产品市场竞争与投资者法律保护研究
|
摘要
20世纪90年代末，La Porta，Lopez-de-Silanes，Shleifer和Vishny(简称LLSV)开创的法律与金融研究，使我们认识到投资者法律保护是公司治理和金融发展最重要的影响因素之一，加强投资者法律保护是改善公司治理和促进金融经济发展最为根本的途径之一。然而，由于转轨经济国家，在投资者法律保护状况和立法改革方面均存在不少困难，企图在短期内迅速提高新兴市场国家的投资者法律保护水平，显然是不太现实的。因此，打破LLSV(1998)以来形成的关注法律制度的研究范式，而转向同时关注法律外制度，提出转轨经济中法律改革的原则和替代性措施，成为新近开创的研究领域。目前，对非法律治理机制的研究已成为继“法与金融”文献之后，国际公司治理研究的新热点。这一研究领域的出现对于一些投资者法律保护相对较弱的新兴市场国家(如中国)利用非法律治理机制(如产品市场竞争、媒体、税务等)来积极改进本国现阶段的公司治理，保护投资者利益，提高本国的金融发展水平具有重要的政策意义。
结合中国的实际情况来看，如何在不断提高投资者法律保护水平的同时，设计和制定出行之有效的非法律治理机制是摆在中国学术界、实务界和证券监管部门面前的一个重大课题。目前，关于中国的非法律治理机制的研究尚处于起步阶段，相关研究还很少，仍然处于较为零散、缺乏系统分析的层面，亟待加强。因此，基于该问题的重要性及相关研究还较为匮乏的考虑，尽快开展有关中国非法律保护制度的理论和实证研究，无论是增强人们对非法律保护制度的了解和认识，还是填补该领域系统研究的空白，无疑都具有十分重要的意义。
本文在借鉴国外文献的基础上，以产品市场竞争作为非法律治理机制的切入点，结合我国的制度背景，详细分析和检验了我国投资者法律保护和产品市场竞争对上市公司的现金股利支付、现金持有价值和资本配置效率的影响，以及产品市场竞争对投资者法律保护不足的弥补效应。本文获得了三个方面的研究发现：首先，随着投资者法律保护水平的改善和产品市场竞争程度的提高，上市公司的现金股利支付力度随之增加，并且当法律保护水平较低时，激烈的产品市场竞争可以弥补法律保护的不足，迫使公司管理层“吐出”多余的自由现金流，支付更多的现金股利给股东，但是当投资者法律保护水平较高时，产品市场竞争并不能对公司的现金股利支付力度产生显著影响。进一步的研究表明，当投资者保护法律制度和法制环境较好时，产品市场竞争对现金股利支付力度没有显著影响，而当投资者保护法律制度和法制环境较差时，产品市场竞争对现金股利支付力度有显著影响。其次，随着产品市场竞争程度的提高，企业的单位新增现金持有的价值不断提高；相对于非国有企业和法制环境较差地区而言，随着产品市场竞争程度的提高，国有企业和法制环境较差地区的企业的单位新增现金持有价值的提高更显著。最后，随着我国投资者法律保护的改善和产品市场竞争程度的提高，企业的投资不足和过度投资程度均得到有效降低，企业的投资效率得到明显提高。进一步研究发现，相对于投资者法律保护水平较高时，激烈的产品市场竞争在投资者法律保护水平较低时，对企业资本配置效率的提高影响更显著，激烈的产品市场竞争能够弥补法律保护的不足，保护投资者的利益。
本文的研究说明，在我国投资者法律保护的完善将是一个长期的过程，而在短期内应该在坚持不断完善投资者法律保护的同时，充分利用产品市场竞争等非法律治理机制来改善和提高上市公司的治理水平，保护投资者利益。因此，本文的研究有着重要的理论意义和现实意义。
At the end of the 20th century, legal and financial research created by La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny(LLSV), makes us realize that the legal protectionof investors is the most important one of factors that impact corporate governance andfinancial development,and strengthen the legal protection of investors is one of the mostfundamental way that improve corporate governance and financial development.However,In transition economy countries there are many difficulties in the situation of legalprotection of investors and legislative reform. Attempt to rapidly improve in the level oflegal protection of emerging market countries in the short term in, is obviously not veryrealistic. So to broke the research paradigm that concerned about the formation of the legalsystem since LLSV (1998), and at the same time steer system of laws concerned about theproposed legal reform and alternative measures in transition economy, as the pioneeringwork of research fields. At present, non-legal governance mechanisms research hasbecome the new hot spot about the International Corporate Governance Research after the"law and finance" literature. The emergence of this field of study has important policyimplications for some emerging market countries (such as China) with relatively weaklegal protection of investors,this country can use non-legal governance mechanisms (suchas product market competition, the media, tax, etc.) to actively improve their corporategovernance at this stage, protect investor interests, improve their level of financialdevelopment.
Combined with China's actual situation, how to constantly improve the level of legalprotection for investors at the same time, design and develop effective non-legalgovernance mechanisms in China are a major issue faced by the academic and practicalindustry and the securities regulatory departments. At present, the non-legal protectionmechanisms research in China is still in its infancy, research is also small, is still in a morefragmented and the lack of systematic analysis of the level, should be strengthened.Therefore, consideration based on the importance of the issue and relatively scarcety aboutrelated research, as soon as possible on the theory and empirical research of non-legalprotection system of China's listed companies, whether it is to enhance of understanding and knowledge of the system of the non-legal protection, or to fill the the field ofsystematic research gaps, no doubt of great significance.
On the basis of literature abroad this paper combine the actual conditions of listedcompanies in China's,use product market competition as an entry pointstarting of thenon-legal governance mechanisms, of from the legal protection of investors and productmarket competition with the listed companies to pay cash dividends, cash holdings andcapital allocation efficiency, analysising and testing in detail of the China's legalprotection of investors and product market competition on the market the company'sfinancial behavior, the paper analysises and testes in detail how to China's legal protectionof investors and product market competition impact to pay cash dividends, the value ofcash holdings and the impact of capital allocation efficiency, and how to product marketcompetition to make up for lack of legal protection for investors. The conclusions of thisresearch are as follows: Firstly, with the level of legal protection of investors and thedegree of product market competition to improve, cash dividends of listed companiesincreased. And when there is a lower level of legal protection, the intense competition inproduct markets can make up for lack of legal protection, force the company's manager tospit out excess free cash flow, to pay more cash dividends to shareholders. But when thereis higher level of legal protection, product market competition should not have asignificant impact on the company's cash dividend payments. Further research shows thatwhen investor protection legal system and legal environment are better, the product marketcompetition have no significant impact on cash dividend payments, and when investorprotection legal system and legal environment are poor, product market competition havea significant impact on cash dividends payments. Secondly, with the improvement in thelevel of product market competition, the value of a unit of cash holdings of corporatecontinuously improve. Vis-(?)-vis non-state-owned enterprises and poor legal environmentareas, with the improvement of the degree of product market competition, the value of aunit of cash holdings of the state-owned enterprises and corporate that lie in thedisadvantaged legal environment enhance more visible. Finally, as legal protection ofinvestors and product market competition in China to improve,the level ofunder-investment and over-investment have been reduced effectively, enterprisessignificantly improve investment efficiency. Further study found that, compared to higher levels of legal protection of investors, when there is a lower level of legal protection ofinvestors, the intense competition in product markets can more visible to improve theefficiency of the capital allocation, and the intense competition in product markets canmake up inadequate protection of the law.
This study shows that in our country to improve the legal protection of investors willbe a long process, and in the near future we should adhere to constantly improve the legalprotection of investors, at the same time make full use of product market competition andother non-legal governance mechanisms to improve and enhance level of govemance oflisted companies to protect the interests of investors. Therefore, this research hasimportant theoretical and practical significance.
结合中国的实际情况来看，如何在不断提高投资者法律保护水平的同时，设计和制定出行之有效的非法律治理机制是摆在中国学术界、实务界和证券监管部门面前的一个重大课题。目前，关于中国的非法律治理机制的研究尚处于起步阶段，相关研究还很少，仍然处于较为零散、缺乏系统分析的层面，亟待加强。因此，基于该问题的重要性及相关研究还较为匮乏的考虑，尽快开展有关中国非法律保护制度的理论和实证研究，无论是增强人们对非法律保护制度的了解和认识，还是填补该领域系统研究的空白，无疑都具有十分重要的意义。
本文在借鉴国外文献的基础上，以产品市场竞争作为非法律治理机制的切入点，结合我国的制度背景，详细分析和检验了我国投资者法律保护和产品市场竞争对上市公司的现金股利支付、现金持有价值和资本配置效率的影响，以及产品市场竞争对投资者法律保护不足的弥补效应。本文获得了三个方面的研究发现：首先，随着投资者法律保护水平的改善和产品市场竞争程度的提高，上市公司的现金股利支付力度随之增加，并且当法律保护水平较低时，激烈的产品市场竞争可以弥补法律保护的不足，迫使公司管理层“吐出”多余的自由现金流，支付更多的现金股利给股东，但是当投资者法律保护水平较高时，产品市场竞争并不能对公司的现金股利支付力度产生显著影响。进一步的研究表明，当投资者保护法律制度和法制环境较好时，产品市场竞争对现金股利支付力度没有显著影响，而当投资者保护法律制度和法制环境较差时，产品市场竞争对现金股利支付力度有显著影响。其次，随着产品市场竞争程度的提高，企业的单位新增现金持有的价值不断提高；相对于非国有企业和法制环境较差地区而言，随着产品市场竞争程度的提高，国有企业和法制环境较差地区的企业的单位新增现金持有价值的提高更显著。最后，随着我国投资者法律保护的改善和产品市场竞争程度的提高，企业的投资不足和过度投资程度均得到有效降低，企业的投资效率得到明显提高。进一步研究发现，相对于投资者法律保护水平较高时，激烈的产品市场竞争在投资者法律保护水平较低时，对企业资本配置效率的提高影响更显著，激烈的产品市场竞争能够弥补法律保护的不足，保护投资者的利益。
本文的研究说明，在我国投资者法律保护的完善将是一个长期的过程，而在短期内应该在坚持不断完善投资者法律保护的同时，充分利用产品市场竞争等非法律治理机制来改善和提高上市公司的治理水平，保护投资者利益。因此，本文的研究有着重要的理论意义和现实意义。
At the end of the 20th century, legal and financial research created by La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny(LLSV), makes us realize that the legal protectionof investors is the most important one of factors that impact corporate governance andfinancial development,and strengthen the legal protection of investors is one of the mostfundamental way that improve corporate governance and financial development.However,In transition economy countries there are many difficulties in the situation of legalprotection of investors and legislative reform. Attempt to rapidly improve in the level oflegal protection of emerging market countries in the short term in, is obviously not veryrealistic. So to broke the research paradigm that concerned about the formation of the legalsystem since LLSV (1998), and at the same time steer system of laws concerned about theproposed legal reform and alternative measures in transition economy, as the pioneeringwork of research fields. At present, non-legal governance mechanisms research hasbecome the new hot spot about the International Corporate Governance Research after the"law and finance" literature. The emergence of this field of study has important policyimplications for some emerging market countries (such as China) with relatively weaklegal protection of investors,this country can use non-legal governance mechanisms (suchas product market competition, the media, tax, etc.) to actively improve their corporategovernance at this stage, protect investor interests, improve their level of financialdevelopment.
Combined with China's actual situation, how to constantly improve the level of legalprotection for investors at the same time, design and develop effective non-legalgovernance mechanisms in China are a major issue faced by the academic and practicalindustry and the securities regulatory departments. At present, the non-legal protectionmechanisms research in China is still in its infancy, research is also small, is still in a morefragmented and the lack of systematic analysis of the level, should be strengthened.Therefore, consideration based on the importance of the issue and relatively scarcety aboutrelated research, as soon as possible on the theory and empirical research of non-legalprotection system of China's listed companies, whether it is to enhance of understanding and knowledge of the system of the non-legal protection, or to fill the the field ofsystematic research gaps, no doubt of great significance.
On the basis of literature abroad this paper combine the actual conditions of listedcompanies in China's,use product market competition as an entry pointstarting of thenon-legal governance mechanisms, of from the legal protection of investors and productmarket competition with the listed companies to pay cash dividends, cash holdings andcapital allocation efficiency, analysising and testing in detail of the China's legalprotection of investors and product market competition on the market the company'sfinancial behavior, the paper analysises and testes in detail how to China's legal protectionof investors and product market competition impact to pay cash dividends, the value ofcash holdings and the impact of capital allocation efficiency, and how to product marketcompetition to make up for lack of legal protection for investors. The conclusions of thisresearch are as follows: Firstly, with the level of legal protection of investors and thedegree of product market competition to improve, cash dividends of listed companiesincreased. And when there is a lower level of legal protection, the intense competition inproduct markets can make up for lack of legal protection, force the company's manager tospit out excess free cash flow, to pay more cash dividends to shareholders. But when thereis higher level of legal protection, product market competition should not have asignificant impact on the company's cash dividend payments. Further research shows thatwhen investor protection legal system and legal environment are better, the product marketcompetition have no significant impact on cash dividend payments, and when investorprotection legal system and legal environment are poor, product market competition havea significant impact on cash dividends payments. Secondly, with the improvement in thelevel of product market competition, the value of a unit of cash holdings of corporatecontinuously improve. Vis-(?)-vis non-state-owned enterprises and poor legal environmentareas, with the improvement of the degree of product market competition, the value of aunit of cash holdings of the state-owned enterprises and corporate that lie in thedisadvantaged legal environment enhance more visible. Finally, as legal protection ofinvestors and product market competition in China to improve,the level ofunder-investment and over-investment have been reduced effectively, enterprisessignificantly improve investment efficiency. Further study found that, compared to higher levels of legal protection of investors, when there is a lower level of legal protection ofinvestors, the intense competition in product markets can more visible to improve theefficiency of the capital allocation, and the intense competition in product markets canmake up inadequate protection of the law.
This study shows that in our country to improve the legal protection of investors willbe a long process, and in the near future we should adhere to constantly improve the legalprotection of investors, at the same time make full use of product market competition andother non-legal governance mechanisms to improve and enhance level of govemance oflisted companies to protect the interests of investors. Therefore, this research hasimportant theoretical and practical significance.
引文
[1] 安同良，施浩，Alcorta．2006．中国制造业企业R&D行为模式的观测与实证--基于江苏省制造业企业问卷调查的实证分析．经济研究，2：21-30．
[2] 陈建梁，王大鹏．2006．产品市场竞争对企业资本结构的影响．管理科学，5：50-57．
[3] 陈炜，孔翔，许年行．2005．我国的法律制度能有效保护中小投资者的利益吗?，深圳证券交易所报告．
[4] 陈炜，孔翔，许年行．2008．我国中小投资者法律保护与控制权私利关系实证检验，中国工业经济，1：24-31．
[5] 陈晓，江东．2000．股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性．经济研究，8：28-35．
[6] 樊刚，王小鲁，朱恒鹏．2002．我国市场化指数--各地区市场化相对进程报告．北京：经济科学出版社．
[7] 樊刚，王小鲁，朱恒鹏．2003．我国市场化指数--各地区市场化相对进程报告．北京：经济科学出版社．
[8] 樊刚，王小鲁，朱恒鹏．2004．我国市场化指数--各地区市场化相对进程报告．北京：经济科学出版社．
[9] 樊纲，王小鲁，朱恒鹏．2007．中国市场化指数--各地区市场化相对进程2006年报告．北京：经济科学出版社．
[10] 高雷，宋顺林．2007．治理环境、治理结构与代理成本--来自国有上市公司面板数据的经验证据．经济评论，3：35-40．
[11] 胡建平，干胜道．2008．产品市场竞争、自由现金流量和代理成本．统计与决策，7：184-185．
[12] 胡一帆，宋敏，张俊喜．2005．竞争、产权、公司治理三大理论的相对重要性及交互关系．经济研究，9：44-56．
[13] 姜付秀，刘志彪．2005．经济波动中的资本结构与产品市场竞争．金融研究，12：73-85．
[14] 姜付秀，刘志彪．2005．行业特征、资本结构与产品市场竞争．管理世界，10：74-81．
[15] 姜付秀，屈耀辉，陆正飞，李焰．2008．产品市场竞争与资本结构动态调整．经济研究，4：99-110．
[16] 蒋荣，陈丽蓉．2007．产品市场竞争治理效应的实证研究：基于CEO变更视角．经济科学，2：102-111．
[17] 科菲．2001．证券市场失败的教训：私有化、少数股东权利保护和投资者信心．经济社会体制比较，2：13-25．
[18] 李青原，陈晓，王永海．2007．产品市场竞争、资产专用性与资本结构--来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据．金融研究，4：100-113．
[19] 李寿喜．2007．产权、代理成本和代理效率．经济研究，1：102-113．
[20] 李晓西．2008．中国经济改革30年：市场化进程卷．重庆：重庆大学出版社．
[21] 廖理，方芳．2005．股利政策代理理论的实证检验．南开管理评论，5：55-62．
[22] 廖理，方芳．2004．管理层持股、股利政策与上市公司代理成本．统计研究，12：27-30．
[23] 林朝南，刘星，郝颖．2006．行业特征与控制权私利：来自中国上市公司的经验证据．经济科学，3：61-72．
[24] 林毅夫，蔡眆，李周．1995．企业改革的核心是什么．经济日报，6月6日．
[25] 林毅夫，蔡眆，李周．1997．充分信息和国有企业改革．上海：上海人民出版社．
[26] 刘芍佳，李骥．1998．超产权论与企业绩效．经济研究，8：3-12．
[27] 刘志彪，姜付秀，卢二坡．2003．资本结构与产品市场竞争强度．经济研究，7：60-68．
[28] 栾天虹．2004．投资者法律保护：理论与实证研究．浙江大学博士学位论文．
[29] 吕长江，周县华．2005．公司治理结构与股利分配动机--基于代理成本和利益侵占的分析．南开管理评论，3：9-17．
[30] 牛建波，李维安．2007．产品市场竞争和公司治理的交互关系研究--基于中 国制造业上市公司1998-2003年数据的实证分析．南大商学评论，1：83-103．
[31] 平新乔，周艺艺．2007．产品市场竞争度对企业研发的影响--基于中国制造业的实证分析．产业经济研究，5：1-10．
[32] 平新乔．2003．中国国有企业代理成本的实证研究．经济研究，11：42-54．
[33] 屈耀辉，姜付秀，陈朝晖．2007．资本结构决策具有战略效应吗?管理世界，2：69-75．
[34] 沈艺峰，许年行，杨熠．2004．我国中小投资者法律保护历史实践的实证检验．经济研究，9：90-100．
[35] 沈艺峰，肖珉，黄娟娟．2005．中小投资者法律保护与公司权益资本成本．经济研究，6：115-224．
[36] 沈艺峰，陈舒予，黄娟娟．2007．投资者法律保护、所有权结构与困境公司高层管理人员变更．中国工业经济，1：96-103．
[37] 施东晖．2003．转轨经济中的所有权与竞争：来自中国上市公司的经验证据．经济研究，8：46-55．
[38] 谭云清，朱荣林，韩忠雪．2008．产品市场竞争、经理报酬与公司绩效：来自中国上市公司的证据．管理评论，2：58-63．
[39] 谭云清，朱荣林．2007．产品市场竞争、监督与公司治理的有效性．上海交通大学学报，7：1165-1169．
[40] 谭云清，朱荣林．2007．产品市场竞争、代理成本及代理效率：一个经验分析．上海管理科学，4：76-78．
[41] 王怀明，吴春燕．2007．产品市场竞争对董事独立性作用的影响．产业经济研究，3：30-37．
[42] 王克敏，陈井勇．2004．股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效．管理世界，7：127-134．
[43] 王雄元，刘焱．2008．产品市场竞争与信息披露质量的实证研究．经济科学，1：92-103．
[44] 吴延兵．2006a．R&D、创新与生产率--中国工业产业的经验证据．中国社 会科学院研究生院博士学位论文．
[45] 吴延兵．2006b．中国工业创新水平及影响因素．产业经济评论，2：45-61．
[46] 吴永明，袁春生．2007．法律治理、投资者保护与财务舞弊：一项基于上市公司的经验证据．中国工业经济，3：104-111．
[47] 夏立军，方轶强．2005．政府控制、治理环境与公司价值--来自中国证券市场的经验证据．经济研究，5：40-51．
[48] 肖珉．2007．投资者法律保护与权益资本成本．厦门大学博士学位论文．
[49] 肖珉．2008．法的建立、法的实施与权益资本成本．中国工业经济，3：40-48．
[50] 辛清泉，林斌，王彦超．2007．政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资．经济研究，8：110-122
[51] 辛宇，许莉萍．2006．公司治理机制与超额现金持有水平．管理世界，5：136-141．
[52] 许年行，吴世农．2006．我国中小投资者法律保护影响股权集中度的变化吗?．经济学(季刊)，2：893-922．
[53] 杨华荣，陈军，陈金贤．2008．产品市场竞争度对上市公司自愿性信息披露影响研究．预测，1：41-45．
[54] 杨瑞龙，郑志．2001．竞争、内部人控制与经济绩效--许继集团治理结构及其绩效的经济学解释．中国工业经济，10：65-71．
[55] 杨兴全，孙杰．2007．行业特征、产品市场竞争程度与上市公司现金持有量关系研究．审计与经济研究，6：99-103．
[56] 杨熠，沈艺峰．2004．现金股利：传递盈利信号还是起监督治理作用．中国会计评论，1：61-76．
[57] 张海燕，陈晓．2008．从现金股利看第一大股东对高级管理层的监督．南开管理评论，2：15-21．
[58] 赵蒲，孙爱英．2004．财务保守行为：基于中国上市公司的实证研究．管理世界，11：109-119．
[59] 钟田丽，范宇．2004．上市公司产品市场竞争程度与财务杠杆的选择．会计研究，6：73-77．
[60] 朱武祥，宋勇．2001．股权结构与企业价值--对家电行业上市公司实证分析．经济研究，12：66-73．
[61] 朱武祥，陈寒梅，吴迅．2002．产品市场竞争与财务保守行为--以燕京啤酒为例的分析．经济研究，8：28-37．
[62] Acs, Z.J., Audretsch, D.B., 1988. Innovation in Large and Small Firms:An Empirical Analysis. American Economic Review 78: 678-690.
[63] Aggarwal, RK., Samwick, AA., 1999. Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Finance 54: 1999-2043.
[64] Aggarwal, R., Samwick., 2006. A Empire-Builders and Shirkers:Investment Firm Performance and Managerial Incentives. Journal of Corporate Finance 12: 489-515.
[65] Aghion P., Dewatripont M., Rey P., 1999. Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth. Review of Economic Studies 66: 825-852.
[66] Aghion P., Bloom N., Blundell R.,Griffith R., Howitt P., 2001. Empirical Estimates of The Relationship Between Product Market Competition and Innovation. Working Paper, University College London.
[67] Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont., P. Rey., 1999. Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth. Review of Economic Studies 66: 825-852.
[68] Aghion, Philippr., Tirole, Jean., 1997. Formal and Real Authority in Organizations. Journal of Political Economy 1051: 1-29
[69] Allen, F, 2005. Corporate Goverance in Emerging Economies. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 21: 164-177.
[70] Allen, F., Qian J., QianM J., 2005. Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China. Journal of Financial Economics 77: 57-116.
[71] Allen, F., Qian J., 2008. Comparing Legal and Alternative Institutions in Commerce.Working Paper, Business School of Wharton.
[72] Allen, F., D. Gale., 2000. Corporate Governance and Competition. Published in Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives edited by X. Vives, Cambridge University Press, 23-94.
[73] Allen, Franklin., Jun Qian., Meijun Qian., 2005. Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 57-116.
[74] Baggs J., De BJ., 2007. Product Market Competition and Agency Costs. Journal of Industrial Economics 55: 289-323.
[75] Bebchuk, L., Roe, M, 1999. A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership. Stanford Law Review 52: 127-170.
[76] Beck T., Demirguc-KuntA., Levine R., 2003. Law, Endowments and Finance. Journal of Financial Economics 70:137-181.
[77] Beck, T., Levine, R., 2002. Industry Growth and Capital Allocation:Does Having A Market- or Bank-Based System Matter? Journal of Financial Economics 64: 147-180.
[78] Berger, A., T. Hannan., 1998. The Efficiency Cost of Market Power In The Banking Industry: A Test of the "Quiet Life" and Related Hypotheses. The Review of Economics and Statistics 80: 454-465.
[79] Berglof, Evon., Thedden, L., 1999. The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigim: Implications for Transition and Developing Countrise. Unpubished Working Paper. Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics: Stockholm, Sweden.
[80] Bertoletti, Paolo., Clara Poletti., 1996. A Note on Endogenous Firm Efficiency in Cournot Models of Incomplete Information. Journal of Economic Theory 71: 303-310.
[81] Bhattacharya U., Daouk H., 2002. The World Price of Insider Trading. Journal of Finance 57: 75-108.
[82] Black, Bernard., Reinier, Kraakman., 1996. A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law. Harvard Law Review 109: 1911-1982.
[83] Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Van Reenen, J., 1995. Dynamic Count Data Models of Technological Innovation. Economic Journal 105: 333-344.
[84] Bottasso, A., Sembenelli, A., 2001. Market Power, Productivity and the Eu Single Market Programe:Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms. European Economic Review AS: 167-186.
[85] Boubakri, N., Cosset, JC, Guedhamio., 2005. Postp Rivatization Corporate Governance: the Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection. Journal Financial Economics 76: 369-399.
[86] Broadberry, S., Crafts, N., 2000. Competition and Innovation in 1950'S Britain. Working Paper No.57. London School of Economics.
[87] Brockman, P., Chung, D., 2003. Investor Protection and Firm Liquidity. Journal of Finance 58: 921-937.
[88] Bushman, R., J, Piotroski., A, Smith., 2006. Capital Allocation and Timely Accounting Recognition of Economic Losses:International Evidence. Chicago University Working paper.
[89] Cheffins, B., 2000. Does LawMatters? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom. SSRN Working Paper.
[90] Chirinko, R., Ees H., Garretsen H., 2004. Investor Protection and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Netherlands. German Economic Review 5: 119-138.
[91] Coffee, J., 2001. Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Examination of the Private Benefits of Control. Columbia Law School Working Paper.
[92] Coffee, J., 2001. The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership and Control. Columbia Law School Working Paper.
[93] De Bettignies., JOE., Baggs, J., 2005. Product Market Competition and Agency Costs. Working Paper, University of British Columbia.
[94] Defond M., HungM Y., 2003. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Worldwide CEO Turnover. SSRN Working Paper.
[95] DeFond, M., C, Park., 1999. The effect of competition on CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics 27: 35-56.
[96] Demirguc--Kunt, A., Maksimovic,V., 1998. Law, Finance and Firm Growth. Journal of Finance 53: 2107-2137.
[97] Denis, D., McConnell J., 2003. International Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 1 -36.
[98] Dittmar, A., J, Mahrt-Smith., 2007. Corporate Governance and the Value of Cash Holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 83: 599-634.
[99] Dittmar, A, Mahrt-Smith J , Servaes H, 2003. International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 111-133.
[100] Doidge, C., KarolyiA., Stulz R., 2004. Why Are Foreign Firms Listed In The U. S. Worth More. Journal of Financial Economics 71: 205-238.
[101] Doidge, C., 2004. Cross-Listings and The Private Benefits of Control: Evidence From Dual-Class Firms. Journal of Financial Economics 72: 519-553.
[102] Durnev, A., Kim E., 2005. To Steal Or Not To Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment and Valuation. Journal of Finance 60: 1461-1493.
[103] Dyck, A., Zingales L., 2004. Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison. Journal of Finance 59: 537-600.
[104] Edwards,FR., 1977. Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries:Expense- Preference Behavior In Banking. Journal of Political Economy 85: 147-169.
[105] Engel, E., Hayes, R., Wang, X., 2003. CEO Turnover and Properties of Accounting Information. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36: 1-28.
[106] Faleye, O., 2004. Cash and Corporate Control. Journal of Finance 59: 2041-2060.
[107] Faulkender, M., R, Wang., 2006. Corporate Financial Policy and the Value of Cash. Journal of Finance 61: 1957-1990.
[108] Fee, C., C, Hadlock., 2000. Management Turnover and Product Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Newspaper Industry. Journal of Business 73: 205-243.
[109] Fershtman, C., JuddK, L., 1987. Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly. American Economic Review 77: 927-940.
[110] Foley, F., Hartzell, J., Titman, S., Twite, G., 2006. Why do Firms Hold So Much Cash? A Tax-Based Explanation. Unpublished working paper, University of Texas.
[111] Franks, J., Mayer, C., Rossi S., 2003. Ownership: Evolution and Regulation. European Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper.
[112] Gayle, P., 2001. Market Concentration and Innovation:New Empirical Evidence on the Schumpeterian Hypothesis. Discussion Papers in Economics, Working Paper No.01-14,Center for Economic Analysis, University of Colorado.
[113] Geroski, P., 1999. Innovation, Technological Opportunity and Market Structure. Oxford Economic Papers 42: 586-602.
[114] Giroud, X., H, Mueller., 2007. Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries. Working Paper, New York University.
[115] Graham, D., D, Kaplan., D, Sibley., 1983. Efficiency and Competition in The Airline Industry. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 118-138.
[116] Glaeser, Edward., Johnson, Simon., Shleifer, andrei., 2001. Coase versus the Coasians. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 853-899.
[117] Griffith, R., 2001. Product Market Competition, Efficiency and Agency Cost: An Empirical Analysis, Working Paper, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
[118] Grosfeld, I., Tressel, T., 2002. Competition and Ownership Structure: Substitutes or Complements. Economics 1133: 653-691.
[119] Grossman, S J., Hart, O D., 1982. Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives, in McCall,J J (Ed) The economics of information and uncertainty. Chicago, IL:University of Chicago Press,.
[120] Grullon, G, R, Michaely., 2006. Corporate Payout Policy and Product Market Competition. Working Paper.
[121] Guadalupe, M., F. P(?)rez-Gonz(?)lez., 2005. The Impact of Product Market Competition on Private Benefits of Control. Working Paper, Columbia University.
[122] Hart, Oliver., 1983. The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 366-382.
[123] Haskel, J., 1991. Imperfect Competition, Work Practices and Productivity Growth. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 53, 265-279.
[124] Hermalin, Benjamin., 1992. The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior. RAND Journal of Economics 23: 350-365.
[125] Himmelberg C., Hubbard G., Love I., 2002. Investor Protection, Ownership and the Cost of Capital. SSRN Working Paper.
[126] Holmen, M., Hogfeldt P., 2004. A Law and Finance Analysis of Initial Public offerings. Journal of Financial Intermediation 13: 324-358.
[127] Holmstrom, B., 1982. Moral Hazard in Teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13: 2324-2340.
[128] Holmstrom, B., Milgrom P., 1994. The Firm as an Incentive System. American Economic Review 84: 972- 991.
[129] Jagannathan, R., Srinivasan, SB., 1999. Does Product Market Competition Reduce Agency Costs? North American Journal of Economics&Finance 10: 387-412.
[130] Januszewski, S., Winter J K., 2002. Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis For Germany. Research in Economics 56: 299-334.
[131] Jayaratne, J., Strahan, P., 1996. The Finance-Growth Nexus:Evidence from Bank Branch Deregulation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 639-670.
[132] Jefferson, G.H., Bai, Huamao., Guan Xiao, jing., Yu Xiao, yun., 2004. R&D Performance in Chinese Industry. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 13:156-203
[133] Jensen, Michael., Kevin, Murphy., 1990. Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98: 225-264.
[134] Jensen, M., 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of Finance 48: 831-880.
[135] Jensen, M., 1986. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers. American Economic Review 76: 323-329.
[136] Johnson, S., Boone P., Breach A., 2000. Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 58: 141-186.
[137] Kaplan, David., S, Sibley., 1983. Efficiency and Competition in the Airline Industry. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 118-138.
[138] Karpoff, J., Lott, J., 1993. The Reputational Penalties Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud. Journal of Law and Economics 36: 757-802.
[139] Karuna, C., 2005. The Effect of Industry Product Market Competition on Managerial Incentives and Pay. Working paper, University of California, Irvine.
[140] Karuna, C, 2007. Industry Product Market Competition and Managerial Incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43: 275-297.
[141] King, R., Levine, R., 1993. Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 717-738.
[142] Klapper, L., Love, I., 2004. Corporate Governance, Investor Protection and Performance in Emerging Markets. Journal of Corporate Finance 10: 703-728.
[143] Kruse, T., C, Rennie., 2006. Product Market Competition, Excess Free Cash Flows and CEO Discipline: Evidence from the U.S. Retail Industry. Working Paper, University of Arkansas.
[144] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000. Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World. Journal of Finance 55: 1-33.
[145] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1999. Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance 54: 471-517.
[146] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy 106: 1113 -115 5.
[147] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1997. Legal Determinants of External Finance. Journal of Finance 52: 1131-1150.
[148] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics 58: 141-186.
[149] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2002. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation. Journal of Finance 57: 1147-1170.
[150] Lemmon, M., Lins, K., 2003. Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis. Journal of Finance 58: 1445-1468.
[151] Leuz, C, Nanda, D., Wysocki P., 2003. Earning Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparision. Journal of Financial Economics 69: 505-527.
[152] Levine, R., 1999. Law, Finance and Economic Growth. Journal of Financial Intermediation 8: 36-67.
[153] Levine, R., Zervos, S., 1998. Stock Market, Banks and Economic Growth. American Economic Review 88: 537-558.
[154] Levine, R., 2002. Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which is Better? Journal of Financial Intermediation 11: 1-30.
[155] LichtAN., Goldschmidt C, Schwartz S., 2001. Culture, Law and Finance: Culture Dimensions of Corporate Governance Laws. Interdiscip linary Center Herzliya, Israel, Working Paper.
[156] Lin Yifu., Fang Cai., Zhou Li., 1998. Competition, Policy Burdens and State-Owned Enterprise Reform. American Economic Review 88: 422-428.
[157] Lins, K., 2003. Equity Ownership and Firm Value In Emergingmarkets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 159-184.
[158] Lu, F., Y, Yao, 2004. The Effectiveness of the Law, Financial Development and Economic Growth in a Economy of Financial Repression: Evidence from China. Working Paper, Peking University.
[159] Lyandres, Evgeny., 2006. Capital Structure and Interaction among Firms in Output Markets-Theory and Evidence. Journal of business 79: 2381-2421.
[160] Mansfield, E., 1964. Industrial Research and Development Expenditures: Determinants, Prospects and Relation to Size of Firm and Inventive Output. Journal of Political Economy 72: 319-340.
[161] Meyer,D.L. 1995.Carbonate Mud-mounds in the Fort Payne Formation, Cumberland Saddle Region,Kentucky and Tennessee,USA. 23: 273-287.
[162] Mikkelson, W., Partch, M., 2003. Do Persistent Large Cash Reserves Hinder Performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 275-294.
[163] Milton, T., 2002. A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the Eastasian Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 64: 215-241.
[164] Nalebuff, B., J. Stiglitz., 1983. Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 21-43.
[165] Nalebuff, Barry., Joseph Stiglitz., 1983. Information, Competition and Markets. American Economic Review 73: 278-283.
[166] Nenova, T., 2003. The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 68: 325-351.
[167] Nickell, S., 1996. Competition and Corporate Performance. Journal of Political conomy 104: 724-746.
[168] Nickell, SJ., Nicolitisas, D., Dryden, N., 1997. What Makes Firms Perform Well. European Economic Review 41: 783-790.
[169] Parrino, R., 1997. CEO Turnover and Outside Succession a Cross-Sectional Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 46: 165-197.
[170] Pinkowitz, L., Stulz R., Williamson R., 2003. Do Firms in Countries with Poor Protection of Investor Rights Hold More Cash.SSRN Working Paper.
[171] Pinkowitz, L., R, Stulz., R, Williamson., 2006. Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross-country Analysis. Journal of Finance 61: 2725-2751.
[172] Pistor, K., 2000. Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Righs in Transition Econnomies. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Working Paper No.49.
[173] Pistor, K., Raiser M., Gelfer S., 2000. Law and Finance in Transition Economics. Economics of Transition 8: 325-368.
[174] Pistor K., 2004. Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economics. European Business Organization Law Review 1: 59-110.
[175] Pistor, Katharina., Chenggang, Xu., 2004. Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies Lessons from China. SSRN Working paper #628065.
[176] Pistor, Katharina., Chenggang, Xu., 2002. Incomplete Law: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework and its Application to the Evolution of Financial Market Regulation. SSRN Working paper #310588.
[177] Raith, M., 2003. Competition, Risk and Managerial Incentives. American Economic Review 93: 1425-1436.
[178] Rajan, Raghuram., Luigi, Zingales., 1998. Financial Dependence and Growth. American Economic Review 88: 559-586.
[179] Rajan, Raghuram., Luigi, Zingales., 2003. The Great Reversals:The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century. Journal of Financial Economics 69: 5-50.
[180] Riahi-Belkaoui A., 2004. Investor Protection, Earnings Opacity and Corporate Valuation. University of Illinois at Chicago Working Paper.
[181] Richardson, S., 2006. Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow. Review of Accounting Studies 11: 159-189.
[182] Ritter, JR., 2005. Recent Developments in Corporate Finance. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
[183] Roe, M., 1990. Political and Legal Restraints On Ownership and Control of Public Companies. Journal of Financial Economics 27: 7-41.
[184] Roe, M., 2000. Political Foundations for Separating Ownership From Corporate Contro. Stanford Law Review 53: 539-606.
[185] Scharfstein, D., 1988. Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack. RAND Journal of Economics 19: 147-155.
[186] Schmidt, K., 1997. Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition. Review of Economic Studies 64: 191-213.
[187] Shleifer, A., 1985. A Theory of Yardstick Competition. RAND Journal of Economics 16: 319-327.
[188] Shleifer, A., R, Vishny., 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance 52: 737-783.
[189] Stein, J., 2003. Agency, Information and Corporate Investment. Handbook of the Economics of Finance. Constantinides , G , M. Harris and R. Stulz (Eds. ) , Amsterdam, North Holland.
[190] Stulz, R., Williamson, R., 2003. Culture, Openness and Finance. Journal of Financial Economics 70: 313-349.
[191] Vicker, J., 1996. Concept of Competition. Oxford Economic Paper, No.1.
[192] Volpin, P., 2002. Governance With Poor Investor Protection: Evidence Form Top Executive Turnover hi Italy. Journal of Financial Economics 64: 61-90.
[193] Yarrow, George., 1986. Privatization in Theory and Practice. Economic Policy 2: 324-364.
[2] 陈建梁，王大鹏．2006．产品市场竞争对企业资本结构的影响．管理科学，5：50-57．
[3] 陈炜，孔翔，许年行．2005．我国的法律制度能有效保护中小投资者的利益吗?，深圳证券交易所报告．
[4] 陈炜，孔翔，许年行．2008．我国中小投资者法律保护与控制权私利关系实证检验，中国工业经济，1：24-31．
[5] 陈晓，江东．2000．股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性．经济研究，8：28-35．
[6] 樊刚，王小鲁，朱恒鹏．2002．我国市场化指数--各地区市场化相对进程报告．北京：经济科学出版社．
[7] 樊刚，王小鲁，朱恒鹏．2003．我国市场化指数--各地区市场化相对进程报告．北京：经济科学出版社．
[8] 樊刚，王小鲁，朱恒鹏．2004．我国市场化指数--各地区市场化相对进程报告．北京：经济科学出版社．
[9] 樊纲，王小鲁，朱恒鹏．2007．中国市场化指数--各地区市场化相对进程2006年报告．北京：经济科学出版社．
[10] 高雷，宋顺林．2007．治理环境、治理结构与代理成本--来自国有上市公司面板数据的经验证据．经济评论，3：35-40．
[11] 胡建平，干胜道．2008．产品市场竞争、自由现金流量和代理成本．统计与决策，7：184-185．
[12] 胡一帆，宋敏，张俊喜．2005．竞争、产权、公司治理三大理论的相对重要性及交互关系．经济研究，9：44-56．
[13] 姜付秀，刘志彪．2005．经济波动中的资本结构与产品市场竞争．金融研究，12：73-85．
[14] 姜付秀，刘志彪．2005．行业特征、资本结构与产品市场竞争．管理世界，10：74-81．
[15] 姜付秀，屈耀辉，陆正飞，李焰．2008．产品市场竞争与资本结构动态调整．经济研究，4：99-110．
[16] 蒋荣，陈丽蓉．2007．产品市场竞争治理效应的实证研究：基于CEO变更视角．经济科学，2：102-111．
[17] 科菲．2001．证券市场失败的教训：私有化、少数股东权利保护和投资者信心．经济社会体制比较，2：13-25．
[18] 李青原，陈晓，王永海．2007．产品市场竞争、资产专用性与资本结构--来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据．金融研究，4：100-113．
[19] 李寿喜．2007．产权、代理成本和代理效率．经济研究，1：102-113．
[20] 李晓西．2008．中国经济改革30年：市场化进程卷．重庆：重庆大学出版社．
[21] 廖理，方芳．2005．股利政策代理理论的实证检验．南开管理评论，5：55-62．
[22] 廖理，方芳．2004．管理层持股、股利政策与上市公司代理成本．统计研究，12：27-30．
[23] 林朝南，刘星，郝颖．2006．行业特征与控制权私利：来自中国上市公司的经验证据．经济科学，3：61-72．
[24] 林毅夫，蔡眆，李周．1995．企业改革的核心是什么．经济日报，6月6日．
[25] 林毅夫，蔡眆，李周．1997．充分信息和国有企业改革．上海：上海人民出版社．
[26] 刘芍佳，李骥．1998．超产权论与企业绩效．经济研究，8：3-12．
[27] 刘志彪，姜付秀，卢二坡．2003．资本结构与产品市场竞争强度．经济研究，7：60-68．
[28] 栾天虹．2004．投资者法律保护：理论与实证研究．浙江大学博士学位论文．
[29] 吕长江，周县华．2005．公司治理结构与股利分配动机--基于代理成本和利益侵占的分析．南开管理评论，3：9-17．
[30] 牛建波，李维安．2007．产品市场竞争和公司治理的交互关系研究--基于中 国制造业上市公司1998-2003年数据的实证分析．南大商学评论，1：83-103．
[31] 平新乔，周艺艺．2007．产品市场竞争度对企业研发的影响--基于中国制造业的实证分析．产业经济研究，5：1-10．
[32] 平新乔．2003．中国国有企业代理成本的实证研究．经济研究，11：42-54．
[33] 屈耀辉，姜付秀，陈朝晖．2007．资本结构决策具有战略效应吗?管理世界，2：69-75．
[34] 沈艺峰，许年行，杨熠．2004．我国中小投资者法律保护历史实践的实证检验．经济研究，9：90-100．
[35] 沈艺峰，肖珉，黄娟娟．2005．中小投资者法律保护与公司权益资本成本．经济研究，6：115-224．
[36] 沈艺峰，陈舒予，黄娟娟．2007．投资者法律保护、所有权结构与困境公司高层管理人员变更．中国工业经济，1：96-103．
[37] 施东晖．2003．转轨经济中的所有权与竞争：来自中国上市公司的经验证据．经济研究，8：46-55．
[38] 谭云清，朱荣林，韩忠雪．2008．产品市场竞争、经理报酬与公司绩效：来自中国上市公司的证据．管理评论，2：58-63．
[39] 谭云清，朱荣林．2007．产品市场竞争、监督与公司治理的有效性．上海交通大学学报，7：1165-1169．
[40] 谭云清，朱荣林．2007．产品市场竞争、代理成本及代理效率：一个经验分析．上海管理科学，4：76-78．
[41] 王怀明，吴春燕．2007．产品市场竞争对董事独立性作用的影响．产业经济研究，3：30-37．
[42] 王克敏，陈井勇．2004．股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效．管理世界，7：127-134．
[43] 王雄元，刘焱．2008．产品市场竞争与信息披露质量的实证研究．经济科学，1：92-103．
[44] 吴延兵．2006a．R&D、创新与生产率--中国工业产业的经验证据．中国社 会科学院研究生院博士学位论文．
[45] 吴延兵．2006b．中国工业创新水平及影响因素．产业经济评论，2：45-61．
[46] 吴永明，袁春生．2007．法律治理、投资者保护与财务舞弊：一项基于上市公司的经验证据．中国工业经济，3：104-111．
[47] 夏立军，方轶强．2005．政府控制、治理环境与公司价值--来自中国证券市场的经验证据．经济研究，5：40-51．
[48] 肖珉．2007．投资者法律保护与权益资本成本．厦门大学博士学位论文．
[49] 肖珉．2008．法的建立、法的实施与权益资本成本．中国工业经济，3：40-48．
[50] 辛清泉，林斌，王彦超．2007．政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资．经济研究，8：110-122
[51] 辛宇，许莉萍．2006．公司治理机制与超额现金持有水平．管理世界，5：136-141．
[52] 许年行，吴世农．2006．我国中小投资者法律保护影响股权集中度的变化吗?．经济学(季刊)，2：893-922．
[53] 杨华荣，陈军，陈金贤．2008．产品市场竞争度对上市公司自愿性信息披露影响研究．预测，1：41-45．
[54] 杨瑞龙，郑志．2001．竞争、内部人控制与经济绩效--许继集团治理结构及其绩效的经济学解释．中国工业经济，10：65-71．
[55] 杨兴全，孙杰．2007．行业特征、产品市场竞争程度与上市公司现金持有量关系研究．审计与经济研究，6：99-103．
[56] 杨熠，沈艺峰．2004．现金股利：传递盈利信号还是起监督治理作用．中国会计评论，1：61-76．
[57] 张海燕，陈晓．2008．从现金股利看第一大股东对高级管理层的监督．南开管理评论，2：15-21．
[58] 赵蒲，孙爱英．2004．财务保守行为：基于中国上市公司的实证研究．管理世界，11：109-119．
[59] 钟田丽，范宇．2004．上市公司产品市场竞争程度与财务杠杆的选择．会计研究，6：73-77．
[60] 朱武祥，宋勇．2001．股权结构与企业价值--对家电行业上市公司实证分析．经济研究，12：66-73．
[61] 朱武祥，陈寒梅，吴迅．2002．产品市场竞争与财务保守行为--以燕京啤酒为例的分析．经济研究，8：28-37．
[62] Acs, Z.J., Audretsch, D.B., 1988. Innovation in Large and Small Firms:An Empirical Analysis. American Economic Review 78: 678-690.
[63] Aggarwal, RK., Samwick, AA., 1999. Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Finance 54: 1999-2043.
[64] Aggarwal, R., Samwick., 2006. A Empire-Builders and Shirkers:Investment Firm Performance and Managerial Incentives. Journal of Corporate Finance 12: 489-515.
[65] Aghion P., Dewatripont M., Rey P., 1999. Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth. Review of Economic Studies 66: 825-852.
[66] Aghion P., Bloom N., Blundell R.,Griffith R., Howitt P., 2001. Empirical Estimates of The Relationship Between Product Market Competition and Innovation. Working Paper, University College London.
[67] Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont., P. Rey., 1999. Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth. Review of Economic Studies 66: 825-852.
[68] Aghion, Philippr., Tirole, Jean., 1997. Formal and Real Authority in Organizations. Journal of Political Economy 1051: 1-29
[69] Allen, F, 2005. Corporate Goverance in Emerging Economies. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 21: 164-177.
[70] Allen, F., Qian J., QianM J., 2005. Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China. Journal of Financial Economics 77: 57-116.
[71] Allen, F., Qian J., 2008. Comparing Legal and Alternative Institutions in Commerce.Working Paper, Business School of Wharton.
[72] Allen, F., D. Gale., 2000. Corporate Governance and Competition. Published in Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives edited by X. Vives, Cambridge University Press, 23-94.
[73] Allen, Franklin., Jun Qian., Meijun Qian., 2005. Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 57-116.
[74] Baggs J., De BJ., 2007. Product Market Competition and Agency Costs. Journal of Industrial Economics 55: 289-323.
[75] Bebchuk, L., Roe, M, 1999. A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership. Stanford Law Review 52: 127-170.
[76] Beck T., Demirguc-KuntA., Levine R., 2003. Law, Endowments and Finance. Journal of Financial Economics 70:137-181.
[77] Beck, T., Levine, R., 2002. Industry Growth and Capital Allocation:Does Having A Market- or Bank-Based System Matter? Journal of Financial Economics 64: 147-180.
[78] Berger, A., T. Hannan., 1998. The Efficiency Cost of Market Power In The Banking Industry: A Test of the "Quiet Life" and Related Hypotheses. The Review of Economics and Statistics 80: 454-465.
[79] Berglof, Evon., Thedden, L., 1999. The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigim: Implications for Transition and Developing Countrise. Unpubished Working Paper. Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics: Stockholm, Sweden.
[80] Bertoletti, Paolo., Clara Poletti., 1996. A Note on Endogenous Firm Efficiency in Cournot Models of Incomplete Information. Journal of Economic Theory 71: 303-310.
[81] Bhattacharya U., Daouk H., 2002. The World Price of Insider Trading. Journal of Finance 57: 75-108.
[82] Black, Bernard., Reinier, Kraakman., 1996. A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law. Harvard Law Review 109: 1911-1982.
[83] Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Van Reenen, J., 1995. Dynamic Count Data Models of Technological Innovation. Economic Journal 105: 333-344.
[84] Bottasso, A., Sembenelli, A., 2001. Market Power, Productivity and the Eu Single Market Programe:Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms. European Economic Review AS: 167-186.
[85] Boubakri, N., Cosset, JC, Guedhamio., 2005. Postp Rivatization Corporate Governance: the Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection. Journal Financial Economics 76: 369-399.
[86] Broadberry, S., Crafts, N., 2000. Competition and Innovation in 1950'S Britain. Working Paper No.57. London School of Economics.
[87] Brockman, P., Chung, D., 2003. Investor Protection and Firm Liquidity. Journal of Finance 58: 921-937.
[88] Bushman, R., J, Piotroski., A, Smith., 2006. Capital Allocation and Timely Accounting Recognition of Economic Losses:International Evidence. Chicago University Working paper.
[89] Cheffins, B., 2000. Does LawMatters? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom. SSRN Working Paper.
[90] Chirinko, R., Ees H., Garretsen H., 2004. Investor Protection and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Netherlands. German Economic Review 5: 119-138.
[91] Coffee, J., 2001. Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Examination of the Private Benefits of Control. Columbia Law School Working Paper.
[92] Coffee, J., 2001. The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership and Control. Columbia Law School Working Paper.
[93] De Bettignies., JOE., Baggs, J., 2005. Product Market Competition and Agency Costs. Working Paper, University of British Columbia.
[94] Defond M., HungM Y., 2003. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Worldwide CEO Turnover. SSRN Working Paper.
[95] DeFond, M., C, Park., 1999. The effect of competition on CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics 27: 35-56.
[96] Demirguc--Kunt, A., Maksimovic,V., 1998. Law, Finance and Firm Growth. Journal of Finance 53: 2107-2137.
[97] Denis, D., McConnell J., 2003. International Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 1 -36.
[98] Dittmar, A., J, Mahrt-Smith., 2007. Corporate Governance and the Value of Cash Holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 83: 599-634.
[99] Dittmar, A, Mahrt-Smith J , Servaes H, 2003. International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 111-133.
[100] Doidge, C., KarolyiA., Stulz R., 2004. Why Are Foreign Firms Listed In The U. S. Worth More. Journal of Financial Economics 71: 205-238.
[101] Doidge, C., 2004. Cross-Listings and The Private Benefits of Control: Evidence From Dual-Class Firms. Journal of Financial Economics 72: 519-553.
[102] Durnev, A., Kim E., 2005. To Steal Or Not To Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment and Valuation. Journal of Finance 60: 1461-1493.
[103] Dyck, A., Zingales L., 2004. Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison. Journal of Finance 59: 537-600.
[104] Edwards,FR., 1977. Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries:Expense- Preference Behavior In Banking. Journal of Political Economy 85: 147-169.
[105] Engel, E., Hayes, R., Wang, X., 2003. CEO Turnover and Properties of Accounting Information. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36: 1-28.
[106] Faleye, O., 2004. Cash and Corporate Control. Journal of Finance 59: 2041-2060.
[107] Faulkender, M., R, Wang., 2006. Corporate Financial Policy and the Value of Cash. Journal of Finance 61: 1957-1990.
[108] Fee, C., C, Hadlock., 2000. Management Turnover and Product Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Newspaper Industry. Journal of Business 73: 205-243.
[109] Fershtman, C., JuddK, L., 1987. Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly. American Economic Review 77: 927-940.
[110] Foley, F., Hartzell, J., Titman, S., Twite, G., 2006. Why do Firms Hold So Much Cash? A Tax-Based Explanation. Unpublished working paper, University of Texas.
[111] Franks, J., Mayer, C., Rossi S., 2003. Ownership: Evolution and Regulation. European Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper.
[112] Gayle, P., 2001. Market Concentration and Innovation:New Empirical Evidence on the Schumpeterian Hypothesis. Discussion Papers in Economics, Working Paper No.01-14,Center for Economic Analysis, University of Colorado.
[113] Geroski, P., 1999. Innovation, Technological Opportunity and Market Structure. Oxford Economic Papers 42: 586-602.
[114] Giroud, X., H, Mueller., 2007. Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries. Working Paper, New York University.
[115] Graham, D., D, Kaplan., D, Sibley., 1983. Efficiency and Competition in The Airline Industry. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 118-138.
[116] Glaeser, Edward., Johnson, Simon., Shleifer, andrei., 2001. Coase versus the Coasians. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 853-899.
[117] Griffith, R., 2001. Product Market Competition, Efficiency and Agency Cost: An Empirical Analysis, Working Paper, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
[118] Grosfeld, I., Tressel, T., 2002. Competition and Ownership Structure: Substitutes or Complements. Economics 1133: 653-691.
[119] Grossman, S J., Hart, O D., 1982. Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives, in McCall,J J (Ed) The economics of information and uncertainty. Chicago, IL:University of Chicago Press,.
[120] Grullon, G, R, Michaely., 2006. Corporate Payout Policy and Product Market Competition. Working Paper.
[121] Guadalupe, M., F. P(?)rez-Gonz(?)lez., 2005. The Impact of Product Market Competition on Private Benefits of Control. Working Paper, Columbia University.
[122] Hart, Oliver., 1983. The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 366-382.
[123] Haskel, J., 1991. Imperfect Competition, Work Practices and Productivity Growth. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 53, 265-279.
[124] Hermalin, Benjamin., 1992. The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior. RAND Journal of Economics 23: 350-365.
[125] Himmelberg C., Hubbard G., Love I., 2002. Investor Protection, Ownership and the Cost of Capital. SSRN Working Paper.
[126] Holmen, M., Hogfeldt P., 2004. A Law and Finance Analysis of Initial Public offerings. Journal of Financial Intermediation 13: 324-358.
[127] Holmstrom, B., 1982. Moral Hazard in Teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13: 2324-2340.
[128] Holmstrom, B., Milgrom P., 1994. The Firm as an Incentive System. American Economic Review 84: 972- 991.
[129] Jagannathan, R., Srinivasan, SB., 1999. Does Product Market Competition Reduce Agency Costs? North American Journal of Economics&Finance 10: 387-412.
[130] Januszewski, S., Winter J K., 2002. Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis For Germany. Research in Economics 56: 299-334.
[131] Jayaratne, J., Strahan, P., 1996. The Finance-Growth Nexus:Evidence from Bank Branch Deregulation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 639-670.
[132] Jefferson, G.H., Bai, Huamao., Guan Xiao, jing., Yu Xiao, yun., 2004. R&D Performance in Chinese Industry. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 13:156-203
[133] Jensen, Michael., Kevin, Murphy., 1990. Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98: 225-264.
[134] Jensen, M., 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. Journal of Finance 48: 831-880.
[135] Jensen, M., 1986. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers. American Economic Review 76: 323-329.
[136] Johnson, S., Boone P., Breach A., 2000. Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 58: 141-186.
[137] Kaplan, David., S, Sibley., 1983. Efficiency and Competition in the Airline Industry. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 118-138.
[138] Karpoff, J., Lott, J., 1993. The Reputational Penalties Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud. Journal of Law and Economics 36: 757-802.
[139] Karuna, C., 2005. The Effect of Industry Product Market Competition on Managerial Incentives and Pay. Working paper, University of California, Irvine.
[140] Karuna, C, 2007. Industry Product Market Competition and Managerial Incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43: 275-297.
[141] King, R., Levine, R., 1993. Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 717-738.
[142] Klapper, L., Love, I., 2004. Corporate Governance, Investor Protection and Performance in Emerging Markets. Journal of Corporate Finance 10: 703-728.
[143] Kruse, T., C, Rennie., 2006. Product Market Competition, Excess Free Cash Flows and CEO Discipline: Evidence from the U.S. Retail Industry. Working Paper, University of Arkansas.
[144] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000. Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World. Journal of Finance 55: 1-33.
[145] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1999. Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance 54: 471-517.
[146] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy 106: 1113 -115 5.
[147] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1997. Legal Determinants of External Finance. Journal of Finance 52: 1131-1150.
[148] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics 58: 141-186.
[149] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2002. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation. Journal of Finance 57: 1147-1170.
[150] Lemmon, M., Lins, K., 2003. Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis. Journal of Finance 58: 1445-1468.
[151] Leuz, C, Nanda, D., Wysocki P., 2003. Earning Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparision. Journal of Financial Economics 69: 505-527.
[152] Levine, R., 1999. Law, Finance and Economic Growth. Journal of Financial Intermediation 8: 36-67.
[153] Levine, R., Zervos, S., 1998. Stock Market, Banks and Economic Growth. American Economic Review 88: 537-558.
[154] Levine, R., 2002. Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which is Better? Journal of Financial Intermediation 11: 1-30.
[155] LichtAN., Goldschmidt C, Schwartz S., 2001. Culture, Law and Finance: Culture Dimensions of Corporate Governance Laws. Interdiscip linary Center Herzliya, Israel, Working Paper.
[156] Lin Yifu., Fang Cai., Zhou Li., 1998. Competition, Policy Burdens and State-Owned Enterprise Reform. American Economic Review 88: 422-428.
[157] Lins, K., 2003. Equity Ownership and Firm Value In Emergingmarkets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 159-184.
[158] Lu, F., Y, Yao, 2004. The Effectiveness of the Law, Financial Development and Economic Growth in a Economy of Financial Repression: Evidence from China. Working Paper, Peking University.
[159] Lyandres, Evgeny., 2006. Capital Structure and Interaction among Firms in Output Markets-Theory and Evidence. Journal of business 79: 2381-2421.
[160] Mansfield, E., 1964. Industrial Research and Development Expenditures: Determinants, Prospects and Relation to Size of Firm and Inventive Output. Journal of Political Economy 72: 319-340.
[161] Meyer,D.L. 1995.Carbonate Mud-mounds in the Fort Payne Formation, Cumberland Saddle Region,Kentucky and Tennessee,USA. 23: 273-287.
[162] Mikkelson, W., Partch, M., 2003. Do Persistent Large Cash Reserves Hinder Performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 275-294.
[163] Milton, T., 2002. A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the Eastasian Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 64: 215-241.
[164] Nalebuff, B., J. Stiglitz., 1983. Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition. Bell Journal of Economics 14: 21-43.
[165] Nalebuff, Barry., Joseph Stiglitz., 1983. Information, Competition and Markets. American Economic Review 73: 278-283.
[166] Nenova, T., 2003. The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 68: 325-351.
[167] Nickell, S., 1996. Competition and Corporate Performance. Journal of Political conomy 104: 724-746.
[168] Nickell, SJ., Nicolitisas, D., Dryden, N., 1997. What Makes Firms Perform Well. European Economic Review 41: 783-790.
[169] Parrino, R., 1997. CEO Turnover and Outside Succession a Cross-Sectional Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 46: 165-197.
[170] Pinkowitz, L., Stulz R., Williamson R., 2003. Do Firms in Countries with Poor Protection of Investor Rights Hold More Cash.SSRN Working Paper.
[171] Pinkowitz, L., R, Stulz., R, Williamson., 2006. Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross-country Analysis. Journal of Finance 61: 2725-2751.
[172] Pistor, K., 2000. Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Righs in Transition Econnomies. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Working Paper No.49.
[173] Pistor, K., Raiser M., Gelfer S., 2000. Law and Finance in Transition Economics. Economics of Transition 8: 325-368.
[174] Pistor K., 2004. Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economics. European Business Organization Law Review 1: 59-110.
[175] Pistor, Katharina., Chenggang, Xu., 2004. Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies Lessons from China. SSRN Working paper #628065.
[176] Pistor, Katharina., Chenggang, Xu., 2002. Incomplete Law: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework and its Application to the Evolution of Financial Market Regulation. SSRN Working paper #310588.
[177] Raith, M., 2003. Competition, Risk and Managerial Incentives. American Economic Review 93: 1425-1436.
[178] Rajan, Raghuram., Luigi, Zingales., 1998. Financial Dependence and Growth. American Economic Review 88: 559-586.
[179] Rajan, Raghuram., Luigi, Zingales., 2003. The Great Reversals:The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century. Journal of Financial Economics 69: 5-50.
[180] Riahi-Belkaoui A., 2004. Investor Protection, Earnings Opacity and Corporate Valuation. University of Illinois at Chicago Working Paper.
[181] Richardson, S., 2006. Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow. Review of Accounting Studies 11: 159-189.
[182] Ritter, JR., 2005. Recent Developments in Corporate Finance. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
[183] Roe, M., 1990. Political and Legal Restraints On Ownership and Control of Public Companies. Journal of Financial Economics 27: 7-41.
[184] Roe, M., 2000. Political Foundations for Separating Ownership From Corporate Contro. Stanford Law Review 53: 539-606.
[185] Scharfstein, D., 1988. Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack. RAND Journal of Economics 19: 147-155.
[186] Schmidt, K., 1997. Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition. Review of Economic Studies 64: 191-213.
[187] Shleifer, A., 1985. A Theory of Yardstick Competition. RAND Journal of Economics 16: 319-327.
[188] Shleifer, A., R, Vishny., 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance 52: 737-783.
[189] Stein, J., 2003. Agency, Information and Corporate Investment. Handbook of the Economics of Finance. Constantinides , G , M. Harris and R. Stulz (Eds. ) , Amsterdam, North Holland.
[190] Stulz, R., Williamson, R., 2003. Culture, Openness and Finance. Journal of Financial Economics 70: 313-349.
[191] Vicker, J., 1996. Concept of Competition. Oxford Economic Paper, No.1.
[192] Volpin, P., 2002. Governance With Poor Investor Protection: Evidence Form Top Executive Turnover hi Italy. Journal of Financial Economics 64: 61-90.
[193] Yarrow, George., 1986. Privatization in Theory and Practice. Economic Policy 2: 324-364.