法律诉讼、政治关系与银行贷款契约——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据
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摘要
本文以2010～2017年A股上市民营企业为样本,实证研究了在政治关系的调节效应下法律诉讼对银行贷款契约的影响。结果发现:(1)公司法律诉讼对银行贷款契约产生负面影响且这种影响随诉讼强度的增大而增大;(2)公司高管的政治关系对银行贷款契约产生正面影响且这种影响随政治关系强度的增大而增大;(3)高管的政治关系会减轻公司法律诉讼对银行贷款契约的负面影响,且这种减轻作用随着政治关系强度的增大而增大。与以往研究不同,本文将正式机制与非正式机制结合,一方面说明建立政治关系这一非正式机制可以作为企业防范法律风险的有效途径,另一方面为政策制定者如何通过正式机制和非正式机制博弈达到利益最大化提供参考。
Based upon the research sample of Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2017,thispaper investigates the relationship among the company lawsuits, political connections and the bank loan contracting. The results show that:(1) the company lawsuit has a negative effect on bank loan contracting, which increases with the increase of the litigation intensity;(2) the political connections have positive effects on bank loan contracting,which increases with the increase of political relationship strength;(3) the political connections will reduce the negative impact of lawsuit proceedings on bank loan contracting, and this effect will increase with the increase of the strength of political relationship. Different from previous studies, this paper combines formal mechanism with informal mechanism. On the one hand, it shows that the informal mechanism of establishing political relations can be an effective way for enterprises to prevent lawsuit risks; on the other hand, it provides a reference for policy makers to maximize their interests through the game between formal mechanism and informal mechanism.
Based upon the research sample of Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2017,thispaper investigates the relationship among the company lawsuits, political connections and the bank loan contracting. The results show that:(1) the company lawsuit has a negative effect on bank loan contracting, which increases with the increase of the litigation intensity;(2) the political connections have positive effects on bank loan contracting,which increases with the increase of political relationship strength;(3) the political connections will reduce the negative impact of lawsuit proceedings on bank loan contracting, and this effect will increase with the increase of the strength of political relationship. Different from previous studies, this paper combines formal mechanism with informal mechanism. On the one hand, it shows that the informal mechanism of establishing political relations can be an effective way for enterprises to prevent lawsuit risks; on the other hand, it provides a reference for policy makers to maximize their interests through the game between formal mechanism and informal mechanism.
引文
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[29]王晓娆,庞志,张曦如.政府直接干预、金融抑制与银行不良贷款--基于省际动态GMM估计方法[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2018,33(01):97-104.
[30]王艳艳,于李胜.国有银行贷款与股价同步性[J].会计研究,2013,(07):42-49.
[31]余明桂,潘红波.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界,2008,(08):9-21.
[32]张维迎,柯荣住.诉讼过程中的逆向选择及其解释--以契约纠纷的基层法院判决书为例的经验研究[J].中国社会科学,2002,(02):31-43.
[2]Allen F,Qian J,Qian M J.Law,Finance,and Economic Growth in China[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57-116.
[3]Arena M,Julio B.The Effects of Securities Class Action Litigation on Corporate Liquidity and Investment Policy[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2015,50(1-2):251-275.
[4]Bessen J E,Meurer M J.The Private Costs of Patent Litigation,Working Paper,2008.
[5]Chow G C.Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions[J].Econometrica,1960,28(3):591-605.
[6]Dai Z,Jin L,Zhang W.Executive Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Litigation[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2014,31(1):152-177.
[7]Fich E M,Shivdasani A.Financial Fraud,Director Reputation,and Shareholder Wealth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,86(2):306-336.
[8]Faccio M,Masulis R W,Mcconnell J J.Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts[J].The Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2597-2635.
[9]Fisman R.Estimating the Value of Political Connections[J].American Economic Review,2001,91(4):1095-1102.
[10]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[11]Johnson S,Boone P,Breach A,et al.Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1-2):141-186.
[12]Shleifer A,Vishny R W.A Survey of Corporate Governance[J].The Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[13]Skinner D J.Earnings Disclosures and Stockholder Lawsuits[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1997,23(3):249-282.
[14]Stock J H,Watson M W.Introduction to Econometrics[M].Boston:Addison Wesley,2011.
[15]Titman S,Wessel R.The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice[J].The Journal of Finance,1988,43(1):1-19.
[16]Yeung I Y M,Tung R L.Achieving Business Success in Confucian Societies:The Importance of Guanxi(Connections)[J].Organizational Dynamics,1996,25(2):54-65.
[17]Yuan Q,Zhang Y.Do Banks Price Litigation Risk in Debt Contracting?Evidence from Class Action Lawsuits[J].Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,2015,42(9-10):1310-1340.
[18]邓建平,曾勇.政治关联能改善民营企业的经营绩效吗[J].中国工业经济,2009,(02):98-108.
[19]杜兴强，雷宇，郭剑花.政治联系、政治联系方式与民营上市公司的会计稳健性[J].中国工业经济,2009,(07):87-97.
[20]黄光国.人情与面子[J].经济社会体制比较,1985,(03):55-62.
[21]胡旭阳.民营企业家的政治身份与民营企业的融资便利--以浙江省民营百强企业为例[J].管理世界,2006,(05):107-113.
[22]毛新述,孟杰.内部控制与诉讼风险[J].管理世界,2013,(11):155-165.
[23]罗党论,刘璐.民营上市公司“出身”、政治关系与债务融资[J].经济管理,2010,32(07):112-119.
[24]罗党论,刘晓龙.政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效--来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2009,(05):97-106.
[25]刘星,陈西婵.证监会处罚、分析师跟踪与公司银行债务融资--来自信息披露违规的经验证据[J].会计研究,2018,(01):60-67.
[26]林毅夫.关于制度变迁的经济学理论:诱致性变迁与强制性变迁[M].财产权利与制度变迁,上海三联出版社,1994.
[27]钱爱民，付东.政治关联与企业产能过剩--基于政府治理环境视角的实证检验[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2017,32(01):19-30.
[28]王庆文，吴世农.政治关系对公司业绩的影响--基于中国上市公司政治影响力指数的研究[C].中国第七届实证会计国际研讨会论文,2008.744-758.
[29]王晓娆,庞志,张曦如.政府直接干预、金融抑制与银行不良贷款--基于省际动态GMM估计方法[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2018,33(01):97-104.
[30]王艳艳,于李胜.国有银行贷款与股价同步性[J].会计研究,2013,(07):42-49.
[31]余明桂,潘红波.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界,2008,(08):9-21.
[32]张维迎,柯荣住.诉讼过程中的逆向选择及其解释--以契约纠纷的基层法院判决书为例的经验研究[J].中国社会科学,2002,(02):31-43.