基于微分博弈理论下的碳税减排策略分析
|
摘要
文章基于政府动态碳税政策,同时考虑环境中工业企业碳排放累积变化对整体环境的负面影响,构建了一个有限期内单政府-多企业的Stackelberg微分博弈模型,其中各企业呈竞争关系。通过运用最优控制理论,构造汉密尔顿方程,给出最优决策路径,得出微观层面上均衡状态下政府与企业的开环策略、大气环境中碳排放累积量的状态变化方程。研究发现:一方面,计划期末碳累积量的单位损害值的预期高低会影响到计划期中政府设定的碳税率的大小以及企业生产排放量的高低;另一方面,市场上企业的多寡,也会影响政府碳税的制定。随着越来越多的企业进入市场,若企业的平均单位生产成本增加,则将促进政府制定较低的碳税率;若平均单位生产成本降低,则将促进政府制定较高的碳税率。
Considering the government's dynamic carbon tax policy and the negative impact of carbon emission stock of the industrial enterprises on the whole environment, a single government-multi enterprises Stackelberg differential game model in a finite horizon is established, where the enterprises are competitive. By using the optimal control theory and Hamilton equations, the optimal decision path and the open loop strategies of the government and enterprises in equilibrium state are given. The carbon emissions accumulation change state equation is also given. The results show that the expected level of unit damage of carbon accumulation in the end of the plan would affect the size of the government's carbon tax rate and the level of production and emission of enterprises. On the other hand, the number of enterprises in the market would also affect the government's carbon tax formulation. With more and more enterprises entering the market, if the average unit production cost is raised, the government will set a low carbon tax rate; and if the average unit production cost is reduced, the government will set a higher carbon tax rate.
Considering the government's dynamic carbon tax policy and the negative impact of carbon emission stock of the industrial enterprises on the whole environment, a single government-multi enterprises Stackelberg differential game model in a finite horizon is established, where the enterprises are competitive. By using the optimal control theory and Hamilton equations, the optimal decision path and the open loop strategies of the government and enterprises in equilibrium state are given. The carbon emissions accumulation change state equation is also given. The results show that the expected level of unit damage of carbon accumulation in the end of the plan would affect the size of the government's carbon tax rate and the level of production and emission of enterprises. On the other hand, the number of enterprises in the market would also affect the government's carbon tax formulation. With more and more enterprises entering the market, if the average unit production cost is raised, the government will set a low carbon tax rate; and if the average unit production cost is reduced, the government will set a higher carbon tax rate.
引文
[1] 石敏俊,袁永娜,周晟吕,等.碳减排政策:碳税、碳交易还是两者兼之[J].管理科学学报,2013,16(9):9-19.
[2] 魏庆坡,碳交易与碳税兼容性分析:兼论中国减排路径选择[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(5):35-43.
[3] 王文军,谢鹏程,胡际莲.碳税和碳交易机制的行业减排成本比较优势研究[J].气候变化研究进展,2016,12(1):53-60.
[4] 郑爽,窦勇.利用经济手段应对气候变化:碳税与碳交易对比分析[J].中国能源,2013,35(10),11-15.
[5] 赵黎明,殷建立.碳交易和碳税情景下碳减排二层规划决策模型研究[J].管理科学,2016,29(1):137-146.
[6] DOCKNER E J,JORGENSEN S,LONG N V.Differential games in economics and management science[M].Cambridge,Eng.:Cambridge University Press,2000.
[7] JORGENSE S,ZACCOUR G.Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control[J].Automatica,2001,37(1):29-36.
[8] YEUNK D K,PETROSYAN L.Subgame consistent solution for a cooperative differential game of climate change control[J].Center of Game Theory,2012,5:356-385.
[9] HUANG X,HE P,ZHANG W.A cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two regions[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016,120(1):43-52.
[10] BAHN O,HAURIE A.A cost-effectiveness differential game model for climate agreements[J].Dynamic Games and Applications,2016,6(1):1-19.
[11] 黄守军,任玉珑,俞集辉,等.寡头电力市场中CO2排放规制的微分对策模型[J].电力系统自动化,2011,35(21):46-51.
[12] 赵黎明,陈喆芝,刘嘉玥.基于微分对策的政企合作低碳策略[J].系统工程,2016,34(1):84-90.
[13] 赵莉,彭小辉,顾海英.传统空气污染物和温室气体减排最优控制策略[J].系统管理学报,2016,25(3):506-513.
[14] 杨仕辉,翁蔚哲.气候政策的微分博弈及其环境效应分析[J].国际经贸探索,2013,29(5):39-51.
[15] 杨仕辉,魏守道,胥然,等.气候政策的经济环境效应分析与比较:基于碳税、许可交易和总量控制的动态微分博弈[J].数学的实践与认识,2014,44(22):35-46.
[16] 魏守道.发展中国家碳税政策的选择及实施时机的效应:基于微分博弈的研究[J].广西财经学院学报,2016,29(3):1-10.
[2] 魏庆坡,碳交易与碳税兼容性分析:兼论中国减排路径选择[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(5):35-43.
[3] 王文军,谢鹏程,胡际莲.碳税和碳交易机制的行业减排成本比较优势研究[J].气候变化研究进展,2016,12(1):53-60.
[4] 郑爽,窦勇.利用经济手段应对气候变化:碳税与碳交易对比分析[J].中国能源,2013,35(10),11-15.
[5] 赵黎明,殷建立.碳交易和碳税情景下碳减排二层规划决策模型研究[J].管理科学,2016,29(1):137-146.
[6] DOCKNER E J,JORGENSEN S,LONG N V.Differential games in economics and management science[M].Cambridge,Eng.:Cambridge University Press,2000.
[7] JORGENSE S,ZACCOUR G.Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control[J].Automatica,2001,37(1):29-36.
[8] YEUNK D K,PETROSYAN L.Subgame consistent solution for a cooperative differential game of climate change control[J].Center of Game Theory,2012,5:356-385.
[9] HUANG X,HE P,ZHANG W.A cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two regions[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016,120(1):43-52.
[10] BAHN O,HAURIE A.A cost-effectiveness differential game model for climate agreements[J].Dynamic Games and Applications,2016,6(1):1-19.
[11] 黄守军,任玉珑,俞集辉,等.寡头电力市场中CO2排放规制的微分对策模型[J].电力系统自动化,2011,35(21):46-51.
[12] 赵黎明,陈喆芝,刘嘉玥.基于微分对策的政企合作低碳策略[J].系统工程,2016,34(1):84-90.
[13] 赵莉,彭小辉,顾海英.传统空气污染物和温室气体减排最优控制策略[J].系统管理学报,2016,25(3):506-513.
[14] 杨仕辉,翁蔚哲.气候政策的微分博弈及其环境效应分析[J].国际经贸探索,2013,29(5):39-51.
[15] 杨仕辉,魏守道,胥然,等.气候政策的经济环境效应分析与比较:基于碳税、许可交易和总量控制的动态微分博弈[J].数学的实践与认识,2014,44(22):35-46.
[16] 魏守道.发展中国家碳税政策的选择及实施时机的效应:基于微分博弈的研究[J].广西财经学院学报,2016,29(3):1-10.