企业避税行为与投资效率实证研究
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摘要
为了研究企业避税活动与投资效率之间的关系,采用Richardson模型测算投资效率,并进一步构建投资效率、投资不足与投资过度分别与避税活动之间的线性模型。结果表明,(1)企业的避税程度与投资效率呈负相关关系,即企业避税程度越高,投资效率越低;(2)企业的避税活动与过度投资呈正相关关系,且没有明显证据表明避税活动与投资不足之间存在显著的相关关系,即企业避税行为容易产生过度投资。因此,建议企业应合理认识避税行为的经济后果,加强对管理层投资行为的评价分析,以期管理层减少损害企业价值的自利行为,提高投资效率。
In order to study the relationship between corporate tax avoidance activities and investment efficiency, the Richardson model was used to measure investment efficiency; and a linear model between investment efficiency, underinvestment and over-investment and tax avoidance activities was further constructed. The results showed that(1)the tax avoidance degree of the enterprises is negatively correlated with the investment efficiency. The higher the tax avoidance degree of enterprises, the lower the investment efficiency.(2)Corporate tax activities are positively related with excessive investment relations.And there is no obvious evidence that the corporate tax avoidance activities have a significant relationship with insufficient investment. That is, corporate tax avoidance is prone to over-investment. Therefore, it is recommended that enterprises should reasonably understand the economic consequences of tax avoidance behaviors and strengthen the evaluation and analysis of management investment behaviors, so that management can reduce self-interested behaviors that damage corporate value and improve investment efficiency.
In order to study the relationship between corporate tax avoidance activities and investment efficiency, the Richardson model was used to measure investment efficiency; and a linear model between investment efficiency, underinvestment and over-investment and tax avoidance activities was further constructed. The results showed that(1)the tax avoidance degree of the enterprises is negatively correlated with the investment efficiency. The higher the tax avoidance degree of enterprises, the lower the investment efficiency.(2)Corporate tax activities are positively related with excessive investment relations.And there is no obvious evidence that the corporate tax avoidance activities have a significant relationship with insufficient investment. That is, corporate tax avoidance is prone to over-investment. Therefore, it is recommended that enterprises should reasonably understand the economic consequences of tax avoidance behaviors and strengthen the evaluation and analysis of management investment behaviors, so that management can reduce self-interested behaviors that damage corporate value and improve investment efficiency.
引文
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[10]张玲,朱婷婷.税收征管、企业避税与企业投资效率[J].审计与经济研究,2015,30(2):83-92.
[11]张兆国,郑宝红,李明.公司治理、税收规避和现金持有价值——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):15-24.
[12]胡晓,刘斌,蒋水全.产品市场竞争、税收规避与资本投资——基于资金压力和代理成本视角的实证考察[J].经济评论,2017(1):90-105.
[2] CHEN S,CHEN X,CHENG Q,et al.Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,95(1):41-61.
[3]陈北国,杨孝安.企业避税活动对投资效率影响的实证分析[J].财会月刊,2015(12):38-40.
[4] BIDDLE G,HILARY G,VERDI R S.How does financial reporting quality relate to investments efficiency[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2009,48(2):112-131.
[5] DESAI M A,DYCK A,ZINGALES L.Theft and taxes[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,84(3):591-623.
[6]刘凡.管理层权力、内部控制与企业避税[J].财会通讯,2017(36):3-7,129.
[7] KIM J B,LI Y,ZHANG L.Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risks:firm-level analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,100(3):639-662.
[8] ARMSTRONG C S,BLOUIN J L,JAGOLINZER A D,et al.Corporate governance,incentives,and tax avoidance[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2015,60(1):1-17.
[9]刘行,叶康涛.企业的避税活动会影响投资效率吗?[J].会计研究,2013(6):47-53,96.
[10]张玲,朱婷婷.税收征管、企业避税与企业投资效率[J].审计与经济研究,2015,30(2):83-92.
[11]张兆国,郑宝红,李明.公司治理、税收规避和现金持有价值——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):15-24.
[12]胡晓,刘斌,蒋水全.产品市场竞争、税收规避与资本投资——基于资金压力和代理成本视角的实证考察[J].经济评论,2017(1):90-105.