股票质押行为会增强会计稳健性吗?
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摘要
作为公司快速获得所需资金的手段之一,股票质押在近些年逐渐成为热度话题。文章以2007-2017年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,分析了股票质押行为对公司会计稳健性的影响,以及控股股东股票质押和非控股股东股票质押两者对公司会计稳健性的不同程度的影响。文章实证结果显示,股票质押行为会显著增强会计稳健性,同时,公司的会计稳健性会随着股票质押比例的提高而增强;将股票质押行为按照质押人的身份划分为控股股东质押和非控股股东质押,前者比后者更能增强公司的会计稳健性;在进一步检验中,将会计稳健性按照来源分成条件稳健性和非条件稳健性后发现,股票质押行为对条件稳健性有显著影响,对非条件稳健性无显著影响。
As one of the company's rapid access to the required funds,stock pledge has gradually become a hot topic in recent years. This paper takes the shareholder pledge and the company's accounting conservatism of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2017 as the research object. It analyzes the impacts of stock pledge on the company's accounting conservatism,and different degrees' impact of stock pledges by controlling shareholders and noncontrolling shareholders on the corporate accounting conservatism. The empirical results show that the stock pledge behavior significantly enhances the accounting conservatism;at the same time,the company's accounting conservatism increases with the increase of stock pledge ratio. The stock pledge behavior is divided into controlling shareholder pledge and non-controlling shareholder pledge. The former better enhances the company's accounting conservatism than the latter. Further examination finds that stock pledge has a significant impact on the conditional conservatism of the company,but no significant impact on the non-conditional conservatism.
As one of the company's rapid access to the required funds,stock pledge has gradually become a hot topic in recent years. This paper takes the shareholder pledge and the company's accounting conservatism of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2017 as the research object. It analyzes the impacts of stock pledge on the company's accounting conservatism,and different degrees' impact of stock pledges by controlling shareholders and noncontrolling shareholders on the corporate accounting conservatism. The empirical results show that the stock pledge behavior significantly enhances the accounting conservatism;at the same time,the company's accounting conservatism increases with the increase of stock pledge ratio. The stock pledge behavior is divided into controlling shareholder pledge and non-controlling shareholder pledge. The former better enhances the company's accounting conservatism than the latter. Further examination finds that stock pledge has a significant impact on the conditional conservatism of the company,but no significant impact on the non-conditional conservatism.
引文
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[17]郑国坚,林东杰,林斌.大股东股权质押,占款与企业价值[J].管理科学学报,2014,9(17):72-87.
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[21]徐寿福,贺学会,陈晶萍.股权质押与大股东双重择时动机[J].财经研究,2016(6):74-86.
[22]BEAVER W H,RYAN S G.Conditional and unconditional conservatism:concepts and modeling[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2005,10(2/3):269-309.
[23]BALL R,SHIVAKUMAR L.Earnings quality in U.K.private firms:comparative loss recognition timeliness[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39(1):83-128.
[24]WATTS R L.Conservatism in accounting,part I:explanations and implications[J].Accounting Horizons,2003,17(3):207-221.
[25]WATTS R L.Conservatism in accounting,Part II:evidence and research opportunities[J].Accounting Horizons,2003,17(4):287-301.
[26]张兆国,刘永丽,李庚秦.会计稳健性计量方法的比较与选择--基于相关性和可靠性的实证研究[J].会计研究,2012(2):37-41.
[27]罗斌元.非条件稳健性、条件稳健性与企业投资效率[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2014(2):119-127.
[28]LOUIS H,SUN A,URCAN O.Value cash holdings and accounting of conservatism[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2012,29(4):49-71.
[2]黎来芳.商业伦理诚信义务与不道德控制--鸿仪系“掏空”上市公司的案例研究[J].会计研究,2005(11):8-14.
[3]李永伟.控股股东股权质押动因及经济后果研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2007.
[4]艾大力,王斌.论大股东股权质押与上市公司财务影响机理与市场反应[J].北京工商大学学报:社会科学版,2012(4):72-76.
[5]王斌,蔡安辉,冯洋.大股东股权质押、控制权转移风险与公司业绩[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013(7):1762-1773.
[6]谢德仁,郑登津,崔宸瑜.控股股东股权质押是潜在的“地雷”吗?--基于股价崩盘风险视角的研究[J].管理世界,2016(5):128-140.
[7]CHO S Y,HAGERMAN R L,NABAR S,et al.Measuring stockholder materiality[J].Accounting Horizons,2003,17:63-76.
[8]ENTWISTLE G M,PHILLIPS F.Relevance,reliability,and the earnings quality debate[J].Accounting Education,2003(1):79-92.
[9]BASU S.The Conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1997,24(1):3-37.
[10]李增泉,卢文彬.会计盈余的稳健性:发现与启示[J].会计研究,2003(2):19-27.
[11]曲晓辉,邱月华.强制性制度变迁与盈余稳健性--来自深沪证券市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2007(7):20-28.
[12]毛新述,戴德明.会计制度改革、盈余稳健性与盈余管理[J].会计研究,2009(12):38-46.
[13]胡念梅,翁健英.会计制度改革与盈余稳健性--基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].江西财经大学学报,2010(2):31-37.
[14]GIVOLY D,HAYN C.The changing time-series properties of earnings,cash flows and accruals:has financial reporting become more conservative?[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2000,29(3):287-320.
[15]BALL R,ROBIN A,WU J S.Accounting standards,the institutional environment and issue incentives:effect on timely loss recognition in China[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting&Economics,2000,7(1):71-96.
[16]郝项超,梁琪.最终控制人股权质押损害公司价值么?[J].会计研究,2009(7):57-63.
[17]郑国坚,林东杰,林斌.大股东股权质押,占款与企业价值[J].管理科学学报,2014,9(17):72-87.
[18]王斌,宋春霞.大股东股权质押、股权性质与盈余管理方式[J].华东经济管理,2015(8):118-128.
[19]AHMED A S,BILLINGS B K,MORTON R M,et al.The role of accounting conservatism in mitigating bondholdershareholder conflicts over dividend policy and in reducing debt costs[J].The Accounting Review,2002,77(4):867-890.
[20]KIM J B,ZHANG L.Accounting conservatism and stock price crash risk:firm-level evidence[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2016,33(1):412-441.
[21]徐寿福,贺学会,陈晶萍.股权质押与大股东双重择时动机[J].财经研究,2016(6):74-86.
[22]BEAVER W H,RYAN S G.Conditional and unconditional conservatism:concepts and modeling[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2005,10(2/3):269-309.
[23]BALL R,SHIVAKUMAR L.Earnings quality in U.K.private firms:comparative loss recognition timeliness[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39(1):83-128.
[24]WATTS R L.Conservatism in accounting,part I:explanations and implications[J].Accounting Horizons,2003,17(3):207-221.
[25]WATTS R L.Conservatism in accounting,Part II:evidence and research opportunities[J].Accounting Horizons,2003,17(4):287-301.
[26]张兆国,刘永丽,李庚秦.会计稳健性计量方法的比较与选择--基于相关性和可靠性的实证研究[J].会计研究,2012(2):37-41.
[27]罗斌元.非条件稳健性、条件稳健性与企业投资效率[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2014(2):119-127.
[28]LOUIS H,SUN A,URCAN O.Value cash holdings and accounting of conservatism[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2012,29(4):49-71.