企业环境治理的驱动机制研究:环保官员变更的视角
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摘要
环境外部性使得具有逐利特征的微观企业主体缺乏足够的环境治理动机。在中国财政分权体系下,由地方环保部门履行企业环境监督职能,环保官员实施的环境规制强度对企业环境治理存在重要影响。为此,本文基于晋升锦标赛的分析框架,从环保厅长变更的角度探讨企业环境治理的驱动机制。研究发现,企业环境治理具有随环保厅长变更年份而变化的政治周期性,且这种周期特征在控制省委书记、省长变更影响后仍旧存在;从环境监管和环保支持两个角度探讨上述内在机制发现,在财政独立性约束条件下,地方环保部门主要通过增加企业的排污费来推动企业环境治理,但环保补贴不存在上述特征。进一步考虑变更环保官员的异质性发现,当新任环保厅长为晋升和年龄相对更小时,企业环境治理的周期性特征更为明显,但环保系统内或系统外的变更对于推动企业环境治理不存在显著性差异。此外区分环保官员的来源地区发现,当企业处于变更环保厅长的非来源地区时,企业环境治理的周期性特征更为明显。本文从政治经济学的视角揭示了我国企业环境治理的驱动机制,研究结论对进一步完善政府环境监督职能、实现生态文明建设具有一定启示意义。
Environmental externalities make micro-enterprise which with profit-seeking characteristics lack sufficient environmental governance motivation. Under China's fiscal decentralization system, local environmental protection departments perform corporate environmental supervision functions, and the intensity of environmental regulation implemented by environmental protection officials has an important impact on corporate environmental governance. To this end, this paper takes the listed companies from 2007 to 2014 as a sample, based on the analysis framework of the promotion tournament, and discusses the driving mechanism of corporate environmental governance from the perspective of the change of environmental protection director. The study found that corporate environmental governance has a political periodicity that changes with the change of the director of the environmental protection department, and this cycle characteristic still exists after controlling the influence of provincial secretary and governor change; Exploring the above internal mechanisms from the perspectives of environmental supervision and environmental protection support, this paper found that due to the constraints of fiscal independence, local environmental protection departments mainly promote corporate environmental governance by increasing the sewage charges of enterprises, but environmental protection subsidies do not have the above characteristics. Consider the heterogeneity of environmental protection officials' turnover, further tests showed that when the new environmental protection director is promoted and the age is relatively small, the cyclical characteristics of corporate environmental governance are more obvious, but there are no significant differences in promoting environmental governance within or outside the environmental protection system. In addition, after distinguishing the source areas of environmental protection officials, the paper found that when the enterprises were in the non-source areas where the environmental protection department was changed, the cyclical characteristics of corporate environmental governance become more obvious. Above all, the paper reveals the mechanism of environmental governance from the perspective of political economy, which has important implications for further improving the government's environmental supervision function and realizing the construction of ecological civilization.
Environmental externalities make micro-enterprise which with profit-seeking characteristics lack sufficient environmental governance motivation. Under China's fiscal decentralization system, local environmental protection departments perform corporate environmental supervision functions, and the intensity of environmental regulation implemented by environmental protection officials has an important impact on corporate environmental governance. To this end, this paper takes the listed companies from 2007 to 2014 as a sample, based on the analysis framework of the promotion tournament, and discusses the driving mechanism of corporate environmental governance from the perspective of the change of environmental protection director. The study found that corporate environmental governance has a political periodicity that changes with the change of the director of the environmental protection department, and this cycle characteristic still exists after controlling the influence of provincial secretary and governor change; Exploring the above internal mechanisms from the perspectives of environmental supervision and environmental protection support, this paper found that due to the constraints of fiscal independence, local environmental protection departments mainly promote corporate environmental governance by increasing the sewage charges of enterprises, but environmental protection subsidies do not have the above characteristics. Consider the heterogeneity of environmental protection officials' turnover, further tests showed that when the new environmental protection director is promoted and the age is relatively small, the cyclical characteristics of corporate environmental governance are more obvious, but there are no significant differences in promoting environmental governance within or outside the environmental protection system. In addition, after distinguishing the source areas of environmental protection officials, the paper found that when the enterprises were in the non-source areas where the environmental protection department was changed, the cyclical characteristics of corporate environmental governance become more obvious. Above all, the paper reveals the mechanism of environmental governance from the perspective of political economy, which has important implications for further improving the government's environmental supervision function and realizing the construction of ecological civilization.
引文
[1]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究.经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[2]Cai,H.,Chen,Y.,Gong,Q..Polluting Thy Neighbor:Unintended Consequences of China`s Pollution Reduction Mandates.Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2016,76(4):86-104.
[3]黎文靖,郑曼妮.空气污染的治理机制及其作用效果--来自地级市的经验数据.中国工业经济,2016,29(4):93-109.
[4]孙伟增,罗党论,郑思齐,万广华.环保考核、地方官员晋升与环境治理--基于2004-2009年中国86个重点城市的经验证据.清华大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014,29(4):49-62+171.
[5]罗党论,赖再洪.重污染企业投资与地方官员晋升--基于地级市1999-2010年数据的经验证据.会计研究,2016,(4):42-48+95.
[6]张军,高远.官员任期、异地交流与经济增长--来自省级经验的证据.经济研究,2007,(11):91-103.
[7]钱先航,曹廷求,李维安.晋升压力、官员任期与城市商业银行的贷款行为.经济研究,2011,(12):72-85.
[8]曹春方.政治权力转移与公司投资:中国的逻辑.管理世界,2013,(1):143-155,157.
[9]钱先航,徐业坤.官员更替、政治身份与民营上市公司的风险承担.经济学(季刊),2014,13(4):1437-1460.
[10]王红建,李青原,邢斐.经济政策不确定性、现金持有水平及其市场价值.金融研究,2014,(9):53-68.
[11]聂辉华,李金波.政企合谋与经济发展.经济学(季刊),2006,6(1):75-90.
[12]于文超,何勤英.辖区经济增长绩效与环境污染事故--基于官员政绩诉求的视角.世界经济文汇,2013,(2):20-35.
[13]Wu,J.,Deng,Y.,Huang,J.,Morck,R.,Yeung,B..Incentives and Outcomes:China`s Environmental Policy.NBER Working Paper,2013.
[14]梁平汉,高楠.人事变更、法制环境和地方环境污染.管理世界,2014,(6):65-78.
[15]Tao,Y..Rationalization of Political Business Cycle in China,Institute of International Relations.National City University Working Paper,2003.
[16]李猛,沈坤荣.地方政府行为对中国经济波动的影响.经济研究,2010,(12):35-47.
[17]文雁兵.新官上任三把火:存在中国式政治经济周期吗.财贸经济,2014,(11):111-124.
[18]周黎安,赵鹰妍,李力雄.资源错配与政治周期.金融研究,2013,(3):15-29.
[19]余靖雯,肖洁,龚六堂.政治周期与地方政府土地出让行为.经济研究,2015,(2):88-102+144.
[20]Pigou,A.C..The Economics of Welfare.Palgrave Macmillan,1920.
[21]Coase,R.H..The Problem of Social Cost.Journal of Law and Economics,1960,56(3):1-44.
[22]陈波.中国碳排放权交易市场的构建及宏观调控研究.中国人口·资源与环境,2013,23(11):7-13.
[23]吴越,唐薇.政府环境责任的规则变迁及深层法律规制问题研究--基于新《环境保护法》和宪法保护的双重视角.社会科学研究,2015,(2):20-29.
[24]Piotroski,J.D.,Wong,T.J.,Zhang,T..Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information:Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms.Journal of Accounting Research,2015,53(2):405-459.
[25]陈艳艳,罗党论.地方官员更替与企业投资.经济研究,2012,(2):18-30.
[26]陈德球,陈运森,董志勇.政策不确定性、税收征管强度与企业税收规避.管理世界,2016,(5):151-163.
[27]Chen,Y.,Jin,G.Z.,Kumar,N.,Shi,G..The Promise of Beijing:Evaluating the Impact of the 2008 Olympic Games on Air Quality.Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2013,66(3):424-443.
[28]马万里,杨濮萌.从“马拉松霾”到“APEC蓝”:中国环境治理的政治经济学.中央财经大学学报,2015,(10):16-22.
[29]杨雪锋,石洁星,王成.政治周期、选择性环境管制与环境绩效.财经论丛,2015,(12):100-108.
[30]石庆玲,郭峰,陈诗一.雾霾治理中的“政治性蓝天”--来自中国地方“两会”的证据.中国工业经济,2016,(5):40-56.
[31]王红建,汤泰劼,宋献中.谁驱动了企业环境治理:官员任期考核还是五年规划目标考核.财贸经济,2017,38(11):147-161.
[32]沈洪涛,马正彪.地区经济发展压力、企业环境表现与债务融资.金融研究,2014,(2):153-166.
[33]龙文滨,李四海,宋献中.环保规制与中小企业环境表现--基于我国中小板与创业板上市公司的经验研究.公共行政评论,2015,8(6):25-58,185-186.
[34]Patten,D.M..The Accuracy of Financial Report Projections of Future Environmental Capital Expenditures:A Research Note.Accounting,Organizations and Society,2005,30(11):457-468.
[35]黎文靖,路晓燕.机构投资者关注企业的环境绩效吗--来自我国重污染行业上市公司的经验证据.金融研究,2015,(12):97-112.
[36]胡珺,宋献中,王红建.非正式制度、家乡认同与企业环境治理.管理世界,2017,(3):76-94,187-188.
[37]钱先航,曹廷求.钱随官走:地方官员与地区间的资金流动.经济研究,2017,(2):156-170.
[38]陶然,苏福兵,陆曦,朱昱铭.经济增长能够带来晋升吗--对晋升锦标竞赛理论的逻辑挑战与省级实证重估.管理世界,2010,(12):13-26.
[39]Robinson,S.L..Trust and Breach of the Psychological Contract,Administrative Science Quarterly,1996,10(11):574-599.
[40]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作--兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因.经济研究,2004,(6):33-40.
[41]张尔升.地方官员的专业禀赋与经济增长--以中国省委书记、省长的面板数据为例.制度经济学研究,2012,(1):72-86.
[42]张平,赵国昌,罗知.中央官员来源与地方经济增长.经济学(季刊),2012,11(2):613-634.
[43]范子英,李欣.部长的政治关联效应与财政转移支付分配.经济研究,2014,(6):129-141.
[44]沈洪涛,周艳坤.环境执法监督与企业环境绩效:来自环保约谈的准自然实验证据.南开管理评论,2017,20(6):73-82.
[45]沈洪涛,黄珍,郭肪汝.告白还是辩白--企业环境表现与环境信息披露关系研究.南开管理评论,2014,17(2):56-63.
[2]Cai,H.,Chen,Y.,Gong,Q..Polluting Thy Neighbor:Unintended Consequences of China`s Pollution Reduction Mandates.Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2016,76(4):86-104.
[3]黎文靖,郑曼妮.空气污染的治理机制及其作用效果--来自地级市的经验数据.中国工业经济,2016,29(4):93-109.
[4]孙伟增,罗党论,郑思齐,万广华.环保考核、地方官员晋升与环境治理--基于2004-2009年中国86个重点城市的经验证据.清华大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014,29(4):49-62+171.
[5]罗党论,赖再洪.重污染企业投资与地方官员晋升--基于地级市1999-2010年数据的经验证据.会计研究,2016,(4):42-48+95.
[6]张军,高远.官员任期、异地交流与经济增长--来自省级经验的证据.经济研究,2007,(11):91-103.
[7]钱先航,曹廷求,李维安.晋升压力、官员任期与城市商业银行的贷款行为.经济研究,2011,(12):72-85.
[8]曹春方.政治权力转移与公司投资:中国的逻辑.管理世界,2013,(1):143-155,157.
[9]钱先航,徐业坤.官员更替、政治身份与民营上市公司的风险承担.经济学(季刊),2014,13(4):1437-1460.
[10]王红建,李青原,邢斐.经济政策不确定性、现金持有水平及其市场价值.金融研究,2014,(9):53-68.
[11]聂辉华,李金波.政企合谋与经济发展.经济学(季刊),2006,6(1):75-90.
[12]于文超,何勤英.辖区经济增长绩效与环境污染事故--基于官员政绩诉求的视角.世界经济文汇,2013,(2):20-35.
[13]Wu,J.,Deng,Y.,Huang,J.,Morck,R.,Yeung,B..Incentives and Outcomes:China`s Environmental Policy.NBER Working Paper,2013.
[14]梁平汉,高楠.人事变更、法制环境和地方环境污染.管理世界,2014,(6):65-78.
[15]Tao,Y..Rationalization of Political Business Cycle in China,Institute of International Relations.National City University Working Paper,2003.
[16]李猛,沈坤荣.地方政府行为对中国经济波动的影响.经济研究,2010,(12):35-47.
[17]文雁兵.新官上任三把火:存在中国式政治经济周期吗.财贸经济,2014,(11):111-124.
[18]周黎安,赵鹰妍,李力雄.资源错配与政治周期.金融研究,2013,(3):15-29.
[19]余靖雯,肖洁,龚六堂.政治周期与地方政府土地出让行为.经济研究,2015,(2):88-102+144.
[20]Pigou,A.C..The Economics of Welfare.Palgrave Macmillan,1920.
[21]Coase,R.H..The Problem of Social Cost.Journal of Law and Economics,1960,56(3):1-44.
[22]陈波.中国碳排放权交易市场的构建及宏观调控研究.中国人口·资源与环境,2013,23(11):7-13.
[23]吴越,唐薇.政府环境责任的规则变迁及深层法律规制问题研究--基于新《环境保护法》和宪法保护的双重视角.社会科学研究,2015,(2):20-29.
[24]Piotroski,J.D.,Wong,T.J.,Zhang,T..Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information:Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms.Journal of Accounting Research,2015,53(2):405-459.
[25]陈艳艳,罗党论.地方官员更替与企业投资.经济研究,2012,(2):18-30.
[26]陈德球,陈运森,董志勇.政策不确定性、税收征管强度与企业税收规避.管理世界,2016,(5):151-163.
[27]Chen,Y.,Jin,G.Z.,Kumar,N.,Shi,G..The Promise of Beijing:Evaluating the Impact of the 2008 Olympic Games on Air Quality.Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2013,66(3):424-443.
[28]马万里,杨濮萌.从“马拉松霾”到“APEC蓝”:中国环境治理的政治经济学.中央财经大学学报,2015,(10):16-22.
[29]杨雪锋,石洁星,王成.政治周期、选择性环境管制与环境绩效.财经论丛,2015,(12):100-108.
[30]石庆玲,郭峰,陈诗一.雾霾治理中的“政治性蓝天”--来自中国地方“两会”的证据.中国工业经济,2016,(5):40-56.
[31]王红建,汤泰劼,宋献中.谁驱动了企业环境治理:官员任期考核还是五年规划目标考核.财贸经济,2017,38(11):147-161.
[32]沈洪涛,马正彪.地区经济发展压力、企业环境表现与债务融资.金融研究,2014,(2):153-166.
[33]龙文滨,李四海,宋献中.环保规制与中小企业环境表现--基于我国中小板与创业板上市公司的经验研究.公共行政评论,2015,8(6):25-58,185-186.
[34]Patten,D.M..The Accuracy of Financial Report Projections of Future Environmental Capital Expenditures:A Research Note.Accounting,Organizations and Society,2005,30(11):457-468.
[35]黎文靖,路晓燕.机构投资者关注企业的环境绩效吗--来自我国重污染行业上市公司的经验证据.金融研究,2015,(12):97-112.
[36]胡珺,宋献中,王红建.非正式制度、家乡认同与企业环境治理.管理世界,2017,(3):76-94,187-188.
[37]钱先航,曹廷求.钱随官走:地方官员与地区间的资金流动.经济研究,2017,(2):156-170.
[38]陶然,苏福兵,陆曦,朱昱铭.经济增长能够带来晋升吗--对晋升锦标竞赛理论的逻辑挑战与省级实证重估.管理世界,2010,(12):13-26.
[39]Robinson,S.L..Trust and Breach of the Psychological Contract,Administrative Science Quarterly,1996,10(11):574-599.
[40]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作--兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因.经济研究,2004,(6):33-40.
[41]张尔升.地方官员的专业禀赋与经济增长--以中国省委书记、省长的面板数据为例.制度经济学研究,2012,(1):72-86.
[42]张平,赵国昌,罗知.中央官员来源与地方经济增长.经济学(季刊),2012,11(2):613-634.
[43]范子英,李欣.部长的政治关联效应与财政转移支付分配.经济研究,2014,(6):129-141.
[44]沈洪涛,周艳坤.环境执法监督与企业环境绩效:来自环保约谈的准自然实验证据.南开管理评论,2017,20(6):73-82.
[45]沈洪涛,黄珍,郭肪汝.告白还是辩白--企业环境表现与环境信息披露关系研究.南开管理评论,2014,17(2):56-63.
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