合作博弈框架下的信托利益分配机制研究
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摘要
本文是基于合作博弈的理论框架研究合作博弈在中国房地产信托利益分配问题的实际应用,在梳理相关理论和概念、分析我国房地产信托发展现状的基础上,对房地产信托这一利益联盟的利益分配问题进行了系统性的研究。具体内容分为六章。
第一章是绪论部分。这一部分首先介绍了整篇文章的学术背景和现实背景；随后阐述了本研究应用的理论框架、建立数理模型、分析实际问题、完善分配机制等研究目的,分析了该项研究两方面的理论意义和现实价值。同时,该部分也清晰地介绍了研究的整体思路、主要研究内容、文章框架结构；给出了研究的主要方法、技术路线和可行性分析。本部分的最后列示了本项研究的特点和各项创新点。
第二章是文献综述部分。本部分首先简要的梳理了博弈论相关理论的相关研究文献成果,包括博弈论的发展脉络、主要的学术研究方向、已取得的研究成果、代表性的学术观点以及与其他学科的交叉研究,其中重点总结了博弈论中合作博弈这一分支的研究成果和发展方向；然后本文评述了运用合作博弈理论解决现实问题方面的研究,主要评析了合作博弈目前被应用较多领域的研究成果,包括区域经济合作、供应链合作等利益联盟,重点分析了合作博弈理论在房地产业、金融业的应用和合作博弈理论在利益分配机制方面的研究；最后综述了目前房地产信托领域的研究现状和热点问题,总结和评述了房地产信托利益分配问题已有的研究成果,结合合作博弈相关理论的综述提出了现有研究存在的不足和空白之处,进而提出了本文的研究内容。
第三章是理论框架的搭建部分。本部分首先解释了合作博弈的基本概念,包括合作博弈的实质、关注的问题、与非合作博弈的关系等,介绍了合作博弈特征函数的概念和合作博弈中比较重要的性质。随后,本文系统的阐述了合作博弈的重要概念：合作博弈的解。分别描述了合作博弈的核与核仁和夏普利值的概念,阐明了这些解的本质意义与进行理论研究所必须说明的重要性质。其中重点分析了本研究要使用的夏普利值,同时对比较重要的核仁解也进行了较为详细的解释。在此基础上,本部分的最后一节对夏普利值的解在房地产信托这一合作博弈的现实应用中所代表的意义进行了解释,分析了夏普利值解在研究房地产信托利益分配问题中的作用。
第四章是对房地产信托利益分配合作博弈模型的建立。本章首先分析了构成房地产信托所谓利益联盟的各方参与者,即合作博弈模型中的博弈者,具体分析了各参与方的参与动机、参与方式、参与稳定性与积极程度、可投入要素以及讨价还价能力。其次,本章又分析了我国房地产信托的产业环境、产业特点以及能够影响到产业利益分配的宏观经济因素和政策因素,同时研究有重要影响的外部性因素对各参与方利益分配的影响方式,建立房地产信托利益分配的合作博弈模型。再次,是利用模型求解合作博弈的夏普利值,并说明整个合作博弈模型的求解过程,使用若干个算例进行直观的说明。在算例的计算中,调整逐项内部性因素和外部性因素变量,分析各类因素对各参与方的敏感性以及变化后利益联盟的稳定性。通过求解和算例试算,分析所得结果,解释所得结果在现实问题中的意义,并结合理论研究部分作出本文数理研究部分的一般性结论。
第五章是实证研究部分,采用房地产信托实践中有一定代表性的真实案例与数理研究所得结论进行实证对比。本部分首先简要介绍所采用实际案例的项目背景、参与各方、当时的宏观经济状况和实际利益分配结果。随后本文将所选案例的数据进行必要的处理,作为算例带入已建立的合作博弈模型中求解,分析所得结果与理论计算值产生差异的原因,基于实际情况并结合本文对房地产信托利益分配的一般性结论,指出我国房地产信托运作机制、利益分配方面与国际房地产信托业存在的差异,具体分析其利弊。最后,综合理论研究、数理研究和实证研究的结论提出本文对房地产信托利益分配机制的参考性意见和值得关注的问题。
第六章是文章的总结和展望部分,是对全文所做研究的归纳与总结和进一步开展研究的展望。
本文的贡献在于：本文的研究是首次将合作博弈的理论和方法运用到房地产信托领域,这是对合作博弈理论在金融业信托领域的应用,是扩大合作博弈理论适用范围的一次很有意义的尝试。同时,通过运用合作博弈理论和模型仿真方法对我国房地产信托的参与主体、利益分配机制、重要影响因素进行研究和探讨,从而为我国房地产信托利益分配机制的完善提供理论依据,在目前这一领域研究相对薄弱的背景下,本文的研究有着较高的理论价值。另一方面,本文研究和分析了我国房地产信托现有运作模式中的各参与主体及其利益分配模式,有针对性的分析了存在的问题,在此基础上提出了房地产信托利益分配机制的完善建议和房地产信托业发展方向的合理预测,对我国房地产信托产业发展有着实用性较高的参考价值。
Based on theoretical framework of cooperative games, this article studied the practical application of cooperative games in the profits allocation of real estate trust in China. On the basis of combing relevant theory and concepts and analyzing the development status of China's real estate trusts, the author conducted a systematic study on the profits allocation issue in the interest union——real estate trusts. Specific contents are divided into six chapters.
The first chapter is an introduction part. This part first described the academic background and practical background of the entire article; then it elaborated the application theoretical framework, establishment of mathematical model, analysis of practical problems and perfection of allocation mechanism and other research purposes in this study, and analyzed two aspects of theoretical significance and practical value in this study. Meanwhile, this part clearly described the overall idea of the study, main research contents, article frame and architecture, and also gave the main method of research, technical route and feasibility analysis. At the end of this part, characteristics and various innovation points of the study were listed in details.
The second chapter is the literature review part. This part first briefly combed the relevant literature research outcomes of related game theory, including the development context of game theory, major academic research direction, research outcomes, representative academic viewpoints and cross-over study with other disciplines, including the emphasized summarization on the research outcomes and development direction of the branch of game theory—cooperative games; Then, this paper reviewed the research on applying cooperative games theory in solving practical problems, and mainly made comment on the research outcomes in the fields with more cooperative games applications currently, including regional economic cooperation, supply chain cooperation and other interest unions, focused on analyzing the application of cooperative games theory in real estate industry, financial industry and the study of cooperative games theory in the mechanism of profits allocation; Finally, this article reviewed the current study status and hot issues in the field of real estate investment trusts, and summarized and commented the existing research outcomes in the allocation of profits of real estate investment trusts, and proposed the shortcomings and gaps of existing researches by combining with the overview of cooperative games related theories and then put forward the research contents in this paper.
The third chapter is the part establishing theoretical framework. This part first explained the basic concepts of cooperative games, including the essence of cooperative games, concerned problems and relations with non-cooperative games and introduced the concept of characteristic type cooperative games and relatively important properties of cooperative games. Subsequently, this paper systematically expounded an important concept of cooperative games:solutions of cooperative games. The author respectively described the concepts of core, nucleolus and Shapley value of Cooperative games and clarified essential meanings of these solutions and some important properties that must be clearly described for the purpose of theoretical study. This part focused on the analysis of Shapley value used in this study, meanwhile carried out more detailed explanation of the more important Nucleolus Solution. On this basis, the last section of this part interpreted the significance represented by Shapley value solution in the realistic application of the cooperative games----the real estate trust, analyzed the functions of shapley in the study of profits allocation of real estate trust.
The fourth chapter established a cooperative games model of profits allocation of real estate trust. This chapter first analyzed all participants constituting the so-called interest union of real estate trust, or the player of cooperative games model, specifically analyzed the participation motives, participation manner, participation stability and positive degree, input factors as well as bargain capacity of all participating parties. Secondly, this chapter also analyzed the industry environment of China's real estate trust, characteristics of real estate trust industry, as well as macroeconomic factors and policy factors that can affect the industry allocation of profits, and studied the influence of all influential external factors on allocation of profits among all participating parties at the same time and thus established cooperative games model of the allocation of profits of real estate trust. Again, the author used the model to solve Shapley value of cooperative games and described the entire solution process of the cooperative games model by using several calculation examples to make intuitive explanation. In the calculation of numerical examples, the author adjusted internal factors and external factors variables item by item; analyzed the influence of various factors on the sensitivity of all participants as well as stability of the interest union after changes. By means of solving and calculation of numerical examples, this paper analyzed the obtained results and explained the significance of the obtained results in realistic problems, and drew a general conclusion of mathematical study part in this paper on the basis of theoretical research section.
Chapter5is an empirical research part, in which, the author conducted an empirical comparison between representative real case in the practice of real estate trust and the conclusion drawn in mathematical study. This section briefly described the project background, all participants and the macroeconomic situation and the actual results of profits allocation of the adopted realistic cases. Subsequently, this article made necessary processing for data of selected cases, and then introduced them as numerical examples into the established cooperative games model for seeking solutions, and then analyzed the causes for the difference between results obtained and theoretical values, based on the actual situation and the general conclusion of profits allocation of real estate investment trusts drawn in this paper, the author pointed out that China's real estate trust industry has some differences with international real estate trusts industry in the trust operating mechanism and the allocation of profits and other aspects, and specifically analyzed the pros and cons. Finally, based on findings in theoretical research, mathematical and empirical research, this paper put forward reference opinions and issues deserving concerns in terms of profits allocation of real estate trust.
Chapter6is the summary and outlook section of the paper, in which, the author summarized the studies conducted in the full paper and made an outlook on further research.
The contribution of this paper lies in:The study in this paper took the initiative to apply cooperative games theory and methods into the field of real estate trust, which is an application of cooperative games theory in trust field of finance industry, and also a significant attempt to expand the application scope of cooperative games theory. At the same time, through the use of cooperative games theory and model simulation method, this paper carried out research and discussion on the participating subjects, profits allocation mechanisms, important factors of China's real estate trust, and thus provide a theoretical basis for the improvement of profits allocation mechanism of China's real estate trust. Under the background of relatively weak research in this field, this study has a high theoretical value. On the other hand, this paper studied and analyzed all participating subjects and their profits allocation model in the existing operation mode of China's real estate trusts, and pertinently analyzed the existing problems. On this basis, this paper proposed suggestions for perfecting profits allocation mechanism of real estate trust and reasonable forecast of development direction of real estate trust, which has a high practical value for the development of China's real estate trust.
第一章是绪论部分。这一部分首先介绍了整篇文章的学术背景和现实背景；随后阐述了本研究应用的理论框架、建立数理模型、分析实际问题、完善分配机制等研究目的,分析了该项研究两方面的理论意义和现实价值。同时,该部分也清晰地介绍了研究的整体思路、主要研究内容、文章框架结构；给出了研究的主要方法、技术路线和可行性分析。本部分的最后列示了本项研究的特点和各项创新点。
第二章是文献综述部分。本部分首先简要的梳理了博弈论相关理论的相关研究文献成果,包括博弈论的发展脉络、主要的学术研究方向、已取得的研究成果、代表性的学术观点以及与其他学科的交叉研究,其中重点总结了博弈论中合作博弈这一分支的研究成果和发展方向；然后本文评述了运用合作博弈理论解决现实问题方面的研究,主要评析了合作博弈目前被应用较多领域的研究成果,包括区域经济合作、供应链合作等利益联盟,重点分析了合作博弈理论在房地产业、金融业的应用和合作博弈理论在利益分配机制方面的研究；最后综述了目前房地产信托领域的研究现状和热点问题,总结和评述了房地产信托利益分配问题已有的研究成果,结合合作博弈相关理论的综述提出了现有研究存在的不足和空白之处,进而提出了本文的研究内容。
第三章是理论框架的搭建部分。本部分首先解释了合作博弈的基本概念,包括合作博弈的实质、关注的问题、与非合作博弈的关系等,介绍了合作博弈特征函数的概念和合作博弈中比较重要的性质。随后,本文系统的阐述了合作博弈的重要概念：合作博弈的解。分别描述了合作博弈的核与核仁和夏普利值的概念,阐明了这些解的本质意义与进行理论研究所必须说明的重要性质。其中重点分析了本研究要使用的夏普利值,同时对比较重要的核仁解也进行了较为详细的解释。在此基础上,本部分的最后一节对夏普利值的解在房地产信托这一合作博弈的现实应用中所代表的意义进行了解释,分析了夏普利值解在研究房地产信托利益分配问题中的作用。
第四章是对房地产信托利益分配合作博弈模型的建立。本章首先分析了构成房地产信托所谓利益联盟的各方参与者,即合作博弈模型中的博弈者,具体分析了各参与方的参与动机、参与方式、参与稳定性与积极程度、可投入要素以及讨价还价能力。其次,本章又分析了我国房地产信托的产业环境、产业特点以及能够影响到产业利益分配的宏观经济因素和政策因素,同时研究有重要影响的外部性因素对各参与方利益分配的影响方式,建立房地产信托利益分配的合作博弈模型。再次,是利用模型求解合作博弈的夏普利值,并说明整个合作博弈模型的求解过程,使用若干个算例进行直观的说明。在算例的计算中,调整逐项内部性因素和外部性因素变量,分析各类因素对各参与方的敏感性以及变化后利益联盟的稳定性。通过求解和算例试算,分析所得结果,解释所得结果在现实问题中的意义,并结合理论研究部分作出本文数理研究部分的一般性结论。
第五章是实证研究部分,采用房地产信托实践中有一定代表性的真实案例与数理研究所得结论进行实证对比。本部分首先简要介绍所采用实际案例的项目背景、参与各方、当时的宏观经济状况和实际利益分配结果。随后本文将所选案例的数据进行必要的处理,作为算例带入已建立的合作博弈模型中求解,分析所得结果与理论计算值产生差异的原因,基于实际情况并结合本文对房地产信托利益分配的一般性结论,指出我国房地产信托运作机制、利益分配方面与国际房地产信托业存在的差异,具体分析其利弊。最后,综合理论研究、数理研究和实证研究的结论提出本文对房地产信托利益分配机制的参考性意见和值得关注的问题。
第六章是文章的总结和展望部分,是对全文所做研究的归纳与总结和进一步开展研究的展望。
本文的贡献在于：本文的研究是首次将合作博弈的理论和方法运用到房地产信托领域,这是对合作博弈理论在金融业信托领域的应用,是扩大合作博弈理论适用范围的一次很有意义的尝试。同时,通过运用合作博弈理论和模型仿真方法对我国房地产信托的参与主体、利益分配机制、重要影响因素进行研究和探讨,从而为我国房地产信托利益分配机制的完善提供理论依据,在目前这一领域研究相对薄弱的背景下,本文的研究有着较高的理论价值。另一方面,本文研究和分析了我国房地产信托现有运作模式中的各参与主体及其利益分配模式,有针对性的分析了存在的问题,在此基础上提出了房地产信托利益分配机制的完善建议和房地产信托业发展方向的合理预测,对我国房地产信托产业发展有着实用性较高的参考价值。
Based on theoretical framework of cooperative games, this article studied the practical application of cooperative games in the profits allocation of real estate trust in China. On the basis of combing relevant theory and concepts and analyzing the development status of China's real estate trusts, the author conducted a systematic study on the profits allocation issue in the interest union——real estate trusts. Specific contents are divided into six chapters.
The first chapter is an introduction part. This part first described the academic background and practical background of the entire article; then it elaborated the application theoretical framework, establishment of mathematical model, analysis of practical problems and perfection of allocation mechanism and other research purposes in this study, and analyzed two aspects of theoretical significance and practical value in this study. Meanwhile, this part clearly described the overall idea of the study, main research contents, article frame and architecture, and also gave the main method of research, technical route and feasibility analysis. At the end of this part, characteristics and various innovation points of the study were listed in details.
The second chapter is the literature review part. This part first briefly combed the relevant literature research outcomes of related game theory, including the development context of game theory, major academic research direction, research outcomes, representative academic viewpoints and cross-over study with other disciplines, including the emphasized summarization on the research outcomes and development direction of the branch of game theory—cooperative games; Then, this paper reviewed the research on applying cooperative games theory in solving practical problems, and mainly made comment on the research outcomes in the fields with more cooperative games applications currently, including regional economic cooperation, supply chain cooperation and other interest unions, focused on analyzing the application of cooperative games theory in real estate industry, financial industry and the study of cooperative games theory in the mechanism of profits allocation; Finally, this article reviewed the current study status and hot issues in the field of real estate investment trusts, and summarized and commented the existing research outcomes in the allocation of profits of real estate investment trusts, and proposed the shortcomings and gaps of existing researches by combining with the overview of cooperative games related theories and then put forward the research contents in this paper.
The third chapter is the part establishing theoretical framework. This part first explained the basic concepts of cooperative games, including the essence of cooperative games, concerned problems and relations with non-cooperative games and introduced the concept of characteristic type cooperative games and relatively important properties of cooperative games. Subsequently, this paper systematically expounded an important concept of cooperative games:solutions of cooperative games. The author respectively described the concepts of core, nucleolus and Shapley value of Cooperative games and clarified essential meanings of these solutions and some important properties that must be clearly described for the purpose of theoretical study. This part focused on the analysis of Shapley value used in this study, meanwhile carried out more detailed explanation of the more important Nucleolus Solution. On this basis, the last section of this part interpreted the significance represented by Shapley value solution in the realistic application of the cooperative games----the real estate trust, analyzed the functions of shapley in the study of profits allocation of real estate trust.
The fourth chapter established a cooperative games model of profits allocation of real estate trust. This chapter first analyzed all participants constituting the so-called interest union of real estate trust, or the player of cooperative games model, specifically analyzed the participation motives, participation manner, participation stability and positive degree, input factors as well as bargain capacity of all participating parties. Secondly, this chapter also analyzed the industry environment of China's real estate trust, characteristics of real estate trust industry, as well as macroeconomic factors and policy factors that can affect the industry allocation of profits, and studied the influence of all influential external factors on allocation of profits among all participating parties at the same time and thus established cooperative games model of the allocation of profits of real estate trust. Again, the author used the model to solve Shapley value of cooperative games and described the entire solution process of the cooperative games model by using several calculation examples to make intuitive explanation. In the calculation of numerical examples, the author adjusted internal factors and external factors variables item by item; analyzed the influence of various factors on the sensitivity of all participants as well as stability of the interest union after changes. By means of solving and calculation of numerical examples, this paper analyzed the obtained results and explained the significance of the obtained results in realistic problems, and drew a general conclusion of mathematical study part in this paper on the basis of theoretical research section.
Chapter5is an empirical research part, in which, the author conducted an empirical comparison between representative real case in the practice of real estate trust and the conclusion drawn in mathematical study. This section briefly described the project background, all participants and the macroeconomic situation and the actual results of profits allocation of the adopted realistic cases. Subsequently, this article made necessary processing for data of selected cases, and then introduced them as numerical examples into the established cooperative games model for seeking solutions, and then analyzed the causes for the difference between results obtained and theoretical values, based on the actual situation and the general conclusion of profits allocation of real estate investment trusts drawn in this paper, the author pointed out that China's real estate trust industry has some differences with international real estate trusts industry in the trust operating mechanism and the allocation of profits and other aspects, and specifically analyzed the pros and cons. Finally, based on findings in theoretical research, mathematical and empirical research, this paper put forward reference opinions and issues deserving concerns in terms of profits allocation of real estate trust.
Chapter6is the summary and outlook section of the paper, in which, the author summarized the studies conducted in the full paper and made an outlook on further research.
The contribution of this paper lies in:The study in this paper took the initiative to apply cooperative games theory and methods into the field of real estate trust, which is an application of cooperative games theory in trust field of finance industry, and also a significant attempt to expand the application scope of cooperative games theory. At the same time, through the use of cooperative games theory and model simulation method, this paper carried out research and discussion on the participating subjects, profits allocation mechanisms, important factors of China's real estate trust, and thus provide a theoretical basis for the improvement of profits allocation mechanism of China's real estate trust. Under the background of relatively weak research in this field, this study has a high theoretical value. On the other hand, this paper studied and analyzed all participating subjects and their profits allocation model in the existing operation mode of China's real estate trusts, and pertinently analyzed the existing problems. On this basis, this paper proposed suggestions for perfecting profits allocation mechanism of real estate trust and reasonable forecast of development direction of real estate trust, which has a high practical value for the development of China's real estate trust.
引文
[1]中国人民大学信托与基金研究所,中国信托业发展报告2012,中国经济出版社,2012.2,pp.26-50
[2]萧条军,博弈论及其应用,三联书店,2004
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[4]谢识予,经济博弈论,复旦大学出版社,2002
[5]马丁J.奥斯本,阿里尔·鲁宾斯坦,博弈论教程,中国社会科学出版社,2000
[6]J. Von Neumann, Zur Theorie der gesellschaftsspield, Mathematische Annalen, 1928(100), pp.155-162
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