公共体育场(馆)委托管理激励机制研究
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摘要
公共体育场(馆)运营商激励机制设计关系委托管理成败。采用文献资料、实地调研、专家访谈等方法,就场(馆)委托管理中激励机制设计问题进行研究。研究认为,国内当前激励机制可分为"固定工资""委托承包""委托+补贴""先补贴后付费""基本费用+绩效费用"5种模式。当前激励机制设计存在激励强度过大,过多聚焦于经济效益,部分国企委托场(馆)激励机制形同虚设,委托期限呈两极化趋势和垄断运营导致激励效果不佳等问题。通过构建委托代理模型,进行最优激励分析,提出通过提高运营商努力水平的可观测度可实现激励相容;激励强度应与运营商边际生产率成正比,与努力成本、风险规避程度和不确定性因素成反比等结论。通过分析场(馆)委托管理激励机制设计的成功实践,证明了模型分析结论的正确性。提出通过推广"基本费用+绩效费用"的薪酬激励机制,探索混合所有制的股权激励机制和适度引入隐性激励机制等途径设计有效激励模式;通过改进招投标制度,加强履约监管,建立负面惩戒机制等举措优化激励配套机制建设;提出完善综合考核机制,培育专业运营机构和竞争性市场,优化委托管理合同设计等优化激励机制设计的策略,以期为优化场(馆)委托管理实践提供理论指导。
The incentive mechanism of agents in public venue is the key to the success of entrusted management. By the methods of literature review, field investigation and expert interview, this paper studies the incentive mechanism in entrusted management of public venue. The study concludes that the current incentive modes in China can be divided into five modes: fixed wage, entrusted contract, entrusted + subsidies, first subsidized and then paid, and "basic fee + performance fee". It is believed that the current incentive mechanism design has some problems, such as excessive incentive intensity, excessive focusing on economic benefits, the absence of incentive mechanism in some state-owned enterprises entrusted venues, the polarization trend of entrusted duration and the existence of authorized monopoly incentives. Through the principal-agent model and the optimal incentive analysis, it is concluded that incentive compatibility can be achieved by improving the observability of operators' effort level; incentive intensity should be proportional to operators' marginal productivity, and inversely proportional to effort cost, risk aversion and uncertainty factors. By referring to the analysis of several factors of incentive mechanism of overseas venues, especially the entrusted management venues in the United States and Europe, the correctness of the model analysis conclusion is proved. Finally, it is proposed to promote the establishment of "basic fee + performance fee" salary incentive mechanism, explore the incentive mechanism of mixed ownership and appropriate introduction of implicit incentive mechanism, and improving the incentive matching mechanism, improve the comprehensive assessment mechanism to cultivate professional operating institutions and competitive markets. By improving the bidding system, strengthening the performance monitoring mechanism, establishing negative incentives, and optimizing the incentive mechanism optimization strategy such as the commission design, in order to provide theoretical guidance for optimizing the venues entrusted management practice.
The incentive mechanism of agents in public venue is the key to the success of entrusted management. By the methods of literature review, field investigation and expert interview, this paper studies the incentive mechanism in entrusted management of public venue. The study concludes that the current incentive modes in China can be divided into five modes: fixed wage, entrusted contract, entrusted + subsidies, first subsidized and then paid, and "basic fee + performance fee". It is believed that the current incentive mechanism design has some problems, such as excessive incentive intensity, excessive focusing on economic benefits, the absence of incentive mechanism in some state-owned enterprises entrusted venues, the polarization trend of entrusted duration and the existence of authorized monopoly incentives. Through the principal-agent model and the optimal incentive analysis, it is concluded that incentive compatibility can be achieved by improving the observability of operators' effort level; incentive intensity should be proportional to operators' marginal productivity, and inversely proportional to effort cost, risk aversion and uncertainty factors. By referring to the analysis of several factors of incentive mechanism of overseas venues, especially the entrusted management venues in the United States and Europe, the correctness of the model analysis conclusion is proved. Finally, it is proposed to promote the establishment of "basic fee + performance fee" salary incentive mechanism, explore the incentive mechanism of mixed ownership and appropriate introduction of implicit incentive mechanism, and improving the incentive matching mechanism, improve the comprehensive assessment mechanism to cultivate professional operating institutions and competitive markets. By improving the bidding system, strengthening the performance monitoring mechanism, establishing negative incentives, and optimizing the incentive mechanism optimization strategy such as the commission design, in order to provide theoretical guidance for optimizing the venues entrusted management practice.
引文
陈磊,陈元欣,2018.美国大型体育场馆运营中PPP模式应用研究[J].首都体育学院学报,30(4):297-301.
陈元欣,王健,2014.公共体育场(馆)运营改革过度市场化问题研究[J].体育科学,34(6):3-10.
陈元欣,王健,2015.大型体育场(馆)运营管理企业化改革研究[J].体育科学,35(10):17-24.
陈元欣,2009.美国体育场馆运营之道[J].环球体育市场,4:27.
陈元欣,王健,2013.我国公共体育场(馆)发展中存在的问题、未来趋势、域外经验与发展对策研究[J].体育科学,33(10):3-13.
陈元欣,陈磊,王健,2015.公共体育场(馆)经营权招投标的制度设计、现存问题及优化策略[J].中国体育科技,54(3):52-59.
侯光明,李存金,2002.现代管理激励与约束机制[M].北京:高等教育出版社:127-130.
胡敏洁,2016.论政府购买公共服务合同中的公法责任[J].中国法学,(4):143-158.
黄文彦,蓝海林,2005.委托代理关系中激励机制的设计[J].华南理工大学学报(社会科学版),7(1):34-37.
李昂,傅士成,2017.政府购买公共服务合同的性质探析[J].政法学刊,34(1):35-41.
李明,2018.PPP大型体育场馆项目契约治理路径及框架体系构建的实证研究[J].首都体育学院学报,30(5):414-417.
刘波,龚晖晖,2009.PPP模式与准公共品的供给--论PPP在大型体育场馆建设中的应用[J].首都体育学院学报,21(2):151-154.
刘田修,郑良一,田文政,等,2014.运动场(馆)规划与管理[M].中国台北:华杏出版机构.
刘银国,2007.基于委托-代理理论的国有企业经营者激励机制研究[J].经济问题探索,(1):155-160.
骆品亮,2006.管理经济学[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社.
让-雅克·拉丰,大卫·马赫蒂摩,2002.激励理论(第一卷)委托-代理模型[M].陈志俊,李艳,单萍萍,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社.
王宝成,2005.委托-代理框架下激励问题的理论综述[J].特区经济,(5):357-358.
王健,陈元欣,王维,2013.中美体育场(馆)委托经营比较研究[J].西安体育学院学报,30(1):1-7.
杨风华,2008.对我国城市公共体育场馆服务民营化改革的认识[J].首都体育学院学报,20(5):22-24.
余佶,2016.政府向社会组织购买公共服务的风险管理--基于委托代理视角及其超越[J].马克思主义与现实,(3):169-175.
郑美艳,王正伦,2016.我国公共体育场馆服务外包项目多元监管模式发展研究[J].中国体育科技,52(2):25-30.
张维迎,1996.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社.
张维迎,2014.理解公司:产权、激励与治理[M].上海:上海人民出版社.
Bengt.Holmstrom,Paul.Milgrom,1987.Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives[J].Econometrica,(55):303-328.
(1)数据来源:根据课题组实地调研中获得的相关信息。文中数据若未特别说明,均来源于课题组实地调研获取的相关数据。
(1)根据NBA联盟30支球队和NFL32支球队场(馆)的官方网站查询统计得出该数据。
陈元欣,王健,2014.公共体育场(馆)运营改革过度市场化问题研究[J].体育科学,34(6):3-10.
陈元欣,王健,2015.大型体育场(馆)运营管理企业化改革研究[J].体育科学,35(10):17-24.
陈元欣,2009.美国体育场馆运营之道[J].环球体育市场,4:27.
陈元欣,王健,2013.我国公共体育场(馆)发展中存在的问题、未来趋势、域外经验与发展对策研究[J].体育科学,33(10):3-13.
陈元欣,陈磊,王健,2015.公共体育场(馆)经营权招投标的制度设计、现存问题及优化策略[J].中国体育科技,54(3):52-59.
侯光明,李存金,2002.现代管理激励与约束机制[M].北京:高等教育出版社:127-130.
胡敏洁,2016.论政府购买公共服务合同中的公法责任[J].中国法学,(4):143-158.
黄文彦,蓝海林,2005.委托代理关系中激励机制的设计[J].华南理工大学学报(社会科学版),7(1):34-37.
李昂,傅士成,2017.政府购买公共服务合同的性质探析[J].政法学刊,34(1):35-41.
李明,2018.PPP大型体育场馆项目契约治理路径及框架体系构建的实证研究[J].首都体育学院学报,30(5):414-417.
刘波,龚晖晖,2009.PPP模式与准公共品的供给--论PPP在大型体育场馆建设中的应用[J].首都体育学院学报,21(2):151-154.
刘田修,郑良一,田文政,等,2014.运动场(馆)规划与管理[M].中国台北:华杏出版机构.
刘银国,2007.基于委托-代理理论的国有企业经营者激励机制研究[J].经济问题探索,(1):155-160.
骆品亮,2006.管理经济学[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社.
让-雅克·拉丰,大卫·马赫蒂摩,2002.激励理论(第一卷)委托-代理模型[M].陈志俊,李艳,单萍萍,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社.
王宝成,2005.委托-代理框架下激励问题的理论综述[J].特区经济,(5):357-358.
王健,陈元欣,王维,2013.中美体育场(馆)委托经营比较研究[J].西安体育学院学报,30(1):1-7.
杨风华,2008.对我国城市公共体育场馆服务民营化改革的认识[J].首都体育学院学报,20(5):22-24.
余佶,2016.政府向社会组织购买公共服务的风险管理--基于委托代理视角及其超越[J].马克思主义与现实,(3):169-175.
郑美艳,王正伦,2016.我国公共体育场馆服务外包项目多元监管模式发展研究[J].中国体育科技,52(2):25-30.
张维迎,1996.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社.
张维迎,2014.理解公司:产权、激励与治理[M].上海:上海人民出版社.
Bengt.Holmstrom,Paul.Milgrom,1987.Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives[J].Econometrica,(55):303-328.
(1)数据来源:根据课题组实地调研中获得的相关信息。文中数据若未特别说明,均来源于课题组实地调研获取的相关数据。
(1)根据NBA联盟30支球队和NFL32支球队场(馆)的官方网站查询统计得出该数据。
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