农村信贷与农业保险互动的收益分配机制——基于合作博弈Shapley值的分析
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摘要
农村信贷与农业保险互动是金融支农的优化模式,在此模式下,农户、信贷机构和保险公司的合作博弈不仅能提高整体收益,并且根据Shapley值分配原则,农户、信贷机构与保险公司各自的收益也能得到提高。但小规模分散经营的农户因缺乏谈判力而面临利益被瓜分的风险,进而可能会退出参与或抵制合作;为了促进合作联盟的形成与稳固,一个可行的解决思路是政府制定贷款利率优惠政策,实施保费补贴,引导发展农村经济合作组织以保证农户的收益;同时,保险公司与信贷机构通过委托代理形成合作关系,并使用Shapley值分配原则来确定代理费率并签订合约。
The cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance is an advanced important mode that finance supports agricultural modernization. Under the cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance in this mode, not only the gross income, but also the income of farmers and credit institutions and insurance companies can improve with the rules of income apportionment which is based on Shapley value.However, the farmers run in small scale and dispersedly, so they are lack of negotiation force, for which the farmers face the risk that their income may be encroached. Therefore, the farmers may resist the cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance. To promote the cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance, a good way of income apportionment viable solution is that government advocates credit institutions actualize lower loan rate, provides premium subsidy for farmers, and promotes the development of rural cooperatives. Besides, insurance companies cooperate with credit institutions by providing insurance for rural credit and delegating agricultural insurance to credit institutions. Based on Shapley value which represents the contribution to cooperative alliance, credit institutions and insurance companies come to an agreement on commission and sign a contract for it.
The cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance is an advanced important mode that finance supports agricultural modernization. Under the cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance in this mode, not only the gross income, but also the income of farmers and credit institutions and insurance companies can improve with the rules of income apportionment which is based on Shapley value.However, the farmers run in small scale and dispersedly, so they are lack of negotiation force, for which the farmers face the risk that their income may be encroached. Therefore, the farmers may resist the cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance. To promote the cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance, a good way of income apportionment viable solution is that government advocates credit institutions actualize lower loan rate, provides premium subsidy for farmers, and promotes the development of rural cooperatives. Besides, insurance companies cooperate with credit institutions by providing insurance for rural credit and delegating agricultural insurance to credit institutions. Based on Shapley value which represents the contribution to cooperative alliance, credit institutions and insurance companies come to an agreement on commission and sign a contract for it.
引文
[1]王珏.我国农村金融体系下信贷约束的系统性分析[J].农村经济,2010(3):47-49.
[2]刘成玉,黎贤强,王焕印.社会资本与我国农村信贷风险控制[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2010(12):87-96.
[3]余泉生,周亚虹.信贷约束强度与农户福祉损失——基于中国农村金融调查截面数据的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2014(3):36-47.
[4]GOODWIN B K. Problems with market insurance in agriculture[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2001,83(3):643-649.
[5]WENNER M. Agricultural insurance revisited:New developments and perspectives in Latin American and the Caribbean[R].Inter-American Development Bank,2005-10.
[6]庹国柱.我国农业保险的发展成就、障碍与前景[J].保险研究,2012(12):21-29.
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[9]刘祚祥,郭伦国,杨勇.信息共享、风险分担与农村银保互动机制[J].广东金融学院学报,2010(3):63-73.
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[12]刘祚祥,黄权国.信息生产能力、农业保险与农村金融市场的信贷配给——基于修正的S-W模型的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2012(5):53-64.
[13]冯庆水,黄艳宁.农村信贷与农业保险互动机制运行效率研究[J].中国管理科学,2015(S1):378-385.
[14]潘明清,郑军,刘丽.农业保险与农村信贷发展:作用机制与政策建议[J].农村经济,2015(6):76-79.
[15]叶明华,卫玥.农业保险与农村信贷:互动模式与绩效评价[J].经济体制改革,2015(5):92-97.
[16]方首军,黄泽颖,孙良媛.农业保险与农村信贷互动关系的理论分析与实证研究:1985~2009[J].农村金融研究,2012(7):60-65.
[17]祝国平,刘吉舫.农业保险是否支持了农业信贷?——来自全国227个地级市的证据[J].农村经济,2014(10):77-81.
[18]程郁,罗丹.信贷约束下中国农户信贷缺口的估计[J].世界经济文汇,2010(2):69-80.
[19]王文举.经济博弈论基础[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2010:129-137.
[2]刘成玉,黎贤强,王焕印.社会资本与我国农村信贷风险控制[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2010(12):87-96.
[3]余泉生,周亚虹.信贷约束强度与农户福祉损失——基于中国农村金融调查截面数据的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2014(3):36-47.
[4]GOODWIN B K. Problems with market insurance in agriculture[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2001,83(3):643-649.
[5]WENNER M. Agricultural insurance revisited:New developments and perspectives in Latin American and the Caribbean[R].Inter-American Development Bank,2005-10.
[6]庹国柱.我国农业保险的发展成就、障碍与前景[J].保险研究,2012(12):21-29.
[7]POMAREDA C. An evolution of the impact of credit insurance on bank performance in Panama[M]//HAZELL P,POMAREDA C,VALDES A,et al. Crop insurance for agricultural development:Issues and experience. Baltimore and London:Johns Hopkins University Press,1986:106-114.
[8]BINSWANGER H P. Risk Aversion,Collateral Requirements,and the Markets for Credit and Insurance in Rural Areas[M]//HAZELL P,POMAREDA C,VALDES A,et al. Crop insurance for agricultural development:Issues and experience. Baltimore and London:Johns Hopkins University Press,1986:67-86.
[9]刘祚祥,郭伦国,杨勇.信息共享、风险分担与农村银保互动机制[J].广东金融学院学报,2010(3):63-73.
[10]张浩,李前进,吴莹.农业保险与农村信贷互动机制研究[J].上海金融,2010(3):87-90.
[11]王戈峰.农业保险与农村信贷互动机制的对接路径研究[J].金融理论与实践,2011(6):96-99.
[12]刘祚祥,黄权国.信息生产能力、农业保险与农村金融市场的信贷配给——基于修正的S-W模型的实证分析[J].中国农村经济,2012(5):53-64.
[13]冯庆水,黄艳宁.农村信贷与农业保险互动机制运行效率研究[J].中国管理科学,2015(S1):378-385.
[14]潘明清,郑军,刘丽.农业保险与农村信贷发展:作用机制与政策建议[J].农村经济,2015(6):76-79.
[15]叶明华,卫玥.农业保险与农村信贷:互动模式与绩效评价[J].经济体制改革,2015(5):92-97.
[16]方首军,黄泽颖,孙良媛.农业保险与农村信贷互动关系的理论分析与实证研究:1985~2009[J].农村金融研究,2012(7):60-65.
[17]祝国平,刘吉舫.农业保险是否支持了农业信贷?——来自全国227个地级市的证据[J].农村经济,2014(10):77-81.
[18]程郁,罗丹.信贷约束下中国农户信贷缺口的估计[J].世界经济文汇,2010(2):69-80.
[19]王文举.经济博弈论基础[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2010:129-137.