俄罗斯精英共识与地区经济发展——鞑靼斯坦共和国的经验
|
摘要
国际经验表明,地区发展可以成为大国经济增长的助推器。在俄罗斯经济发展模式需要转型的背景下,俄罗斯高等经济大学的研究团队对鞑靼斯坦共和国的发展管理模式进行了分析。从21世纪第一个十年中期起,鞑靼斯坦共和国的发展管理模式,在俄罗斯就被视为实践典范。当前在鞑靼斯坦共和国已经形成了独特的投资环境,与俄罗斯其他地区相比,其突出特点在于,地方政府的政策可预见度高,且能够为地区重点项目的投资者提供切实保障,地区商业支出与投资风险低。鞑靼斯坦共和国主要精英群体在利益方面相互协调,在地区发展重点与实现路径上具备共识,这在过去是而且也将持续是鞑靼斯坦共和国发展的重要优势。鞑靼斯坦共和国能否建立起在亚洲国家成功运作的追赶型发展模式,这将取决于当地精英能否找到应对近期地区新挑战的共识性对策,同时也取决于俄罗斯联邦层面的地区政策架构。封闭性的固定资产所有制结构,以及劳动报酬水平落后,是鞑靼斯坦共和国面临的主要发展障碍。
In the context of Russia's need to make a transition towards a new developmental model and in light of the international experience suggesting that advanced regions within large economies could become the primary drivers of national growth, this article analyzes the developmental model that has been shaping up in the Republic of Tatarstan(the RT). In Russia, since the mid-2000s,this model has been considered as an example of best practice. This article identifies the main characteristics and stages in the evolution of the RT developmental model, as well as highlights its strengths and limitations using the SWOT-analysis techniques. It is noted that a "special" investment climate has formed in the region, featuring predictable government policies, lower costs and risks of doing business, and informal guarantees for entrepreneurs willing to invest in the RT's priority projects. According to this article, the consolidation of interests of major regional elite groups, their consensus regarding the priorities for regional development and associated policy instruments have been important comparative advantages of Tatarstan. The prospects for formation in the RT of a catching-up developmental model similar to ones in the successful countries of Southeast Asia will depend upon the extent to which current Tatarstan's elites could find a consolidated response to the new challenges confronting the RT recently, as well as the degree of soundness of the federal policy with respect to the more developed regions. The main obstacles to development include the current closed ownership structure of core assets, limiting possibilities of market entry for new players, and lower average wages prejudging the outflow of skilled personnel from the RT.
In the context of Russia's need to make a transition towards a new developmental model and in light of the international experience suggesting that advanced regions within large economies could become the primary drivers of national growth, this article analyzes the developmental model that has been shaping up in the Republic of Tatarstan(the RT). In Russia, since the mid-2000s,this model has been considered as an example of best practice. This article identifies the main characteristics and stages in the evolution of the RT developmental model, as well as highlights its strengths and limitations using the SWOT-analysis techniques. It is noted that a "special" investment climate has formed in the region, featuring predictable government policies, lower costs and risks of doing business, and informal guarantees for entrepreneurs willing to invest in the RT's priority projects. According to this article, the consolidation of interests of major regional elite groups, their consensus regarding the priorities for regional development and associated policy instruments have been important comparative advantages of Tatarstan. The prospects for formation in the RT of a catching-up developmental model similar to ones in the successful countries of Southeast Asia will depend upon the extent to which current Tatarstan's elites could find a consolidated response to the new challenges confronting the RT recently, as well as the degree of soundness of the federal policy with respect to the more developed regions. The main obstacles to development include the current closed ownership structure of core assets, limiting possibilities of market entry for new players, and lower average wages prejudging the outflow of skilled personnel from the RT.
引文
(1) Никитин А.С.Инвестиционный рейтинг как инструмент стимулирования эффек- тивности управления развитием регионов России// Экономическая политика.2016.Т.11.№.6.С.192-221; Фрейнкман Л,Яковлев А.Агентство стратегических инициатив как институт раз- вития нового типа// Вопросы экономики.2014.№.6.С.18-39.
(2) Зубаревич Н.В.Регионы России:неравенство,кризис,модернизация.М.:Независимый институт социальной политики,2010.
(1) Игорь Шувалов:?Мы все привыкли,что Татарстан — лидер,и спасибо ему за всегда прекрасные результаты?.03.06.2017.https://realnoevremya.ru/articles/67146-prezentacii-na creytinga-sostoyaniya-investklimata-v-regionah
(2) 文中提到的《战略-2030》,全称为《2030 年前鞑靼斯坦共和国经济发展战略》,俄文为?Стратегия социально-экономического развития Республики Татарстан до 2030 года?——译者注
(3) Стратегия социально-экономического развития Республики Татарстан до 2030 года.2015.Утверждена Законом РТ от 17.06.2015 №.40-ЗРТ.
(4) M.Rochlitz,“Collective Action Abroad:How Foreign Investors Organize”,Working Paper.Series at NRU HSE:Political Science,No.WP BRP 32/PS/2016,2016.
(1) Зубаревич Н.В.Регионы России:неравенство,кризис,модернизация.М.:Независимый институт социальной политики,2010; K.M.Dowley,“Striking the Federal Bargain in Russia:Comparative Regional Government Strategies”,Communist and Post-Communist Studies,1998,Vol.31,No.4,pp.359-380; R.W.Orttung,“Business and Politics in the Russian Regions”,Problems of Post- Communism,2004,Vol.51,No.2,pp.48-60; D.Zimin,“Promoting Investment in Russia’s Regions”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2010,Vol.51,No.5,pp.653-668; D.Zimine,M.J.Bradshaw,“Local Politics,Economic Structure,and Performance:The Case of Sakhalin”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2003,Vol.44,No.4,pp.287-304; Y.Zverev,“Kaliningrad:Problems and Paths of Development”,Problems of Post- Communism,2007,Vol.54,No.2,pp.9-25.
(2) Баранов А,Малков Е,Полищук Л,Рохлиц М,Сюняев Г.Измерение институтов в российских регионах:методология,источники данных,анализ// Вопросы экономики.2015.№.2.С.69-102.
(1) D.Zimin,“Promoting Investment in Russia’s Regions”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2010,Vol.51,No.5,pp.653-668.
(2) Гельман В.Я.Региональная власть в современной России:институты,режимы и практики// Полис:Политические исследования.1998.№.1.С.87-105; J.Kahn,“The Parade of Sovereignties:Establishing the Vocabulary of the New Russian Federalism”,Post-Soviet Affairs,2000,Vol.16,No1,pp.58-89; K.Matsuzato,“Authoritarian Transformations of the Mid-Volga National Republics:An Attempt at Macro-Regionology”,Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,2004,Vol.20,No.2,pp.98-123; V.V.Mikhailov,“Authoritarian Regimes of Russia and Tatarstan:Coexistence and Subjection”,Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,2010,Vol.26,No.4,pp.471-493.
(3) Зубаревич Н.Пространство России после Крыма и на фоне кризиса// Pro et Contra.2014.Т.18.№.3-4.С.118-128.A.Aslund,“Russia’s Economic Transformation Under Putin”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2004,Vol.45,No.6,pp.397-420; G.Sharafutdinova,“Paradiplomacy in the Russian Regions:Tatarstan’s Search for Statehood”,Europe-Asia Studies,2003,Vol.55,No.4,pp.613-629; G.Sharafutdinova,“Coping with Economic Crisis in Russia’s Regions:The Case of Tatarstan”,Russian Analytical Digest,2016,No.182,pp.7-9.
(4) M.De Melo,G.Ofer,P.Yossifov,“Transition in Regional Capitals Along the Volga”,Post- Soviet Geography and Economics,1999,Vol.40,No.8,pp.553-616; K.Stoner-Weiss,“Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy:Observations on the Devolution Process in Russia”,Post-Soviet Affairs,1999,Vol.15,No.1,pp.87-106.
(5) M.J.Sagers,“The Regional Dimension of Russian Oil Production:Is a Sustained Recovery in Prospect?”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2006,Vol.47,No.5,pp.505-545; G.Sharafutdinova,“Coping with Economic Crisis in Russia’s Regions:The Case of Tatarstan”,Russian Analytical Digest,2016,No.182,pp.7-9.
(1) J.Kahn,“The Parade of Sovereignties:Establishing the Vocabulary of the New Russian Federalism”,Post-Soviet Affairs,2000,Vol.16,No.1,pp.58-89; L.McCann,“Globalisation and Postsocialist Development:The Tatarstan Variety of Capitalism”,Post-Communist Economies,2004,Vol.16,No.3,pp.349-362.
(2) L.Hagendoorn,E.Poppe,A.Minescu,“Support for Separatism in Ethnic Republics of the Russian Federation”,Europe-Asia Studies,2008,Vol.60,No.3,pp.353-373.
(3) P.Rutland,“Petronation? Oil,Gas,and National Identity in Russia”,Post-Soviet Affairs,2015,Vol.31,No.1,pp.66-89.
(4) S.Darrell,“Russia’s Market-Distorting Federalism”,Post-Soviet Geography and Economics,1997,Vol.38,No.8,pp.445-460; M.Kopsidis,“Disintegration of Russian Grain Markets in Transition:Political and Economic Dimensions”,Post-Communist Economies,2000,Vol.12,No.1,pp.47-60.
(5) M.Bradshaw,J.Prendergrast,“The Russian Heartland Revisited:An Assessment of Russia’s Transformation”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2005,Vol.46,No.2,pp.83- 122; L.Drobizheva,“Comparison of élite Groups in Tatarstan,Sakha,Magadan,and Orenburg”,Post-Soviet Affairs,1999,Vol.15,No.4,pp.387-406.
(6) G.Sharafutdinova,“Chechnya vs.Tatarstan:Understanding Ethnopolitics in Post- Communist Russia”,Problems of Post-Communism,2000,Vol.47,No.2,pp.13-22.
(7) L.McCann,“Globalisation and Postsocialist Development:The Tatarstan Variety of Capitalism”,Post-Communist Economies,2004,Vol.16,No.3,pp.349-362.
(8) L.Drobizheva,“Comparison of élite Groups in Tatarstan,Sakha,Magadan,and Orenburg”,pp.387-406.
(1) D.C.North,J.J.Wallis,S.B.Webb,B.R.Weingast (еds.),In the Shadow of Violence:The Problem of Development in Limited Access Societies,N.Y.:Cambridge University Press,2013; D.C.North,J.J.Wallis,B.R.Weingast,Violence and Social Orders:A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History,N.Y.:Cambridge University Press,2009.
(2)本文中的精英共识是指上层政商界精英代表之间稳定的观点一致与行动统一,这些精英共同管理着地区的主要资产,决定着地区的政策走向。
(1) Рейтинг инновационного развития субъектов Российской Федерации.Вып.1 / под ред.Л.М.Гохберга.М.:НИУ ВШЭ,2012; Рейтинг инновационного развития субъектов Российской Федерации.Вып.5 / под ред.Л.М.Гохберга.М.:НИУ ВШЭ,2017.
(2) Предпринимательский климат в России:Индекс ОПОРЫ 2012.http://oporamo.ru/doc/ ind.pdf
(3) M.J.Sagers,“The Regional Dimension of Russian Oil Production:Is a Sustained Recovery in Prospect?”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2006,Vol.47,No.5,pp.505-545.
(1) Овчарова Л.Н,Прокофьева Л.М.Система социальной поддержки,направлен- ной на активизацию выхода из бедности,в регионах Российской Федерации// SPERO.2014.№.19.С.87-102.(раздел “социальная политики”)
(1) M.Bornstein,“Russia’s Mass Privatization Programme”,Communist Economies and Economic Transformation,1994,Vol.6,No.4,pp.419-457.
(1) Хакимов Р.С.Татарстан:идеология регионального развития.Казань:КЦФПП,2014.
(2) Лапина Н,Чирикова А.Путинские реформы и потенциал влияния региональных элит.М.:Институт социологии РАН; Московское представительство Фонда им.Ф.Эберта,2004.C.8.
(3)经过长期协商,该协议在2007年最终签订,有效期为10年,该协议在很大程度上只具有象征性意义,但这仍然说明,鞑靼斯坦保持了自身的特殊地位。
(1) АО Связьинвестнефтехим
(2) АО Холдинговая компания Ак Барс
(3) Татнефтехиминвест-холдинг
(1)棕地(brownfield)项目是指对被废弃、闲置或未被充分利用的场地进行再开发与扩建的项目——译者注
(2) K.Vartapetov,“Russian Fiscal Federalism Under Stress:Federal Support of Regions During the Global Financial Crisis”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2011,Vol.52,No.4,pp.529-542.
(3) Шаймиев М.Ш.Стратегия развития Республики Татарстан// Вестник Поволжского института управления.2001.№.1.С.16-24.
(1) Кластерный проект Иннокам
(2) 这里举一个典型的案例——由于鞑靼斯坦沙米耶夫总统向梅德韦杰夫总统提出了获取支持的直接请求,喀山有机合成股份公司(АО Казаньоргсинтез)在 2009 年获得了俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行的贷款。
(3) 在建设阿莫尼铵厂(завод Аммоний)时,东京三菱银行、三井住友银行、摩根大通和瑞穗实业银行同对外经济银行共同参与融资,在 2011 年秋共同发放了 5 亿美元贷款。Строительство завода ?Аммоний? выросло в цене в 2,5 раза.10.07.2013.http://www.moneyjournal.ru/bizness/nedvizhimost/stroitelstvo-zavoda-ammoniy-viroslo-v-tsene-v-2–5-raza-9752.html
(4) Наталья Козлова.Ущерб от действий руководства Татфондбанка оценили в 3 млрд.04.03.2017.https://rg.ru/2017/03/04/reg-pfo/ushcherb-ot-dejstvij-rukovodstva-tatfondbanka-ocenili-v-3-mlrd.html
(1) 如叶卡捷琳娜·布拉金斯卡娅所说,与俄罗斯其他地区相比,鞑靼斯坦共和国穆斯林人口与非穆斯林人口之间文化同化程度最高,宗教包容程度也更高。E.Braginskaia,“‘Domestication’ or Representation? Russia and the Institutionalisation of Islam in Comparative Perspective”,Europe-Asia Studies,2012,Vol.64,No.3,pp.597-620.
(1)截至2013年1月1日,鞑靼斯坦共和国法人持有的工业用地占比为59%,该数据俄罗斯联邦平均值仅为8%。
(2) A.Amsden,Asia’s Next Giant:South Korea and Late Industrialization,N.Y.:Oxford University Press,1989; A.H.Amsden,W.W.Chu,Beyond Late Development:Taiwan’s Upgrading Policies,Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,2003; C.Sabel,L.Jordan,Doing,Learning,Being:Some Lessons Learned from Malaysia’s National Transformation Program,Washington,DC:World Bank,2015; L.K.Yew,From Third World to First:The Singapore Story,1965–2000,N.Y.:Harper Collins Publishers,2000.
(1) L.Putterman,“On the Past and Future of China’s Township and Village-Owned Enterprises”,World Development,1997,Vol.25,No.10,pp.1639-1655; M.L.Weitzman,C.Xu,“Chinese Township Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives”,Journal of Comparative Economics,1994,Vol.18,No.2,pp.121-145.
(1) R.F.Doner,B.R Schneider,“The Middle-Income Trap:More Politics than Economics”,World Politics,2016,Vol.68,No.4,pp.608-644; World Development Report 2017:Governance and the Law,Washington,DC:World Bank,2017.
(2) Салагаев А.Л,Сергеев С.А.Региональная элита Республики Татарстан:Структура и эволюция// Полития.2013.№.2(69).С.74-85.
(3) Хакимов Р.С.Татарстан:идеология регионального развития.Казань:КЦФПП,2014.
(1) D.C.North,J.J.Wallis,S.B.Webb,B.R.Weingast (еds.),In the Shadow of Violence:The Problem of Development in Limited Access Societies,N.Y.:Cambridge University Press,2013; D.C.North,J.J.Wallis,B.R.Weingast,Violence and Social Orders:A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History,N.Y.:Cambridge University Press,2009.
(2) 这些规范有时可以不需要明文规定,在中国就有这样的案例。
(3) 法里特·加济祖尔林(Фарит Газизуллин)从 1991 年起任鞑靼斯坦共和国政府第一副总理,负责私有化与工业管理事务,1996 年出任俄罗斯联邦国有财产管理委员会第一副主席,1997 年升任俄罗斯联邦副总理和财产关系部部长。卡米尔·伊斯哈科夫(Камиль Исхаков)自 1991 年起任喀山市市长,于 2005 年被任命为俄罗斯联邦总统驻远东联邦区全权代表。
(1) 在地区媒体的笔下,该事件被为描述为由时任鞑靼斯坦共和国总统办公厅主任哈利亚夫·尼扎莫夫、卡马河畔切尔内行政长官拉夫加特·阿尔滕巴涅夫和鞑靼斯坦共和国内务部部长伊斯坎德尔·加利莫夫三人在地方领导支持下发起的“宫廷政变”(http://kazan.bezformata.ru/listnews/vsesilnij-avtor-putcha-glav/12834907/)。沙伊米耶夫之所以能够继续控制国家委员会,主要得益于喀山行政长官伊斯哈科夫和总统安全局局长阿斯加特·萨法罗夫的大力支持。这次地区内部冲突最终以更换内务部部长(改由萨法罗夫出任)、“叛乱”发起人之一被调至俄罗斯联邦会议而告终。
(2) Хакимов Р.С.Татарстан:идеология регионального развития.Казань:КЦФПП,2014.
(1)在所有高度集中的政治制度中,很多问题都取决于领导人的决策。鞑靼斯坦也并不例外。然而,问题的关键在于,地区领袖能否在制度建设中也贯彻现代化思想,能否建立起在自己卸任后仍然能够运行的制度体系。如果无法实现这个目标,那么这个在“手动模式”下发展的国家或地区很有可能会开始衰败,甚至走向自我灭亡(在“阿拉伯之春”时期的很多近东国家都发生过这样的情况)。
(1)2015年,鞑靼斯坦共和国的平均工资为斯维尔德洛夫斯克州平均工资的95%,但同期鞑靼斯坦的人均地区生产总值却高出对方15%。
(2)在2017年发生了诸多可以证明鞑靼斯坦与联邦中央关系恶化的事件,其中包括联邦中央拒绝续签与鞑靼斯坦的分权协议(该协议已在2017年7月到期),以及联邦中央拒绝援助鞑靼斯坦储备银行。
(3)如2012年在喀山发生的内务机关丑闻事件,以及2017年鞑靼斯坦储备银行的执照吊销事件。
(1)在此需要说明,鞑靼斯坦共和国的大学在全俄排行榜上的排名总体较为靠后。2016年,在俄罗斯高校排行榜中,喀山联邦大学排名仅为第17位,而医科大学、科技大学和航空航天大学排名分别为第32、第54和第55位(http://www.edu.ru/ratings/reyting-vuzovrossii-2016/)。2016年,鞑靼斯坦共和国生源质量最高的(根据公费班的入读分数排名)医科大学在全俄该指标排名中仅列第37位(https://www.hse.ru/ege/rating/2016/68395231 /gos/?rlist&uplist&vuz-abiturients-budget-order=ge&vuz-abiturients-budget-val=300)
(1) Становая Т.Трансформация путинских элит:2014-2024.Московский центр Карнеги.2017.26 июля.http://carnegie.ru/2017/07/26/ru-pub-72625
(1) D.C.North,J.J.Wallis,S.B.Webb,B.R.Weingast (еds.),In the Shadow of Violence:The Problem of Development in Limited Access Societies,N.Y.:Cambridge University Press,2013; D.C.North,J.J.Wallis,B.R.Weingast,Violence and Social Orders:A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History,N.Y.:Cambridge University Press,2009.
(2) Зубаревич Н.В.Регионы России:неравенство,кризис,модернизация.М.:Независимый институт социальной политики,2010.
(1) Игорь Шувалов:?Мы все привыкли,что Татарстан — лидер,и спасибо ему за всегда прекрасные результаты?.03.06.2017.https://realnoevremya.ru/articles/67146-prezentacii-na creytinga-sostoyaniya-investklimata-v-regionah
(2) 文中提到的《战略-2030》,全称为《2030 年前鞑靼斯坦共和国经济发展战略》,俄文为?Стратегия социально-экономического развития Республики Татарстан до 2030 года?——译者注
(3) Стратегия социально-экономического развития Республики Татарстан до 2030 года.2015.Утверждена Законом РТ от 17.06.2015 №.40-ЗРТ.
(4) M.Rochlitz,“Collective Action Abroad:How Foreign Investors Organize”,Working Paper.Series at NRU HSE:Political Science,No.WP BRP 32/PS/2016,2016.
(1) Зубаревич Н.В.Регионы России:неравенство,кризис,модернизация.М.:Независимый институт социальной политики,2010; K.M.Dowley,“Striking the Federal Bargain in Russia:Comparative Regional Government Strategies”,Communist and Post-Communist Studies,1998,Vol.31,No.4,pp.359-380; R.W.Orttung,“Business and Politics in the Russian Regions”,Problems of Post- Communism,2004,Vol.51,No.2,pp.48-60; D.Zimin,“Promoting Investment in Russia’s Regions”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2010,Vol.51,No.5,pp.653-668; D.Zimine,M.J.Bradshaw,“Local Politics,Economic Structure,and Performance:The Case of Sakhalin”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2003,Vol.44,No.4,pp.287-304; Y.Zverev,“Kaliningrad:Problems and Paths of Development”,Problems of Post- Communism,2007,Vol.54,No.2,pp.9-25.
(2) Баранов А,Малков Е,Полищук Л,Рохлиц М,Сюняев Г.Измерение институтов в российских регионах:методология,источники данных,анализ// Вопросы экономики.2015.№.2.С.69-102.
(1) D.Zimin,“Promoting Investment in Russia’s Regions”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2010,Vol.51,No.5,pp.653-668.
(2) Гельман В.Я.Региональная власть в современной России:институты,режимы и практики// Полис:Политические исследования.1998.№.1.С.87-105; J.Kahn,“The Parade of Sovereignties:Establishing the Vocabulary of the New Russian Federalism”,Post-Soviet Affairs,2000,Vol.16,No1,pp.58-89; K.Matsuzato,“Authoritarian Transformations of the Mid-Volga National Republics:An Attempt at Macro-Regionology”,Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,2004,Vol.20,No.2,pp.98-123; V.V.Mikhailov,“Authoritarian Regimes of Russia and Tatarstan:Coexistence and Subjection”,Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,2010,Vol.26,No.4,pp.471-493.
(3) Зубаревич Н.Пространство России после Крыма и на фоне кризиса// Pro et Contra.2014.Т.18.№.3-4.С.118-128.A.Aslund,“Russia’s Economic Transformation Under Putin”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2004,Vol.45,No.6,pp.397-420; G.Sharafutdinova,“Paradiplomacy in the Russian Regions:Tatarstan’s Search for Statehood”,Europe-Asia Studies,2003,Vol.55,No.4,pp.613-629; G.Sharafutdinova,“Coping with Economic Crisis in Russia’s Regions:The Case of Tatarstan”,Russian Analytical Digest,2016,No.182,pp.7-9.
(4) M.De Melo,G.Ofer,P.Yossifov,“Transition in Regional Capitals Along the Volga”,Post- Soviet Geography and Economics,1999,Vol.40,No.8,pp.553-616; K.Stoner-Weiss,“Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy:Observations on the Devolution Process in Russia”,Post-Soviet Affairs,1999,Vol.15,No.1,pp.87-106.
(5) M.J.Sagers,“The Regional Dimension of Russian Oil Production:Is a Sustained Recovery in Prospect?”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2006,Vol.47,No.5,pp.505-545; G.Sharafutdinova,“Coping with Economic Crisis in Russia’s Regions:The Case of Tatarstan”,Russian Analytical Digest,2016,No.182,pp.7-9.
(1) J.Kahn,“The Parade of Sovereignties:Establishing the Vocabulary of the New Russian Federalism”,Post-Soviet Affairs,2000,Vol.16,No.1,pp.58-89; L.McCann,“Globalisation and Postsocialist Development:The Tatarstan Variety of Capitalism”,Post-Communist Economies,2004,Vol.16,No.3,pp.349-362.
(2) L.Hagendoorn,E.Poppe,A.Minescu,“Support for Separatism in Ethnic Republics of the Russian Federation”,Europe-Asia Studies,2008,Vol.60,No.3,pp.353-373.
(3) P.Rutland,“Petronation? Oil,Gas,and National Identity in Russia”,Post-Soviet Affairs,2015,Vol.31,No.1,pp.66-89.
(4) S.Darrell,“Russia’s Market-Distorting Federalism”,Post-Soviet Geography and Economics,1997,Vol.38,No.8,pp.445-460; M.Kopsidis,“Disintegration of Russian Grain Markets in Transition:Political and Economic Dimensions”,Post-Communist Economies,2000,Vol.12,No.1,pp.47-60.
(5) M.Bradshaw,J.Prendergrast,“The Russian Heartland Revisited:An Assessment of Russia’s Transformation”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2005,Vol.46,No.2,pp.83- 122; L.Drobizheva,“Comparison of élite Groups in Tatarstan,Sakha,Magadan,and Orenburg”,Post-Soviet Affairs,1999,Vol.15,No.4,pp.387-406.
(6) G.Sharafutdinova,“Chechnya vs.Tatarstan:Understanding Ethnopolitics in Post- Communist Russia”,Problems of Post-Communism,2000,Vol.47,No.2,pp.13-22.
(7) L.McCann,“Globalisation and Postsocialist Development:The Tatarstan Variety of Capitalism”,Post-Communist Economies,2004,Vol.16,No.3,pp.349-362.
(8) L.Drobizheva,“Comparison of élite Groups in Tatarstan,Sakha,Magadan,and Orenburg”,pp.387-406.
(1) D.C.North,J.J.Wallis,S.B.Webb,B.R.Weingast (еds.),In the Shadow of Violence:The Problem of Development in Limited Access Societies,N.Y.:Cambridge University Press,2013; D.C.North,J.J.Wallis,B.R.Weingast,Violence and Social Orders:A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History,N.Y.:Cambridge University Press,2009.
(2)本文中的精英共识是指上层政商界精英代表之间稳定的观点一致与行动统一,这些精英共同管理着地区的主要资产,决定着地区的政策走向。
(1) Рейтинг инновационного развития субъектов Российской Федерации.Вып.1 / под ред.Л.М.Гохберга.М.:НИУ ВШЭ,2012; Рейтинг инновационного развития субъектов Российской Федерации.Вып.5 / под ред.Л.М.Гохберга.М.:НИУ ВШЭ,2017.
(2) Предпринимательский климат в России:Индекс ОПОРЫ 2012.http://oporamo.ru/doc/ ind.pdf
(3) M.J.Sagers,“The Regional Dimension of Russian Oil Production:Is a Sustained Recovery in Prospect?”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2006,Vol.47,No.5,pp.505-545.
(1) Овчарова Л.Н,Прокофьева Л.М.Система социальной поддержки,направлен- ной на активизацию выхода из бедности,в регионах Российской Федерации// SPERO.2014.№.19.С.87-102.(раздел “социальная политики”)
(1) M.Bornstein,“Russia’s Mass Privatization Programme”,Communist Economies and Economic Transformation,1994,Vol.6,No.4,pp.419-457.
(1) Хакимов Р.С.Татарстан:идеология регионального развития.Казань:КЦФПП,2014.
(2) Лапина Н,Чирикова А.Путинские реформы и потенциал влияния региональных элит.М.:Институт социологии РАН; Московское представительство Фонда им.Ф.Эберта,2004.C.8.
(3)经过长期协商,该协议在2007年最终签订,有效期为10年,该协议在很大程度上只具有象征性意义,但这仍然说明,鞑靼斯坦保持了自身的特殊地位。
(1) АО Связьинвестнефтехим
(2) АО Холдинговая компания Ак Барс
(3) Татнефтехиминвест-холдинг
(1)棕地(brownfield)项目是指对被废弃、闲置或未被充分利用的场地进行再开发与扩建的项目——译者注
(2) K.Vartapetov,“Russian Fiscal Federalism Under Stress:Federal Support of Regions During the Global Financial Crisis”,Eurasian Geography and Economics,2011,Vol.52,No.4,pp.529-542.
(3) Шаймиев М.Ш.Стратегия развития Республики Татарстан// Вестник Поволжского института управления.2001.№.1.С.16-24.
(1) Кластерный проект Иннокам
(2) 这里举一个典型的案例——由于鞑靼斯坦沙米耶夫总统向梅德韦杰夫总统提出了获取支持的直接请求,喀山有机合成股份公司(АО Казаньоргсинтез)在 2009 年获得了俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行的贷款。
(3) 在建设阿莫尼铵厂(завод Аммоний)时,东京三菱银行、三井住友银行、摩根大通和瑞穗实业银行同对外经济银行共同参与融资,在 2011 年秋共同发放了 5 亿美元贷款。Строительство завода ?Аммоний? выросло в цене в 2,5 раза.10.07.2013.http://www.moneyjournal.ru/bizness/nedvizhimost/stroitelstvo-zavoda-ammoniy-viroslo-v-tsene-v-2–5-raza-9752.html
(4) Наталья Козлова.Ущерб от действий руководства Татфондбанка оценили в 3 млрд.04.03.2017.https://rg.ru/2017/03/04/reg-pfo/ushcherb-ot-dejstvij-rukovodstva-tatfondbanka-ocenili-v-3-mlrd.html
(1) 如叶卡捷琳娜·布拉金斯卡娅所说,与俄罗斯其他地区相比,鞑靼斯坦共和国穆斯林人口与非穆斯林人口之间文化同化程度最高,宗教包容程度也更高。E.Braginskaia,“‘Domestication’ or Representation? Russia and the Institutionalisation of Islam in Comparative Perspective”,Europe-Asia Studies,2012,Vol.64,No.3,pp.597-620.
(1)截至2013年1月1日,鞑靼斯坦共和国法人持有的工业用地占比为59%,该数据俄罗斯联邦平均值仅为8%。
(2) A.Amsden,Asia’s Next Giant:South Korea and Late Industrialization,N.Y.:Oxford University Press,1989; A.H.Amsden,W.W.Chu,Beyond Late Development:Taiwan’s Upgrading Policies,Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,2003; C.Sabel,L.Jordan,Doing,Learning,Being:Some Lessons Learned from Malaysia’s National Transformation Program,Washington,DC:World Bank,2015; L.K.Yew,From Third World to First:The Singapore Story,1965–2000,N.Y.:Harper Collins Publishers,2000.
(1) L.Putterman,“On the Past and Future of China’s Township and Village-Owned Enterprises”,World Development,1997,Vol.25,No.10,pp.1639-1655; M.L.Weitzman,C.Xu,“Chinese Township Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives”,Journal of Comparative Economics,1994,Vol.18,No.2,pp.121-145.
(1) R.F.Doner,B.R Schneider,“The Middle-Income Trap:More Politics than Economics”,World Politics,2016,Vol.68,No.4,pp.608-644; World Development Report 2017:Governance and the Law,Washington,DC:World Bank,2017.
(2) Салагаев А.Л,Сергеев С.А.Региональная элита Республики Татарстан:Структура и эволюция// Полития.2013.№.2(69).С.74-85.
(3) Хакимов Р.С.Татарстан:идеология регионального развития.Казань:КЦФПП,2014.
(1) D.C.North,J.J.Wallis,S.B.Webb,B.R.Weingast (еds.),In the Shadow of Violence:The Problem of Development in Limited Access Societies,N.Y.:Cambridge University Press,2013; D.C.North,J.J.Wallis,B.R.Weingast,Violence and Social Orders:A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History,N.Y.:Cambridge University Press,2009.
(2) 这些规范有时可以不需要明文规定,在中国就有这样的案例。
(3) 法里特·加济祖尔林(Фарит Газизуллин)从 1991 年起任鞑靼斯坦共和国政府第一副总理,负责私有化与工业管理事务,1996 年出任俄罗斯联邦国有财产管理委员会第一副主席,1997 年升任俄罗斯联邦副总理和财产关系部部长。卡米尔·伊斯哈科夫(Камиль Исхаков)自 1991 年起任喀山市市长,于 2005 年被任命为俄罗斯联邦总统驻远东联邦区全权代表。
(1) 在地区媒体的笔下,该事件被为描述为由时任鞑靼斯坦共和国总统办公厅主任哈利亚夫·尼扎莫夫、卡马河畔切尔内行政长官拉夫加特·阿尔滕巴涅夫和鞑靼斯坦共和国内务部部长伊斯坎德尔·加利莫夫三人在地方领导支持下发起的“宫廷政变”(http://kazan.bezformata.ru/listnews/vsesilnij-avtor-putcha-glav/12834907/)。沙伊米耶夫之所以能够继续控制国家委员会,主要得益于喀山行政长官伊斯哈科夫和总统安全局局长阿斯加特·萨法罗夫的大力支持。这次地区内部冲突最终以更换内务部部长(改由萨法罗夫出任)、“叛乱”发起人之一被调至俄罗斯联邦会议而告终。
(2) Хакимов Р.С.Татарстан:идеология регионального развития.Казань:КЦФПП,2014.
(1)在所有高度集中的政治制度中,很多问题都取决于领导人的决策。鞑靼斯坦也并不例外。然而,问题的关键在于,地区领袖能否在制度建设中也贯彻现代化思想,能否建立起在自己卸任后仍然能够运行的制度体系。如果无法实现这个目标,那么这个在“手动模式”下发展的国家或地区很有可能会开始衰败,甚至走向自我灭亡(在“阿拉伯之春”时期的很多近东国家都发生过这样的情况)。
(1)2015年,鞑靼斯坦共和国的平均工资为斯维尔德洛夫斯克州平均工资的95%,但同期鞑靼斯坦的人均地区生产总值却高出对方15%。
(2)在2017年发生了诸多可以证明鞑靼斯坦与联邦中央关系恶化的事件,其中包括联邦中央拒绝续签与鞑靼斯坦的分权协议(该协议已在2017年7月到期),以及联邦中央拒绝援助鞑靼斯坦储备银行。
(3)如2012年在喀山发生的内务机关丑闻事件,以及2017年鞑靼斯坦储备银行的执照吊销事件。
(1)在此需要说明,鞑靼斯坦共和国的大学在全俄排行榜上的排名总体较为靠后。2016年,在俄罗斯高校排行榜中,喀山联邦大学排名仅为第17位,而医科大学、科技大学和航空航天大学排名分别为第32、第54和第55位(http://www.edu.ru/ratings/reyting-vuzovrossii-2016/)。2016年,鞑靼斯坦共和国生源质量最高的(根据公费班的入读分数排名)医科大学在全俄该指标排名中仅列第37位(https://www.hse.ru/ege/rating/2016/68395231 /gos/?rlist&uplist&vuz-abiturients-budget-order=ge&vuz-abiturients-budget-val=300)
(1) Становая Т.Трансформация путинских элит:2014-2024.Московский центр Карнеги.2017.26 июля.http://carnegie.ru/2017/07/26/ru-pub-72625
(1) D.C.North,J.J.Wallis,S.B.Webb,B.R.Weingast (еds.),In the Shadow of Violence:The Problem of Development in Limited Access Societies,N.Y.:Cambridge University Press,2013; D.C.North,J.J.Wallis,B.R.Weingast,Violence and Social Orders:A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History,N.Y.:Cambridge University Press,2009.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |