Networks,coalitions and international trade agreements.

详细信息   

• 作者：Lake ; James.
• 学历：Doctor
• 年：2012
• 导师：Krishna,Pravin,eadvisor
• 毕业院校：The Johns Hopkins University
• ISBN：9781267752086
• CBH：3532373
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：7985288
• Pages：157

文摘

Using network and coalition theory,this dissertation explores two main questions. First,in the presence of multilateral negotiations,are Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) necessary for,or will they prevent,global free trade? Second,why do governments routinely set tariffs below their commitments in the World Trade Organization,a practice known as binding overhang? The first question is explored using a novel dynamic network theoretic model where countries are farsighted and asymmetric in terms of market size. I develop a new equilibrium concept that endogenizes the order of negotiations. When two countries have a PTA,one member's formation of an additional PTA may create incentives for its original partner to form a PTA with its new partner. When considering forming an additional PTA,the current member therefore recognizes the potential for erosion of its preferential access in both partner markets. This fear of preference erosion undermines its willingness to form the additional PTA meaning PTAs can prevent global free trade. Global free trade is attained when countries fear of preference erosion is sufficiently small. Since greater asymmetry increases rents protected by members,preference erosion becomes more costly and the scope for global free trade falls as asymmetry increases. To answer the second question,I develop a dynamic theory of domestic political competition where the government is captured by either importers or exporters,who pay a contribution to determine the tariff level. Since the lobbying threat only binds in recessions,I relate the moments of binding overhang to the parameters of the model. Fluctuations in binding overhang result from tariff concessions by importers (exporters) in response to the threat of lobbying by exporters (importers). A stronger exporter (importer) lobbying threat leads importers (exporters) to concede lower (higher) tariffs. These larger tariff concessions increase the variance of binding overhang. However,because it depends on the direction of tariff concessions,the mean of binding overhang decreases (increases) in response to a stronger lobbying threat when importers (exporters) control tariff setting. The analysis of each question yields insights into real world trade trade agreements.