TPL介入的产运销供应链联盟决策及运作效率评价
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摘要
在生产商批发价格为内生变量且TPL物流服务水平影响零售商市场需求的情形下,研究了整体联盟、分散决策、产运联盟和运销联盟四种模式下产运销供应链系统内各决策主体的决策行为以及系统的运作效率。分别构建了各决策模式下的数学模型,并证明了系统最优解或博弈均衡解的存在性和唯一性。通过对上述四种模式下的运算结果进行两两比较,发现:较之整体联盟,其他三种决策模式下系统利润均出现损失;其他三种模式下的最优订购量、物流服务水平和二者的比值大小均取决于某些特定的条件,这导致TPL介入的供应链内部联盟并非一定能使系统整体运作效率获得提高。进一步通过数值算例对零售价格和可变物流服务成本进行了灵敏度分析,发现在大多数情形下,运销联盟模式下的系统运作效率是上述三种决策模式中最高的。
This paper assumes that the manufacturer's wholesale price is an endogenous variable and the market demand of the retailer is affected by the service level of TPL provider. We studies the decision-making behavior and operational efficiency of a production-transportation-marketing system under integrative alliance, decentralized decision, production and transportation alliance, transportation and marketing alliance mode respectively. The mathematical models are developed under these four modes and then the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solutions or game equilibrium solutions are proved. Through the pairwise comparison, we find that the system's profits under the other three modes are lower than that in the integrative alliance. Moreover, the value size of the optimal ordering quantity, logistics service level and the ratio between them under other three modes depends on some specific conditions. Therefore, the supply chain internal alliance may not be able to improve the system operational efficiency. We further give a numerical example and then do the sensitivity analysis on the retail price and variable logistics service cost. Finally, we find that the system operation efficiency under the transportation and marketing alliance mode is highest among these three decision modes in most cases.
This paper assumes that the manufacturer's wholesale price is an endogenous variable and the market demand of the retailer is affected by the service level of TPL provider. We studies the decision-making behavior and operational efficiency of a production-transportation-marketing system under integrative alliance, decentralized decision, production and transportation alliance, transportation and marketing alliance mode respectively. The mathematical models are developed under these four modes and then the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solutions or game equilibrium solutions are proved. Through the pairwise comparison, we find that the system's profits under the other three modes are lower than that in the integrative alliance. Moreover, the value size of the optimal ordering quantity, logistics service level and the ratio between them under other three modes depends on some specific conditions. Therefore, the supply chain internal alliance may not be able to improve the system operational efficiency. We further give a numerical example and then do the sensitivity analysis on the retail price and variable logistics service cost. Finally, we find that the system operation efficiency under the transportation and marketing alliance mode is highest among these three decision modes in most cases.
引文
[1] 吴庆,但斌.低值易逝品的第三方物流收入共享协调合同研究[J] .管理工程学报,2009,23(3):40- 44.
[2] 公彦德,李帮义.主导模式对供应链决策、稳定性和效率的影响分析[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(3):42- 49.
[3] 陈晓旭,王勇,于海龙.3PL参与的时变需求变质品三级供应链模型[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(1):65-73.
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[6] 秦星红,苏强,洪志生等.服务质量约束下网络上的与物流服务商协调模型[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2014,42(9):1444-1451.
[7] Cai X Q, Chen J, Xiao Y B, et al.. Fresh-product supply chain management with logistics outsourcing[J]. Omega 2013, 41(4): 752-765.
[8] 吴庆,但斌.物流服务水平影响市场需求变化的TPL协调合同[J].管理科学学报,2008,11(5):64-75.
[9] 王勇,李莉英.需求依赖服务水平和价格的外包物流协调合同[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(6):775-785.
[10] 吴庆,但斌,钱宇等.努力水平影响损耗的低值易逝品TPL协调合同[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(12):15-26.
[11] Wu Q, Mu Y P, Feng Y. Coordinating contracts for fresh product outsourcing logistics channels with power structures[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 160: 94-105.
[12] 冯颖,余云龙,张炎治等.TPL服务商参与决策的生鲜农产品三级供应链协调机制[J].管理工程学报,2015,29(4):213-221.
[13] Jiang L, Wang Y, Liu D M. Logistics cost sharing in supply chains involving a third party logistics provider[J]. Central European journal of operations research, 2014. 1-24.
[14] 曹勇.改善生鲜农产品运达质量的实证分析——以长丰草莓为例[D].合肥,安徽农业大学,2014.
[15] Baron P J, Muller R D. Consumer perceptions in eastern european food markets[J]. British food journal, 1995, 97(2): 34-35.
[16] Sheu J B, Gao X Q. Alliance or no alliance-bargaining power in competing reverse supply chains[J]. European journal of operational research, 2014, 233(2): 313-325.
[17] Taleizadeh A A, Soleymanfar V R, Choi T M. optimal pricing and alliance strategy in a retailer-led supply chain with the return policy: a game-theoretic ananlysis[J]. Information sciences, 2017, 420: 466- 489.
[18] Giri B C, Roy B, Maiti T. Coordinating a three-echelon supply chain under price and quality dependent demand with sub-supply chain and RFM strategies[J]. Applied mathematical modelling, 2017, 52: 747-769.
[19] 李昌文,周永务.两层分销链中的联盟定价策略与稳定性研究[J].系统工程学报,2016,31(2):234-241.
[20] Yang J, Wang J J, Wong C W Y, et al. Relational stability and alliance performance in supply chain[J]. Omega, 2008, 36(4): 600- 608.
[21] Gao J W, Yang X F, Liu D. Uncertain Shapley value of coalitional game with application to supply chain alliance[J]. Applied soft computing, 2017, 56: 551-556.
[22] 刘天亮,陈剑,辛春林.凸需求情形下分权供应链运作效率及福利分析[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(1):61- 68.
[23] 蒋鹏飞,王震.三级供应链合作博弈分析[J].山东大学学报(理学版),2008,43(1):103-106.
[24] 王利,彭亮,孟庆良.三级供应链合作利润博弈与分配机制构建[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(5):59- 65.
[25] Seifert R W, Zequeira R I, Liao S Q. A three-echelon supply chain with price-only contracts and sub-supply chain coordination[J]. International journal of production research, 2012, 138: 345-353.
[26] 郑鑫,朱晓曦,马卫民.基于Shapley值法的三级闭环供应链收益分配模型[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(4):17-22.
[27] 刘佐菁,胡雨川.第三方物流提供商参与的供应链协调研究[J].科技管理研究,2013,24:242-246.
[2] 公彦德,李帮义.主导模式对供应链决策、稳定性和效率的影响分析[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(3):42- 49.
[3] 陈晓旭,王勇,于海龙.3PL参与的时变需求变质品三级供应链模型[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(1):65-73.
[4] Jiang L, Wang Y, Yan X M. Decision and coordination in a competing retail channel involving a third-party logistics provider[J]. Computer and industrial engineering, 2014, 76: 109-121.
[5] 尤建新,劳水琴.涉及第三方物流服务质量的供应链协调[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2012,40(9):1422-1427.
[6] 秦星红,苏强,洪志生等.服务质量约束下网络上的与物流服务商协调模型[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2014,42(9):1444-1451.
[7] Cai X Q, Chen J, Xiao Y B, et al.. Fresh-product supply chain management with logistics outsourcing[J]. Omega 2013, 41(4): 752-765.
[8] 吴庆,但斌.物流服务水平影响市场需求变化的TPL协调合同[J].管理科学学报,2008,11(5):64-75.
[9] 王勇,李莉英.需求依赖服务水平和价格的外包物流协调合同[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(6):775-785.
[10] 吴庆,但斌,钱宇等.努力水平影响损耗的低值易逝品TPL协调合同[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(12):15-26.
[11] Wu Q, Mu Y P, Feng Y. Coordinating contracts for fresh product outsourcing logistics channels with power structures[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 160: 94-105.
[12] 冯颖,余云龙,张炎治等.TPL服务商参与决策的生鲜农产品三级供应链协调机制[J].管理工程学报,2015,29(4):213-221.
[13] Jiang L, Wang Y, Liu D M. Logistics cost sharing in supply chains involving a third party logistics provider[J]. Central European journal of operations research, 2014. 1-24.
[14] 曹勇.改善生鲜农产品运达质量的实证分析——以长丰草莓为例[D].合肥,安徽农业大学,2014.
[15] Baron P J, Muller R D. Consumer perceptions in eastern european food markets[J]. British food journal, 1995, 97(2): 34-35.
[16] Sheu J B, Gao X Q. Alliance or no alliance-bargaining power in competing reverse supply chains[J]. European journal of operational research, 2014, 233(2): 313-325.
[17] Taleizadeh A A, Soleymanfar V R, Choi T M. optimal pricing and alliance strategy in a retailer-led supply chain with the return policy: a game-theoretic ananlysis[J]. Information sciences, 2017, 420: 466- 489.
[18] Giri B C, Roy B, Maiti T. Coordinating a three-echelon supply chain under price and quality dependent demand with sub-supply chain and RFM strategies[J]. Applied mathematical modelling, 2017, 52: 747-769.
[19] 李昌文,周永务.两层分销链中的联盟定价策略与稳定性研究[J].系统工程学报,2016,31(2):234-241.
[20] Yang J, Wang J J, Wong C W Y, et al. Relational stability and alliance performance in supply chain[J]. Omega, 2008, 36(4): 600- 608.
[21] Gao J W, Yang X F, Liu D. Uncertain Shapley value of coalitional game with application to supply chain alliance[J]. Applied soft computing, 2017, 56: 551-556.
[22] 刘天亮,陈剑,辛春林.凸需求情形下分权供应链运作效率及福利分析[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(1):61- 68.
[23] 蒋鹏飞,王震.三级供应链合作博弈分析[J].山东大学学报(理学版),2008,43(1):103-106.
[24] 王利,彭亮,孟庆良.三级供应链合作利润博弈与分配机制构建[J].运筹与管理,2010,19(5):59- 65.
[25] Seifert R W, Zequeira R I, Liao S Q. A three-echelon supply chain with price-only contracts and sub-supply chain coordination[J]. International journal of production research, 2012, 138: 345-353.
[26] 郑鑫,朱晓曦,马卫民.基于Shapley值法的三级闭环供应链收益分配模型[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(4):17-22.
[27] 刘佐菁,胡雨川.第三方物流提供商参与的供应链协调研究[J].科技管理研究,2013,24:242-246.
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