市场契约下控制“内部人控制”与会计管制问题研究
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摘要
“内部人控制”一直是国内外企业界和学术界普遍关注的热点问题，它也是我国国有企业长期低效运作、日益陷入困境的一个重要原因，能否控制“内部人控制”是关系到我国国有企业改革成败的关键环节。
本文研究对象是通过市场契约下的国有资产代理权竞买等方式和会计管制来解决国有企业“内部人控制”问题。本文论证并指出：通过市场契约，把市场竞争从产权外部引入到产权内部，这样才能保证国有企业建立有效的内部治理机制，从而构建了对国有企业“内部人控制”的事前、事中控制机制。本文又通过论证了宏观会计管制及完善一系列制度等来达到对“内部人控制”的事后控制。经过本文的分析论述后，我们可以得出这样的结论：会计管制可视为控制“内部人控制”的重要外部环境，公司(法人)治理结构可视为基本的内部制度结构。两者在监控国有企业“内部人控制”方面是互为前提、互相促进的，即市场契约下控制“内部人控制”为会计管制理顺了秩序，而会计管制又为控制“内部人控制”提供了有力的保证。为实现对内部人有效的控制，会计管制的改革必须与企业法人治理结构的建设同步展开，才可能产生理想的成效。同时，它也是本论文在分析研究的基础上做出的独特见解。
本文主要包括以下几个部分：
第一章为绪论部分，主要介绍了国内外“内部人控制”的研究进展，以及本题的研究思路和研究方法。
第二章介绍了“内部人控制”的概念溯源、相关理论背景—委托代理理论，并分析了我国国有企业特有的“内部人控制”形成的原因及其特殊性等相关的基本理论问题，为接下来的研究打好基础。
第三章是本文的精髓。在西方经济学契约理论的基础之上，着重引进了“市场契约”这个概念。本文通过理论上分析得出，市场契约不但能够产生企业内部治理效率，而且还会构造企业讲实话、报实力的机制，它可以克服由于现代企业委托代理双方信息的不对称和市场的不确定性所导致的不好的市场结果。它也是本文研究的理论前提。
第四章首先着重分析了建立在不同的经济、社会、政治和法律基础上的企业监督模式与会计管制模式的关系。这部分得到的启示将为我国国有企业对“内部人控制”的监
沈阳工业大学硕士学位论文
督和会计管制模式的建立提供有益借鉴。然后，本章又主要分析了转轨过程中我国国有
企业会计工作秩序紊乱的实质和原因。
第五章是市场契约下对控制“内部人控制”的完善。它主要包括了市场契约下公司
治理对“内部人控制”的控制以及市场契约下会计管制改革的目标和思路。在借鉴国外
的经验，结合中国国情的基础上，本章就我国会计管制改革应实现的目标、改革的思路
的政策建议提供了一点拙劣之见。
最后是结论部分，总结和强调了文章的中心论点，分析了研究中存在的不足，以期
为今后的“内部人控制”研究提供参考。
The "insider control" is always the heatpoint problem with which business and academic circles are universally concerned at home and abroad. It is an important reason of the long-term poor efficiency operation and increasing the predicament in our country state-owned enterprises (SOEs) too. Whether realizing the "insider control" or not is the key link to success or failure of our country SOEs reform.
Research objective of this paper is to solve the "insider control" of our country SOEs by state-run assets attorneyship competed and bought and accounting regulation under the market agreement. This paper is designed to point out: Through the market agreement, leading the market competition from property right outside into and can guarantee the SOEs sets up effective inside governance mechanism, thus constructs the control mechanism of the "insider control" of SOEs in advance and in the affair. This paper proved macroscopical accounting regulation and perfecting systems could control the "insider control" in the afterwards. After the analysis of this paper is described, we can conclude as follows: the accounting regulation can be regarded as the important external environment of controlling the "insider control" and the corporate governance can be basically regarded as the inside system structure. They interact as prerequisite and promotional, that is, controlling the "insider control" under the market agree
ment makes the order for accounting regulation and accounting regulation offers the strong assurance for controlling the "insider control". In order to realize effective control to the insider, the reformation of accounting regulation and the construction of the corporate governance must be launched in step. It probably comes into being the ideal result. Besides, it is the unique opinion that this paper provides on the basis of analyses and researches.
This paper mainly includes following several parts:
Chapter One, the introductory part, is designed to introduce the domestic and international research progress on the insider control mainly, and the thoughts of the subject research under discussion and research approach.
Chapter Two, the introduced "insider control" concept traces to the source, relevant theory background (trust-agency theory), analyses for our country SOEs peculiar reason on the "insider control" and its particularity and so on for the relevant basic theoretical question in order to lay a solid foundation for the following research.
Chapter Three is a marrow of this paper. On western economics agreement foundation of theory, we introduce this concept of "market agreement" emphatically. Through analysis and
drawing in theory, market agreement can produce enterprise manage efficiency, and can also construct the mechanism of enterprise's speaking the truth. It may overcome the inefficient market results caused by the contemporary business in which the uncertainty of the two parties's message is not symmetric (between client and agent) and market to cause. It is a theory prerequisite that this paper studies too.
Chapter Four is used to analyse emphatically the relationship of the enterprise supervision mode and accounting regulation mode set up on different economical, social, political and legal foundations. The inspiration we learn from it will offer useful experiences for the supervision of the "insider control" of our country SOEs and the construction of accounting regulation mode. Then, this chapter has mainly analysed the essence and reasons for the accountant work disorder in our country SOEs during the transition course.
Chapter Five presents the perfection of the "insider control" under the market agreement. It includes that the corporate governance controls the "insider control" under market agreement and the goal and thoughts of accounting regulation reform under the market agreement. Using the foreign experience and combining it with the China's actual conditions, this chapter offers a little personal view for the goal and thoughts of accounting regulation reform.
The conclusive
本文研究对象是通过市场契约下的国有资产代理权竞买等方式和会计管制来解决国有企业“内部人控制”问题。本文论证并指出：通过市场契约，把市场竞争从产权外部引入到产权内部，这样才能保证国有企业建立有效的内部治理机制，从而构建了对国有企业“内部人控制”的事前、事中控制机制。本文又通过论证了宏观会计管制及完善一系列制度等来达到对“内部人控制”的事后控制。经过本文的分析论述后，我们可以得出这样的结论：会计管制可视为控制“内部人控制”的重要外部环境，公司(法人)治理结构可视为基本的内部制度结构。两者在监控国有企业“内部人控制”方面是互为前提、互相促进的，即市场契约下控制“内部人控制”为会计管制理顺了秩序，而会计管制又为控制“内部人控制”提供了有力的保证。为实现对内部人有效的控制，会计管制的改革必须与企业法人治理结构的建设同步展开，才可能产生理想的成效。同时，它也是本论文在分析研究的基础上做出的独特见解。
本文主要包括以下几个部分：
第一章为绪论部分，主要介绍了国内外“内部人控制”的研究进展，以及本题的研究思路和研究方法。
第二章介绍了“内部人控制”的概念溯源、相关理论背景—委托代理理论，并分析了我国国有企业特有的“内部人控制”形成的原因及其特殊性等相关的基本理论问题，为接下来的研究打好基础。
第三章是本文的精髓。在西方经济学契约理论的基础之上，着重引进了“市场契约”这个概念。本文通过理论上分析得出，市场契约不但能够产生企业内部治理效率，而且还会构造企业讲实话、报实力的机制，它可以克服由于现代企业委托代理双方信息的不对称和市场的不确定性所导致的不好的市场结果。它也是本文研究的理论前提。
第四章首先着重分析了建立在不同的经济、社会、政治和法律基础上的企业监督模式与会计管制模式的关系。这部分得到的启示将为我国国有企业对“内部人控制”的监
沈阳工业大学硕士学位论文
督和会计管制模式的建立提供有益借鉴。然后，本章又主要分析了转轨过程中我国国有
企业会计工作秩序紊乱的实质和原因。
第五章是市场契约下对控制“内部人控制”的完善。它主要包括了市场契约下公司
治理对“内部人控制”的控制以及市场契约下会计管制改革的目标和思路。在借鉴国外
的经验，结合中国国情的基础上，本章就我国会计管制改革应实现的目标、改革的思路
的政策建议提供了一点拙劣之见。
最后是结论部分，总结和强调了文章的中心论点，分析了研究中存在的不足，以期
为今后的“内部人控制”研究提供参考。
The "insider control" is always the heatpoint problem with which business and academic circles are universally concerned at home and abroad. It is an important reason of the long-term poor efficiency operation and increasing the predicament in our country state-owned enterprises (SOEs) too. Whether realizing the "insider control" or not is the key link to success or failure of our country SOEs reform.
Research objective of this paper is to solve the "insider control" of our country SOEs by state-run assets attorneyship competed and bought and accounting regulation under the market agreement. This paper is designed to point out: Through the market agreement, leading the market competition from property right outside into and can guarantee the SOEs sets up effective inside governance mechanism, thus constructs the control mechanism of the "insider control" of SOEs in advance and in the affair. This paper proved macroscopical accounting regulation and perfecting systems could control the "insider control" in the afterwards. After the analysis of this paper is described, we can conclude as follows: the accounting regulation can be regarded as the important external environment of controlling the "insider control" and the corporate governance can be basically regarded as the inside system structure. They interact as prerequisite and promotional, that is, controlling the "insider control" under the market agree
ment makes the order for accounting regulation and accounting regulation offers the strong assurance for controlling the "insider control". In order to realize effective control to the insider, the reformation of accounting regulation and the construction of the corporate governance must be launched in step. It probably comes into being the ideal result. Besides, it is the unique opinion that this paper provides on the basis of analyses and researches.
This paper mainly includes following several parts:
Chapter One, the introductory part, is designed to introduce the domestic and international research progress on the insider control mainly, and the thoughts of the subject research under discussion and research approach.
Chapter Two, the introduced "insider control" concept traces to the source, relevant theory background (trust-agency theory), analyses for our country SOEs peculiar reason on the "insider control" and its particularity and so on for the relevant basic theoretical question in order to lay a solid foundation for the following research.
Chapter Three is a marrow of this paper. On western economics agreement foundation of theory, we introduce this concept of "market agreement" emphatically. Through analysis and
drawing in theory, market agreement can produce enterprise manage efficiency, and can also construct the mechanism of enterprise's speaking the truth. It may overcome the inefficient market results caused by the contemporary business in which the uncertainty of the two parties's message is not symmetric (between client and agent) and market to cause. It is a theory prerequisite that this paper studies too.
Chapter Four is used to analyse emphatically the relationship of the enterprise supervision mode and accounting regulation mode set up on different economical, social, political and legal foundations. The inspiration we learn from it will offer useful experiences for the supervision of the "insider control" of our country SOEs and the construction of accounting regulation mode. Then, this chapter has mainly analysed the essence and reasons for the accountant work disorder in our country SOEs during the transition course.
Chapter Five presents the perfection of the "insider control" under the market agreement. It includes that the corporate governance controls the "insider control" under market agreement and the goal and thoughts of accounting regulation reform under the market agreement. Using the foreign experience and combining it with the China's actual conditions, this chapter offers a little personal view for the goal and thoughts of accounting regulation reform.
The conclusive
引文
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[2] 梁能主编．公司治理结构：中国的实践与美国的经验．中国人民大学出版社， 2000．95～250
[3] Barton K. Boyd. Board Control and CEO Compensation. Strategic Management Journal, June 1994, 335～344
[4] 费方域．什么是公司治理结构．上海经济研究，1996(5)．22～27
[5] 陈湘永，张剑文，张伟文．我国上市公司“内部人控制”研究．管理世界，2000(4)．103～109
[6] 严莉．中国国有企业内部人控制研究(学位论文)．电子科技大学，2001．3，6～10，13～19，26～27
[7] 王勇．完全契约与不完全契约—两种分析方法的一个比较．经济学动态，2002(7)．22～26
[8] Hart, O. Corporate Governance, Some Theory and Implications. The Economic Journal, 1995(5), 678～689
[9] Jensen, M.and Meckling, W. The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 1976, 305～360
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