机构投资者对公司内部控制人的监督及其经济后果研究
|
摘要
由于股权过于集中和股权分置等原因，中国上市公司的公司治理面临着严重的“内部人控制”问题，而机构投资者参与公司治理、减缓内部人控制问题既是证券市场发展到一定阶段的产物，也是机构投资者自身发展到一定阶段的必然选择。本文在“新兴+转轨”的中国资本市场环境中以及超常规发展机构投资者的政策背景下，研究机构投资者在公司治理中的作用。
在梳理国内外现有文献的基础上，本研究根据我国机构投资者发展的现状，分析了他们参与公司治理的必然性和必要性、以及影响机构投资者参与公司治理的宏观因素和微观因素。随后，从两类代理问题出发研究机构投资者在公司治理中的作用，一类为股东-经理之间的代理问题，另一类为大-小股东之间的代理问题。不仅从理论上分析了机构投资者与两类内部控制人行为的关系，还实证检验机构投资者是否影响经理人员的薪酬契约和控制权私有收益，以及是否能监督和制衡控股股东在关联交易中的“掏空”行为。在此基础上，研究了机构投资者对内部控制人行为影响所带来的经济后果，即对公司会计业绩和市场价值的影响。最后进一步研究了在我国现有的制度背景下和国有企业改革过程中，上市公司产权性质和股权分置改革对机构投资者参与公司治理效应的影响。
研究过程中，主要从机构投资者的持股集中度、投资期限、持股稳定性和独立性四个特征出发，研究大机构与小机构、长期机构与短期机构、稳定与不稳定机构、独立机构与非独立机构各自的公司治理作用。总体上讲，随着持股比例的提高，长期的、独立的和稳定持股的大机构能够克服个人投资者在监督公司上的“搭便车”问题，有效监督中国上市公司治理中存在的“内部人控制”问题。
在理论分析的基础上，本研究实证发现：
（1）当公司经理成为主要内部控制人时，公司治理的焦点是减缓股东与经理之间的利益冲突问题，薪酬操纵是管理人员获取私有收益的主要手段。机构持股与高管薪酬和私有收益的实证结果显示，独立机构投资者显著提高高管薪酬-业绩敏感性、降低高管的非货币私有收益，对货币私有收益也有一定的限制作用；相反，非独立机构，为了保持与公司的关系，或者是受政府干预程度较高时，对高管薪酬契约没有显著影响。同时，在公司持股时间较长的机构投资者，监督成本较低，他们愿意从监督中获取收益，能够显著降低高管的非货币私有收益，但是对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性没有积极影响。表明长期机构投资者偏好采用直接监督的方式给管理者施压，而不是采用激励机制促使管理者按照股东利益行事。结论支持了标准代理理论的观点，激励机制和股东监督机制是一种互替关系。而持股时间较短的机构投资者，不会积极监督高管私有收益的获取，他们常常以公司长期价值为代价，利用当前盈余信息进行交易，短期内提高了以盈余为业绩的薪酬-业绩敏感性。
（2）当大股东成为公司主要内部控制人时，大、小股东之间的利益冲突成为公司治理要解决的核心问题，关联交易中的占款行为是大股东获取私利的主要渠道。从机构持股与大股东利益侵占的回归结果看，前十大股东中的机构投资者能有效限制大股东的掏空行为，减少关联交易中的利益侵占，但是，他们不能与控股股东形成制衡的股权结构。同时，实证结论表明与公司没有业务联系的、受政府干预少的独立机构投资者和持股时间较长的机构投资者能有效的限制关联交易中大股东的掏空行为。相反，非独立机构投资者和短期机构投资者不能有效降低大股东资金占用。
（3）机构投资者参与公司治理的效果最终反映到公司业绩和市场价值上，考虑到不同的机构投资者对公司治理的态度和作用不同，因此，本研究从机构投资者的四个特征入手，即持股集中度、投资期限和稳定性以及机构的独立性，深入讨论了不同类型的机构投资者对公司业绩产生的不同影响。实证结果显示，各类机构整体持股比例与公司业绩正相关，其中，大机构投资者比小机构投资者发挥着更好的治理效应，其持股比例与公司业绩正相关关系更强；独立机构投资者比非独立机构投资者发挥着更好的治理效应，其持股比例与公司业绩正相关关系更强；长期机构投资者比短期机构投资者发挥着更好的治理效应，其持股比例与公司业绩正相关关系更强。从机构投资者持股稳定性对公司业绩的动态关系研究得出机构投资者持股波动性越小、持续持股时间越长，公司业绩越好。
（4）“国有股一股独大”和“二元股权结构”是中国上市公司的特殊股权结构，考虑到产权性质可能会影响机构投资者参与公司治理，本研究对此进行了检验。研究结果表明，国有产权性质阻碍了机构投资者参与公司治理，对机构投资者提高公司业绩有消极影响；相对于非独立机构投资者，上市公司国有产权性质对独立机构投资者的治理效应具有更显著的阻碍作用；而且在后股改时期，这种负面影响并没有减弱。
Since controlling shareholders’ equity is highly centralized and stock rights aresplit, corporate governance of Chinese listed companies are faced with serious insidercontrolling problems. It is not only the product of development of securities markets butalso the inevitable choice of development of institutional investors themselves to acertain stage that institutional investors involve in corporate governance toalleviate(mitigate) internal control issues. This dissertation researches the role ofinstitutional investors in corporate governance under the environment of "emerging andtransition" Chinese capital markets and the policy context of super-normally developinginstitutional investors in China.
Based on the existing literatures and the development status of China's institutionalinvestors, this dissertation analyzes the inevitability and necessity of institutionalinvestors taking parting in corporate governance, and the macro factors and microfactors affecting the active institutional shareholders. Then, starting from the two mains,the relationships between active institutional shareholders and the two types of insidercontrolling behaviors are theoretically analyzed at first, the one is the managercontrolling behavior, and the other is block shareholder controlling behavior. Hereafter,it does empirical tests that whether institutional investors impact on executivecompensation including pay-performance sensitivity and excessive consumption in job,and whether they monitoring and prevent the tunneling behavior of controllingshareholders in related party transactions. On this basis, economic consequences ofinstitutional investors impacting on the insiders’ controlling behaviors are discussed,which are corporate performance and value. Finally, considering Chinese existingsystem and state-owned enterprise reform processes, influences of corporate ownershipand split-share reform on institutional investors involving in corporate governance arefurther researched.
Considering the four characteristics of institutional investors, includinginstitutional ownership concentration, the independence and the investment horizon ofthe institutional investors, and institutional ownership stability, this dissertation analyzesdeeply the different role of institutional investors in corporate governance between largeand small investors, long-term and short-term investors, stable and unstable investors,and dependent and independent investors. Overall, the empirical results indicate, with the addition of the institutional ownership, long-term, independent, stable holding andlarge institutional investors play a more active monitoring role than do other types ofinstitutions. They have stronger incentives and better capabilities to monitor insidercontrolling issues in China listed companies governance, and to overcome free riderproblem of individual investors in monitoring.
Based on theoretical analysis, the empirical findings show as follows:
1) When a company is mainly controlled by managers, the purpose of corporategovernance is to mitigate the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers.Salary manipulation is the primary means to get private benefits for managers. Althoughevidence suggests that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, notall institutions are equally willing or able to serve this function. The dissertationexamines the effects of institutional monitoring on executive compensation. The resultsindicate that independent institutional investor ownership is more positively associatedwith pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation than non-independentone. And independent institutional investors can reduce private benefits of managers,but there is no evidence that non-independent institutional investors can do. Partialreasons for non-independent institutional investors are that they would keep thepotential business relations with the corporations or be limited by governmentintervention. Meanwhile, this dissertation also investigates how the investment horizonof a firm’s institutional shareholders impacts the executive compensation. Long-terminvestors have more incentives and time to monitor their portfolio firms’ executivecompensation because they can get benefits from monitoring with lower cost. Theresults show there is no evidence of long-term investors enhancing managers’pay-performance sensitivity, but long-term investor ownership is negatively related tomanagerial private benefits. The findings imply that, for long-term investors,monitoring is possible, but they do not prefer the use of incentives to encouragemanagers to act in accordance with the interests of shareholders, and they mainly takethe direct monitoring such as filing shareholder proposals to facilitate managers’ actionin favor of companies. These findings are in line with standard agency theorysuggesting that institutional monitoring induced by long-term-investment horizonssubstitutes for managerial incentives. In contrary, short-term institutional investorscreate implicit incentives for CEOs to over-allocate effort toward improving currentearnings at the expense of creating long-term value, which is they increase managers’ pay-performance sensitivity in short-term but do not monitor the private benefits ofmanagers.
2) When a company is controlled mainly by block shareholders, the conflicts ofinterest between the large and small shareholders is become the core issue in corporategovernance, and the controlling shareholder can expropriate wealth from minorityshareholders in many ways, but the main and direct means is tunneling in related-partytransactions. The dissertation testes the associations between institutional ownership andthe expropriation of minority shareholders by large holders in connected transactions.The results imply institutional investors within top ten shareholders can effectively limitthe tunneling behavior of large shareholders, to reduce the expropriation of minorityshareholders in related-party transactions. Meanwhile, the results show independent andlong-term institutional investor ownership are significantly negatively related to theexpropriation of minority shareholders, but other types of institutional investors showno monitoring effect. These findings suggest that independent and long-terminstitutional investors have advantages in monitoring firms’ tunneling of controllingshareholders.
3) The monitoring effects of institutional investors involving in corporategovernance are reflected finally by firm performance and market value. So, theassociations between corporate firm performance and the level and stability ofinstitutional ownership within a simultaneous equation model are investigated.Considering the heterogeneity of institutional investors, this dissertation discusses theseassociations from four features of institutional investors, and those are institutionalownership concentration, the independence and the investment horizon of theinstitutional investors, and institutional ownership stability. Several results are obtainedfrom empirical tests. First, we find that there is a positive relationship between totalinstitutional ownership and firm performance. Second, we show that only concentratedholdings by long-term and independent institutions are positively associated with firmperformance. Further, the volatility of long-term institutions holdings is negative to firmperformance. That is, the more institutional ownership stability the better firmperformance is. However, concentrated holdings by short-term and non-independentinstitutions are not positive significantly to firm performance. These results indicate thatlarge investors, independent, long-term and stable institutions play a better role inmonitoring than other styles of institutions.
4) Due to “the dominance of state-owned shares” and “dual ownership structure” is the special ownership structure of Chinese listed companies, monitoring effects ofinstitutional investors may be affected by corporate ownership. Based on Chinesespecial ownership structure, the impact of different listed companies’ ownership on therelationship between different institutional holdings and firm performance isinvestigated. The results show that state-owned property right of listed companieshinder the institutional investors from participating in corporate governance, and has anegative impact on institutional investors improving firm performance. Additionally,compared to the non-independent institutional investors, this negative effect is moresignificant on independent institutional investors. Moreover, this negative impact is notdiminished in Split-Share Structure Reform period.
在梳理国内外现有文献的基础上，本研究根据我国机构投资者发展的现状，分析了他们参与公司治理的必然性和必要性、以及影响机构投资者参与公司治理的宏观因素和微观因素。随后，从两类代理问题出发研究机构投资者在公司治理中的作用，一类为股东-经理之间的代理问题，另一类为大-小股东之间的代理问题。不仅从理论上分析了机构投资者与两类内部控制人行为的关系，还实证检验机构投资者是否影响经理人员的薪酬契约和控制权私有收益，以及是否能监督和制衡控股股东在关联交易中的“掏空”行为。在此基础上，研究了机构投资者对内部控制人行为影响所带来的经济后果，即对公司会计业绩和市场价值的影响。最后进一步研究了在我国现有的制度背景下和国有企业改革过程中，上市公司产权性质和股权分置改革对机构投资者参与公司治理效应的影响。
研究过程中，主要从机构投资者的持股集中度、投资期限、持股稳定性和独立性四个特征出发，研究大机构与小机构、长期机构与短期机构、稳定与不稳定机构、独立机构与非独立机构各自的公司治理作用。总体上讲，随着持股比例的提高，长期的、独立的和稳定持股的大机构能够克服个人投资者在监督公司上的“搭便车”问题，有效监督中国上市公司治理中存在的“内部人控制”问题。
在理论分析的基础上，本研究实证发现：
（1）当公司经理成为主要内部控制人时，公司治理的焦点是减缓股东与经理之间的利益冲突问题，薪酬操纵是管理人员获取私有收益的主要手段。机构持股与高管薪酬和私有收益的实证结果显示，独立机构投资者显著提高高管薪酬-业绩敏感性、降低高管的非货币私有收益，对货币私有收益也有一定的限制作用；相反，非独立机构，为了保持与公司的关系，或者是受政府干预程度较高时，对高管薪酬契约没有显著影响。同时，在公司持股时间较长的机构投资者，监督成本较低，他们愿意从监督中获取收益，能够显著降低高管的非货币私有收益，但是对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性没有积极影响。表明长期机构投资者偏好采用直接监督的方式给管理者施压，而不是采用激励机制促使管理者按照股东利益行事。结论支持了标准代理理论的观点，激励机制和股东监督机制是一种互替关系。而持股时间较短的机构投资者，不会积极监督高管私有收益的获取，他们常常以公司长期价值为代价，利用当前盈余信息进行交易，短期内提高了以盈余为业绩的薪酬-业绩敏感性。
（2）当大股东成为公司主要内部控制人时，大、小股东之间的利益冲突成为公司治理要解决的核心问题，关联交易中的占款行为是大股东获取私利的主要渠道。从机构持股与大股东利益侵占的回归结果看，前十大股东中的机构投资者能有效限制大股东的掏空行为，减少关联交易中的利益侵占，但是，他们不能与控股股东形成制衡的股权结构。同时，实证结论表明与公司没有业务联系的、受政府干预少的独立机构投资者和持股时间较长的机构投资者能有效的限制关联交易中大股东的掏空行为。相反，非独立机构投资者和短期机构投资者不能有效降低大股东资金占用。
（3）机构投资者参与公司治理的效果最终反映到公司业绩和市场价值上，考虑到不同的机构投资者对公司治理的态度和作用不同，因此，本研究从机构投资者的四个特征入手，即持股集中度、投资期限和稳定性以及机构的独立性，深入讨论了不同类型的机构投资者对公司业绩产生的不同影响。实证结果显示，各类机构整体持股比例与公司业绩正相关，其中，大机构投资者比小机构投资者发挥着更好的治理效应，其持股比例与公司业绩正相关关系更强；独立机构投资者比非独立机构投资者发挥着更好的治理效应，其持股比例与公司业绩正相关关系更强；长期机构投资者比短期机构投资者发挥着更好的治理效应，其持股比例与公司业绩正相关关系更强。从机构投资者持股稳定性对公司业绩的动态关系研究得出机构投资者持股波动性越小、持续持股时间越长，公司业绩越好。
（4）“国有股一股独大”和“二元股权结构”是中国上市公司的特殊股权结构，考虑到产权性质可能会影响机构投资者参与公司治理，本研究对此进行了检验。研究结果表明，国有产权性质阻碍了机构投资者参与公司治理，对机构投资者提高公司业绩有消极影响；相对于非独立机构投资者，上市公司国有产权性质对独立机构投资者的治理效应具有更显著的阻碍作用；而且在后股改时期，这种负面影响并没有减弱。
Since controlling shareholders’ equity is highly centralized and stock rights aresplit, corporate governance of Chinese listed companies are faced with serious insidercontrolling problems. It is not only the product of development of securities markets butalso the inevitable choice of development of institutional investors themselves to acertain stage that institutional investors involve in corporate governance toalleviate(mitigate) internal control issues. This dissertation researches the role ofinstitutional investors in corporate governance under the environment of "emerging andtransition" Chinese capital markets and the policy context of super-normally developinginstitutional investors in China.
Based on the existing literatures and the development status of China's institutionalinvestors, this dissertation analyzes the inevitability and necessity of institutionalinvestors taking parting in corporate governance, and the macro factors and microfactors affecting the active institutional shareholders. Then, starting from the two mains,the relationships between active institutional shareholders and the two types of insidercontrolling behaviors are theoretically analyzed at first, the one is the managercontrolling behavior, and the other is block shareholder controlling behavior. Hereafter,it does empirical tests that whether institutional investors impact on executivecompensation including pay-performance sensitivity and excessive consumption in job,and whether they monitoring and prevent the tunneling behavior of controllingshareholders in related party transactions. On this basis, economic consequences ofinstitutional investors impacting on the insiders’ controlling behaviors are discussed,which are corporate performance and value. Finally, considering Chinese existingsystem and state-owned enterprise reform processes, influences of corporate ownershipand split-share reform on institutional investors involving in corporate governance arefurther researched.
Considering the four characteristics of institutional investors, includinginstitutional ownership concentration, the independence and the investment horizon ofthe institutional investors, and institutional ownership stability, this dissertation analyzesdeeply the different role of institutional investors in corporate governance between largeand small investors, long-term and short-term investors, stable and unstable investors,and dependent and independent investors. Overall, the empirical results indicate, with the addition of the institutional ownership, long-term, independent, stable holding andlarge institutional investors play a more active monitoring role than do other types ofinstitutions. They have stronger incentives and better capabilities to monitor insidercontrolling issues in China listed companies governance, and to overcome free riderproblem of individual investors in monitoring.
Based on theoretical analysis, the empirical findings show as follows:
1) When a company is mainly controlled by managers, the purpose of corporategovernance is to mitigate the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers.Salary manipulation is the primary means to get private benefits for managers. Althoughevidence suggests that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, notall institutions are equally willing or able to serve this function. The dissertationexamines the effects of institutional monitoring on executive compensation. The resultsindicate that independent institutional investor ownership is more positively associatedwith pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation than non-independentone. And independent institutional investors can reduce private benefits of managers,but there is no evidence that non-independent institutional investors can do. Partialreasons for non-independent institutional investors are that they would keep thepotential business relations with the corporations or be limited by governmentintervention. Meanwhile, this dissertation also investigates how the investment horizonof a firm’s institutional shareholders impacts the executive compensation. Long-terminvestors have more incentives and time to monitor their portfolio firms’ executivecompensation because they can get benefits from monitoring with lower cost. Theresults show there is no evidence of long-term investors enhancing managers’pay-performance sensitivity, but long-term investor ownership is negatively related tomanagerial private benefits. The findings imply that, for long-term investors,monitoring is possible, but they do not prefer the use of incentives to encouragemanagers to act in accordance with the interests of shareholders, and they mainly takethe direct monitoring such as filing shareholder proposals to facilitate managers’ actionin favor of companies. These findings are in line with standard agency theorysuggesting that institutional monitoring induced by long-term-investment horizonssubstitutes for managerial incentives. In contrary, short-term institutional investorscreate implicit incentives for CEOs to over-allocate effort toward improving currentearnings at the expense of creating long-term value, which is they increase managers’ pay-performance sensitivity in short-term but do not monitor the private benefits ofmanagers.
2) When a company is controlled mainly by block shareholders, the conflicts ofinterest between the large and small shareholders is become the core issue in corporategovernance, and the controlling shareholder can expropriate wealth from minorityshareholders in many ways, but the main and direct means is tunneling in related-partytransactions. The dissertation testes the associations between institutional ownership andthe expropriation of minority shareholders by large holders in connected transactions.The results imply institutional investors within top ten shareholders can effectively limitthe tunneling behavior of large shareholders, to reduce the expropriation of minorityshareholders in related-party transactions. Meanwhile, the results show independent andlong-term institutional investor ownership are significantly negatively related to theexpropriation of minority shareholders, but other types of institutional investors showno monitoring effect. These findings suggest that independent and long-terminstitutional investors have advantages in monitoring firms’ tunneling of controllingshareholders.
3) The monitoring effects of institutional investors involving in corporategovernance are reflected finally by firm performance and market value. So, theassociations between corporate firm performance and the level and stability ofinstitutional ownership within a simultaneous equation model are investigated.Considering the heterogeneity of institutional investors, this dissertation discusses theseassociations from four features of institutional investors, and those are institutionalownership concentration, the independence and the investment horizon of theinstitutional investors, and institutional ownership stability. Several results are obtainedfrom empirical tests. First, we find that there is a positive relationship between totalinstitutional ownership and firm performance. Second, we show that only concentratedholdings by long-term and independent institutions are positively associated with firmperformance. Further, the volatility of long-term institutions holdings is negative to firmperformance. That is, the more institutional ownership stability the better firmperformance is. However, concentrated holdings by short-term and non-independentinstitutions are not positive significantly to firm performance. These results indicate thatlarge investors, independent, long-term and stable institutions play a better role inmonitoring than other styles of institutions.
4) Due to “the dominance of state-owned shares” and “dual ownership structure” is the special ownership structure of Chinese listed companies, monitoring effects ofinstitutional investors may be affected by corporate ownership. Based on Chinesespecial ownership structure, the impact of different listed companies’ ownership on therelationship between different institutional holdings and firm performance isinvestigated. The results show that state-owned property right of listed companieshinder the institutional investors from participating in corporate governance, and has anegative impact on institutional investors improving firm performance. Additionally,compared to the non-independent institutional investors, this negative effect is moresignificant on independent institutional investors. Moreover, this negative impact is notdiminished in Split-Share Structure Reform period.
引文
薄仙慧，吴联生.2009.国有控股与机构投资者的治理效应：盈余管理视角[J].经济研究，2：81-91.
蔡卫星，高明华.2010.终极股东的所有权、控制权与利益侵占：来处关联交易的证据[J].南方经济，2：28-41.
陈冬华，陈信元，万华林.2005.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究，3：92-101.
陈小悦，徐晓东.2001.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究，11:3-11.
陈晓，王琨.2005.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革——来自我国资本市场的实证证据[J].经济研究，4：77-86
陈信元，陈冬华，万华林，梁上坤.2009.地区差异、薪酬管制与高管腐败[J].管理世界，11：130-143.
程书强.2006.机构投资者持股与上市公司会计盈余信息关系实证研究[J].管理世界，9:129-136.
杜兴强，郭剑花，雷宇.2010.大股东资金占用、外部审计与公司治理[J].经济管理，32（1）：111-117.
杜兴强，王丽华.2007.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究，1：58-65.
段亚林.2000.监管控股股东滥用股权的博弈分析[J].中国工业经济，5：70-75.
樊纲，王小鲁，朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数――各地区市场化相对进程2009年报告[M].北京：经济科学出版社，2010年.
范海峰，胡玉明.2010.机构投资者持股与公司股权融资成本的实证研究[J].经济与管理研究，2：44-50.
方军雄.2009.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗？[J].经济研究，3：110-124.
傅强，邱建华.2010.机构投资者对上市公司治理的影响[J].商业研究，2:169-173.
高雷，张杰.2009.公司治理、资金占用与盈余管理[J].金融研究，5：121-140.
高培涛.2010.机构投资者参与我国上市公司治理的实证研究[D].山东大学..
郝颖，刘星.2009.资本投向、利益攫取与挤占效应[J].管理世界，5：128-144.
郝云宏，吴俏.2005.机构投资者参与公司治理的理性决策分析[J].商业经济与管理，8：69-73.
贺建刚，孙铮，李增泉.2010.难以抑制的控股股东行为：理论解释与案例分析[J].会计研究，3：20-27.
洪剑峭，薛皓.2008.股权制衡对关联交易和关联销售的持续性影响[J].南开管理评论，11（1）：24-30.
李建伟.2008.高管薪酬规范与法律的有限干预[J].政法论坛，26（3）：107-116.
李善民，王彩萍.2007.机构持股与上市公司高级管理层薪酬关系实证研究[J].管理评论，1：41-48.
李淑娟.2007.社保基金参与公司治理的模式选择[J].改革与战略，4：113-115.
李双海，李海英.2009.机构持股、中小投资者保护与会计盈余质量[J].山西财经大学学报，12:107-114.
李维安，李滨.2008.机构投资者介入公司治理效果的实证研究——基于CCGINK的经验研究[J].南开管理评论，4:4-14.
李向前.2002.机构投资者、公司治理与资本市场稳定研究[J].南开经济研究，2：69-72.
李增泉，孙铮，王志伟.2004.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究，12：3-13.
李增泉.2000.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究，1：24-30.
林志伟，胥佚萱，郭琳.2010.投资者监督、政府干预与企业价值——基于机构投资者的经验证据[J].上海立信会计学院学报，5:50-62.
刘斌，刘星，李世新，何顺文.2003. CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究，3：35-39.
刘峰，贺建刚，魏明海.2004.控制权、业绩与利益输送——基于五粮液的案例研究[J].管理世界，8：102-118.
刘凤委，孙铮，李增泉.2007.政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约[J].管理世界，9：76-84.
刘星，吴先聪.2011.机构投资者异质性、企业产权与公司绩效：基于股权分置改革前后的比较分析[J].中国管理科学，5：182-192.
刘志远，花贵如.2009.政府控制、机构投资者持股与投资者权益保护[J].财经研究，35（4）：119-130.
娄伟.2002.基金持股与上市公司业绩相关性的实证研究[J].上海经济研究，6：58-62.
吕怀立，李婉丽.2010.控股股东自利行为选择与上市公司股权制衡关系研究——基于股权结构的内外生双重属性[J].管理评论，22（3）：19-28.
穆林娟，张红.2008.机构投资者持股与上市公司业绩相关性研究——基于中国上市公司的经验数据[J].北京工商大学学报（社会科学版），23（4）：76-82.
潘越，戴亦一，魏诗琪.2011.机构投资者与上市公司“合谋”了吗：基于高管非自愿变更与继任选择事件的分析[J].南开管理评论，14（2）：69-81.
彭丁.2011.大股东控制、机构投资者治理与公司绩效——基于深交所上市公司的经验证据[J].宏观经济研究，7：50-55.
钱露.2010.机构投资者持股与公司绩效关系研究——基于中国A股上市公司的证据[J].经济学动态，1：60-63.
权小锋，吴世农，文芳.2010.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究，11：73-87.
冉戎，郝颖.2011.终极控制、利益一致性与公司价值[J].管理科学学报，7：83-94.
石美娟，童卫华.2009.机构投资者提升公司价值吗?[J].金融研究，10：150-161.
宋玉.2009.最终控制人性质、两权分离度与机构投资者持股——兼论不同类型机构投资者的差异[J].南开管理评论，5：55-64.
宋渊洋，唐跃军.2009.机构投资者有助于企业业绩改善吗？[J].南方经济，12：56-68.
孙立，林丽.2006.QFII投资中国内地证券市场的实证分析[J].金融研究，313（7）：123-133.
谭松涛，傅勇.2009.管理层激励与机构投资者持股偏好[J].中国软科学，7：109-114.
唐松莲，袁春生.2010.监督或攫取：机构投资者治理角色的识别研究——来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J].管理评论，22（8）：19-29.
唐跃军，宋渊洋.2010.价值选择VS.价值创造——来自中国市场机构投资者的证据[J].经济学季刊，9（2）：609-632.
涂国前，刘峰.2010.制衡股东性质与制衡效果——来自中国民营化上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界，11：132-142.
王凤华，张晓明.2010.独立董事对上市公司关联交易盈余管理行为制约研究[J].软科学，24（6）：115-119.
王克敏，姬美光，李薇.2009.公司信息透明度与大股东资金占用研究[J].南开管理评论，12（4）：83-91.
王克敏，王志超.2007.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界，7：111-119.
王琨，肖星.2005.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论，8（2）：27-33.
王亮，姚益龙.2010.企业特征、关联交易与大股东支持——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南方经济，11：34-46.
王奇波，宋常.2006.国外关于最优股权结构与股权制衡的文献综述[J].会计研究，1：83-94.
王奇波.2005.机构投资者参与的控制权竞争研究[J].经济科学，6：54-64.
王永海，王铁林，李表原.2007.机构投资者参与公司治理积极性的分析[J].南开管理评论，10（1）：4-7.
魏刚.2000.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究，3：32-39.
翁洪波，吴世农.2007.机构投资者、公司治理与上市公司股利政策[J].中国会计评论，5:367-380.
吴超鹏，郑方镳，林周勇，李文强，吴世农.2006.对价支付影响因素的理论和实证分析[J].经济研究，8：14-23.
吴冬梅，庄新田.2010.所有权性质、公司治理与控制权私人收益[J].管理评论，22（7）：53-60.
吴晓晖，姜彦福.2006.机构投资者治理效率研究[J].统计研究，9：33-36.
吴晓求.2006.股权分置改革的若干理论问题——兼论全流通条件下中国资本市场的若干新变化[J].财贸经济，2：24-31.
夏立军，方轶强.2005.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究，5：40-51.
肖星，王琨.2005.证券投资基金：投资者还是投机者？[J].世界经济，8：73-79.
辛清泉，林斌，王彦超.2007.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究，8：110-122.
辛清泉，谭伟强.2009.市场化改革、企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究，11：68-81.
辛宇，徐莉萍.2007.投资者保护视角下治理环境与股改对价之间的关系研究[J].经济研究，9：121-133.
姚颐，刘志远，王健.2007.股权分置改革、机构投资者与投资者保护[J].金融研究，11：45-56.
姚颐，刘志远.2009.机构投资者具有监督作用吗?[J].金融研究，6:128-143.
伊志宏，李艳丽，高伟.2010.异质机构投资者的治理效应：基于高管薪酬视角[J].统计与决策，5：122-125.
余佩琨，李志文，王玉涛.2009.机构投资者能跑赢个人投资者吗？[J].金融研究，8：147-157.
余晓东，杨治南.2001.股东积极主义：一个博弈论的解释[J].外国经济与管理，23（3）：30-34.
袁蓉丽，肖泽忠，邹宏.2010.金融机构投资者的持股和公司业绩：基于股东积极主义的视角[J].中国软科学，11：110-122.
张纯，吕伟.2007.机构投资者、终极产权与融资约束[J].管理世界，11：119-126.
张敏，姜付秀.2010.机构投资者、企业产权与薪酬契约[J].世界经济，8：43-58.
张鸣，郭思永.2007.高管薪酬利益驱动下的企业并购——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究，33（12）：103-113.
赵洪江，夏晖.2009.机构投资者持股与上市公司创新行为关系实证研究[J].中国软科学，5：33-39.
郑爱华，冯晓云，郑晓华.2010.机构投资者持股对上市公司大股东掏空行为之影响[J].财会月刊，3：13-15.
郑国坚.2009.基于效率观和掏空观的关联交易与盈余质量关系研究[J].会计研究，10：68-76.
钟海燕，冉茂盛，文守逊.2010.政府干预、内部人控制与公司投资[J].管理世界，7：98-108.
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M., Matos, P.2011. Does Governance Travel around the World?Evidence from Institutional Investors [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,100(1):154-181.
Ajinkya, B., Bhojraj, S., Sengupta, P.2005. The Association between Outside Directors,Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts [J]. Journal ofAccounting Research,43（3）:343-376.
Almazan, A., Hartzell, J.C., Starks, L.T.2005. Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs ofMonitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation [J]. Financial Management,34(4):5-34.
Baek, J.S., Kang, J.K., Park, K.S.2004. Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from theKorean Financial Crisis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,71(2):265-313.
Baik, B., Kang, J.K., Kim, J.M.2010. Local Institutional Investors, Information Asymmetries, andEquity returns [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,97（1）:81-106.
Barabanov, S.S., Ozocak, O., Turtle, H.J., Walker, T.J.2008. Institutional Investors and ShareholderLitigation [J]. Financial Management,37(2):227-250.
Bebchuk, L.A., Fried, J.M., Walker, D.I.2002. Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Designof Executive Compensation [J]. University of Chicago Law Review,69(July):751-846.
Belev, B.2003. Institutional Investors in Bulgarian Corporate Governance Reform: Obstacles orFacilitators?[J]. Journal of World Business,38(4):361-374.
Bennett, J., Sias, R.W., Starks, L.T.2003. Greener Pastures and the Impact of Dynamic InstitutionalPreferences [J]. The Review of Financial Studies,16(4):1203-1238.
Berkman, H., Cole, R.A., Fu, L.J.2009. Expropriation through Loan Guarantees to Related Parties:Evidence from China [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,33(1):141-156.
Berle, A., Means, G.,1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. New York, NY:Macmillan.
Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., Mullainathan, S.2002. Ferreting out Tunneling: an Application to IndianBusiness Groups [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,117(1):121-148.
Bhattacharya, P.S., Graham, M.A.2009. On Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: ADisaggregated View [J]. Journal of Multinational Financial Management,19(5):370-394.
Black, B.1998. Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States [J]. ColumbiaUniversity Working Paper.
Bohren, O., Priestley, R., Odegaard, B.A.2005. The Duration of Equity Ownership [J]. WorkingPaper, Norwegian School of Management.
Bolton, P., Scheinkman, J., Xiong, W.2006. Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviourin Speculative Markets [J]. Review of Economic Studies,73(3):577-610.
Brickley, J.A., Lease, R.C., Smith, C.W.1988. Ownership Structure and Voting on AntitakeoverAmendments [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,20(1):267-291.
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., Panunzi, F.1997. Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of theFirm [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,112(3):693-728.
Burns, N., Kedia, S., Marc, L.2010. Institutional Ownership and Monitoring: Evidence fromFinancial Misreporting [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,16(4):443-455.
Bushee, B.J.1998. The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior [J].The Accounting Review,73(3):305-333.
Bushee, B.J.2001. Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run Value?[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,18（2）:207-246.
Bushee, B.J., Goodman, T.H.2007. Which Institutional Investors Trade Based on PrivateInformation About, Earnings and Returns?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,45（2）:289-321.
Carleton, W.T., Nelson, J.M., Weisbach, M.S.1998. The Influence of Institutions on CorporateGovernance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF [J]. The Journal ofFinance,53(4):1335-1362.
Chen, X., Harford, J., Li, K.2007. Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?[J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,86(2):279-305.
Cheng, C.S.A., Huang, H.H., Li, Y. Lobo, G.2010. Institutional Monitoring Through ShareholderLitigation [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,95（3）:356-383.
Cheung, Y.L., Jing, L.H., Lu, T., Rau, P.T., Stouraitis, A.2009a. Tunneling and propping up: Ananalysis of related party transactions by Chinese listed companies [J]. Pacific-Basin FinanceJournal,17(3):372-393.
Cheung, Y.L., Qi, Y., Rau, P.R., Stouraitis, A.2009b. Buy High, Sell Low: How Listed Firms PriceAsset Transfers in Related Party Transactions [J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,33(5):914-924.
Cheung, Y.L., Rau, P.R., Stouraitis, A.2006. Tunneling, Propping, and Expropriation: Evidence fromConnected Part Transactions in Hong Kong [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,82(2):343-386.
Chuang, W.I., Lee, B.S.2011. The Informational Role of Institutional Investors and FinancialAnalysts in the Market [J]. Journal of Financial Markets,14:465-493.
Chung, K.H., Zhang, H.2011. Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership [J]. Journal ofFinancial and Quantitative analysis,46（1）:247-273.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J.P.H., Lang, L.H.P.2002. Disentangling the Incentive andEntrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings [J]. Journal of Finance,57(6):2741-2771.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L.H.P.2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in EastAsian Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,58(1/2):81-112.
Claessens, S., Fan, J.P.H.2002. Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey [J]. International Review ofFinance,3（2）:71-103.
Coffee, J.1991. Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor [J].Columbia Law Review,91(6):1277-1368.
Coles, J., Daniel, N., Naveen, L.2006. Managerial Incentives and Risk-Taking [J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics,79(2):431-468.
Conyon, M.J., He, L.2011. Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China [J].Journal of Corporate Finance,17(4):1158-1175.
Core, J.E., Guay, W., Larcker, D.F.2008. The Power of the Pen and Executive Compensation [J].Journal of Financial Economics,88(1):1-25.
Core, J.E., Holthausen, R.W., Larcker, D.F.1999. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive OfficerCompensation, and Firm Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,51(3):371-406.
Cornett, M.M., Marcus, A.J., Saunders, A., Tehranian, H.2007. The Impact of InstitutionalOwnership on Corporate Operating Performance [J].Journal of Banking and Finance,31(6):1771-1794.
Dahya, J., Dimitrov, O., McConnell, J.2008. Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards, andCorporate Value: a Cross-Country Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,87(1):73-100.
David, P., Kochhar, R.1996. Barriers to Effective Corporate Governance by Institutional Investors:Implications for Theory and Practice [J]. European Management Journal,14（5）:457-466.
David, P., Kochhar, R., Levitas, E.1998. The Effect or Institutional Investors on the Level and Mixof CEO Compensation [J]. Academy of Management Journal,41（2）:200-208.
Davis, G., Kim, E.H.2007. Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds [J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics,85(2):552-570.
Del Guercio, D.1996. The Distorting Effect of the Prudent-Man Laws on Institutional EquityInvestment [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,40(1):31-62.
Del Guercio, D., Hawkins, J.1999. The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism [J].Journal of Financial Economics,52（3）:293-340
Del Guercio, D., Seery, L., Woidtke, T.2008. Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional InvestorActivists ‘‘Just Vote No’’?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,90(1):84-103.
Demiralp, I., D’Mello, R., Schlingemann, F.P., Subramaniam, V.2011. Are There MonitoringBenefits to Institutional Ownership? Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings [J]. Journal ofCorporate Finance,17(5):1340-1359.
Dikolli, S.S., Kulp, S.L., Sedatole, K.L.2009. Transient Institutional Ownership and CEOContracting [J]. The Accounting Review,84（3）:737-770.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.2008. The Law and Economics ofSelf-Dealing [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,88(3):430-465.
Drucker, P.F.1976. The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America [M],London: Heinemann.
Duggal, R., Millar, J.A.1999. Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: The Case of BidderReturns [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,5(2):103-117.
Elyasiani, E., Jia, J.2008. Institutional Ownership Stability and BHC Performance [J]. Journal ofBanking&Finance,32(9):1767-1781.
Elyasiani, E., Jia, J.2010. Distribution of Institutional Ownership and Corporate Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,34(3):606-620.
Engel, E., Gordon, E., Hayes, R.2002. The Roles of Performance Measures and Monitoring inAnnual Governance Decisions in Entrepreneurial Firms [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,40(2):485-518
Farrar, D.E., Girton, L.1981. Institutional Investors and Concentration of Financial Power: Berleand Means Revisited [J]. The Journal of Finance,36(2):369-381.
Feng, Z., Ghosh, C., He, F., Sirmans, C.F.2010. Institutional Monitoring and REIT CEOCompensation [J]. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,40(4):446-479.
Ferreira, M.A., Matos, P.2008. The Colors of Investors’ Money: The Role of Institutional Investorsaround the World [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,88(3):499-533.
Firth, F., Fung, P.M.Y., Rui, O.M.2006. Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,12(4):693-714.
Frye, T., Shleifer, A.1997. The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand [J]. American EconomicReview,87:354-358
Gao, L., Kling, G.2008. Corporate Governance and Tunneling: Empirical Evidence from China [J].Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,16(5):591-605.
Gaspar, J.M., Massa, M., Matos, P.2005. Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market forCorporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,76(1):135-165.
Gillan, S.L., Starks, L.T.2000. Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: the Roleof Institutional Investors [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,57(2):275-305.
Gillan, S.L., Starks, L.T.2007. The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States [J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,19(1):55-73.
Gomes, A., Novaes, W.2006. Sharing of Control versus Monitoring as Corporate GovernanceMechanisms [J]. Working Paper, Washington University.
Gordon, E.A., Henry, E. D.Palia.2004（a）. Related Party Transactions: Associations with CorporateGovernance and Firm Value [J]. Working Paper.
Gordon, E.A., Henry, E., Palia, D.2004（b）. Related Party Transactions and Corporate Governance[J]. Advances in Financial Economics,9:1-27.
Grinstein, G.Y., Michaely, R.2005. Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy [J]. Journal of Finance,60（3）:1389-1426.
Grossman, S., Hart, O.1980. Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem, and the Theory of theCorporation [J]. Bell Journal of Economics,11(1):42-64.
Grossman, S., Hart, O.1988. One Share One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Journalof Financial Economics,20(1/2):175-202.
Hartzell, J.C., Starks, L.T.2003. Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation [J]. Journal ofFinance,58（6）:2351-2374.
Hellman, N.2005. Can We Expect Institutional Investors to Improve Corporate Governance?[J].Scandinavian Journal of Management,21(3):293-327.
Helwege, J., Intintoli, V.J., Zhang, A.2012. Voting with Their Feet or Activism? InstitutionalInvestors’ Impact on CEO Turnover [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,18(1):22-37.
Holderness，C.G.2003. A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control [J]. Economic PolicyReview,（4）:51-64
Hsu, G.C.M., Koh, P.S.2005. Does the Presence of Institutional Investors Influence AccrualsManagement? Evidence from Australia [J]. Corporate Governance,13（6）:809-823.
Jackson, S.B., Lopez, T.J., Reitenga, A.L.2008. Accounting Fundamental and CEO BonusCompensation [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,27(5):374-393.
Janakiraman, S., Radhakrishnan, S., Tsang, A.2010. Institutional Investors, Managerial Ownership,and Executive Compensation [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing&Finance,25(4):673-707
Jensen, M.1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal ControlSystems [J]. Journal of Finance,48(3):831-880.
Jensen, M., Meckling, W.1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, andOwnership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,3（4）:305-360.
Jensen, M., Murphy, K.1990. Performance Compensation and Top Management Incentives [J].Journal of Political Economy,98(2):225-264.
Jian, M., Wong, T.J.2003. Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions:Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups [J]. Working paper.
Jian, M., Wong, T.J.2010. Propping through Related Party Transactions [J]. Review of AccountingStudies,15（1）:70-105.
Jiang, C.X.J., Kim, C., Zhou, D.2011. Liquidity, Analysts, and Institutional Ownership [J].International Review of Financial Analysis,20(5):335-344.
Jiang, G.H., Lee, M.C., Yue, H.2010. Tunneling Through Intercorporate Loans: The ChinaExperience [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,98(1):1-20.
Johnson, E.C.1990. An Insider’s Look at Institutional Investors [J]. Harvard Business Review,4:195-196.
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.2000. Tunneling,[J]. AmericanEconomic Review,90(2):22-27.
Karpoff, J.M., Malatesta, P.H., Walkling, R.A.1996. Corporate Governance and ShareholderInitiatives: Empirical Evidence [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,42(3):365-395.
Ke, B., Petroni, K.2004. How Informed are Actively Trading Institutional Investors? Evidence fromTheir Trading Behavior before a Break in a String of Consecutive Earnings Increases [J].Journal of Accounting Research,42（5）:895-927.
Ke, B., Petroni, K., Safieddine, A.1999. Ownership Concentration and Sensitivity of Executive Payto Accounting Performance: Evidence from Publicly and Privately-Held Insurance Companies[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,28(2),185-209.
Ke, B., Ramalingegowda, S.2005. Do Institutional Investors Exploit the Post-EarningsAnnouncement Drift?[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,39(1):25-53.
Khan, R., Dharwadkar, R., Brandes, P.2005. Institutional Ownership and CEO Compensation: aLongitudinal Examination [J]. Journal of Business Research,58(8):1078-1088.
Koh, P.S.2007. Institutional Investor Type, Earnings Management and Benchmark Beaters [J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,26(3):267-299.
Kohlbeck, M., Mayhew, B.W.2010. Valuation of Firms that Disclose Related Party Transactions [J].Journal Account Public Policy,29(2):115-137.
Kostant, P.C.1999. Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the Course of Corporate Governance and Counsel’sChanging Role [J]. Journal of Socio-Economics,28(3):203-246.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.1999. Corporate Ownership around the World [J].The Journal of Finance,54（2）:471-517.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.2000. Investor Protection and CorporateGovernance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,58(1-2):3-27.
Lewellen, J.2011. Institutional Investors and the Limits of Arbitrage [J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,102(1):62-80.
Li, H., Zhou, L.2005. Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Disciplinary Role ofPersonnel Control in China [J]. Journal of Public Economics,89(9-10):1743-1762.
Light.1989. The Privatization of Equity [J]. Harvard Business Review,（1/2）:61-74
Luo, W., Zhang, Y., Zhu, N.2011. Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites: New Evidence froman Emerging Market [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,17（2）:352-370.
Mahoney, L., Roberts, R.W.2007. Corporate Social Performance, Financial Performance andInstitutional Ownership in Canadian Firms [J]. Accounting Forum,31（3）:233-253.
Manconi, A., Massa, M., Yasuda, A.2012. The Role of Institutional Investors in Propagating theCrisis of2007-2008[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming.
Maug, E.1998. Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-off between Liquidity and Control?[J]. Journal of Finance,53(1):65-98.
McCahery, J.A., Sautner, Z., Starks, L.T.2010. Behind the Scenes: The Corporate GovernancePreferences of Institutional Investors [J]. Working Paper, University of Texas at Austin.
McConnell, J.J., Servaes, H.1990. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,27(2):595-612.
Morgan, A., Poulsen, A., Wolf, J., Yang, T.2011. Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from MutualFund Voting [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,17(4):914-928.
Myers, S C.2000. Outside [J]. The Journal of Finance,55（3）:1005-1037
Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.S.1984. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms HaveInformation those Investors Do Not Have [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,13（2）:187-221.
Ng, A., Yuce, A., Chen, E.2009. Determinants of State Equity Ownership, and Its Effect onValue/Performance: China’s Privatized Firms [J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,17(4):413-443.
Parrino, R., Sias, R.W., Starks, L.T.2003. Voting with Their Feet: Institutional Ownership Changesaround Forced CEO Turnover [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,68（1）:3-46.
Porter, M.E.1992. Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System [J]. HarvardBusiness Review,70(5):65-82.
Pound, J.1988. Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight [J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,20(1):237-265.
Pozen, R.C.1994. Institutional Investors: the Reluctant Activists [J]. Harvard Business Review,（1-2）:140–149.
Ramalingegowda, S., Yu, Y.2012. Institutional Ownership and Conservatism [J]. Journal ofAccounting and Economics,53(1-2):98-114.
Romano, R.1993. Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered [J].Columbia Law Review,93(5):794-853.
Rubach, M.J., Sebora, T.C.2009. Determinants of Institutional Investor Activism: A Test of theRyan-Schneider Model （2002）[J]. Journal of Managerial Issues,21（2）:245-261.
Ruiz-Mallorqui, M.V., Santana-Martin, D.J.2011. Dominant Institutional Owners and Firm Value [J].Journal of Banking and Finance,35(1):118-129.
Ryan, L.V., Schneider, M.2002. The Antecedents of Institutional Investor Activism [J]. Academy ofManagement Review,27（4）:554-573.
Shin, J.Y.2008. Institutional Investment Horizons and CEO Compensation [J]. Working Paper,University of Illinois.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W.1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of PoliticalEconomy,94(3):461-488.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W.1989. Management Entrenchment: The Case of Managerial SpecificInvestments [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,25(1):123-139.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W.1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Finance,52:737-783.
Sias, R.W., Starks, L.T.1997. Return Autocorrelation and Institutional Investors [J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics,46(1):103-131.
Smith, M.1996. Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS [J].Journal of Finance,51（1）:227-252.
Wahal, S.1996. Pension fund activism and firm performance [J]. Journal of Financial andQuantitative Analysis,31(1):1–23.
Wahal, S., McConnell, J.2000. Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial Myopia?[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,6(3):307-329.
Wei, Z., Varela, O.2003. State Equity Ownership and Firm Market Performance: Evidence fromChina’s Newly Privatized Firms [J]. Global Finance Journal,14(1):65-82.
Woidtke, T.2002. Agents Watching Agents?: Evidence from Pension Fund Ownership and FirmValue [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,63(1):99-131.
Yuan, R.L., Xiao, J.Z., Zou, H.2008. Mutual Funds’ Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidencefrom China [J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,32(8):1552-1565.
蔡卫星，高明华.2010.终极股东的所有权、控制权与利益侵占：来处关联交易的证据[J].南方经济，2：28-41.
陈冬华，陈信元，万华林.2005.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究，3：92-101.
陈小悦，徐晓东.2001.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究，11:3-11.
陈晓，王琨.2005.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革——来自我国资本市场的实证证据[J].经济研究，4：77-86
陈信元，陈冬华，万华林，梁上坤.2009.地区差异、薪酬管制与高管腐败[J].管理世界，11：130-143.
程书强.2006.机构投资者持股与上市公司会计盈余信息关系实证研究[J].管理世界，9:129-136.
杜兴强，郭剑花，雷宇.2010.大股东资金占用、外部审计与公司治理[J].经济管理，32（1）：111-117.
杜兴强，王丽华.2007.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究，1：58-65.
段亚林.2000.监管控股股东滥用股权的博弈分析[J].中国工业经济，5：70-75.
樊纲，王小鲁，朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数――各地区市场化相对进程2009年报告[M].北京：经济科学出版社，2010年.
范海峰，胡玉明.2010.机构投资者持股与公司股权融资成本的实证研究[J].经济与管理研究，2：44-50.
方军雄.2009.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗？[J].经济研究，3：110-124.
傅强，邱建华.2010.机构投资者对上市公司治理的影响[J].商业研究，2:169-173.
高雷，张杰.2009.公司治理、资金占用与盈余管理[J].金融研究，5：121-140.
高培涛.2010.机构投资者参与我国上市公司治理的实证研究[D].山东大学..
郝颖，刘星.2009.资本投向、利益攫取与挤占效应[J].管理世界，5：128-144.
郝云宏，吴俏.2005.机构投资者参与公司治理的理性决策分析[J].商业经济与管理，8：69-73.
贺建刚，孙铮，李增泉.2010.难以抑制的控股股东行为：理论解释与案例分析[J].会计研究，3：20-27.
洪剑峭，薛皓.2008.股权制衡对关联交易和关联销售的持续性影响[J].南开管理评论，11（1）：24-30.
李建伟.2008.高管薪酬规范与法律的有限干预[J].政法论坛，26（3）：107-116.
李善民，王彩萍.2007.机构持股与上市公司高级管理层薪酬关系实证研究[J].管理评论，1：41-48.
李淑娟.2007.社保基金参与公司治理的模式选择[J].改革与战略，4：113-115.
李双海，李海英.2009.机构持股、中小投资者保护与会计盈余质量[J].山西财经大学学报，12:107-114.
李维安，李滨.2008.机构投资者介入公司治理效果的实证研究——基于CCGINK的经验研究[J].南开管理评论，4:4-14.
李向前.2002.机构投资者、公司治理与资本市场稳定研究[J].南开经济研究，2：69-72.
李增泉，孙铮，王志伟.2004.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究，12：3-13.
李增泉.2000.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究，1：24-30.
林志伟，胥佚萱，郭琳.2010.投资者监督、政府干预与企业价值——基于机构投资者的经验证据[J].上海立信会计学院学报，5:50-62.
刘斌，刘星，李世新，何顺文.2003. CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究，3：35-39.
刘峰，贺建刚，魏明海.2004.控制权、业绩与利益输送——基于五粮液的案例研究[J].管理世界，8：102-118.
刘凤委，孙铮，李增泉.2007.政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约[J].管理世界，9：76-84.
刘星，吴先聪.2011.机构投资者异质性、企业产权与公司绩效：基于股权分置改革前后的比较分析[J].中国管理科学，5：182-192.
刘志远，花贵如.2009.政府控制、机构投资者持股与投资者权益保护[J].财经研究，35（4）：119-130.
娄伟.2002.基金持股与上市公司业绩相关性的实证研究[J].上海经济研究，6：58-62.
吕怀立，李婉丽.2010.控股股东自利行为选择与上市公司股权制衡关系研究——基于股权结构的内外生双重属性[J].管理评论，22（3）：19-28.
穆林娟，张红.2008.机构投资者持股与上市公司业绩相关性研究——基于中国上市公司的经验数据[J].北京工商大学学报（社会科学版），23（4）：76-82.
潘越，戴亦一，魏诗琪.2011.机构投资者与上市公司“合谋”了吗：基于高管非自愿变更与继任选择事件的分析[J].南开管理评论，14（2）：69-81.
彭丁.2011.大股东控制、机构投资者治理与公司绩效——基于深交所上市公司的经验证据[J].宏观经济研究，7：50-55.
钱露.2010.机构投资者持股与公司绩效关系研究——基于中国A股上市公司的证据[J].经济学动态，1：60-63.
权小锋，吴世农，文芳.2010.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究，11：73-87.
冉戎，郝颖.2011.终极控制、利益一致性与公司价值[J].管理科学学报，7：83-94.
石美娟，童卫华.2009.机构投资者提升公司价值吗?[J].金融研究，10：150-161.
宋玉.2009.最终控制人性质、两权分离度与机构投资者持股——兼论不同类型机构投资者的差异[J].南开管理评论，5：55-64.
宋渊洋，唐跃军.2009.机构投资者有助于企业业绩改善吗？[J].南方经济，12：56-68.
孙立，林丽.2006.QFII投资中国内地证券市场的实证分析[J].金融研究，313（7）：123-133.
谭松涛，傅勇.2009.管理层激励与机构投资者持股偏好[J].中国软科学，7：109-114.
唐松莲，袁春生.2010.监督或攫取：机构投资者治理角色的识别研究——来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J].管理评论，22（8）：19-29.
唐跃军，宋渊洋.2010.价值选择VS.价值创造——来自中国市场机构投资者的证据[J].经济学季刊，9（2）：609-632.
涂国前，刘峰.2010.制衡股东性质与制衡效果——来自中国民营化上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界，11：132-142.
王凤华，张晓明.2010.独立董事对上市公司关联交易盈余管理行为制约研究[J].软科学，24（6）：115-119.
王克敏，姬美光，李薇.2009.公司信息透明度与大股东资金占用研究[J].南开管理评论，12（4）：83-91.
王克敏，王志超.2007.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界，7：111-119.
王琨，肖星.2005.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论，8（2）：27-33.
王亮，姚益龙.2010.企业特征、关联交易与大股东支持——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南方经济，11：34-46.
王奇波，宋常.2006.国外关于最优股权结构与股权制衡的文献综述[J].会计研究，1：83-94.
王奇波.2005.机构投资者参与的控制权竞争研究[J].经济科学，6：54-64.
王永海，王铁林，李表原.2007.机构投资者参与公司治理积极性的分析[J].南开管理评论，10（1）：4-7.
魏刚.2000.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究，3：32-39.
翁洪波，吴世农.2007.机构投资者、公司治理与上市公司股利政策[J].中国会计评论，5:367-380.
吴超鹏，郑方镳，林周勇，李文强，吴世农.2006.对价支付影响因素的理论和实证分析[J].经济研究，8：14-23.
吴冬梅，庄新田.2010.所有权性质、公司治理与控制权私人收益[J].管理评论，22（7）：53-60.
吴晓晖，姜彦福.2006.机构投资者治理效率研究[J].统计研究，9：33-36.
吴晓求.2006.股权分置改革的若干理论问题——兼论全流通条件下中国资本市场的若干新变化[J].财贸经济，2：24-31.
夏立军，方轶强.2005.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究，5：40-51.
肖星，王琨.2005.证券投资基金：投资者还是投机者？[J].世界经济，8：73-79.
辛清泉，林斌，王彦超.2007.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究，8：110-122.
辛清泉，谭伟强.2009.市场化改革、企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究，11：68-81.
辛宇，徐莉萍.2007.投资者保护视角下治理环境与股改对价之间的关系研究[J].经济研究，9：121-133.
姚颐，刘志远，王健.2007.股权分置改革、机构投资者与投资者保护[J].金融研究，11：45-56.
姚颐，刘志远.2009.机构投资者具有监督作用吗?[J].金融研究，6:128-143.
伊志宏，李艳丽，高伟.2010.异质机构投资者的治理效应：基于高管薪酬视角[J].统计与决策，5：122-125.
余佩琨，李志文，王玉涛.2009.机构投资者能跑赢个人投资者吗？[J].金融研究，8：147-157.
余晓东，杨治南.2001.股东积极主义：一个博弈论的解释[J].外国经济与管理，23（3）：30-34.
袁蓉丽，肖泽忠，邹宏.2010.金融机构投资者的持股和公司业绩：基于股东积极主义的视角[J].中国软科学，11：110-122.
张纯，吕伟.2007.机构投资者、终极产权与融资约束[J].管理世界，11：119-126.
张敏，姜付秀.2010.机构投资者、企业产权与薪酬契约[J].世界经济，8：43-58.
张鸣，郭思永.2007.高管薪酬利益驱动下的企业并购——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究，33（12）：103-113.
赵洪江，夏晖.2009.机构投资者持股与上市公司创新行为关系实证研究[J].中国软科学，5：33-39.
郑爱华，冯晓云，郑晓华.2010.机构投资者持股对上市公司大股东掏空行为之影响[J].财会月刊，3：13-15.
郑国坚.2009.基于效率观和掏空观的关联交易与盈余质量关系研究[J].会计研究，10：68-76.
钟海燕，冉茂盛，文守逊.2010.政府干预、内部人控制与公司投资[J].管理世界，7：98-108.
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M., Matos, P.2011. Does Governance Travel around the World?Evidence from Institutional Investors [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,100(1):154-181.
Ajinkya, B., Bhojraj, S., Sengupta, P.2005. The Association between Outside Directors,Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts [J]. Journal ofAccounting Research,43（3）:343-376.
Almazan, A., Hartzell, J.C., Starks, L.T.2005. Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs ofMonitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation [J]. Financial Management,34(4):5-34.
Baek, J.S., Kang, J.K., Park, K.S.2004. Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from theKorean Financial Crisis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,71(2):265-313.
Baik, B., Kang, J.K., Kim, J.M.2010. Local Institutional Investors, Information Asymmetries, andEquity returns [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,97（1）:81-106.
Barabanov, S.S., Ozocak, O., Turtle, H.J., Walker, T.J.2008. Institutional Investors and ShareholderLitigation [J]. Financial Management,37(2):227-250.
Bebchuk, L.A., Fried, J.M., Walker, D.I.2002. Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Designof Executive Compensation [J]. University of Chicago Law Review,69(July):751-846.
Belev, B.2003. Institutional Investors in Bulgarian Corporate Governance Reform: Obstacles orFacilitators?[J]. Journal of World Business,38(4):361-374.
Bennett, J., Sias, R.W., Starks, L.T.2003. Greener Pastures and the Impact of Dynamic InstitutionalPreferences [J]. The Review of Financial Studies,16(4):1203-1238.
Berkman, H., Cole, R.A., Fu, L.J.2009. Expropriation through Loan Guarantees to Related Parties:Evidence from China [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,33(1):141-156.
Berle, A., Means, G.,1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. New York, NY:Macmillan.
Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., Mullainathan, S.2002. Ferreting out Tunneling: an Application to IndianBusiness Groups [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,117(1):121-148.
Bhattacharya, P.S., Graham, M.A.2009. On Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: ADisaggregated View [J]. Journal of Multinational Financial Management,19(5):370-394.
Black, B.1998. Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States [J]. ColumbiaUniversity Working Paper.
Bohren, O., Priestley, R., Odegaard, B.A.2005. The Duration of Equity Ownership [J]. WorkingPaper, Norwegian School of Management.
Bolton, P., Scheinkman, J., Xiong, W.2006. Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviourin Speculative Markets [J]. Review of Economic Studies,73(3):577-610.
Brickley, J.A., Lease, R.C., Smith, C.W.1988. Ownership Structure and Voting on AntitakeoverAmendments [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,20(1):267-291.
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., Panunzi, F.1997. Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of theFirm [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,112(3):693-728.
Burns, N., Kedia, S., Marc, L.2010. Institutional Ownership and Monitoring: Evidence fromFinancial Misreporting [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,16(4):443-455.
Bushee, B.J.1998. The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior [J].The Accounting Review,73(3):305-333.
Bushee, B.J.2001. Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run Value?[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,18（2）:207-246.
Bushee, B.J., Goodman, T.H.2007. Which Institutional Investors Trade Based on PrivateInformation About, Earnings and Returns?[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,45（2）:289-321.
Carleton, W.T., Nelson, J.M., Weisbach, M.S.1998. The Influence of Institutions on CorporateGovernance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF [J]. The Journal ofFinance,53(4):1335-1362.
Chen, X., Harford, J., Li, K.2007. Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?[J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,86(2):279-305.
Cheng, C.S.A., Huang, H.H., Li, Y. Lobo, G.2010. Institutional Monitoring Through ShareholderLitigation [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,95（3）:356-383.
Cheung, Y.L., Jing, L.H., Lu, T., Rau, P.T., Stouraitis, A.2009a. Tunneling and propping up: Ananalysis of related party transactions by Chinese listed companies [J]. Pacific-Basin FinanceJournal,17(3):372-393.
Cheung, Y.L., Qi, Y., Rau, P.R., Stouraitis, A.2009b. Buy High, Sell Low: How Listed Firms PriceAsset Transfers in Related Party Transactions [J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,33(5):914-924.
Cheung, Y.L., Rau, P.R., Stouraitis, A.2006. Tunneling, Propping, and Expropriation: Evidence fromConnected Part Transactions in Hong Kong [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,82(2):343-386.
Chuang, W.I., Lee, B.S.2011. The Informational Role of Institutional Investors and FinancialAnalysts in the Market [J]. Journal of Financial Markets,14:465-493.
Chung, K.H., Zhang, H.2011. Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership [J]. Journal ofFinancial and Quantitative analysis,46（1）:247-273.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J.P.H., Lang, L.H.P.2002. Disentangling the Incentive andEntrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings [J]. Journal of Finance,57(6):2741-2771.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L.H.P.2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in EastAsian Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,58(1/2):81-112.
Claessens, S., Fan, J.P.H.2002. Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey [J]. International Review ofFinance,3（2）:71-103.
Coffee, J.1991. Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor [J].Columbia Law Review,91(6):1277-1368.
Coles, J., Daniel, N., Naveen, L.2006. Managerial Incentives and Risk-Taking [J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics,79(2):431-468.
Conyon, M.J., He, L.2011. Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China [J].Journal of Corporate Finance,17(4):1158-1175.
Core, J.E., Guay, W., Larcker, D.F.2008. The Power of the Pen and Executive Compensation [J].Journal of Financial Economics,88(1):1-25.
Core, J.E., Holthausen, R.W., Larcker, D.F.1999. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive OfficerCompensation, and Firm Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,51(3):371-406.
Cornett, M.M., Marcus, A.J., Saunders, A., Tehranian, H.2007. The Impact of InstitutionalOwnership on Corporate Operating Performance [J].Journal of Banking and Finance,31(6):1771-1794.
Dahya, J., Dimitrov, O., McConnell, J.2008. Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards, andCorporate Value: a Cross-Country Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,87(1):73-100.
David, P., Kochhar, R.1996. Barriers to Effective Corporate Governance by Institutional Investors:Implications for Theory and Practice [J]. European Management Journal,14（5）:457-466.
David, P., Kochhar, R., Levitas, E.1998. The Effect or Institutional Investors on the Level and Mixof CEO Compensation [J]. Academy of Management Journal,41（2）:200-208.
Davis, G., Kim, E.H.2007. Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds [J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics,85(2):552-570.
Del Guercio, D.1996. The Distorting Effect of the Prudent-Man Laws on Institutional EquityInvestment [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,40(1):31-62.
Del Guercio, D., Hawkins, J.1999. The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism [J].Journal of Financial Economics,52（3）:293-340
Del Guercio, D., Seery, L., Woidtke, T.2008. Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional InvestorActivists ‘‘Just Vote No’’?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,90(1):84-103.
Demiralp, I., D’Mello, R., Schlingemann, F.P., Subramaniam, V.2011. Are There MonitoringBenefits to Institutional Ownership? Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings [J]. Journal ofCorporate Finance,17(5):1340-1359.
Dikolli, S.S., Kulp, S.L., Sedatole, K.L.2009. Transient Institutional Ownership and CEOContracting [J]. The Accounting Review,84（3）:737-770.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.2008. The Law and Economics ofSelf-Dealing [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,88(3):430-465.
Drucker, P.F.1976. The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America [M],London: Heinemann.
Duggal, R., Millar, J.A.1999. Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: The Case of BidderReturns [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,5(2):103-117.
Elyasiani, E., Jia, J.2008. Institutional Ownership Stability and BHC Performance [J]. Journal ofBanking&Finance,32(9):1767-1781.
Elyasiani, E., Jia, J.2010. Distribution of Institutional Ownership and Corporate Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,34(3):606-620.
Engel, E., Gordon, E., Hayes, R.2002. The Roles of Performance Measures and Monitoring inAnnual Governance Decisions in Entrepreneurial Firms [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,40(2):485-518
Farrar, D.E., Girton, L.1981. Institutional Investors and Concentration of Financial Power: Berleand Means Revisited [J]. The Journal of Finance,36(2):369-381.
Feng, Z., Ghosh, C., He, F., Sirmans, C.F.2010. Institutional Monitoring and REIT CEOCompensation [J]. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,40(4):446-479.
Ferreira, M.A., Matos, P.2008. The Colors of Investors’ Money: The Role of Institutional Investorsaround the World [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,88(3):499-533.
Firth, F., Fung, P.M.Y., Rui, O.M.2006. Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,12(4):693-714.
Frye, T., Shleifer, A.1997. The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand [J]. American EconomicReview,87:354-358
Gao, L., Kling, G.2008. Corporate Governance and Tunneling: Empirical Evidence from China [J].Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,16(5):591-605.
Gaspar, J.M., Massa, M., Matos, P.2005. Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market forCorporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,76(1):135-165.
Gillan, S.L., Starks, L.T.2000. Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: the Roleof Institutional Investors [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,57(2):275-305.
Gillan, S.L., Starks, L.T.2007. The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States [J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,19(1):55-73.
Gomes, A., Novaes, W.2006. Sharing of Control versus Monitoring as Corporate GovernanceMechanisms [J]. Working Paper, Washington University.
Gordon, E.A., Henry, E. D.Palia.2004（a）. Related Party Transactions: Associations with CorporateGovernance and Firm Value [J]. Working Paper.
Gordon, E.A., Henry, E., Palia, D.2004（b）. Related Party Transactions and Corporate Governance[J]. Advances in Financial Economics,9:1-27.
Grinstein, G.Y., Michaely, R.2005. Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy [J]. Journal of Finance,60（3）:1389-1426.
Grossman, S., Hart, O.1980. Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem, and the Theory of theCorporation [J]. Bell Journal of Economics,11(1):42-64.
Grossman, S., Hart, O.1988. One Share One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Journalof Financial Economics,20(1/2):175-202.
Hartzell, J.C., Starks, L.T.2003. Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation [J]. Journal ofFinance,58（6）:2351-2374.
Hellman, N.2005. Can We Expect Institutional Investors to Improve Corporate Governance?[J].Scandinavian Journal of Management,21(3):293-327.
Helwege, J., Intintoli, V.J., Zhang, A.2012. Voting with Their Feet or Activism? InstitutionalInvestors’ Impact on CEO Turnover [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,18(1):22-37.
Holderness，C.G.2003. A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control [J]. Economic PolicyReview,（4）:51-64
Hsu, G.C.M., Koh, P.S.2005. Does the Presence of Institutional Investors Influence AccrualsManagement? Evidence from Australia [J]. Corporate Governance,13（6）:809-823.
Jackson, S.B., Lopez, T.J., Reitenga, A.L.2008. Accounting Fundamental and CEO BonusCompensation [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,27(5):374-393.
Janakiraman, S., Radhakrishnan, S., Tsang, A.2010. Institutional Investors, Managerial Ownership,and Executive Compensation [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing&Finance,25(4):673-707
Jensen, M.1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal ControlSystems [J]. Journal of Finance,48(3):831-880.
Jensen, M., Meckling, W.1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, andOwnership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,3（4）:305-360.
Jensen, M., Murphy, K.1990. Performance Compensation and Top Management Incentives [J].Journal of Political Economy,98(2):225-264.
Jian, M., Wong, T.J.2003. Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions:Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups [J]. Working paper.
Jian, M., Wong, T.J.2010. Propping through Related Party Transactions [J]. Review of AccountingStudies,15（1）:70-105.
Jiang, C.X.J., Kim, C., Zhou, D.2011. Liquidity, Analysts, and Institutional Ownership [J].International Review of Financial Analysis,20(5):335-344.
Jiang, G.H., Lee, M.C., Yue, H.2010. Tunneling Through Intercorporate Loans: The ChinaExperience [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,98(1):1-20.
Johnson, E.C.1990. An Insider’s Look at Institutional Investors [J]. Harvard Business Review,4:195-196.
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.2000. Tunneling,[J]. AmericanEconomic Review,90(2):22-27.
Karpoff, J.M., Malatesta, P.H., Walkling, R.A.1996. Corporate Governance and ShareholderInitiatives: Empirical Evidence [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,42(3):365-395.
Ke, B., Petroni, K.2004. How Informed are Actively Trading Institutional Investors? Evidence fromTheir Trading Behavior before a Break in a String of Consecutive Earnings Increases [J].Journal of Accounting Research,42（5）:895-927.
Ke, B., Petroni, K., Safieddine, A.1999. Ownership Concentration and Sensitivity of Executive Payto Accounting Performance: Evidence from Publicly and Privately-Held Insurance Companies[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,28(2),185-209.
Ke, B., Ramalingegowda, S.2005. Do Institutional Investors Exploit the Post-EarningsAnnouncement Drift?[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,39(1):25-53.
Khan, R., Dharwadkar, R., Brandes, P.2005. Institutional Ownership and CEO Compensation: aLongitudinal Examination [J]. Journal of Business Research,58(8):1078-1088.
Koh, P.S.2007. Institutional Investor Type, Earnings Management and Benchmark Beaters [J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,26(3):267-299.
Kohlbeck, M., Mayhew, B.W.2010. Valuation of Firms that Disclose Related Party Transactions [J].Journal Account Public Policy,29(2):115-137.
Kostant, P.C.1999. Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the Course of Corporate Governance and Counsel’sChanging Role [J]. Journal of Socio-Economics,28(3):203-246.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.1999. Corporate Ownership around the World [J].The Journal of Finance,54（2）:471-517.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.2000. Investor Protection and CorporateGovernance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,58(1-2):3-27.
Lewellen, J.2011. Institutional Investors and the Limits of Arbitrage [J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,102(1):62-80.
Li, H., Zhou, L.2005. Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Disciplinary Role ofPersonnel Control in China [J]. Journal of Public Economics,89(9-10):1743-1762.
Light.1989. The Privatization of Equity [J]. Harvard Business Review,（1/2）:61-74
Luo, W., Zhang, Y., Zhu, N.2011. Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites: New Evidence froman Emerging Market [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,17（2）:352-370.
Mahoney, L., Roberts, R.W.2007. Corporate Social Performance, Financial Performance andInstitutional Ownership in Canadian Firms [J]. Accounting Forum,31（3）:233-253.
Manconi, A., Massa, M., Yasuda, A.2012. The Role of Institutional Investors in Propagating theCrisis of2007-2008[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming.
Maug, E.1998. Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-off between Liquidity and Control?[J]. Journal of Finance,53(1):65-98.
McCahery, J.A., Sautner, Z., Starks, L.T.2010. Behind the Scenes: The Corporate GovernancePreferences of Institutional Investors [J]. Working Paper, University of Texas at Austin.
McConnell, J.J., Servaes, H.1990. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,27(2):595-612.
Morgan, A., Poulsen, A., Wolf, J., Yang, T.2011. Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from MutualFund Voting [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,17(4):914-928.
Myers, S C.2000. Outside [J]. The Journal of Finance,55（3）:1005-1037
Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.S.1984. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms HaveInformation those Investors Do Not Have [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,13（2）:187-221.
Ng, A., Yuce, A., Chen, E.2009. Determinants of State Equity Ownership, and Its Effect onValue/Performance: China’s Privatized Firms [J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,17(4):413-443.
Parrino, R., Sias, R.W., Starks, L.T.2003. Voting with Their Feet: Institutional Ownership Changesaround Forced CEO Turnover [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,68（1）:3-46.
Porter, M.E.1992. Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System [J]. HarvardBusiness Review,70(5):65-82.
Pound, J.1988. Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight [J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,20(1):237-265.
Pozen, R.C.1994. Institutional Investors: the Reluctant Activists [J]. Harvard Business Review,（1-2）:140–149.
Ramalingegowda, S., Yu, Y.2012. Institutional Ownership and Conservatism [J]. Journal ofAccounting and Economics,53(1-2):98-114.
Romano, R.1993. Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered [J].Columbia Law Review,93(5):794-853.
Rubach, M.J., Sebora, T.C.2009. Determinants of Institutional Investor Activism: A Test of theRyan-Schneider Model （2002）[J]. Journal of Managerial Issues,21（2）:245-261.
Ruiz-Mallorqui, M.V., Santana-Martin, D.J.2011. Dominant Institutional Owners and Firm Value [J].Journal of Banking and Finance,35(1):118-129.
Ryan, L.V., Schneider, M.2002. The Antecedents of Institutional Investor Activism [J]. Academy ofManagement Review,27（4）:554-573.
Shin, J.Y.2008. Institutional Investment Horizons and CEO Compensation [J]. Working Paper,University of Illinois.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W.1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of PoliticalEconomy,94(3):461-488.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W.1989. Management Entrenchment: The Case of Managerial SpecificInvestments [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,25(1):123-139.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W.1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Finance,52:737-783.
Sias, R.W., Starks, L.T.1997. Return Autocorrelation and Institutional Investors [J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics,46(1):103-131.
Smith, M.1996. Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS [J].Journal of Finance,51（1）:227-252.
Wahal, S.1996. Pension fund activism and firm performance [J]. Journal of Financial andQuantitative Analysis,31(1):1–23.
Wahal, S., McConnell, J.2000. Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial Myopia?[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,6(3):307-329.
Wei, Z., Varela, O.2003. State Equity Ownership and Firm Market Performance: Evidence fromChina’s Newly Privatized Firms [J]. Global Finance Journal,14(1):65-82.
Woidtke, T.2002. Agents Watching Agents?: Evidence from Pension Fund Ownership and FirmValue [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,63(1):99-131.
Yuan, R.L., Xiao, J.Z., Zou, H.2008. Mutual Funds’ Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidencefrom China [J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,32(8):1552-1565.