Pricing Game Model of Wasted Clothing Recycling and Remanufacturing Based on Government Subsidy
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摘要
In the global environment of pursuing resource regeneration and green environmental protection, more and more wasted clothing need to be solved. In order to make full use of the wasted clothing and save land and soil resources, an idea of wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing is put forward. In the new idea a pricing game model is established basing on Stacklberg differential game theory between traditional and remanufactured clothing. In this model, the differences in consumers' willingness to pay and the government's subsidies are considered. Government's optimal subsidy are obtained which ensure not only the interests of manufacturers but also environmental reputation and maximum social benefits. The study is helpful to push the wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing plan. It makes some index more precise quantification as government's subsidy, manufacturers and the social benefits. Government and manufactures can make the detailed cooperation plan reference to it.
In the global environment of pursuing resource regeneration and green environmental protection, more and more wasted clothing need to be solved. In order to make full use of the wasted clothing and save land and soil resources, an idea of wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing is put forward. In the new idea a pricing game model is established basing on Stacklberg differential game theory between traditional and remanufactured clothing. In this model, the differences in consumers' willingness to pay and the government's subsidies are considered. Government's optimal subsidy are obtained which ensure not only the interests of manufacturers but also environmental reputation and maximum social benefits. The study is helpful to push the wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing plan. It makes some index more precise quantification as government's subsidy, manufacturers and the social benefits. Government and manufactures can make the detailed cooperation plan reference to it.
In the global environment of pursuing resource regeneration and green environmental protection, more and more wasted clothing need to be solved. In order to make full use of the wasted clothing and save land and soil resources, an idea of wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing is put forward. In the new idea a pricing game model is established basing on Stacklberg differential game theory between traditional and remanufactured clothing. In this model, the differences in consumers' willingness to pay and the government's subsidies are considered. Government's optimal subsidy are obtained which ensure not only the interests of manufacturers but also environmental reputation and maximum social benefits. The study is helpful to push the wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing plan. It makes some index more precise quantification as government's subsidy, manufacturers and the social benefits. Government and manufactures can make the detailed cooperation plan reference to it.
引文
[1] GOU Y. Status analysis of textile waste recycling industry in guangzhou and shenzhen[J]. Recyclable Resources and Cyclular Economy, 2017, 10(8): 17-19. (in Chinese)
[2] LIU Y X, HAO S L. Value study of used textile recycling based on industry closed-loop[J]. Wool Textile Journal, 2016, 44(2): 66-69. (in Chinese)
[3] ZHANG X F, MA W X, SUN J Q. Comparative study on the degradation process of polyester[J]. Wool Textile Journal, 2017, 45(5): 43-49. (in Chinese)
[4] ZHANG M J, ZHAO G L. Recycling techniques of synthetic fibers[J]. China Synthetic Fiber Industry, 2012, 35(2) : 48-52. (in Chinese)
[5] ZAMANI B, SVANSTROM M, PETERS G, et al. A carbon footprint of textile recycling[J]. Journal of Industrial Ecology,2014(18): 1-12.
[6] CHAVAN R B. Environmental sustainability through textile recycling[J]. Journal of Textile Science & Engineering, 2014(S2): 1.
[7] DISSANAYAKE G, SINHA P. An examination of the product development process for fashion remanufacturing[J]. Resources Conservation and Recycling, 2015, 104(A): 94-102
[8] Lü K K. Research on strategy of recycling old clothes[D].Yangzhou: Yangzhou University, 2014. (in Chinese)
[9] MITRA S, WEBSTER S. Competition in remanufacturing and the effects of government subsidies[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2007, 111(2): 287-298.
[10] ZHU Q H, DOU Y J. A game model for green supply chain management based on government subsidies[J]. Journal of Management Science in China, 2011, 14(6):86-95. (in Chinese)
[11] WANG W B, DA Q L. The decision-making model of the electronic product manufacturer about collection and remanufacturing based on premium and penalty mechanism[J]. Chinese Journa1 of Management Science, 2008, 16(5): 57-63. (in Chinese)
[12] XU C Q, ZHAO Z Y, YUAN B Y. Products differential pricing and supply chain coordination mechanism under the government subsidy policy[J]. Systems Engineering, 2014, 32(3): 78-86. (in Chinese)
[13] XIE Q Y. Research on alternative green products[D]. Nanchang: Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, 2008.(in Chinese)
[14] XIE S Y. Economic Game Theory[M]. Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2002: 61-89. (in Chinese)
[15] WU C H. Product-design and pricing strategies with remanufacturing[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 222(2): 204-215.
[16] WANG K,ZHAO Y, CHENG Y. Cooperation or competition? channel choice for a remanufacturing fashion supply chain with government subsidy[J]. Sustainability, 2014, 6(10): 7292-7310.
[17] FUDENBERG D, LEVINE D.K. The theory of learning in games[M]. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998: 57-69.
[18] CHOI T M. Pricing and branding for remanufactured fashion products[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2017, 165(1): 1385-1394.
[19] FERGUSON M E, Toktay L B. The effect of competition on recovery strategies[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2006, 15(3): 351-368.
[20] ZHAO X M, XU Y Y, LIN Y H. The effects of government subsidies on remanufacturing in the nash market[J]. Industrial Engineering and Management, 2015, 20(1): 90-94. (in Chinese)
[21] XIONG Z K, HUANG F, LIU Y. A study of remanufactured product marketing strategy of retailers in new product distribution[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2013, 16(2): 26-32. (in Chinese)
[2] LIU Y X, HAO S L. Value study of used textile recycling based on industry closed-loop[J]. Wool Textile Journal, 2016, 44(2): 66-69. (in Chinese)
[3] ZHANG X F, MA W X, SUN J Q. Comparative study on the degradation process of polyester[J]. Wool Textile Journal, 2017, 45(5): 43-49. (in Chinese)
[4] ZHANG M J, ZHAO G L. Recycling techniques of synthetic fibers[J]. China Synthetic Fiber Industry, 2012, 35(2) : 48-52. (in Chinese)
[5] ZAMANI B, SVANSTROM M, PETERS G, et al. A carbon footprint of textile recycling[J]. Journal of Industrial Ecology,2014(18): 1-12.
[6] CHAVAN R B. Environmental sustainability through textile recycling[J]. Journal of Textile Science & Engineering, 2014(S2): 1.
[7] DISSANAYAKE G, SINHA P. An examination of the product development process for fashion remanufacturing[J]. Resources Conservation and Recycling, 2015, 104(A): 94-102
[8] Lü K K. Research on strategy of recycling old clothes[D].Yangzhou: Yangzhou University, 2014. (in Chinese)
[9] MITRA S, WEBSTER S. Competition in remanufacturing and the effects of government subsidies[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2007, 111(2): 287-298.
[10] ZHU Q H, DOU Y J. A game model for green supply chain management based on government subsidies[J]. Journal of Management Science in China, 2011, 14(6):86-95. (in Chinese)
[11] WANG W B, DA Q L. The decision-making model of the electronic product manufacturer about collection and remanufacturing based on premium and penalty mechanism[J]. Chinese Journa1 of Management Science, 2008, 16(5): 57-63. (in Chinese)
[12] XU C Q, ZHAO Z Y, YUAN B Y. Products differential pricing and supply chain coordination mechanism under the government subsidy policy[J]. Systems Engineering, 2014, 32(3): 78-86. (in Chinese)
[13] XIE Q Y. Research on alternative green products[D]. Nanchang: Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, 2008.(in Chinese)
[14] XIE S Y. Economic Game Theory[M]. Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2002: 61-89. (in Chinese)
[15] WU C H. Product-design and pricing strategies with remanufacturing[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 222(2): 204-215.
[16] WANG K,ZHAO Y, CHENG Y. Cooperation or competition? channel choice for a remanufacturing fashion supply chain with government subsidy[J]. Sustainability, 2014, 6(10): 7292-7310.
[17] FUDENBERG D, LEVINE D.K. The theory of learning in games[M]. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998: 57-69.
[18] CHOI T M. Pricing and branding for remanufactured fashion products[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2017, 165(1): 1385-1394.
[19] FERGUSON M E, Toktay L B. The effect of competition on recovery strategies[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2006, 15(3): 351-368.
[20] ZHAO X M, XU Y Y, LIN Y H. The effects of government subsidies on remanufacturing in the nash market[J]. Industrial Engineering and Management, 2015, 20(1): 90-94. (in Chinese)
[21] XIONG Z K, HUANG F, LIU Y. A study of remanufactured product marketing strategy of retailers in new product distribution[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2013, 16(2): 26-32. (in Chinese)