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道德增强的伦理探析——自由意志的视角
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  • 英文篇名:The Ethnical Analysis of Moral Bioenhancement:By Engaging into the Problem of Free Will
  • 作者:马翰林
  • 英文作者:MA Han-lin;School of Marxism,Suzhou University of Science and Technology;
  • 关键词:道德生物增强 ; 意志自由 ; 表征
  • 英文关键词:Moral Bioenhancement;;free will;;representation
  • 中文刊名:自然辩证法研究
  • 英文刊名:Studies in Dialectics of Nature
  • 机构:苏州科技大学马克思主义学院;
  • 出版日期:2019-09-18
  • 出版单位:自然辩证法研究
  • 年:2019
  • 期:09
  • 基金:江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究基金“自由意志问题范式转换——计算主义自由意志研究”(2018SJA1353);; 国家社科基金项目“合成生物学的安全伦理问题及其策略研究”(18CZX020)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:19-24
  • 页数:6
  • CN:11-1649/B
  • ISSN:1000-8934
  • 分类号:B82-058
摘要
道德生物增强(MB)设想通过生理改造提高接受者的道德认知能力,获得特定的道德目的。从生物保守主义出发,对该思潮的一个主要批评是MB会削弱人类的"作恶的自由",但"作恶的自由"相比于"可供取舍的选择可能性(AP)"而言说服力更差,这让MB的批评者一度陷入被动。但即便面对来自使用AP的反驳,MB的支持者依然可以通过坚守相容论的立场而立于不败之地。我们将试图从丹尼特的意识表征进化理论入手,提出一种新的道德生物保守主义视角,指出MB的支持者会陷入"MB无用论"同"废除人类直接意识控制的道德意义"的悖论之中。
        Moral Bioenhancement(MB) is the use of biomedical technology to improve peoples' moral cognitive ability,and make them to get certain moral purpose. Base on bioconservative thesis,a major criticism to MB means that it will undermine"the freedom to fall"of people,but this may get critics themselves into trouble. In view of this,we change"freedom to fall"into"Alternative possibility",the MB supporters can also avoid be falsified by taking a compatibilism position. We will try to start with a new moral conservatism perspective from Dennett's theory of consciousness representation evolution. And point out that MB supporters will fall into the paradox of " MB uselessness" and " abolition of the moral meaning of human direct consciousness control".
引文
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