落后产能的成因研究——土地分成合约的视角
|
摘要
落后产能问题一直困扰着我国的经济发展,并且变得日益凸显。国家考虑落后产能耗能高、污染重、技术水平低等产业特征,先后出台了一系列淘汰政策来提高产业结构。这些政策虽然在一定程度上收到了一些成效,但实施效果却不尽如人意。究其原因,主要与中国经济体制和政府的分成税制有关,所以本文主要研究在现有的体制安排和政府的分税制下,落后产能的形成问题。
本文基于现有的相关理论研究,以财政分权为研究背景,从土地分成合约的视角对落后产能的成因给出了全新的阐释。本文分别介绍了中西方土地制度的特点和差异,同时讨论了每种土地制度下的分成合约对落后产能形成的影响。通过建立中央和地方政府间的单一土地分成合约模型,讨论并比较了在存在惩罚与不存在惩罚的情况下地方政府引进落后产能的影响因素和落后产能引进量的大小。通过引入地区差异这个影响因素对模型展开进一步讨论,并分析了其对落后产能问题加剧的影响。
通过理论分析得出,中央政府与地方政府之间这种固定的土地分成合约,导致了现有体制下的落后产能的形成。地方政府作为风险规避者往往青睐于引进落后产能企业,而不是引进好企业。另外地区间差异会加剧落后产能的形成,从而使得好企业在竞争过程中被淘汰。在此基础上,本文以纺织行业为例分析了各地区落后产能的影响因素,并采用相关数据对各地区经济发展程度、地区税收收入以及其他影响因素进行了实证分析。最后,提出了加强政府监督以及推行灵活的合约安排制度来淘汰落后产能问题的政策建议。
The problem of backward production capacity has been plaguing the economic development of China for a long time, and is becoming increasingly prominent. Considering the industrial characteristics of backward production capacity such as high energy consumption, heavy pollution, lower level of technology and so on, a series of phase-out policies have been issued by the government to improve the industrial structure. Although these policies have achieved some success to a certain extent, the implementation effect, however, is not entirely as desired. The reason is, primarily concerned with the economic system of China and the tax-sharing system of the government. Therefore, this paper mainly studies the formation of backward production capacity under the existing institutional arrangements and tax-sharing system.
Based on the existing theoretical investigation concerned, on the background of fiscal decentralization and from the perspective of land share-cropping contract, this paper gives a brand-new explanation to the cause of backward production capacity. This paper introduces separately the characteristics and differences of the land system between the west and the east, and also discusses the influence on the formation of backward production capacity under the given land share-cropping contract. Through establishing the single land share-cropping contract model between the central and the local governments, this paper discusses and compares the influencing factors and the amount of backward production capacity introduced by the local government, both in the cases of punishment and no punishment. Through the introduction of regional disparity, this paper discusses the model further and analyzes its impact on the aggravation of the problem of backward production capacity.
Through theoretical analysis, the fixed land share-cropping contract between the central and local governments causes the formation of backward production capacity under existing system. The local government, which is risk averse, tends to favor the introduction of backward production capacity instead of good enterprises. Furthermore, the regional disparity will aggravate the formation of backward production capacity and then eliminate good enterprises through competition. On that basis, this paper takes the textile industry as an example to discuss the influencing factors of backward production capacity of each region, and use related data to make empirical analysis of the degree of regional economic development, regional tax revenues and other influencing factors. In the end, this paper proposes to strengthen the government oversight and implement a flexible system of contractual arrangements to wash out backward production capacity.
本文基于现有的相关理论研究,以财政分权为研究背景,从土地分成合约的视角对落后产能的成因给出了全新的阐释。本文分别介绍了中西方土地制度的特点和差异,同时讨论了每种土地制度下的分成合约对落后产能形成的影响。通过建立中央和地方政府间的单一土地分成合约模型,讨论并比较了在存在惩罚与不存在惩罚的情况下地方政府引进落后产能的影响因素和落后产能引进量的大小。通过引入地区差异这个影响因素对模型展开进一步讨论,并分析了其对落后产能问题加剧的影响。
通过理论分析得出,中央政府与地方政府之间这种固定的土地分成合约,导致了现有体制下的落后产能的形成。地方政府作为风险规避者往往青睐于引进落后产能企业,而不是引进好企业。另外地区间差异会加剧落后产能的形成,从而使得好企业在竞争过程中被淘汰。在此基础上,本文以纺织行业为例分析了各地区落后产能的影响因素,并采用相关数据对各地区经济发展程度、地区税收收入以及其他影响因素进行了实证分析。最后,提出了加强政府监督以及推行灵活的合约安排制度来淘汰落后产能问题的政策建议。
The problem of backward production capacity has been plaguing the economic development of China for a long time, and is becoming increasingly prominent. Considering the industrial characteristics of backward production capacity such as high energy consumption, heavy pollution, lower level of technology and so on, a series of phase-out policies have been issued by the government to improve the industrial structure. Although these policies have achieved some success to a certain extent, the implementation effect, however, is not entirely as desired. The reason is, primarily concerned with the economic system of China and the tax-sharing system of the government. Therefore, this paper mainly studies the formation of backward production capacity under the existing institutional arrangements and tax-sharing system.
Based on the existing theoretical investigation concerned, on the background of fiscal decentralization and from the perspective of land share-cropping contract, this paper gives a brand-new explanation to the cause of backward production capacity. This paper introduces separately the characteristics and differences of the land system between the west and the east, and also discusses the influence on the formation of backward production capacity under the given land share-cropping contract. Through establishing the single land share-cropping contract model between the central and the local governments, this paper discusses and compares the influencing factors and the amount of backward production capacity introduced by the local government, both in the cases of punishment and no punishment. Through the introduction of regional disparity, this paper discusses the model further and analyzes its impact on the aggravation of the problem of backward production capacity.
Through theoretical analysis, the fixed land share-cropping contract between the central and local governments causes the formation of backward production capacity under existing system. The local government, which is risk averse, tends to favor the introduction of backward production capacity instead of good enterprises. Furthermore, the regional disparity will aggravate the formation of backward production capacity and then eliminate good enterprises through competition. On that basis, this paper takes the textile industry as an example to discuss the influencing factors of backward production capacity of each region, and use related data to make empirical analysis of the degree of regional economic development, regional tax revenues and other influencing factors. In the end, this paper proposes to strengthen the government oversight and implement a flexible system of contractual arrangements to wash out backward production capacity.
引文
[1]国务院批转发展改革委等部门关于抑制部分行业产能过剩和重复建设引导产业健康发展若干意见的通知,国发「2009」38号.
[2]国务院关于进一步加强淘汰落后产能工作的通知,国发[2010]7号.
[3]胡立彪.淘汰落后产能需先淘汰落后政绩观[N],中国质量报,2010,1,26(1)．
[4]宏观经济研究院能源所课题组.淘汰高耗能落后产能的着力点[J].宏观经济管理,2007(7)：21-23.
[5]侯世国.落实节能减排措施,推行行业结构调整[J].冶金管理,2007,(3).
[6]宋宪萍.产业结构趋同的体制剖析[J].理论界,2000(2)：31-32.
[7]沈立人,戴园晨.我国“诸侯经济”的形成及其弊端和根源[J].经济研究,1990,(3).
[8]曹建海、周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作—兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004,(6).
[9]国务院关于淘汰落后产能的相关文件,国发[2009-2010].
[10]邵建利.上海工业园区调整和淘汰落后产能的对策研究[J].上海经济研究,2008,(2).
[11]佘明龙.东部发达地区落后生产能力的淘汰——以浙江嘉兴为例[J].浙江经济,2009,(12).
[12]吕铁.发达国家淘汰落后产能的做法与启示退出壁垒[J].中国经济时报,2010,(1).
[13]江小涓.国有企业的能力过剩、退出及退出援助政策[J].经济研究,1995,(2).
[14]杨蕙馨.从进入退出角度看中国产业组织的合理化[N].东南大学学报,2000,(4).
[15]郭立宏.论中国产业市场低进入壁垒高退出壁垒的矛盾与治理[J].经济改革,1995,(2).
[16]卢华.国有企业退出壁垒的案例分析——以我国纺织业为例[J].管理世界,2000,(1).
[17]曹建海.中国重复建设的形成机制与政策措施[J].中国工业经济,2002,(4).
[18]谢地,李世朗.我国国有企业退出壁垒分析及对策[R].当代经济研究,2005—08.
[19]张新海.转轨时期落后产能的退出壁垒与退出机制[J].宏观经济管理,2007,(10).
[20]梁东黎.转轨期企业落后产能的淘汰机制研究[J].江海学刊,2008,(5).
[21]刘小鲁.地方政府主导型消耗战与制度性退出壁垒[J].世界经济,2005,(9).
[22]张五常.中国的经济制度(M).北京：中信出版社,2009.
[23]John P. Blair, Rishi Kumar. Is local economic development a zero-sum game?[J]. Urban Affairs Annual Reviews,1997 (47):1-19.
[24]张钢、徐贤春.招商引资与地方政府绩效评估[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2004,(3).
[25]吴凡、冉畅.有限理性地方政府之间的引资博弈分析[J].财经科学,2009(6)：255.
[26]毕宝德.土地经济学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,1998.
[27]Tiebout, Charle. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1956(64):416-24.
[28]Oates, Wallace E. Fiscal Federalism[M].New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovic,1972.
[29]Musgrave, Robert A. The Theory of Public Finance:A Study in Political Economy[M].New York:Mcgraw-Hill,1959.
[30]马骏.中国中央与地方财政关系模式[J].中国经济评论,1994,(6).
[31]Jin Qian and B. Weingast. Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives Federalism, Chinese Style[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2005(89):1719-1742.
[32]Young. The Razor's Edge:Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's republic of china[J]. Quarterly Journal of Republic Economics, Vol. CSV,2000, (4).
[33]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004,(6).
[34]樊纲.当前宏观经济变化趋势与对策[J].经济界,2006,(1).
[35]黄君洁.中国财政分权的现实问题研究[N].厦门大学学报(哲社版),2007(6)：97—104.
[36]胡顺义.中央与地方政府间财政关系的效率分析[J].经济研究,2008,(12).
[37]黄肖广,李睿鑫.财政分权与经济增长的地区差异效应研究——基于东、中、西部省际面板数据(1988-2005)的分析[J].学术交流,2009,(1).
[38]倪红.中国与美国地方税制的比较分析[J].涉外税务,2001,(6).
[39]刘国臻.论美国的土地发展权制度及其对我国的启示[J].法学评论(双月刊),2007(3)：140—146.
[40]华春雨；彭赟.中美土地资源管理制度比较研究[J].华商,2008,(10).
[41]孔庆山.美国自由土地制度述论[N].华侨大学学报,2004,2,121(7).
[42]Smith,Adam.An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [N]. University of Chicago Press,1776.
[43]Marx, Karl. Capital[M].Edoted bu Frederirk Engels, International Publishers,New York,1894.
[44]Mill, John S. Principles of Political Economy[M]. W.J.Ashley, Longmans Company, London,1848.
[45]Marshall, Alfred. Principles of Economics[M]. C. W. Guillebaud, Macmillan Company, London,1890.
[46]张五常.佃农理论(M).北京：中信出版社,2000.
[47]Stiglitz, Joseph E. Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping[J]. Review of Economic Studies,1974(2),41:219-255.
[48]苏明.当前我国地方税税权划分存在的主要问题[J].改革纵横,2000,(7).
[49]陈碧琴,傅强.中央政府与地方政府的税收竞争动态博弈分析[J].财经问题研究,2009,(12).
[50]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996.
[51]吕政.论中国工业的比较优势[J].中国工业经济,2003,(8).
[52]张耀辉.地区间竞争影响、形成原因与化解[J].中国工业经济,2004(6)：80-89.
[53]中国东西不投资环境的比较分析[D].武汉理工大学,2004.
[54]刘荣.我国东西部差异不断扩大的根源及其对策[N].郑州轻工业学院学报,2009,10,5(10).
[55]陈军.中国入世后纺织业的新增长点纺织科学研究[J].生态纺织品,2002,(2).
[56]郝伟民.纺织工业面临的竞争环境与对策[J].研究与探索,2003,(8).
[57]邹建锋.贸易壁垒挑战纺织业过度竞争呼唤结构调整[J].行业经济,2003,(2).
[58]韩亮亮.产业集聚对区域经济增长的影响——以江苏省纺织业为例[D].南京理工大学,2009,(6).
[59]傅纯恒,胡丹婷.增强我国纺织品环境竞争力的几点思考[N].浙江工程学院学报,2000(2)：123～127.
[60]杜钰洲.纺织工业发展形势及对策[J].管理世界,2004,(2).
[61]新文.纺织业面临巨大压力[N].中华合作时报,2008,11(1)：12～13.
[2]国务院关于进一步加强淘汰落后产能工作的通知,国发[2010]7号.
[3]胡立彪.淘汰落后产能需先淘汰落后政绩观[N],中国质量报,2010,1,26(1)．
[4]宏观经济研究院能源所课题组.淘汰高耗能落后产能的着力点[J].宏观经济管理,2007(7)：21-23.
[5]侯世国.落实节能减排措施,推行行业结构调整[J].冶金管理,2007,(3).
[6]宋宪萍.产业结构趋同的体制剖析[J].理论界,2000(2)：31-32.
[7]沈立人,戴园晨.我国“诸侯经济”的形成及其弊端和根源[J].经济研究,1990,(3).
[8]曹建海、周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作—兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004,(6).
[9]国务院关于淘汰落后产能的相关文件,国发[2009-2010].
[10]邵建利.上海工业园区调整和淘汰落后产能的对策研究[J].上海经济研究,2008,(2).
[11]佘明龙.东部发达地区落后生产能力的淘汰——以浙江嘉兴为例[J].浙江经济,2009,(12).
[12]吕铁.发达国家淘汰落后产能的做法与启示退出壁垒[J].中国经济时报,2010,(1).
[13]江小涓.国有企业的能力过剩、退出及退出援助政策[J].经济研究,1995,(2).
[14]杨蕙馨.从进入退出角度看中国产业组织的合理化[N].东南大学学报,2000,(4).
[15]郭立宏.论中国产业市场低进入壁垒高退出壁垒的矛盾与治理[J].经济改革,1995,(2).
[16]卢华.国有企业退出壁垒的案例分析——以我国纺织业为例[J].管理世界,2000,(1).
[17]曹建海.中国重复建设的形成机制与政策措施[J].中国工业经济,2002,(4).
[18]谢地,李世朗.我国国有企业退出壁垒分析及对策[R].当代经济研究,2005—08.
[19]张新海.转轨时期落后产能的退出壁垒与退出机制[J].宏观经济管理,2007,(10).
[20]梁东黎.转轨期企业落后产能的淘汰机制研究[J].江海学刊,2008,(5).
[21]刘小鲁.地方政府主导型消耗战与制度性退出壁垒[J].世界经济,2005,(9).
[22]张五常.中国的经济制度(M).北京：中信出版社,2009.
[23]John P. Blair, Rishi Kumar. Is local economic development a zero-sum game?[J]. Urban Affairs Annual Reviews,1997 (47):1-19.
[24]张钢、徐贤春.招商引资与地方政府绩效评估[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2004,(3).
[25]吴凡、冉畅.有限理性地方政府之间的引资博弈分析[J].财经科学,2009(6)：255.
[26]毕宝德.土地经济学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,1998.
[27]Tiebout, Charle. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1956(64):416-24.
[28]Oates, Wallace E. Fiscal Federalism[M].New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovic,1972.
[29]Musgrave, Robert A. The Theory of Public Finance:A Study in Political Economy[M].New York:Mcgraw-Hill,1959.
[30]马骏.中国中央与地方财政关系模式[J].中国经济评论,1994,(6).
[31]Jin Qian and B. Weingast. Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives Federalism, Chinese Style[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2005(89):1719-1742.
[32]Young. The Razor's Edge:Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's republic of china[J]. Quarterly Journal of Republic Economics, Vol. CSV,2000, (4).
[33]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设长期存在的原因[J].经济研究,2004,(6).
[34]樊纲.当前宏观经济变化趋势与对策[J].经济界,2006,(1).
[35]黄君洁.中国财政分权的现实问题研究[N].厦门大学学报(哲社版),2007(6)：97—104.
[36]胡顺义.中央与地方政府间财政关系的效率分析[J].经济研究,2008,(12).
[37]黄肖广,李睿鑫.财政分权与经济增长的地区差异效应研究——基于东、中、西部省际面板数据(1988-2005)的分析[J].学术交流,2009,(1).
[38]倪红.中国与美国地方税制的比较分析[J].涉外税务,2001,(6).
[39]刘国臻.论美国的土地发展权制度及其对我国的启示[J].法学评论(双月刊),2007(3)：140—146.
[40]华春雨；彭赟.中美土地资源管理制度比较研究[J].华商,2008,(10).
[41]孔庆山.美国自由土地制度述论[N].华侨大学学报,2004,2,121(7).
[42]Smith,Adam.An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [N]. University of Chicago Press,1776.
[43]Marx, Karl. Capital[M].Edoted bu Frederirk Engels, International Publishers,New York,1894.
[44]Mill, John S. Principles of Political Economy[M]. W.J.Ashley, Longmans Company, London,1848.
[45]Marshall, Alfred. Principles of Economics[M]. C. W. Guillebaud, Macmillan Company, London,1890.
[46]张五常.佃农理论(M).北京：中信出版社,2000.
[47]Stiglitz, Joseph E. Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping[J]. Review of Economic Studies,1974(2),41:219-255.
[48]苏明.当前我国地方税税权划分存在的主要问题[J].改革纵横,2000,(7).
[49]陈碧琴,傅强.中央政府与地方政府的税收竞争动态博弈分析[J].财经问题研究,2009,(12).
[50]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996.
[51]吕政.论中国工业的比较优势[J].中国工业经济,2003,(8).
[52]张耀辉.地区间竞争影响、形成原因与化解[J].中国工业经济,2004(6)：80-89.
[53]中国东西不投资环境的比较分析[D].武汉理工大学,2004.
[54]刘荣.我国东西部差异不断扩大的根源及其对策[N].郑州轻工业学院学报,2009,10,5(10).
[55]陈军.中国入世后纺织业的新增长点纺织科学研究[J].生态纺织品,2002,(2).
[56]郝伟民.纺织工业面临的竞争环境与对策[J].研究与探索,2003,(8).
[57]邹建锋.贸易壁垒挑战纺织业过度竞争呼唤结构调整[J].行业经济,2003,(2).
[58]韩亮亮.产业集聚对区域经济增长的影响——以江苏省纺织业为例[D].南京理工大学,2009,(6).
[59]傅纯恒,胡丹婷.增强我国纺织品环境竞争力的几点思考[N].浙江工程学院学报,2000(2)：123～127.
[60]杜钰洲.纺织工业发展形势及对策[J].管理世界,2004,(2).
[61]新文.纺织业面临巨大压力[N].中华合作时报,2008,11(1)：12～13.