉴企业激励理论以及社会资本理论的基础上,结合我国沪市上市公司的信息披露特点,构建了企业高管拥有的社会资本的计量模型,同时采用因子分析等计量技术,将社会资本变量纳入企业经营绩效的实证研究模型。在笔者所接触的范围内,这在国内外现有的相关研究中尚属首次。二是本研究将社会资本纳入了激励机制的内生变量。在国内外原有的研究成果中,更多地基于激励理论考察了企业高管的激励要素,包括人口特征(有些研究中还包括了人力资本特征)、薪酬制度以及股票期权等,但是几乎没有相关的研究成果在激励理论框架下系统地考察社会资本要素。本研究将社会资本纳入了企业高管激励机制的内生变量,从而为考察转型期中国企业高管人员的激励机制、完善转型期的企业治理结构提供了理论借鉴和实践指南。三是本研究构建了不完全契约理论的激励优化模型。本研究在理论探讨和实证分析的基础上,构建了基于不完全契约理论的激励优化模型。在转型期的中国,除了原有的人口特征、薪酬制度和股票期权等激励因素外,社会资本的重要性日益凸显。本研究在理论探讨和实证分析的基础上,进一步优化了企业高管激励模型。该模型的构建将为后续激励理论和企业治理结构的完善提供参考和借鉴。四是本研究首创了社会资本超额收益理论。虽然国内外关于社会资本理论的研究很多,但是系统地研究企业高管社会资本超额收益与其组织的经营绩效以及激励机制之间的关系尚属首次。因此,本研究在理论分析和实证研究的基础上,首创社会资本超额收益理论,将具备着非常重要的理论价值和实践意义。
当然,由于受时间、精力和学识等因素的制约,本研究也存在着一定的不足。概括起来,这些不足主要体现在如下方面。一是实证研究的样本总量还有很大的提升空间,最理想的情况应该是全样本研究。二是研究结论的普适性还存在着一定的局限。由于本研究的样本企业全部是上市公司,能否将研究结论推广到上市公司和非上市公司尚需进一步实证检验。三是社会资本的作用机制尚待完善。本研究探讨了高管薪酬、高管团队拥有的社会资本对企业经营绩效的影响,但是却未能对企业高管拥有的社会资本对企业经营绩效发挥作用的微观机理进行深入研究(例如,社会资本到底是对争取政府资源从而对企业经营绩效产生正向影响,还是通过市场规模的扩大从而对企业经营绩效产生正向影响等,很难根据现有的数据对其进行精确量化)。
从全文的结构看,第一章为导论部分(包括了研究的宏观背景、研究意义、主要研究内容、研究方法、研究的创新之处和研究的不足之处),第二章为相关理论和实证研究综述,第三章为社会资本与高管激励—一个理论分析框架,第四章为高管团队社会资本、激励机制与公司绩效描述统计,第五章为企业高管社会资本与经营绩效的实证研究,第六章为企业高管薪酬制度与经营绩效的实证研究,第七章为研究结论、政策建议及进一步研究展望。
This paper adopts the main-board public companies listed before2006as research objects, and selects the effective samples of107companies after deducing the ST and SST abnormal samples from total110samples collected in accordance with classic sampling principle. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper systematically researches into the impact of public company senior management team social capital and incentive mechanism (mainly president's annual salary and stock option) on enterprise's operational performance. This paper adopts the public companies'absolute operational performance index, relative operational performance index, the total social capital possessed by senior management team and their annual salary as dependent variables and takes enterprise's industrial feature, regional feature and senior management team's population feature as controlled variables. By adopting linear multiple regression model and logistic bivariate regression model, this paper implements quantitative study on senior management team's social capital and president's annual salary's influence on enterprise's operational performance. Meanwhile, on the basis of the research result, this paper draws the research conclusion and puts forward suggestions on policy.
This research puts forward five hypotheses on the basis of building theoretical analysis framework, namely:the significant positive correlation between social capital possessed by senior management team and enterprise's operational performance (Hypothesis1), the significant positive correlation between senior management team's salary and enterprise's operational performance (Hypothesis2), the significant positive correlation between social capital possessed by senior management team and enterprise's incentive mechanism strength (Hypothesis3), the significant negative correlation between senior management team's salary and state-owned share ratio (Hypothesis4), and state-owned public enterprise's incentive mechanism for senior managers focus more on the acquisition of social capital (Hypothesis5).
In order to build the empirical analysis model for this research, this paper quantizes senior management team, social capital and other variables. The senior management team includes president, CEO and COO or deputy president (the very first ranking vice president in case of no deputy vice president) and CFO. The senior management team of these three core positions, rather than other positions, will be regarded as the evaluation range of this research. In case that one of these positions serves as the president, other people in the board can be regarded within the range of this research. The social capital adopts social network relationship accumulated through standardization, socialization and systemization. To be specific, the research adopts the network popularity, which means the number of total senior managing positions this team has served in, network height, which means this management team's reputation score in the highest position, and network reputation range, which means the value difference between the highest score and lowest score, to form the social capital's comprehensive variable through factor analysis. These three indexes to indicate social capital level will be generated from information source, mainly the annual reports, half-year reports, and seasonal reports, issued by public companies. In case that such information is not accessible from issued information source, this paper will adopt public channels, mainly information queried from Baidu.com, Google.com and other formal publications, to get relevant information substitution. Judged from it, the social capital adopted in this paper is able to use quantitative index for operational definition, and its analytical level is different from the social capital of macro level and medium level. Instead, it means the individual's social capitation possession in a micro level. Since the information source issued by public companies only include annual salary rather than bonus and allowance, the invisible income will be inaccessible. Therefore, the salary data for senior management team in this research means the annual salary part of them, while stock right and option right will be taken into the evaluation model in the form of virtual variables. In order to indicate the comprehensive operational performance, the performance index adopted by this research includes absolute performance indicator and relative performance indicator. Absolute performance indicator includes profit per share, revenue per share and combined performance. Relative performance indicator includes growth rate of profit per share, growth rate of revenue per share and growth rate of the combined performance. The weight of the revenue per share and growth rate of the revenue per share is60%and the weight of profit per share and growth rate of the profit per share is40%. The reason of adopting this weighted index is that annual total income is an objective performance data that cannot be easily influenced by finance system, accounting method or information launch way. Based on it, this paper introduces the enterprise's basic features, senior management team's individual feature and other controlled variables to establish empirical research model for the sake of analyzing the influence of senior management team's social capital and annual salary on enterprise's absolute operational performance and relative operational performance.
On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper gains the below conclusions:firstly, there is a significant positive correlation between senior management team's social capital and enterprise's operational performance, which proves the Hypothesis1. Secondly, there is a significant positive correlation between senior management team's salary and enterprise's operational performance, which proves the Hypothesis2. Thirdly, there is a significant positive correlation between management team's social capital and enterprise's motivation strength, which proves the Hypothesis3. Fourthly, there is a significant negative correlation between senior management team's salary and state-own share ratio, which proves the Hypothesis4. Fifthly, the state-owned public enterprise's senior managing team motivation system focuses more on the acquisition of social capital, which proves the Hypothesis5. These research results shall provide valuable reference to optimizing incentive mechanism for senior management team, improving corporate governance theory, enhance the principle-agent theory and enriching social capital theory.
The innovations of this research lie in following aspects:firstly, the paper puts forward the evaluation mode for senior management team's social capital. This paper, on the basis of enterprise motivation theory and social capital theory, after combining the information launch features of public companies in Shanghai Stock Market and Shenzhen Stock Market, establishes the evaluation model for senior management team's social capital. Meanwhile, this paper adopts factor analysis and other calculation technique to integrate social capital into operational performance. According to author's experience, it's the first research of this kind in China. Secondly, this research takes social capital as incentive mechanism's endogenous variables, while most domestic and international researches focus on evaluating senior manager's motivation factors including population features and or human capital features based on motivation theory. This paper, by adopting endogenous variable in incentive mechanism for senior managers, provides theoretical reference and practice guidance to evaluating senior manager incentive mechanism during transactional period and improving enterprise managing structure during transactional period. Thirdly, this research establishes the optimized motivation model based on Incomplete Contract Theory. This paper, on the basis of theoretical research and empirical analysis, establishes the optimized motivation model based on Incomplete Contract Theory. The transactional period in china, in addition to original population feature, salary system and stock option motivations, social capital becomes more and more significant. This research, based on theoretical researches and empirical analysis, further optimizes motivation model for senior managers. The establishment of this model shall provide reference and guidance to improving motivation theory and enterprise managing structure. Fourthly, this research is the first one of this kind to put forward the excess income of social capital theory. Thought there a number of domestic and international researches on social capital, this paper is the first one to systematically introduce the relationship among social capital excess income, enterprise's operational performance and incentive mechanism. Therefore, this research, on the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical research, creates the social capital excess income theory, which will be of great theoretical and practical significance.
However, due to limitation in time, energy and knowledge, there are some defects of this research. Generally speaking, the defects are mainly as below: firstly, the sample quantity of empirical research has much room for improvement, and the most ideal case shall be full sample research. Secondly, the conclusion of this research cannot be widely adopted. Since all samples of this research are public companies, it needs further test to check whether this research result is adaptable to both public companies and private companies. Thirdly, the function of social capital needs further improvement. This research analyzes the influence of senior manager's salary and senior managing team's social capital on enterprise's operational performance. However, it fails to research into the functional micro mechanism of senior management team's social capital in improving enterprise's operational performance. For example whether social capital is effective in gaining government resource to causes positive influence to enterprise's operational performance or is effective in enlarging market to causes positive influence in enterprise's operational performance is still hard to be determined accurately based on current data.
Judged from the structure of this paper, the Chapter1is the introduction, which includes the macro background, research significance, research content, research method, innovations and defects of this research. The Chapter2introduces the relevant theories and empirical researches. Chapter3establishes a theoretical analysis framework for social capital and senior managers incentive mechanism. Chapter4statistics senior management team's social capital, incentive mechanism and enterprise's performance. Chapter5implements empirical research on senior manger's social capital and operational performance. Chapter6implements empirical research on senior manager salary system and operational performance. Chapter7includes research result, policy suggestion and expectation for further researches.
引文
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2 社会关系网络中某个或某些个体和有些个体发生直接联系,但与其他个体不发生直接联系,无直接联系或关系间断(disconnection)的现象,从网络整体看好像网络结构中出现了洞穴。基于此,伯特用结构洞来表示非冗余的联系,认为“非冗余的联系人被结构洞所连接,一个结构洞是两个行动者之间的非冗余的联系”。从而为认识社会关系网络的作用机制提供了一个新的理论视角。
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1 例如诺贝尔经济学奖获得者肯尼思·阿罗和罗伯特·索洛就对社会资本概念持批评和反对态度。
2 康小明,人力资本、社会资本与职业发展成就,北京大学出版社,2009：63-64.
1 郑广文,试析我国高管激励报酬契约的设计,《决策&信息》,2009(9)：134.
1 曹阳,中国上市公司高管层股权激励实效效果研究,经济科学出版社,2008：3.
1 边燕杰,城市居民社会资本的来源及作用：网络观点与调查发现,《中国社会科学》,2004(3)：136-146。
2 雷万鹏,钟宇平,中国高等教育需求中的城乡差异—人力资本与社会资本理论的视角,《北京大学教育评论》,2005(3)：48-57。
1 杜亮,媒体称有影响力企业家不是人大代表就是政协委员,中国企业家,2012年3月13日刊。
1 资料来源：任家河,《262公司推股权激励93公司行权价倒挂成白条》,理财周报,2012.5.2.
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