政企合谋视角下的环境治理——基于官员考核标准变化的准自然实验
|
摘要
在原有GDP锦标赛模式下,地方政府为了追求经济增长往往会忽略环境保护等次要目标,甚至形成政企合谋,默许当地企业的污染行为。2007年国务院发布了《国务院关于印发节能减排综合性工作方案的通知》,正式将环保一票否决制引入官员晋升考核标准中。这一考核制度意味着,如果地方官员无法完成上级制定的节能减排任务,即使经济发展等方面的业绩再突出,都将无法晋升。这一政策变化必然会导致地方官员在环保工作上的投入发生跳跃式增加,尤其是对环保违法行为的监管。基于2004年至2015年各地环保行政处罚案件的数据,本文采用断点回归方法(RDD)估计得出,环保一票否决制的引入使得一个城市每年的环保行政处罚数量平均增加约30起。而在政策冲击前后,企业的生产与排污行为并没有发生跳跃式变化。进一步地分析发现,各地区对这一政策的反应存在巨大的异质性。借助机器学习,本文发现,在众多变量中,官员是否受到晋升年龄限制、任期等政治因素是影响地方官员对这一政策反应最为重要的因素。
Under the GDP Championship in the past, local governments may pursuit of economic growth but neglect other factors such as environmental protection, and even conspire with local enterprises to acquiesce the pollution behavior. The State Council promulgated the "Notice of the State Council on Printing and Distributing the Comprehensive Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction" in 2007, and confirmedly introduced the "One-Vote Veto System" of environmental protection into the official assessment system. This assessment system means that if local officials are unable to complete the task of energy conservation and emission reduction formulated by their superiors, even if the performance of economic development and other aspects are outstanding, they will not be promoted. This change had led local officials to significantly increase their efforts in environmental protection, especially in the regulation of environmental violations. We collect the data of administrative punishment cases of environmental pollution from 2004 to 2015 and use the RD Design to estimate the treatment effect. Then we find that the introduction of "One-Vote Veto System" had increased the number of administrative penalties by about 30 times on average. But there is no leap in the production and emissions of enterprises around the policy shock.Further, the responses of different cities to this policy are heterogeneous. With machine learning technology, we find that among the variables, whether the officials are subject to promotion age restrictions, tenure and other political factors are the most important factors affecting local officials' response to this policy.
Under the GDP Championship in the past, local governments may pursuit of economic growth but neglect other factors such as environmental protection, and even conspire with local enterprises to acquiesce the pollution behavior. The State Council promulgated the "Notice of the State Council on Printing and Distributing the Comprehensive Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction" in 2007, and confirmedly introduced the "One-Vote Veto System" of environmental protection into the official assessment system. This assessment system means that if local officials are unable to complete the task of energy conservation and emission reduction formulated by their superiors, even if the performance of economic development and other aspects are outstanding, they will not be promoted. This change had led local officials to significantly increase their efforts in environmental protection, especially in the regulation of environmental violations. We collect the data of administrative punishment cases of environmental pollution from 2004 to 2015 and use the RD Design to estimate the treatment effect. Then we find that the introduction of "One-Vote Veto System" had increased the number of administrative penalties by about 30 times on average. But there is no leap in the production and emissions of enterprises around the policy shock.Further, the responses of different cities to this policy are heterogeneous. With machine learning technology, we find that among the variables, whether the officials are subject to promotion age restrictions, tenure and other political factors are the most important factors affecting local officials' response to this policy.
引文
[1]赵云旗.公共财政与中国经济增长方式转变[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2014.
[2]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):4-19.
[3]张五常.中国的经济制度[M].北京:中信出版社,2009.
[4]Jia Ruixue.Pollution for promotion[R].USC FBE Applied Economics Working Paper,2013.
[5]Liang Jiaqi,Langbein L.Performance management,high-powered incentives,and environmental policies in China[J].International Public Management Journal,2015,18(3):346-385.
[6]Nie Huihua,Jiang Minjie,Wang Xianghong.The impact of political cycle:Evidence from coalmine accidents in China[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2013,41(4):995-1011.
[7]聂辉华,李金波.政企合谋与经济发展[J].经济学(季刊),2007(1):75-90.
[8]石庆玲,郭峰,陈诗一.雾霾治理中的“政治性蓝天”---来自中国地方“两会”的证据[J].中国工业经济,2016(5):42-58.
[9]王红建,汤泰劼,宋献中.谁驱动了企业环境治理:官员任期考核还是五年规划目标考核[J].财贸经济,2017(11):149-163.
[10]龙硕,胡军.政企合谋视角下的环境污染:理论与实证研究[J].财经研究,2014(10):131-144.
[11]梁平汉,高楠.人事变更、法制环境和地方环境污染[J].管理世界,2014(6):65-78.
[12]郭峰,石庆玲.官员更替、合谋震慑与空气质量的临时性改善[J].经济研究,2017(7):157-170.
[13]陈刚,李树.官员交流、任期与反腐败[J].世界经济,2012(2):120-142.
[14]聂辉华,蒋敏杰.政企合谋与矿难:来自中国省级面板数据的证据[J].经济研究,2011(6):146-156.
[15]罗党论,赖再洪.重污染企业投资与地方官员晋升---基于地级市1999-2010年数据的经验证据[J].会计研究,2016(4):42-48.
[16]周敏,毕睿罡,寇宗来.官员任期、年龄限制与地方企业投资---来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].产业经济研究,2017(3):120-130.
[17]谭之博,周黎安.官员任期与信贷和投资周期[J].金融研究,2015(6):80-93.
[18]徐现祥,王贤彬,舒元.地方官员与经济增长---来自中国省长、省委书记交流的证据[J].经济研究,2007(9):18-31.
[19]张军,高远,傅勇,等.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施[J].经济研究,2007(3):4-19.
[20]陈硕,朱志韬.相对绩效考核与自由裁量权:中国县级官员治理考察[R].复旦大学经济学院工作论文,2018.
[21]陈硕.从治理到制度:央地关系下的中国政治精英选拔1368-2010[R].复旦大学经济学院工作论文,2015.
[22]Walter I,Ugelow J L.Environmental policies in developing countries[J].AMBIO,1979,8(2/3):102-109.
[23]Walter I.Environmentally induced industrial relocation to developing countries[J].Environment and Trade,1982,2:235-256.
[24]Copeland B R,Taylor M S.North-south trade and the environment[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(3):755-787.
[25]Copeland B R,Taylor M S.Trade,growth,and the environment[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2004,42(1):7-71.
[26]Hausman C,Rapson D S.Regression discontinuity in time:Considerations for empirical applications[J].Annual Review of Resource Economics,2018,10:533-552.
[27]Gelman A,Imbens G.Why high-order polynomials should not be used in regression discontinuity designs[J].Journal of Business&Economic Statistics,2018,47:1-10.
[28]Lee D S,Lemieux T.Regression discontinuity designs in economics[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2010,48(2):281-355.
[29]Hahn J,Todd P,Van der Klaauw W.Identification and estimation of treatment effects with a regression-discontinuity design[J].Econometrica,2001,69(1):201-209.
[30]McCrary J.Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design:A density test[J].Journal of Economerics,2008,142(2):698-714.
(1)详见《中共干部选拔管理条例(2014修订版)》
(2)详细内容见《节能减排综合性方案》。
(3)标准的断点回归设计通常以横截面变量作为配置变量,以时间为配置变量的断点回归设计是一种特殊情形[28]。而以时间为配置变量的断点回归设计则在环境经济学与能源经济学领域被大量使用。
(4)除正文中展示的结果外,本文还对回归方程(1)中的控制变量做了连续性检验,结果表明,本文选取的控制变量在政策冲击前后均未发生跳跃式变化,限于篇幅未一一列出。
[2]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):4-19.
[3]张五常.中国的经济制度[M].北京:中信出版社,2009.
[4]Jia Ruixue.Pollution for promotion[R].USC FBE Applied Economics Working Paper,2013.
[5]Liang Jiaqi,Langbein L.Performance management,high-powered incentives,and environmental policies in China[J].International Public Management Journal,2015,18(3):346-385.
[6]Nie Huihua,Jiang Minjie,Wang Xianghong.The impact of political cycle:Evidence from coalmine accidents in China[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2013,41(4):995-1011.
[7]聂辉华,李金波.政企合谋与经济发展[J].经济学(季刊),2007(1):75-90.
[8]石庆玲,郭峰,陈诗一.雾霾治理中的“政治性蓝天”---来自中国地方“两会”的证据[J].中国工业经济,2016(5):42-58.
[9]王红建,汤泰劼,宋献中.谁驱动了企业环境治理:官员任期考核还是五年规划目标考核[J].财贸经济,2017(11):149-163.
[10]龙硕,胡军.政企合谋视角下的环境污染:理论与实证研究[J].财经研究,2014(10):131-144.
[11]梁平汉,高楠.人事变更、法制环境和地方环境污染[J].管理世界,2014(6):65-78.
[12]郭峰,石庆玲.官员更替、合谋震慑与空气质量的临时性改善[J].经济研究,2017(7):157-170.
[13]陈刚,李树.官员交流、任期与反腐败[J].世界经济,2012(2):120-142.
[14]聂辉华,蒋敏杰.政企合谋与矿难:来自中国省级面板数据的证据[J].经济研究,2011(6):146-156.
[15]罗党论,赖再洪.重污染企业投资与地方官员晋升---基于地级市1999-2010年数据的经验证据[J].会计研究,2016(4):42-48.
[16]周敏,毕睿罡,寇宗来.官员任期、年龄限制与地方企业投资---来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].产业经济研究,2017(3):120-130.
[17]谭之博,周黎安.官员任期与信贷和投资周期[J].金融研究,2015(6):80-93.
[18]徐现祥,王贤彬,舒元.地方官员与经济增长---来自中国省长、省委书记交流的证据[J].经济研究,2007(9):18-31.
[19]张军,高远,傅勇,等.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施[J].经济研究,2007(3):4-19.
[20]陈硕,朱志韬.相对绩效考核与自由裁量权:中国县级官员治理考察[R].复旦大学经济学院工作论文,2018.
[21]陈硕.从治理到制度:央地关系下的中国政治精英选拔1368-2010[R].复旦大学经济学院工作论文,2015.
[22]Walter I,Ugelow J L.Environmental policies in developing countries[J].AMBIO,1979,8(2/3):102-109.
[23]Walter I.Environmentally induced industrial relocation to developing countries[J].Environment and Trade,1982,2:235-256.
[24]Copeland B R,Taylor M S.North-south trade and the environment[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(3):755-787.
[25]Copeland B R,Taylor M S.Trade,growth,and the environment[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2004,42(1):7-71.
[26]Hausman C,Rapson D S.Regression discontinuity in time:Considerations for empirical applications[J].Annual Review of Resource Economics,2018,10:533-552.
[27]Gelman A,Imbens G.Why high-order polynomials should not be used in regression discontinuity designs[J].Journal of Business&Economic Statistics,2018,47:1-10.
[28]Lee D S,Lemieux T.Regression discontinuity designs in economics[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2010,48(2):281-355.
[29]Hahn J,Todd P,Van der Klaauw W.Identification and estimation of treatment effects with a regression-discontinuity design[J].Econometrica,2001,69(1):201-209.
[30]McCrary J.Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design:A density test[J].Journal of Economerics,2008,142(2):698-714.
(1)详见《中共干部选拔管理条例(2014修订版)》
(2)详细内容见《节能减排综合性方案》。
(3)标准的断点回归设计通常以横截面变量作为配置变量,以时间为配置变量的断点回归设计是一种特殊情形[28]。而以时间为配置变量的断点回归设计则在环境经济学与能源经济学领域被大量使用。
(4)除正文中展示的结果外,本文还对回归方程(1)中的控制变量做了连续性检验,结果表明,本文选取的控制变量在政策冲击前后均未发生跳跃式变化,限于篇幅未一一列出。