中国风险投资的运行机制研究
|
摘要
在现代经济中,风险投资展现出日益突出的作用。新的公司、新的技术和新的产品,甚至新的行业,很多时候都与风险投资的支持与推动分不开。中国自上世纪80年代中期就引入风险投资,近三十年来取得了长足的进展。但由于各种原因,中国风险投资行业的仍处于发展的初期阶段,相关政策法规有待完善,募资渠道和资金来源相对有限,退出通道也有待多元化,更重要的是,风险投资机构的运作机制存在进一步完善的空间,这些都是影响风险投资业进一步发展的因素。本文运用信息经济学、新制度经济学的合约理论与组织理论,对中国风险投资的运行机制进行了分析,得出了一些重要的结论。
首先,关于风险投资的组织模式,目前国外主要有公司制、有限合伙制与信托制三种形式,其中有限合伙制占重要地位,而国内则以公司制为主。针对国内大多数人主张大力发展有限合伙制的观点,作者认为,公司制与合伙制各有短长,允许它们相互竞争,通过竞争完成进化,是政府应采取的基本态度。根据笔者的经验,升级型公司制可以较好地综合有限合伙制与公司制各自优势,同时可以在一定程度上避免二者的缺陷。但这种制度的有效运行依然需要相应的制度环境,依然需要在与其他组织的竞争中发展。
其次,关于风险投资的融资机制,针对目前中国风险投资融资渠道单一且主要来自政府及政府控制的国有企业之现状,提出政府的资金在风险投资发展的初期可以起引导和辅助作用,发挥“诱导效应”,但风险投资的真正运行主体应该是市场主体,因为风险投资本质上是对市场机会的一种运用。而通过市场来筹集资金,需要根据市场主体的偏好,设计其最大化的合约安排,发掘潜在的交易机会,实现分工与专业化的利益。因此,加强对民间投资主体的培育,通过多样化的合约安排开辟多元化的筹资渠道是风险投资发展的应有之义。
第三.关于风险投资的决策机制,作者在描述风险投资项目选择的程序的基础上,重点讨论了风险投资的评估体系,在改造AHP模型的基础上,构建了灰色多层次评估模型,提供了评估风险投资项目的风险与收益的依据。论文同时揭示了目前投资决策环节存在的决策成本过高、专业人才匮乏和尽职调查不够等缺陷。
第四,关于风险投资的资金运用监管问题,本文在委托-代理理论的基础上,说明了风险投资基金加强投资后管理而不是干预决策的重要性,在此基础上把创业投资后管理活动分为监控活动和增值活动两部分,其中,创业投资家的监控活动包括监控财务状况、监控市场营销状况、监控股权变动、监控CEO的报酬、监控追加借款等；增值活动包括制定战略计划、充当管理团队的参谋、招募CEO或CFO等高层管理人员、招募新员工、联系潜在客户、组建有效运行的董事会、运作管理等。作者特别以早期项目为例,说明了从项目选择到退出的整个管理过程。
第五,关于风险投资的退出机制,作者重点讨论了风险投资在退出环节遇到的三个重要问题：退出时间、退出价格和退出方式,作者分析了选择最佳退出时间,协商退出价格和决定退出方式时要考虑的重要因素,特别强调创业投资应该应用多种退出渠道相互配合、灵活运用。创业投资在整个运作过程中处处存在风险,而市场中投机机会的增多也使得创业投资不能及时退出的代价增大；由于创业投资退出是以回收资本、实现增值为最终目的,因此在实现退出时不能拘泥于某一种形式,应该针对不同的情况采取积极灵活的退出决策,减少退出风险。
最后,作者根据前面关于风险投资组织形式、融资机制、决策机制、监管机制和退出机制的分析,得出了优化我国风险投资运行机制的政策建议。
Venture capital plays increasingly prominent role in modern economy. Startup companies, creative technologies, innovative products, and even brand-new industries, mostly are inseparable from the support and driven of the venture capital. Since its introduction to China in the mid-1980s, venture capital has made considerable progress during the past three decades. However, due to various factors, the development of venture capital industry in China is still in the early stage:the relevant policies and regulations need to be improved, the fund-raising channels and capital resources are relatively limited, the exit channels are not smooth enough, and so on. In addition to above mentioned problems existing in macroeconomic policies and industrial environment, the operational mechanism of venture firms is remain to be researched and improved, all these factors affect the further development of the venture capital. Utilizing contract theory and organization theory of information economics and new institutional economics, this disstertation analyzes the operational mechanism of venture capital industry in China, and draws some important conclusions.
First of all, at present there are three forms of organizational structure for venture capital firms:corporation, limited partnership and trust. While the form of limited partnership dominates overseas, corporation takes main stream domestically. Different from the majority point of view in the domestic that advocating the development of limited partnership system, the author thinks that, either form of corporation or limited partnership has its own advantages. The government should allow healthy competition between them to achive their organic and orderly evolution. Based on the author's experience, advanced corporation has both the advantages of traditional corporation and limited partnership, and at the same time, avoid their possible drawbacks. However, necessary regulations are needed to safeguard the smooth running of this advanced corporation form. And the same is ture about necessary competions against other forms.
Secondly, about financing and funding options of venture capital firms, in view of the fact that current financing channel of venture capital in China is single and mainly through the government and state-owned enterprises controlled by government, the author suggests that the government play a guiding and supporting role in the early stage of the development of venture capital investment industry to trigger the "induced effects", while at the same time the actual operational platform for the venture capital should be the open market as venture capital investment is essentially an utilization of market opportunities. And to raise funds through the market, it is necessary to follow the preferences of market participants, design contract arrangement to maximize their payoffs, explore potential profitable business opportunities, and realize the benefits of specialization and professionalism. Therefore, the meaning of the development of venture capital investment industry should be strengthening the education for private investors and creating diversified financing channels for them through a variety of contractual arrangements.
Thirdly, about decision-making mechanism of venture capital, the author focuses on investment related evaluation system after a description of project selection procedures, constructs a Gray Multilevel Evaluation model based on the transformation of the AHP model, and provides a basis to assess the risks and returns of targeted projects. The essay also reveals the strategic decision-making such as high decision-making costs, lack of professional personnel and insufficiency of due-diligence investigation.
Fourthly, about supervision of invested venture capital, based on Principal-agent theory, the essay illustrates importance of post-investment financial management rather than the intervention of investment decision for invested projects. Furthermore, post-investment management can be categorized into supervising activities and value-adding activities. The supervising activities conducted by investors include the supervision of cash/account management, marketing, change of ownership, compensation for CEO and financing. The value-added activities include planning corporate strategies, consulting of management issues, recruiting senior management, contacting potential customers, establishing an effective board and others. The author takes early-stage investment as an example to illustrate the process form project selection to exit.
Fifthly, about exit strategy, the author mainly discusses three important issues:exit timing, exit pricing and exit manners. Key factors of how to choose the best exit time, negotiate exit price, and choose exit manners are revealed and analyzed. The author also emphasizes that investors should select different exit manners and channels depending on specific situation. Risk is everywhere during the whole process of investment. With more and more speculative investment opportunities in the market, the risk will grow bigger without timely exit. The ultimate goal of venture capital investment is to recover the invested capital and gain of added value, therefore investors should consider various exit manners and policies to reduce risk.
Finally, based on the analysis of venture capital firm's organizational form, financing and funding options, decision-making mechanism, regulatory environment and exit strategies, the author offers the policy recommendations to optimize operational mechanism of venture capital investment in China.
首先,关于风险投资的组织模式,目前国外主要有公司制、有限合伙制与信托制三种形式,其中有限合伙制占重要地位,而国内则以公司制为主。针对国内大多数人主张大力发展有限合伙制的观点,作者认为,公司制与合伙制各有短长,允许它们相互竞争,通过竞争完成进化,是政府应采取的基本态度。根据笔者的经验,升级型公司制可以较好地综合有限合伙制与公司制各自优势,同时可以在一定程度上避免二者的缺陷。但这种制度的有效运行依然需要相应的制度环境,依然需要在与其他组织的竞争中发展。
其次,关于风险投资的融资机制,针对目前中国风险投资融资渠道单一且主要来自政府及政府控制的国有企业之现状,提出政府的资金在风险投资发展的初期可以起引导和辅助作用,发挥“诱导效应”,但风险投资的真正运行主体应该是市场主体,因为风险投资本质上是对市场机会的一种运用。而通过市场来筹集资金,需要根据市场主体的偏好,设计其最大化的合约安排,发掘潜在的交易机会,实现分工与专业化的利益。因此,加强对民间投资主体的培育,通过多样化的合约安排开辟多元化的筹资渠道是风险投资发展的应有之义。
第三.关于风险投资的决策机制,作者在描述风险投资项目选择的程序的基础上,重点讨论了风险投资的评估体系,在改造AHP模型的基础上,构建了灰色多层次评估模型,提供了评估风险投资项目的风险与收益的依据。论文同时揭示了目前投资决策环节存在的决策成本过高、专业人才匮乏和尽职调查不够等缺陷。
第四,关于风险投资的资金运用监管问题,本文在委托-代理理论的基础上,说明了风险投资基金加强投资后管理而不是干预决策的重要性,在此基础上把创业投资后管理活动分为监控活动和增值活动两部分,其中,创业投资家的监控活动包括监控财务状况、监控市场营销状况、监控股权变动、监控CEO的报酬、监控追加借款等；增值活动包括制定战略计划、充当管理团队的参谋、招募CEO或CFO等高层管理人员、招募新员工、联系潜在客户、组建有效运行的董事会、运作管理等。作者特别以早期项目为例,说明了从项目选择到退出的整个管理过程。
第五,关于风险投资的退出机制,作者重点讨论了风险投资在退出环节遇到的三个重要问题：退出时间、退出价格和退出方式,作者分析了选择最佳退出时间,协商退出价格和决定退出方式时要考虑的重要因素,特别强调创业投资应该应用多种退出渠道相互配合、灵活运用。创业投资在整个运作过程中处处存在风险,而市场中投机机会的增多也使得创业投资不能及时退出的代价增大；由于创业投资退出是以回收资本、实现增值为最终目的,因此在实现退出时不能拘泥于某一种形式,应该针对不同的情况采取积极灵活的退出决策,减少退出风险。
最后,作者根据前面关于风险投资组织形式、融资机制、决策机制、监管机制和退出机制的分析,得出了优化我国风险投资运行机制的政策建议。
Venture capital plays increasingly prominent role in modern economy. Startup companies, creative technologies, innovative products, and even brand-new industries, mostly are inseparable from the support and driven of the venture capital. Since its introduction to China in the mid-1980s, venture capital has made considerable progress during the past three decades. However, due to various factors, the development of venture capital industry in China is still in the early stage:the relevant policies and regulations need to be improved, the fund-raising channels and capital resources are relatively limited, the exit channels are not smooth enough, and so on. In addition to above mentioned problems existing in macroeconomic policies and industrial environment, the operational mechanism of venture firms is remain to be researched and improved, all these factors affect the further development of the venture capital. Utilizing contract theory and organization theory of information economics and new institutional economics, this disstertation analyzes the operational mechanism of venture capital industry in China, and draws some important conclusions.
First of all, at present there are three forms of organizational structure for venture capital firms:corporation, limited partnership and trust. While the form of limited partnership dominates overseas, corporation takes main stream domestically. Different from the majority point of view in the domestic that advocating the development of limited partnership system, the author thinks that, either form of corporation or limited partnership has its own advantages. The government should allow healthy competition between them to achive their organic and orderly evolution. Based on the author's experience, advanced corporation has both the advantages of traditional corporation and limited partnership, and at the same time, avoid their possible drawbacks. However, necessary regulations are needed to safeguard the smooth running of this advanced corporation form. And the same is ture about necessary competions against other forms.
Secondly, about financing and funding options of venture capital firms, in view of the fact that current financing channel of venture capital in China is single and mainly through the government and state-owned enterprises controlled by government, the author suggests that the government play a guiding and supporting role in the early stage of the development of venture capital investment industry to trigger the "induced effects", while at the same time the actual operational platform for the venture capital should be the open market as venture capital investment is essentially an utilization of market opportunities. And to raise funds through the market, it is necessary to follow the preferences of market participants, design contract arrangement to maximize their payoffs, explore potential profitable business opportunities, and realize the benefits of specialization and professionalism. Therefore, the meaning of the development of venture capital investment industry should be strengthening the education for private investors and creating diversified financing channels for them through a variety of contractual arrangements.
Thirdly, about decision-making mechanism of venture capital, the author focuses on investment related evaluation system after a description of project selection procedures, constructs a Gray Multilevel Evaluation model based on the transformation of the AHP model, and provides a basis to assess the risks and returns of targeted projects. The essay also reveals the strategic decision-making such as high decision-making costs, lack of professional personnel and insufficiency of due-diligence investigation.
Fourthly, about supervision of invested venture capital, based on Principal-agent theory, the essay illustrates importance of post-investment financial management rather than the intervention of investment decision for invested projects. Furthermore, post-investment management can be categorized into supervising activities and value-adding activities. The supervising activities conducted by investors include the supervision of cash/account management, marketing, change of ownership, compensation for CEO and financing. The value-added activities include planning corporate strategies, consulting of management issues, recruiting senior management, contacting potential customers, establishing an effective board and others. The author takes early-stage investment as an example to illustrate the process form project selection to exit.
Fifthly, about exit strategy, the author mainly discusses three important issues:exit timing, exit pricing and exit manners. Key factors of how to choose the best exit time, negotiate exit price, and choose exit manners are revealed and analyzed. The author also emphasizes that investors should select different exit manners and channels depending on specific situation. Risk is everywhere during the whole process of investment. With more and more speculative investment opportunities in the market, the risk will grow bigger without timely exit. The ultimate goal of venture capital investment is to recover the invested capital and gain of added value, therefore investors should consider various exit manners and policies to reduce risk.
Finally, based on the analysis of venture capital firm's organizational form, financing and funding options, decision-making mechanism, regulatory environment and exit strategies, the author offers the policy recommendations to optimize operational mechanism of venture capital investment in China.
引文
[1]A.M.Spence,1976:"Information aspects of Market Structure:An Introduction." Quarterly Journal of Economics 90:591-97.
[2]Andrew L. Zacharakis, Dean A. Shepherd,2003. The development Of Venture-capital-backed Internet Companies an Ecosystem Perspective. Journal of Business Venturing,18,217-231
[3]Antonio Davila,George Forster, Mahendra Gupta,2003. Venture Capital Financing and the Growth of Start-up Firms. Journal of Business Venturing,18,689-708
[4]Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., Mullainathan, S.Ferreting out tunneling:an application to Indian business Groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002,118,121-148
[5]Christian Keuschnigg, Soren BO Nielsen, December 2003. Taxes and Venture Capital Support. Public Finance, NO.1094,1-38
[6]Christian Keuschnigg, Soren BO Nielsen,2004. Start-ups, Venture Capitalists, and the Capital Gains Tax. Journal of Public Economics,88,1011-1042
[7]Cleillent K. Wang, Kangmao Wang, Qing Lu,2003. Effects of Venture Capitalists Participation in Listed Companies. Journal of Banking & Finance,27, 2015-2034
[8]David J. Denis,2004. Entrepreneurial Finance an Overview Of the Issues and Evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance,10,301-326
[9]Dean A. Shepherd, Andrew Zacharakis, Robert. Baron,2003.'VCs'Decision Processes; Evidence Suggesting More Experience May Not AlWays Be Better. Journal of Business Venturing,18,381-401
[10]Dimo. P. Dimov, Dean A. Shepherd,2005. Human Capital Theory and Venture Capital Firms:Exploring"Home Returns" And "Strike Outs". Journal of Business Venture,20,1-21
[11]Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege,1998. Venture Capital Financing, MoralHazard, and Learning. Journal of Banking & Finance,22,703-735
[12]Donglas Crmming, Grant Fleming, JO-Ann Suchard,2005. Venture Capitalist Value-added Activities, Fundraising and Drawdowns. Journal of Banking & Finance,29,295-331
[13]Douglas Cumming, Daniel Schmidt, UweWalz,2004. Legality and Venture Governance around the world. Center for Financial Studies,17,1-39
[14]Filatotchev, I., Mickiewicz, T.Ownership Concentration, Private Benefits of Control and Debt Financing, SSRN Working Paper, Birkbeck College, University of London/SSEES, University College London,2003,October.
[15]Garry D. BmtOn, David AhiStrom, Kuang S. Yeh,2004. Understabling Venture Capital in East Asia:the Impact of Institutions on the industry Today and Tomorrow. Journal of Business,39,72-88
[16]Garry D. Bruton, David Ahistrom,2003. An Institutional View Of China's Venture Capital Industry Explaining the Difference between China and the West. Journal of Business Venturing,18,233-259
[17]Gompers, P. A., Lerner, J. Risk and reward in private equity investments:the challenge of performance assessment[J], Journal of Private Equity,1997,1:5-12.
[18]Gompers, P. A., Lerner, J. The venture capital cycle [M].The MIT Press,1999.
[19]Haizhou Huang, Chenggang Xu,2003. Financial Syndication and R&D. Economics Letters,80,141-146
[20]Henry Chesbrongh,2003. The Governance and Performance of Xerox's Technology Spin-Off Companies. Research Policy,32,403-421
[21]Joel A. C. Baum, Brain S. Silvcrman,2004. Picking Winners or Building Them Alliance, Intellectual, and Human Capital as Selection Criteria in Venture Financing and Performance Of Biotechnology Start-ups. Journal of Business Venturing,19,411-436
[22]John R. M. Hand, April 2005, The Value Relevance Of Financial Statements in the Venture Capital Market. Accounting Review
[23]Johnson, S., R., La Porta, F., Lopez-De-Silanes, and A., Shleifer, Tunnelling. American Economic Review 2000,90:22.
[24]Josh Lerner, Antoinette Schoar,2004. The Liquidity Puzzle:Theory and Evidence from Private Equity. Journal of Financial Economics,72,3-40
[25]Juan Florin,2005. IS Venture Capital Worth it Effects On Firm Performance and Founder Returns. Journal of Business Venturing,20,113-135
[26]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.,1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54,471-518
[27]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, The Journal of Finance 2002,3:1147
[28]Laura Bottazzi, Marco Da Rin, July 2004. Active Financial Intermediation: Evidence On the Role Of Organizational Specialization and Human Capital. Working Paper Series,1-39
[29]Lerner, J., Schoar, A.. The illiquidity pullze:theory and evidence from private equity [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2004,72:3-40.
[30]Lowell W. Busenitz, James O. Fiet, Douglas D. Moesel,2004. Reconsidering the Venture Capitalists "Value Added" Troposition:An Interorganizational Learning Perspective. Journal of Business Venturing,19,787-807
[31]M.C.Jensen and W.H.Meckling,1976:" Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure." Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-60.
[32]Marco Da Rin, Giovanna Nicodano, Alessandro Sembenelli. Public Policy and the Creation of Active Venture Capital Market
[33]Mark Lehrer, Kazuhiro Asakawa,2004. Rethinking the Public Sector: Idiosyncrasies of Biotechnology Commercialization as Motors of National R&D Reform in Germany and Japan. Research Policy,33,921-938
[34]Mike Wright, Y Lockett, December 2003. The Structure and Management of Alliances:Syndication in the Venture Capital Industry. Journal of Management Studies, V01.40,2073-2102
[35]Paula Gompers, Josh Lerner, David S. Scharfstein, July 2003. Entrepreneurial Spawning:Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures,1986-1999. Economic Research
[36]Peggy M. Lee, Sunil Wahal,2004. Grandstanding, Certification and the Underpricing of Venture Capital Backed IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics,73, 375-407
[37]Robert J. Hendershott,2004. Net Value:Wealth Creation and Destruction during the Internet Boom. Journal of Corporate Finance,10,281-299
[38]Roman lnderst, Holger M. Muller,2004. The Effect Of Capital Market Characteristics On the Value Of Start-up Firms, Journal of Financial Economics, 72,319-356
[39]Sahlman, W. A., The structure and governance of venture capital organizations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27:473-521.
[40]Sea Jin Chang,2004. Venture Capital Financing, Strategic Alliances, and the Initial Public Offering of Internet Start-ups. Journal of Business Venturing,19,721-741
[41]Susheng Wang, Hailan Zhou,2004. Staged Financing in Venture Capital:Moral Hazard and Risks. Journal of Corporate Finance,10,131-155
[42]Thrainn Eggertsson,1990:Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge University Press.
[43]Thomas Keil, July 2004. Building External Corporate Venturing Capability. Journal of Management Studies, V01.41, No.5,799-825
[44]Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan, Jonathan Linton,2004. The Relationship between Governance Structure and Risk Management, Approaches in Japanese Venture Capital Firms. Journal of Business Venturing,19,831-849
[45]Uwe Walz, Douglas Cumming, March 2004. Private Equity Returns and Disclosure around the World. Center of Financial Studies,5,1-39
[46]Vesa Kanniainen, Christian Keuschnigg,2003. The Optimal Portfolio of Start-up Firms in Venture Capital Finance. Journal of Corporate Finance,9,521-534
[47]VeSa Kanniainen, Christian Keuschnigg,2004. Start-up Investment with Scarce Venture Capital Support. Journal of Banking & Finance,28,1939-1959
[48]Victory Fleischer,2004. The Rational Exuberance Of Structuring Venture Capital Startups. Tax Law Review, V01.57
[49]Y.Barzel,1985:"Transaction Costs:Are they Just Costs?" Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,141:4-16.
[50]Zingales, Luigi."In search of new foundations", The Journal of Finance,2000,55: 1623-1653
[51]陈玮,PE的模式之争[N]。长三角,2009年9月15日。
[52]陈德棉,鲍长生..风险投资的风险防范机制的中外比较研究[J].经济论坛,2005(12)：12-14
[53]陈坤.有限合伙与我国私募基金组织形式的选择[J],商场现代化,2009(3)
[54]陈青松.PE热盼IPO重启：并购退出收益低回报率不能和IPO比[N],中国企业报,2013
[55]陈业宏,文杰.对我国采取有限合伙创业投资的质疑[J]。武汉大学学报：哲学社会科学版,2004(3)
[56]陈友忠.中国创业投资退出机制曙光初现[J],中国企业家,2004
[57]陈植.专户投资产品份额转让倒计时：PE谋划LP退出新通道,[N]21世纪经济报道,2013
[58]戴丰.风险投资公司对投资企业的监督管理[J],青岛职业技术学院学报,2006,19-50-51
[59]戴天柱.我国风险投资运作的支持系统与激励机制探索[J],财经论丛,2005(5)
[60]单军,王旭,卫国红.我国风险投资公司组织形式研究.长春工业大学学报(社会科学版),2003(04)：123-129
[61]德群.巴菲特投资思想方法实录,中国华侨出版社,2011年2月第1版
[62]董海华.风险投资组织模式研究.哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版),2004,(02)：114-116
[63]冯坡.市场寒冬影响券商直投退出回报新政加速直投市场化转型[J],ChinaVenture,2013
[64]付碧莲.一季度PE市场募资额大降六成并购成为退出主渠道[N],国际金融报,2013
[65]高建光.我国风险投资机构组织形式的选择.中国科技产业,2000(06)：
[66]郭建鸾.基于公司治理的创业投资基金组织形式分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2004,(1)：72-76.
[67]郭明杉,杨波,孙长雄.风险投资有限合伙制激励约束机制研究[J],商业研究,2008(2)
[68]户才和.活跃在中国风险资本市场上的六类风险投资机构.中国科技信息,2000(21)：54-59
[69]黄鑫.中国风险投资退出渠道分析[D].山东财政学院图书馆,2010
[70]黄艳艳.风险投资公司项目投资风险管理[J],集团经济研究,2007, 252：144-145
[71]李国兰.我国风险投资机构的组织形式.企业经济,2003(04)：88-93
[72]李云飞,周宗放.基于历史业绩的风险投资报酬激励机制[J],软科学,2012(1)
[73]厉以宁.发展创业投资还需私募资金.网际商务,2001(10)：10
[74]刘楠.风险投资退出渠道的分析[J].经济研究,2007,5：24-25
[75]刘澎.关于尽快建立中国自己的风险投资业的建议与思路.战略与管理,1998(02)：5-8
[76]刘伟华,彭龙,卢俊峰.私募/风险资本退出与场外股权交易市场建设探析[J],经济师,2011,2：80-81
[77]刘晓纯,张潇.风险投资机构中普通合伙人激励机制创新研究[J],中央财经大学学报,2012(6)
[78]刘欣.创业投资退出机制浅议[J].财会通讯,2008,6：18-19
[79]罗欣.风险投资退出渠道[J].理论研究,2009,10：43-46
[80]潘庆华,杜励婧.中国风险投资业的现状及运行模式选择.软科学,2004,(03)：18-21
[81]潘沩.PE投资“曲线”套现退出：上市公司接盘隐忧初现[N],21世纪经济报道,2013
[82]庞跃华,曾令华.私募股权基金组织形式的比较及中国选择[J],财经理论与实践,2011(3)
[83]施阳,崔笋.论风险投资业在中国的发展.财经科学,2000,(S2)：87-92
[84]史际春、温烨、邓峰等著.企业和公司法,中国人民大学出版社,2001年第423页
[85]史秋实.英雄云集看创投起伏[J],企业导刊,2012,2：49-51
[86]宋海燕,杨丽.有限合伙制——风险资本的最佳组建模式.上海金融,2000(09)：73-80
[87]谈毅,叶岑.风险投资的契约结构与治理机制分析.科学,2002年增刊：132-136
[88]谈毅.创业投资家的代理风险表现与控制机制[J].科研管理,2000,(11)：32-40
[89]谈毅.我国风险投资基金管理模式探析.科研管理,2005,(7)：109-116
[90]覃静.后危机时期PE的谋“退”与求“进”[J],现代企业文化,2010,9：148-149
[91]陶晓峰..美国风险投资的经济分析及其对中国的借鉴意义[D].西南财经大学,2004
[92]田桂林.论风险投资的制度安排.经济与管理,2004(12)：23-27
[93]王蓓.中国PE退出机制的现状分析及引发的思考[J],现代商业,99-100
[94]王方宏.中外风险投资运作机制比较[J],海南金融,2002(1)
[95]王磊,邓戎,郭立宏.私募股权投资研究综述[J].西北大学学报,2009,(7)：103-107.
[96]王先锋.风险投资组织机构模式的探讨.科技创业,2004,(03)：31-33
[97]王益,许小松.风险资本市场治理结构研究.深圳证券交易所研究报告[R],1999年
[98]王永菲.风险投资中的收益分配与激励机制探究——基于信息不对称下委托代 理模型的分析[J],安徽商贸职业技术学院学报,2012(4)
[99]王子珍,张惠贤..国外风险投资机构运作机制对我国的启示.理论界,2005(07)：37-42
[100]卫平,谭湘婷.我国风险投资机构组织形式的创新.投资研究,2000(05)
[101]魏娟,梁静国.我国公司制风险投资公司运作模式分析.商业研究,2005,(09)：75-77
[102]翁恺宁,项杨.我国风险投资企业组织形态创新：有限合伙制下的民投官办模式.中国经济,2001,(04)：21-22
[103]吴凤琴.风险投资退出渠道的研究[J].内蒙古科技与经济,2011,7：31-33
[104]吴忠林.创业投资退出机制研究[J].中国建材,2007,8：67-68
[105]徐东.风险投资基金组织形式国际比较及我国的选择[J],亚太经济,2010(1)
[106]徐锐.大牌PE机构持股转换实现退出投资获利不走寻常路[N],上海证券报,2013
[107]徐晓东.外部权益保护、控制权利益与委托-代理理论[J],管理评论,2004,9：18-22
[108]许金峰.对我国风险投资公司运作模式和绩效的探讨.沿海企业与科技,2005(08)：6-12
[109]杨成万.创投机构非IPO退出渠道亟待拓展创投业发展5大猜想[N],金融投资报,2012
[110]杨隆丰.创业风险投资组织形式的选择与对策,陕西综合经济,2008(6)
[111]尹国俊.日本风险资本产权缺失的影响——新制度经济学分析[J],科研管理,2004(3)
[112]应瑞瑶,赵永清.创业投资组织形式形式选择问题分析——基于民间投资者的角度[J],江苏社会科学,2004(2)
[113]佚名。2010。中国风险投资中的隐性风险,http://www.661aw.cn/toppnew/gsfzs/ gfyxgs//zgfxtz/12334.shtml。
[114]张丹,姜太平.中国风险投资业实行有限合伙制的思考.市场论坛,2004(09)：51-56
[115]张俊芳.中国风险投资退出渠道的现状、问题及政策建议[J],科技创新与生产力,2010,8：17-21
[116]张勇.我国风险投资机构的形式选择与对策.投资研究,2003(07)：102-107
[117]赵军伟.我国风险投资融资机制的问题与对策[J],天中学刊,2008(6)
[118]赵燕,王洁.我国私募基金的基金(PEFOF)的运作模式和发展建议[J],金融与经济,2011,2：57-59
[119]仲旭.我国风险投资机构的组织形式..经济论坛,2004(08)：121-128
[2]Andrew L. Zacharakis, Dean A. Shepherd,2003. The development Of Venture-capital-backed Internet Companies an Ecosystem Perspective. Journal of Business Venturing,18,217-231
[3]Antonio Davila,George Forster, Mahendra Gupta,2003. Venture Capital Financing and the Growth of Start-up Firms. Journal of Business Venturing,18,689-708
[4]Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., Mullainathan, S.Ferreting out tunneling:an application to Indian business Groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002,118,121-148
[5]Christian Keuschnigg, Soren BO Nielsen, December 2003. Taxes and Venture Capital Support. Public Finance, NO.1094,1-38
[6]Christian Keuschnigg, Soren BO Nielsen,2004. Start-ups, Venture Capitalists, and the Capital Gains Tax. Journal of Public Economics,88,1011-1042
[7]Cleillent K. Wang, Kangmao Wang, Qing Lu,2003. Effects of Venture Capitalists Participation in Listed Companies. Journal of Banking & Finance,27, 2015-2034
[8]David J. Denis,2004. Entrepreneurial Finance an Overview Of the Issues and Evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance,10,301-326
[9]Dean A. Shepherd, Andrew Zacharakis, Robert. Baron,2003.'VCs'Decision Processes; Evidence Suggesting More Experience May Not AlWays Be Better. Journal of Business Venturing,18,381-401
[10]Dimo. P. Dimov, Dean A. Shepherd,2005. Human Capital Theory and Venture Capital Firms:Exploring"Home Returns" And "Strike Outs". Journal of Business Venture,20,1-21
[11]Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege,1998. Venture Capital Financing, MoralHazard, and Learning. Journal of Banking & Finance,22,703-735
[12]Donglas Crmming, Grant Fleming, JO-Ann Suchard,2005. Venture Capitalist Value-added Activities, Fundraising and Drawdowns. Journal of Banking & Finance,29,295-331
[13]Douglas Cumming, Daniel Schmidt, UweWalz,2004. Legality and Venture Governance around the world. Center for Financial Studies,17,1-39
[14]Filatotchev, I., Mickiewicz, T.Ownership Concentration, Private Benefits of Control and Debt Financing, SSRN Working Paper, Birkbeck College, University of London/SSEES, University College London,2003,October.
[15]Garry D. BmtOn, David AhiStrom, Kuang S. Yeh,2004. Understabling Venture Capital in East Asia:the Impact of Institutions on the industry Today and Tomorrow. Journal of Business,39,72-88
[16]Garry D. Bruton, David Ahistrom,2003. An Institutional View Of China's Venture Capital Industry Explaining the Difference between China and the West. Journal of Business Venturing,18,233-259
[17]Gompers, P. A., Lerner, J. Risk and reward in private equity investments:the challenge of performance assessment[J], Journal of Private Equity,1997,1:5-12.
[18]Gompers, P. A., Lerner, J. The venture capital cycle [M].The MIT Press,1999.
[19]Haizhou Huang, Chenggang Xu,2003. Financial Syndication and R&D. Economics Letters,80,141-146
[20]Henry Chesbrongh,2003. The Governance and Performance of Xerox's Technology Spin-Off Companies. Research Policy,32,403-421
[21]Joel A. C. Baum, Brain S. Silvcrman,2004. Picking Winners or Building Them Alliance, Intellectual, and Human Capital as Selection Criteria in Venture Financing and Performance Of Biotechnology Start-ups. Journal of Business Venturing,19,411-436
[22]John R. M. Hand, April 2005, The Value Relevance Of Financial Statements in the Venture Capital Market. Accounting Review
[23]Johnson, S., R., La Porta, F., Lopez-De-Silanes, and A., Shleifer, Tunnelling. American Economic Review 2000,90:22.
[24]Josh Lerner, Antoinette Schoar,2004. The Liquidity Puzzle:Theory and Evidence from Private Equity. Journal of Financial Economics,72,3-40
[25]Juan Florin,2005. IS Venture Capital Worth it Effects On Firm Performance and Founder Returns. Journal of Business Venturing,20,113-135
[26]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.,1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54,471-518
[27]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, The Journal of Finance 2002,3:1147
[28]Laura Bottazzi, Marco Da Rin, July 2004. Active Financial Intermediation: Evidence On the Role Of Organizational Specialization and Human Capital. Working Paper Series,1-39
[29]Lerner, J., Schoar, A.. The illiquidity pullze:theory and evidence from private equity [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2004,72:3-40.
[30]Lowell W. Busenitz, James O. Fiet, Douglas D. Moesel,2004. Reconsidering the Venture Capitalists "Value Added" Troposition:An Interorganizational Learning Perspective. Journal of Business Venturing,19,787-807
[31]M.C.Jensen and W.H.Meckling,1976:" Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure." Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-60.
[32]Marco Da Rin, Giovanna Nicodano, Alessandro Sembenelli. Public Policy and the Creation of Active Venture Capital Market
[33]Mark Lehrer, Kazuhiro Asakawa,2004. Rethinking the Public Sector: Idiosyncrasies of Biotechnology Commercialization as Motors of National R&D Reform in Germany and Japan. Research Policy,33,921-938
[34]Mike Wright, Y Lockett, December 2003. The Structure and Management of Alliances:Syndication in the Venture Capital Industry. Journal of Management Studies, V01.40,2073-2102
[35]Paula Gompers, Josh Lerner, David S. Scharfstein, July 2003. Entrepreneurial Spawning:Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures,1986-1999. Economic Research
[36]Peggy M. Lee, Sunil Wahal,2004. Grandstanding, Certification and the Underpricing of Venture Capital Backed IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics,73, 375-407
[37]Robert J. Hendershott,2004. Net Value:Wealth Creation and Destruction during the Internet Boom. Journal of Corporate Finance,10,281-299
[38]Roman lnderst, Holger M. Muller,2004. The Effect Of Capital Market Characteristics On the Value Of Start-up Firms, Journal of Financial Economics, 72,319-356
[39]Sahlman, W. A., The structure and governance of venture capital organizations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27:473-521.
[40]Sea Jin Chang,2004. Venture Capital Financing, Strategic Alliances, and the Initial Public Offering of Internet Start-ups. Journal of Business Venturing,19,721-741
[41]Susheng Wang, Hailan Zhou,2004. Staged Financing in Venture Capital:Moral Hazard and Risks. Journal of Corporate Finance,10,131-155
[42]Thrainn Eggertsson,1990:Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge University Press.
[43]Thomas Keil, July 2004. Building External Corporate Venturing Capability. Journal of Management Studies, V01.41, No.5,799-825
[44]Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan, Jonathan Linton,2004. The Relationship between Governance Structure and Risk Management, Approaches in Japanese Venture Capital Firms. Journal of Business Venturing,19,831-849
[45]Uwe Walz, Douglas Cumming, March 2004. Private Equity Returns and Disclosure around the World. Center of Financial Studies,5,1-39
[46]Vesa Kanniainen, Christian Keuschnigg,2003. The Optimal Portfolio of Start-up Firms in Venture Capital Finance. Journal of Corporate Finance,9,521-534
[47]VeSa Kanniainen, Christian Keuschnigg,2004. Start-up Investment with Scarce Venture Capital Support. Journal of Banking & Finance,28,1939-1959
[48]Victory Fleischer,2004. The Rational Exuberance Of Structuring Venture Capital Startups. Tax Law Review, V01.57
[49]Y.Barzel,1985:"Transaction Costs:Are they Just Costs?" Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,141:4-16.
[50]Zingales, Luigi."In search of new foundations", The Journal of Finance,2000,55: 1623-1653
[51]陈玮,PE的模式之争[N]。长三角,2009年9月15日。
[52]陈德棉,鲍长生..风险投资的风险防范机制的中外比较研究[J].经济论坛,2005(12)：12-14
[53]陈坤.有限合伙与我国私募基金组织形式的选择[J],商场现代化,2009(3)
[54]陈青松.PE热盼IPO重启：并购退出收益低回报率不能和IPO比[N],中国企业报,2013
[55]陈业宏,文杰.对我国采取有限合伙创业投资的质疑[J]。武汉大学学报：哲学社会科学版,2004(3)
[56]陈友忠.中国创业投资退出机制曙光初现[J],中国企业家,2004
[57]陈植.专户投资产品份额转让倒计时：PE谋划LP退出新通道,[N]21世纪经济报道,2013
[58]戴丰.风险投资公司对投资企业的监督管理[J],青岛职业技术学院学报,2006,19-50-51
[59]戴天柱.我国风险投资运作的支持系统与激励机制探索[J],财经论丛,2005(5)
[60]单军,王旭,卫国红.我国风险投资公司组织形式研究.长春工业大学学报(社会科学版),2003(04)：123-129
[61]德群.巴菲特投资思想方法实录,中国华侨出版社,2011年2月第1版
[62]董海华.风险投资组织模式研究.哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版),2004,(02)：114-116
[63]冯坡.市场寒冬影响券商直投退出回报新政加速直投市场化转型[J],ChinaVenture,2013
[64]付碧莲.一季度PE市场募资额大降六成并购成为退出主渠道[N],国际金融报,2013
[65]高建光.我国风险投资机构组织形式的选择.中国科技产业,2000(06)：
[66]郭建鸾.基于公司治理的创业投资基金组织形式分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2004,(1)：72-76.
[67]郭明杉,杨波,孙长雄.风险投资有限合伙制激励约束机制研究[J],商业研究,2008(2)
[68]户才和.活跃在中国风险资本市场上的六类风险投资机构.中国科技信息,2000(21)：54-59
[69]黄鑫.中国风险投资退出渠道分析[D].山东财政学院图书馆,2010
[70]黄艳艳.风险投资公司项目投资风险管理[J],集团经济研究,2007, 252：144-145
[71]李国兰.我国风险投资机构的组织形式.企业经济,2003(04)：88-93
[72]李云飞,周宗放.基于历史业绩的风险投资报酬激励机制[J],软科学,2012(1)
[73]厉以宁.发展创业投资还需私募资金.网际商务,2001(10)：10
[74]刘楠.风险投资退出渠道的分析[J].经济研究,2007,5：24-25
[75]刘澎.关于尽快建立中国自己的风险投资业的建议与思路.战略与管理,1998(02)：5-8
[76]刘伟华,彭龙,卢俊峰.私募/风险资本退出与场外股权交易市场建设探析[J],经济师,2011,2：80-81
[77]刘晓纯,张潇.风险投资机构中普通合伙人激励机制创新研究[J],中央财经大学学报,2012(6)
[78]刘欣.创业投资退出机制浅议[J].财会通讯,2008,6：18-19
[79]罗欣.风险投资退出渠道[J].理论研究,2009,10：43-46
[80]潘庆华,杜励婧.中国风险投资业的现状及运行模式选择.软科学,2004,(03)：18-21
[81]潘沩.PE投资“曲线”套现退出：上市公司接盘隐忧初现[N],21世纪经济报道,2013
[82]庞跃华,曾令华.私募股权基金组织形式的比较及中国选择[J],财经理论与实践,2011(3)
[83]施阳,崔笋.论风险投资业在中国的发展.财经科学,2000,(S2)：87-92
[84]史际春、温烨、邓峰等著.企业和公司法,中国人民大学出版社,2001年第423页
[85]史秋实.英雄云集看创投起伏[J],企业导刊,2012,2：49-51
[86]宋海燕,杨丽.有限合伙制——风险资本的最佳组建模式.上海金融,2000(09)：73-80
[87]谈毅,叶岑.风险投资的契约结构与治理机制分析.科学,2002年增刊：132-136
[88]谈毅.创业投资家的代理风险表现与控制机制[J].科研管理,2000,(11)：32-40
[89]谈毅.我国风险投资基金管理模式探析.科研管理,2005,(7)：109-116
[90]覃静.后危机时期PE的谋“退”与求“进”[J],现代企业文化,2010,9：148-149
[91]陶晓峰..美国风险投资的经济分析及其对中国的借鉴意义[D].西南财经大学,2004
[92]田桂林.论风险投资的制度安排.经济与管理,2004(12)：23-27
[93]王蓓.中国PE退出机制的现状分析及引发的思考[J],现代商业,99-100
[94]王方宏.中外风险投资运作机制比较[J],海南金融,2002(1)
[95]王磊,邓戎,郭立宏.私募股权投资研究综述[J].西北大学学报,2009,(7)：103-107.
[96]王先锋.风险投资组织机构模式的探讨.科技创业,2004,(03)：31-33
[97]王益,许小松.风险资本市场治理结构研究.深圳证券交易所研究报告[R],1999年
[98]王永菲.风险投资中的收益分配与激励机制探究——基于信息不对称下委托代 理模型的分析[J],安徽商贸职业技术学院学报,2012(4)
[99]王子珍,张惠贤..国外风险投资机构运作机制对我国的启示.理论界,2005(07)：37-42
[100]卫平,谭湘婷.我国风险投资机构组织形式的创新.投资研究,2000(05)
[101]魏娟,梁静国.我国公司制风险投资公司运作模式分析.商业研究,2005,(09)：75-77
[102]翁恺宁,项杨.我国风险投资企业组织形态创新：有限合伙制下的民投官办模式.中国经济,2001,(04)：21-22
[103]吴凤琴.风险投资退出渠道的研究[J].内蒙古科技与经济,2011,7：31-33
[104]吴忠林.创业投资退出机制研究[J].中国建材,2007,8：67-68
[105]徐东.风险投资基金组织形式国际比较及我国的选择[J],亚太经济,2010(1)
[106]徐锐.大牌PE机构持股转换实现退出投资获利不走寻常路[N],上海证券报,2013
[107]徐晓东.外部权益保护、控制权利益与委托-代理理论[J],管理评论,2004,9：18-22
[108]许金峰.对我国风险投资公司运作模式和绩效的探讨.沿海企业与科技,2005(08)：6-12
[109]杨成万.创投机构非IPO退出渠道亟待拓展创投业发展5大猜想[N],金融投资报,2012
[110]杨隆丰.创业风险投资组织形式的选择与对策,陕西综合经济,2008(6)
[111]尹国俊.日本风险资本产权缺失的影响——新制度经济学分析[J],科研管理,2004(3)
[112]应瑞瑶,赵永清.创业投资组织形式形式选择问题分析——基于民间投资者的角度[J],江苏社会科学,2004(2)
[113]佚名。2010。中国风险投资中的隐性风险,http://www.661aw.cn/toppnew/gsfzs/ gfyxgs//zgfxtz/12334.shtml。
[114]张丹,姜太平.中国风险投资业实行有限合伙制的思考.市场论坛,2004(09)：51-56
[115]张俊芳.中国风险投资退出渠道的现状、问题及政策建议[J],科技创新与生产力,2010,8：17-21
[116]张勇.我国风险投资机构的形式选择与对策.投资研究,2003(07)：102-107
[117]赵军伟.我国风险投资融资机制的问题与对策[J],天中学刊,2008(6)
[118]赵燕,王洁.我国私募基金的基金(PEFOF)的运作模式和发展建议[J],金融与经济,2011,2：57-59
[119]仲旭.我国风险投资机构的组织形式..经济论坛,2004(08)：121-128