政府主导、地方政府竞争与科技创新效率
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摘要
基于1997～2016年中国省域层面数据,从理论和实证层面分析了政府主导、地方政府竞争对科技创新效率的影响。研究发现:政府主导对科技创新效率具有显著的正向促进作用,其影响轨迹呈倒"U"型变化;中国式分权体制下,地方政府竞争不利于科技创新效率提升,其影响呈"U"变化;地方政府竞争会削弱政府主导对科技创新效率正向促进的边际贡献,以至于二者协同效应不利于科技创新效率的提升。
Based on the provincial data of 1997-2016 years in China,this paper carries out a theoretical and empirical analysis on the influence of government dominance and local government competition on the efficiency of technological innovation.Results show that:(1)government dominance has a positive effect on the efficiency technological innovation,and the track of its impact is inverted " U" shape;(2)under the Chinese decentralization system,local government competition has a negative impact on the efficiency of technological innovation,and the track of its impact is " U" shape;(3)the local government competition weaken the marginal contribution of the government dominance,so that the synergy effect is not obvious.
Based on the provincial data of 1997-2016 years in China,this paper carries out a theoretical and empirical analysis on the influence of government dominance and local government competition on the efficiency of technological innovation.Results show that:(1)government dominance has a positive effect on the efficiency technological innovation,and the track of its impact is inverted " U" shape;(2)under the Chinese decentralization system,local government competition has a negative impact on the efficiency of technological innovation,and the track of its impact is " U" shape;(3)the local government competition weaken the marginal contribution of the government dominance,so that the synergy effect is not obvious.
引文
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[2]白俊红,王钺,蒋伏心,等.研发要素流动、空间知识溢出与经济增长[J].经济研究,2017(7):109-123.
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[4]Klette T J,Men J.R&D Investment Responses to R&D Subsidies:A Theoretical Analysis and a Microeconometric Study[C].Department of Business and Management Science,Norwegian School of Economics,2010.
[5]Czarnitzki D,Hussinger K,Schneider C.R&D Collaboration with Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights[J].Review of Industrial Organization,2015,46(2):183-204.
[6] Mansfield E,Switzer L.Effects of Federal Support on Company-Financed R&D:The Case of Energy:Management Science[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2017,30(5):562-571.
[7]朱平芳,徐伟民.政府的科技激励政策对大中型工业企业R&D投入及其专利产出的影响——上海市的实证研究[J].经济研究,2003(6):45-53.
[8]李左峰,张铭慎.政府科技项目投入对企业创新绩效的影响研究——来自我国95家创新型企业的证据[J].中国软科学,2012(12):123-132.
[9]Wallsten S J.The Effects of Government-Industry R&D Programs on Private R&D:The Case of the Small Business Innovation ResearchProgram[J]. RandJournalof Economics,2000,31(1):82-100.
[10]Marino M,Lhuillery S,Parrotta P,et al.Additionality or Crowding-out?An Overall Evaluation of Public R&D Subsidy on Private R&D Expenditure[J].Research Policy,2016,45(9):1715-1730.
[11]丘海雄,徐建牛.产业集群技术创新中的地方政府行为[J].管理世界,2004(10):36-46.
[12]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[13]傅勇,张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界,2007(3):4-12.
[14]潘镇,金中坤,徐伟.财政分权背景下地方政府科技支出行为研究[J].上海经济研究,2013(1):34-45.
[15]张梁梁,杨俊,罗鉴益.财政分权视角下地方政府科技支出的标尺竞争——基于265个地级市的实证研究[J].当代财经,2016(4):29-39.
[16]顾元媛,沈坤荣.地方官员创新精神与地区创新——基于长三角珠三角地级市的经验证据[J].金融研究,2012(11):89-102.
[17]谢乔昕,宋良荣.中国式分权、经济影响力与研发投入[J].科学学研究,2015,33(12):1797-1804.
[18]潘修中.财政分权、财政透明度与地方财政科技投入[J].科学管理研究,2017(1):95-98.
[19]余泳泽.创新要素集聚、政府支持与科技创新效率——基于省域数据的空间面板计量分析[J].经济评论,2011(2):93-101.
[20]李永友.转移支付与地方政府间财政竞争[J].中国社会科学,2015(10):114-133.
[21]刘尚希,韩凤芹.科技创新中央与地方关系研究[M].经济科学出版社,2016.
(1)投入指标:科技资本为各省市内部R&D经费支出额;科技劳动力为各省市R&D人员全时当量;科技机构为各省市科研机构数量。产出指标:科研产品为各省市年度专利申请授权量;科技价值为各省市年度技术市场成交额。
(1)限于篇幅限制,稳健性检验结果未汇报在文章中,如有需要可向作者索取。
[2]白俊红,王钺,蒋伏心,等.研发要素流动、空间知识溢出与经济增长[J].经济研究,2017(7):109-123.
[3]Arrow K J.The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing[J].Review of Economic Studies,1971,29(3):155-173.
[4]Klette T J,Men J.R&D Investment Responses to R&D Subsidies:A Theoretical Analysis and a Microeconometric Study[C].Department of Business and Management Science,Norwegian School of Economics,2010.
[5]Czarnitzki D,Hussinger K,Schneider C.R&D Collaboration with Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights[J].Review of Industrial Organization,2015,46(2):183-204.
[6] Mansfield E,Switzer L.Effects of Federal Support on Company-Financed R&D:The Case of Energy:Management Science[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2017,30(5):562-571.
[7]朱平芳,徐伟民.政府的科技激励政策对大中型工业企业R&D投入及其专利产出的影响——上海市的实证研究[J].经济研究,2003(6):45-53.
[8]李左峰,张铭慎.政府科技项目投入对企业创新绩效的影响研究——来自我国95家创新型企业的证据[J].中国软科学,2012(12):123-132.
[9]Wallsten S J.The Effects of Government-Industry R&D Programs on Private R&D:The Case of the Small Business Innovation ResearchProgram[J]. RandJournalof Economics,2000,31(1):82-100.
[10]Marino M,Lhuillery S,Parrotta P,et al.Additionality or Crowding-out?An Overall Evaluation of Public R&D Subsidy on Private R&D Expenditure[J].Research Policy,2016,45(9):1715-1730.
[11]丘海雄,徐建牛.产业集群技术创新中的地方政府行为[J].管理世界,2004(10):36-46.
[12]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[13]傅勇,张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界,2007(3):4-12.
[14]潘镇,金中坤,徐伟.财政分权背景下地方政府科技支出行为研究[J].上海经济研究,2013(1):34-45.
[15]张梁梁,杨俊,罗鉴益.财政分权视角下地方政府科技支出的标尺竞争——基于265个地级市的实证研究[J].当代财经,2016(4):29-39.
[16]顾元媛,沈坤荣.地方官员创新精神与地区创新——基于长三角珠三角地级市的经验证据[J].金融研究,2012(11):89-102.
[17]谢乔昕,宋良荣.中国式分权、经济影响力与研发投入[J].科学学研究,2015,33(12):1797-1804.
[18]潘修中.财政分权、财政透明度与地方财政科技投入[J].科学管理研究,2017(1):95-98.
[19]余泳泽.创新要素集聚、政府支持与科技创新效率——基于省域数据的空间面板计量分析[J].经济评论,2011(2):93-101.
[20]李永友.转移支付与地方政府间财政竞争[J].中国社会科学,2015(10):114-133.
[21]刘尚希,韩凤芹.科技创新中央与地方关系研究[M].经济科学出版社,2016.
(1)投入指标:科技资本为各省市内部R&D经费支出额;科技劳动力为各省市R&D人员全时当量;科技机构为各省市科研机构数量。产出指标:科研产品为各省市年度专利申请授权量;科技价值为各省市年度技术市场成交额。
(1)限于篇幅限制,稳健性检验结果未汇报在文章中,如有需要可向作者索取。
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