VC-E合作治理机制与技术创新绩效关系研究
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摘要
风险投资作为扶持技术创新发展的重要融资模式，日益受到学术界和企业界关注。尽管人们普遍认为风险投资家的投资后管理可帮助企业实现资本增值，但是学术界对于VC投资后管理与技术创新关系问题尚未形成共识，并持续争论了20多年。有些学者认为VC投资后管理对于技术创新有显著的积极作用，其中以VC增值服务尤显突出。有些学者却认为VC投资后管理对技术创新的正向作用不明显甚至会阻碍技术创新进程。由此可知，VC投资后管理的增值过程仍是一个值得长期关注的问题。
本研究认为，造成VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效差异性研究结论的原因是，学者们仅依赖双变量模型来诠释VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效的直接因果效应,难以获得全面和准确的认识。这种分析方法缺乏对多变量和动态性模型的考虑，最终产生VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效关系问题的分歧性研究结果。
鉴于此，本研究首先从社会交换理论出发，根据风险投资是一种关系型投资的特点，将风险投资家(Venture capitalist,VC)与创业企业家(Entrepreneur,E)的关系界定为社会交易关系且两者间互动遵循的规则是互惠性与承诺。其次，借助网络治理理论，认为风险投资家与创业企业家（VC-E）合作关系的好坏取决于双方对关系的治理。由此演绎出合作关系治理的视角，将VC-E合作治理机制作为前置影响因子，重新审视VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效之间的关系。论文主要从三个方面创新性地展开工作：
①以交易成本理论和社会交换理论为基础，从创业企业所属投资项目的交易属性和关系属性出发，提炼出VC-E合作治理机制的影响因素，并分析在这些因素的影响下，VC-E合作治理机制形成与演变的一般规律。
②以委托-代理理论、资源基础理论与社会交换理论为基础，构筑VC-E合作治理机制、VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效关系的多变量概念模型，将VC投资后管理视为VC-E合作关系的行为表现且作为中介变量，研究VC-E合作治理机制通过影响VC投资后管理进而影响技术创新绩效的作用机理与路径选择。
③调节变量的研究。基于社会交换理论，将过程公平、关系冲突和任务冲突视为调节变量引入VC-E合作治理机制、VC投资后管理与技术创新关系的概念模型，进而分析其对技术创新绩效产生的调节效应。
通过理论分析和实证研究，运用多元线性回归和层级回归，研究发现：
①资产专用性、不确定性、投资吸引力与文化契合度是影响VC-E合作治理机制的重要因素。VC-E合作治理机制分为契约治理机制和关系治理机制，因此这些因素对它们的影响机理各不相同。资产专用性与契约治理呈正相关，与关系治理呈正相关。不确定性与契约治理呈负相关，与关系治理的相关关系不显著。投资吸引力与契约治理是负相关，与关系治理是正相关。文化契合度与契约治理呈负相关，与关系治理呈正相关。
②VC-E合作治理机制对技术创新绩效有显著的影响。契约治理对技术创新绩效的两个维度即创新能力、创新产出的影响均表现为倒“Ｕ”型非线性关系。关系治理对创新能力、创新产出的影响均是显著的正相关。
③VC投资后管理的中介效应显著。契约治理、关系治理分别通过VC投资后管理的两个维度即VC监控行为、VC增值服务对创新能力、创新产出产生显著的影响。契约治理与VC监控行为呈正相关，与VC增值服务呈倒“U”型非线性关系。VC监控行为与创新产出呈倒“U”型非线性关系，与创新能力的关系是负向关系，其假设得到实证数据的部分支持。关系治理与VC监控行为呈负相关，与VC增值服务呈正相关。VC增值服务与创新能力、创新产出均呈正向关系。
④过程公平、关系冲突的调节效应显著，任务冲突的调节效应比较显著。过程公平在VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效之间起着显著的正向调节作用。关系冲突在VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效之间起着显著的负向调节作用。任务冲突在VC监控行为与创新能力之间起着正向调节作用，在VC增值服务与创新能力之间起着正向调节作用，但是在VC监控行为与创新产出、VC增值服务与创新产出之间的调节作用不显著。因此需要进一步考察任务冲突对技术创新绩效的调节作用。
本研究以合作关系治理为研究视角，以科技型创业企业为数据采集对象，运用交易成本理论、资源基础理论、委托-代理理论和社会交换理论来探究VC-E合作治理机制、VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效之间的关系。结论显示，VC投资后管理的价值增值功能持续实现的必要条件是VC和E之间良好的合作关系，而良好合作关系来自两者之间适宜的合作治理机制。与契约治理机制相比，关系治理机制更有利于构筑VC和E之间的良好合作关系，进而促进VC投资后管理对技术创新的推动作用。本研究突破已有研究偏重讨论契约治理而造成的对VC-E合作关系理解的局限，进一步完善了VC-E关系的理论框架，促使理论界和企业家更好的理解各种治理机制，以此在契约治理与关系治理之间寻求最佳平衡。本研究是对风险投资理论与创业管理理论的深化与拓展，对VC-E关系问题有一定的参考价值和指导意义。
As an important financing mode to support the development of technologicalinnovation, venture capital (VC) has attracted increasing attention by the scholars andentrepreneurs. Although it is general agreement that venture capital’ role in promotingbusiness performance is that the value-added features of the non-financial form ofpost-investment activities,the reseachers have not yet theorized for the relationshipbetweenVC post-investment activities and technological innovation,continuingcontroversy for over20years. Some scholars considered that VC post-investmentactivities has significant positive effect on the technological innovation.Particularly, VCvalue-added service has positive influence on the technological innovation.Somescholars argued that the positive role of VC post-investment activities is not obviousor even hinder the process of technological innovation. Therefore, the value-addedprocess of VC post-investment activities also remains under debate.
This study suggests that the cause of different conclusions about the relationshipbetween VC post-investment activities and technological innovation performance is thatscholars have not considered the multi-variable and dynamic model,relying solely onthe two-varible model to explain the direct causal effect of the relationship between VCpost-investment activities and technological innovation performance.Underlying theseissues,the level of analysis is not comprehensive and accurate.
In view of this, based on social exchange theory,we first define the relationshipbetween venture ccapitalist and the entrepreneur (VC-E) as the social exchangerelationship which means they should obey the rules of reciprocal and commitment,according to the characteristic of venture capital is a relational investment.Second,weconsider the cooperative relationship of venture capitalist and entrepreneur depend onthe governance mechanism on the basis of network governance theory.Together, fromthe cooperative governance perspective,these two parts of our central question help usto re-understand the relationship between VC post-investment activities andtechnological innovation performance,taking the VC-E cooperative governancemechanism as pre-impact factor. In this paper, we provide three contributions tounderstanding the conditions under which VC-E cooperative mechanism contributes tohigher relative technological innovation performance.
(1) based on the transaction cost theory and social exchange theory, from transaction attributes and relationship attributes of investment projects from start-ups,we extract influence factors of VC-E cooperative governance mechanism and examinethe formation and evolution of the VC-E cooperative governance mechanism under theinfluence of these factors.
(2)According to the principal-agent theory, resource-based theory and the socialexchange theory, we set up a multi-variable concept model about the relationshipamongVC-Ecooperative governance mechanism,VCpost-investment activities andtechnological innovation performance.Meanwhile,VC post-investment activities isregarded as specific behaviour of VC-E cooperative relationship and considered asmediator.We theorize and examine the influence of VC-E cooperative governancemechanism on technological innovation performance through the VC post-investmentactivities.
(3)Studying on moderating variables. From the social exchange theory, we considerprocedural justice, relation conflict and task conflict as moderator and test thesemoderating effective.
Through theoretical analysis and empirical testing, using multiple linear regressionand hierarchical regression, we find:
(1) Asset specificity, uncertainty, investment attraction and cultural fit is animportant factor affecting in the VC-E cooperative governance mechanisms. The VC-Ecooperative governance mechanism is divided into contractual governance mechanismand the relational governance mechanism, which would be affected differently by assetspecificity, uncertainty, investment attraction and cultural fit. Asset specificity hassignificant positive influence on contractural governance and negative effect onrelational governance.Uncertainty is negative correlative to the contractualgovernance.We fail to observe the relationship between uncertainty and relationalgovernance. Investment attraction has a net negative contribution to contracturalgovernance and net positive effect on relational governance. Cultural fit is negativecorrelative to the contractural governance and positive correlative to the relationalgovernance.
(2) The VC-E cooperative governance mechanism has a significant impact ontechnological innovation performance. The influence of contractual governance on thetwo dimensions of technology innovation performance, innovation capability andinnovation output is expressed as the inverted "U" shaped relationship. The relationalgovernance effecting on innovation capability and innovation output are significantly positive.
(3) The mediating effective of the VC post-investment activities significantly.Contractual governance, relational governance have contribution to innovationcapability and innovation output through the two dimensions of VC post-investmentactivities,VCsupervision&control and VC value-added service. Contracturalgovernance has positive effect on the VC supervision&control, has an inverted Urelationship with VC value added service. VC supervision&control has an inverted Urelationship with the innovation output. VC supervision&control is negativecorrelative to the innovation capability, which is partially tested by empirical data.Relational governance has negative influence on the VC supervision&control,haspositive effect on VC value-added service that has a positive contribution to innovationcapability and innovation output.
(4)The moderating effective of procedural justice and relation conflict is significant,while task conflict as moderator is partially tested. Procedural justice moderatespositively the relationship between VC post-investment activities and technologicalinnovation performance.Relation conflict has negative moderating effective on therelationship between VC post-investment activities and technological innovationperformance. Task conflict moderates positively the relationship betweenVCsupervision&control and innovation capability, and has positive moderatingeffective on the relationship between VC value-added service and innovatin capability.Bue the moderating effective of task conflict on the relationship between VCsupervision&control and innovation output, and on the relationship between VCvalue-added service and innovation output would not be tested by empiricaldata.Therefore,we need to further investigate the moderating effective of task conflicton the technological innovation performance.
From the cooperative governance perspective,this paper tries to contribute to thisresearch fild about the relationship among VC-E cooperative governancemechanism,VC post-investment activities and technological innovation performance onbasis of transaction cost theory,principal-agent theory and social exchange theory on thedata of high-tech start-ups in Chengdu,Wuhan,Beijing,Shengzheng,Xinan,Chongqing.We found the following:It is very important for venture capitalist to achive the value ofpost-investment activities under which cooperative relationship between VC and Eshould be established and promoted.Co-operative relationship between VC and E isnecessary for the success of VC post-investment activities and technological innovation performance.While good cooperation would be formed through optimal VC-Ecooperative governance mechanism.Compared with the contracturalgovernance,relational governance is more contribution to the good cooperativerelationship between VC and E.Further,relational governance appears to positivelyaffect technological innovation through promoting VC post-investment activities.Thistheoretical framework acts as a counter weight to most previous studies on the VC-Erelationship that have emphasized contractural governance in order to build partnercooperation without sufficient consideration of how relational governance affect thepartner cooperation.Meanwhile,the research promotes scholars and entrepreneurs tounderstand the meaning of various governance mechanisms and develops deeply thetheoretical framework of VC-E relationship in order to balance relationship betweencontractural governance and relational governance. The study is the furtherdevelopment of the theory of venture capital and entrepreneurship management, whichhas a certain reference and guide value for the cooperative relationships between VCand E.
本研究认为，造成VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效差异性研究结论的原因是，学者们仅依赖双变量模型来诠释VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效的直接因果效应,难以获得全面和准确的认识。这种分析方法缺乏对多变量和动态性模型的考虑，最终产生VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效关系问题的分歧性研究结果。
鉴于此，本研究首先从社会交换理论出发，根据风险投资是一种关系型投资的特点，将风险投资家(Venture capitalist,VC)与创业企业家(Entrepreneur,E)的关系界定为社会交易关系且两者间互动遵循的规则是互惠性与承诺。其次，借助网络治理理论，认为风险投资家与创业企业家（VC-E）合作关系的好坏取决于双方对关系的治理。由此演绎出合作关系治理的视角，将VC-E合作治理机制作为前置影响因子，重新审视VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效之间的关系。论文主要从三个方面创新性地展开工作：
①以交易成本理论和社会交换理论为基础，从创业企业所属投资项目的交易属性和关系属性出发，提炼出VC-E合作治理机制的影响因素，并分析在这些因素的影响下，VC-E合作治理机制形成与演变的一般规律。
②以委托-代理理论、资源基础理论与社会交换理论为基础，构筑VC-E合作治理机制、VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效关系的多变量概念模型，将VC投资后管理视为VC-E合作关系的行为表现且作为中介变量，研究VC-E合作治理机制通过影响VC投资后管理进而影响技术创新绩效的作用机理与路径选择。
③调节变量的研究。基于社会交换理论，将过程公平、关系冲突和任务冲突视为调节变量引入VC-E合作治理机制、VC投资后管理与技术创新关系的概念模型，进而分析其对技术创新绩效产生的调节效应。
通过理论分析和实证研究，运用多元线性回归和层级回归，研究发现：
①资产专用性、不确定性、投资吸引力与文化契合度是影响VC-E合作治理机制的重要因素。VC-E合作治理机制分为契约治理机制和关系治理机制，因此这些因素对它们的影响机理各不相同。资产专用性与契约治理呈正相关，与关系治理呈正相关。不确定性与契约治理呈负相关，与关系治理的相关关系不显著。投资吸引力与契约治理是负相关，与关系治理是正相关。文化契合度与契约治理呈负相关，与关系治理呈正相关。
②VC-E合作治理机制对技术创新绩效有显著的影响。契约治理对技术创新绩效的两个维度即创新能力、创新产出的影响均表现为倒“Ｕ”型非线性关系。关系治理对创新能力、创新产出的影响均是显著的正相关。
③VC投资后管理的中介效应显著。契约治理、关系治理分别通过VC投资后管理的两个维度即VC监控行为、VC增值服务对创新能力、创新产出产生显著的影响。契约治理与VC监控行为呈正相关，与VC增值服务呈倒“U”型非线性关系。VC监控行为与创新产出呈倒“U”型非线性关系，与创新能力的关系是负向关系，其假设得到实证数据的部分支持。关系治理与VC监控行为呈负相关，与VC增值服务呈正相关。VC增值服务与创新能力、创新产出均呈正向关系。
④过程公平、关系冲突的调节效应显著，任务冲突的调节效应比较显著。过程公平在VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效之间起着显著的正向调节作用。关系冲突在VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效之间起着显著的负向调节作用。任务冲突在VC监控行为与创新能力之间起着正向调节作用，在VC增值服务与创新能力之间起着正向调节作用，但是在VC监控行为与创新产出、VC增值服务与创新产出之间的调节作用不显著。因此需要进一步考察任务冲突对技术创新绩效的调节作用。
本研究以合作关系治理为研究视角，以科技型创业企业为数据采集对象，运用交易成本理论、资源基础理论、委托-代理理论和社会交换理论来探究VC-E合作治理机制、VC投资后管理与技术创新绩效之间的关系。结论显示，VC投资后管理的价值增值功能持续实现的必要条件是VC和E之间良好的合作关系，而良好合作关系来自两者之间适宜的合作治理机制。与契约治理机制相比，关系治理机制更有利于构筑VC和E之间的良好合作关系，进而促进VC投资后管理对技术创新的推动作用。本研究突破已有研究偏重讨论契约治理而造成的对VC-E合作关系理解的局限，进一步完善了VC-E关系的理论框架，促使理论界和企业家更好的理解各种治理机制，以此在契约治理与关系治理之间寻求最佳平衡。本研究是对风险投资理论与创业管理理论的深化与拓展，对VC-E关系问题有一定的参考价值和指导意义。
As an important financing mode to support the development of technologicalinnovation, venture capital (VC) has attracted increasing attention by the scholars andentrepreneurs. Although it is general agreement that venture capital’ role in promotingbusiness performance is that the value-added features of the non-financial form ofpost-investment activities,the reseachers have not yet theorized for the relationshipbetweenVC post-investment activities and technological innovation,continuingcontroversy for over20years. Some scholars considered that VC post-investmentactivities has significant positive effect on the technological innovation.Particularly, VCvalue-added service has positive influence on the technological innovation.Somescholars argued that the positive role of VC post-investment activities is not obviousor even hinder the process of technological innovation. Therefore, the value-addedprocess of VC post-investment activities also remains under debate.
This study suggests that the cause of different conclusions about the relationshipbetween VC post-investment activities and technological innovation performance is thatscholars have not considered the multi-variable and dynamic model,relying solely onthe two-varible model to explain the direct causal effect of the relationship between VCpost-investment activities and technological innovation performance.Underlying theseissues,the level of analysis is not comprehensive and accurate.
In view of this, based on social exchange theory,we first define the relationshipbetween venture ccapitalist and the entrepreneur (VC-E) as the social exchangerelationship which means they should obey the rules of reciprocal and commitment,according to the characteristic of venture capital is a relational investment.Second,weconsider the cooperative relationship of venture capitalist and entrepreneur depend onthe governance mechanism on the basis of network governance theory.Together, fromthe cooperative governance perspective,these two parts of our central question help usto re-understand the relationship between VC post-investment activities andtechnological innovation performance,taking the VC-E cooperative governancemechanism as pre-impact factor. In this paper, we provide three contributions tounderstanding the conditions under which VC-E cooperative mechanism contributes tohigher relative technological innovation performance.
(1) based on the transaction cost theory and social exchange theory, from transaction attributes and relationship attributes of investment projects from start-ups,we extract influence factors of VC-E cooperative governance mechanism and examinethe formation and evolution of the VC-E cooperative governance mechanism under theinfluence of these factors.
(2)According to the principal-agent theory, resource-based theory and the socialexchange theory, we set up a multi-variable concept model about the relationshipamongVC-Ecooperative governance mechanism,VCpost-investment activities andtechnological innovation performance.Meanwhile,VC post-investment activities isregarded as specific behaviour of VC-E cooperative relationship and considered asmediator.We theorize and examine the influence of VC-E cooperative governancemechanism on technological innovation performance through the VC post-investmentactivities.
(3)Studying on moderating variables. From the social exchange theory, we considerprocedural justice, relation conflict and task conflict as moderator and test thesemoderating effective.
Through theoretical analysis and empirical testing, using multiple linear regressionand hierarchical regression, we find:
(1) Asset specificity, uncertainty, investment attraction and cultural fit is animportant factor affecting in the VC-E cooperative governance mechanisms. The VC-Ecooperative governance mechanism is divided into contractual governance mechanismand the relational governance mechanism, which would be affected differently by assetspecificity, uncertainty, investment attraction and cultural fit. Asset specificity hassignificant positive influence on contractural governance and negative effect onrelational governance.Uncertainty is negative correlative to the contractualgovernance.We fail to observe the relationship between uncertainty and relationalgovernance. Investment attraction has a net negative contribution to contracturalgovernance and net positive effect on relational governance. Cultural fit is negativecorrelative to the contractural governance and positive correlative to the relationalgovernance.
(2) The VC-E cooperative governance mechanism has a significant impact ontechnological innovation performance. The influence of contractual governance on thetwo dimensions of technology innovation performance, innovation capability andinnovation output is expressed as the inverted "U" shaped relationship. The relationalgovernance effecting on innovation capability and innovation output are significantly positive.
(3) The mediating effective of the VC post-investment activities significantly.Contractual governance, relational governance have contribution to innovationcapability and innovation output through the two dimensions of VC post-investmentactivities,VCsupervision&control and VC value-added service. Contracturalgovernance has positive effect on the VC supervision&control, has an inverted Urelationship with VC value added service. VC supervision&control has an inverted Urelationship with the innovation output. VC supervision&control is negativecorrelative to the innovation capability, which is partially tested by empirical data.Relational governance has negative influence on the VC supervision&control,haspositive effect on VC value-added service that has a positive contribution to innovationcapability and innovation output.
(4)The moderating effective of procedural justice and relation conflict is significant,while task conflict as moderator is partially tested. Procedural justice moderatespositively the relationship between VC post-investment activities and technologicalinnovation performance.Relation conflict has negative moderating effective on therelationship between VC post-investment activities and technological innovationperformance. Task conflict moderates positively the relationship betweenVCsupervision&control and innovation capability, and has positive moderatingeffective on the relationship between VC value-added service and innovatin capability.Bue the moderating effective of task conflict on the relationship between VCsupervision&control and innovation output, and on the relationship between VCvalue-added service and innovation output would not be tested by empiricaldata.Therefore,we need to further investigate the moderating effective of task conflicton the technological innovation performance.
From the cooperative governance perspective,this paper tries to contribute to thisresearch fild about the relationship among VC-E cooperative governancemechanism,VC post-investment activities and technological innovation performance onbasis of transaction cost theory,principal-agent theory and social exchange theory on thedata of high-tech start-ups in Chengdu,Wuhan,Beijing,Shengzheng,Xinan,Chongqing.We found the following:It is very important for venture capitalist to achive the value ofpost-investment activities under which cooperative relationship between VC and Eshould be established and promoted.Co-operative relationship between VC and E isnecessary for the success of VC post-investment activities and technological innovation performance.While good cooperation would be formed through optimal VC-Ecooperative governance mechanism.Compared with the contracturalgovernance,relational governance is more contribution to the good cooperativerelationship between VC and E.Further,relational governance appears to positivelyaffect technological innovation through promoting VC post-investment activities.Thistheoretical framework acts as a counter weight to most previous studies on the VC-Erelationship that have emphasized contractural governance in order to build partnercooperation without sufficient consideration of how relational governance affect thepartner cooperation.Meanwhile,the research promotes scholars and entrepreneurs tounderstand the meaning of various governance mechanisms and develops deeply thetheoretical framework of VC-E relationship in order to balance relationship betweencontractural governance and relational governance. The study is the furtherdevelopment of the theory of venture capital and entrepreneurship management, whichhas a certain reference and guide value for the cooperative relationships between VCand E.
引文
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