纵向兼任高管与股价崩盘风险:“侵占效应”还是“监督效应”?
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摘要
纵向兼任高管现象在我国上市公司中普遍存在,对公司财务管理及决策产生重要的直接影响。理论上纵向兼任高管对公司股价崩盘的影响是双向的,既有"监督效应"又有"侵占效应",究竟哪一种效应是更主要的?基于委托代理理论,本文以2007-2017年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验表明,存在纵向兼任高管的公司股价崩盘风险更高,纵向兼任高管通过加剧大股东的掏空行为提高了股价崩盘风险,支持了"侵占效应"假说;进一步研究发现,在大股东控制力较弱(大股东持股比例较低)、内外部监督机制较差(单一大股东、独立董事人数较少、机构投资者持股比例较低和法制环境较差)时,公司的股价崩盘风险更高,这在逻辑上为纵向兼任高管的"侵占效应"假说提供了进一步的证据支持。本文对纵向兼任高管的相关研究进行了拓展和创新,同时丰富和发展了公司股价崩盘风险领域的相关研究。
Longitudinal concurrent executives are ubiquitous in listed companies in China, which has an important direct impact on corporate financial management and decision-making.In theory, the impact of the longitudinal concurrent executives on the collapse of the company′s stock price is bidirectional, with both "supervisory effect" and "embezzlement effect". Which effect is the most important?Based on principal-agent theory, this paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as samples. Empirical tests show that companies with longitudinal concurrent executives have higher risk of stock price crash,and longitudinal concurrent executives increase the risk of stock price crash by intensifying the tunneling behavior of major shareholders, which supports the "embezzlement effect" hypothesis;further research finds that when the controlling power of major shareholders is weaker(the proportion of major shareholders is low),and the internal and external supervision mechanism is poorer(single major shareholders, the number of independent directors is small, the proportion of institutional investors is low, and the legal environment is poor), the risk of stock price crash is higher, which logically provides further evidence for the hypothesis of "embezzlement effect" of longitudinal concurrent executives. This paper expands and innovates the related research on longitudinal concurrent executives, and enriches and develops the related research in the field of stock price crash risk.
Longitudinal concurrent executives are ubiquitous in listed companies in China, which has an important direct impact on corporate financial management and decision-making.In theory, the impact of the longitudinal concurrent executives on the collapse of the company′s stock price is bidirectional, with both "supervisory effect" and "embezzlement effect". Which effect is the most important?Based on principal-agent theory, this paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as samples. Empirical tests show that companies with longitudinal concurrent executives have higher risk of stock price crash,and longitudinal concurrent executives increase the risk of stock price crash by intensifying the tunneling behavior of major shareholders, which supports the "embezzlement effect" hypothesis;further research finds that when the controlling power of major shareholders is weaker(the proportion of major shareholders is low),and the internal and external supervision mechanism is poorer(single major shareholders, the number of independent directors is small, the proportion of institutional investors is low, and the legal environment is poor), the risk of stock price crash is higher, which logically provides further evidence for the hypothesis of "embezzlement effect" of longitudinal concurrent executives. This paper expands and innovates the related research on longitudinal concurrent executives, and enriches and develops the related research in the field of stock price crash risk.
引文
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[18] 温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰,等.中介效应检验程序及其应用[J].心理学报,2004,36(5):614-620.
[19] 王化成,曹丰,叶康涛.监督还是掏空:大股东持股比列与股价崩盘风险[J].管理世界,2015(2):45-57.
[20] 梁权熙,曾海舰.独立董事制度改革、独立董事的独立性与股价崩盘风险[J].管理世界,2016(3):144-159.
[21] Xu N,Li X,Yuan Q,et al.Excess Perks and Stock Price Crash Risk[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014,25(2):419-434.
[2] Hutton A P,Marcus A J,Tehranian H.Opaque Financial Reports,R2,and Crash Risk[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,94(1):67-86.
[3] Grossman S J,Hart O D.Takeover Bids,The Free-Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1980,11(1):42-64.
[4] Shleifer A,Vishny R W.Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[5] 佟爱琴,李孟洁.产权性质、纵向兼任高管与企业风险承担[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2018(1):118-126.
[6] Graham J R,Harvey C R,Rajgopal S.The economic implications of corporate financial reporting[J].Journal of Accounting & Economics,2005,40(1):3-73.
[7] Kothari S P,Shu S,Wysocki P D.Do Managers Withhold Bad News?[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2009,47(1):241-276.
[8] 姜付秀,蔡欣妮,朱冰.多个大股东与股价崩盘风险[J].会计研究,2018(1):68-74.
[9] Jiang G,Lee M C C,Yue H.Tunneling Through Intercorporate Loans[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,98(1):1-20.
[10] 姜付秀,马云飙,王运通.退出威胁能抑制控股股东私利行为吗?[J].管理世界,2015(5):147-159.
[11] 陈德球,魏刚,肖泽忠.法律制度效率、金融深化与家族控制权偏好[J].经济研究,2013(10):55-68.
[12] 祝继高,王春飞.大股东能有效控制管理层吗?[J].管理世界,2012(4):138-152.
[13] Claessens S,Djankov S,Lang L H P.The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1-2):81-112.
[14] Johnson S,Porta R L,Shleifer A.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(2):22-27.
[15] Burkart M,Fausto P,Andrei S.Family Firms[J].Journal of Finance,2003,58(3):2167-2202.
[16] 郑杲娉,薛健,陈晓.兼任高管与公司价值[J].会计研究,2014(11):24-29.
[17] 潘红波,韩芳芳.纵向兼任高管、产权性质与会计信息质量[J].会计研究,2016(7):19-26.
[18] 温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰,等.中介效应检验程序及其应用[J].心理学报,2004,36(5):614-620.
[19] 王化成,曹丰,叶康涛.监督还是掏空:大股东持股比列与股价崩盘风险[J].管理世界,2015(2):45-57.
[20] 梁权熙,曾海舰.独立董事制度改革、独立董事的独立性与股价崩盘风险[J].管理世界,2016(3):144-159.
[21] Xu N,Li X,Yuan Q,et al.Excess Perks and Stock Price Crash Risk[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014,25(2):419-434.