电网虚假数据注入攻击的双层优化模型
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摘要
近年来随着智能电网技术和信息技术的发展,电力系统受到网络攻击的可能性越来越大。基于状态估计原理提出了虚假数据注入(FDI)攻击双层非线性优化模型。上层模型中,网络攻击方对电力系统测量数据展开攻击,其目的是寻找最优攻击方案使电力系统的经济损失最大化,以量测攻击范围和状态估计残差为约束条件,而下层模型采用安全约束经济调度模型,调度运行人员根据状态估计处理后的负荷数据优化调度电力系统的运行。针对双层优化模型的复杂性,利用KKT(Karush-Kuhn-Tucker)条件将其转化为单层非线性规划模型后求解。在GAMS上实现所提出虚假数据注入攻击非线性规划模型的编程仿真,并调用非线性规划求解器BARON进行求解。算例分析结果表明FDI双层优化攻击可能严重危害电力系统安全和经济运行,验证了所提出模型和方法的有效性。
With the development of smart grid technology and information technology in recent years, the possibility of cyber attacks in power system increases. A bi-level nonlinear optimization model of false data injection(FDI) attack is proposed based on the state estimation. In the upper level, the cyber attackers hack the measurement data of the power system with the purpose of finding the optimal attack strategy to maximize the economic loss of the power system while subjected to a list of constraints including the measuring attack range and state estimation residual error. The security-constrained economic dispatch model is used in the lower level and the power system operators perform the optimization dispatch of power system based on the load data disposed by the state estimation. In order to handle the complexity of the bi-level optimization model, the proposed model is transformed to single-level nonlinear planning model with KKT(Karush-Kuhn-Tucker) conditions. The programming simulation of nonlinear FDI attack model is implemented in GAMS and solved by using the nonlinear planning solver of BARON. The numerical results indicate that the bi-level FDI optimization attack could seriously deteriorate the secure and economic operation of power systems, and the effectiveness of the proposed approach is consequently validated.
With the development of smart grid technology and information technology in recent years, the possibility of cyber attacks in power system increases. A bi-level nonlinear optimization model of false data injection(FDI) attack is proposed based on the state estimation. In the upper level, the cyber attackers hack the measurement data of the power system with the purpose of finding the optimal attack strategy to maximize the economic loss of the power system while subjected to a list of constraints including the measuring attack range and state estimation residual error. The security-constrained economic dispatch model is used in the lower level and the power system operators perform the optimization dispatch of power system based on the load data disposed by the state estimation. In order to handle the complexity of the bi-level optimization model, the proposed model is transformed to single-level nonlinear planning model with KKT(Karush-Kuhn-Tucker) conditions. The programming simulation of nonlinear FDI attack model is implemented in GAMS and solved by using the nonlinear planning solver of BARON. The numerical results indicate that the bi-level FDI optimization attack could seriously deteriorate the secure and economic operation of power systems, and the effectiveness of the proposed approach is consequently validated.
引文
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[18] 田猛,王先培,董政呈,等.基于拉格朗日乘子法的虚假数据攻击策略[J].电力系统自动化,2017,41(11):26-32.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20161225004.TIAN Meng,WANG Xianpei,DONG Zhengcheng,et al.Injected attack strategy for false data based on Lagrange multipliers method[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2017,41(11):26-32.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20161225004.
[19] TAWARMALANI M,SAHINIDIS N V.GAMS/BARON:a tutorial and empirical performance analysis[M].New York:Springer,2002.
[20] ZIMMERMAN R D,MURILLO-SANCHEZ C E,GAN D.MATPOWER:a MATLAB power system simulation package[M].New York:Cornell University PSERC,1997.
[2] 汤奕,王琦,倪明,等.电力信息物理融合系统中的网络攻击分析[J].电力系统自动化,2016,40(6):1-4.TANG Yi,WANG Qi,NI Ming,et al.Analysis of cyber attacks in cyber physical power system[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2016,40(6):1-4.
[3] 汤奕,陈倩,李梦雅,等.电力信息物理融合系统环境中的网络攻击研究综述[J].电力系统自动化,2016,40(17):59-69.TANG Yi,CHEN Qian,LI Mengya,et al.Overview on cyber-attacks against cyber physical power system[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2016,40(17):59-69.
[4] 舒隽,郭志锋,韩冰.电网虚假数据注入攻击的非线性分析模型[J].华北电力大学学报(自然科学版),2018,45(2):75-81.SHU Jun,GUO Zhifeng,HAN Bing.The nonlinear analysis model of the false data injection attack for power grid[J].Journal of North China Electric Power University (Natural Science Edition),2018,45(2):75-81.
[5] LIU X,LI Z.False data attacks against AC state estimation with incomplete network information[J].IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2017,8(5):2239-2248.
[6] RAHMAN M A,MOHSENIAN-RAD H.False data injection attacks against nonlinear state estimation in smart power grids[C]// 2013 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting,July 21-25,2013,Vancouver,Canada:1-5.
[7] DENG R,XIAO G,LU R,et al.False data injection on state estimation in power systems-attacks,impacts and defense:a survey[J].IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics,2016,13(2):411-423.
[8] KONSTANTINOU C,MANIATAKOS M.A case study on implementing false data injection attacks against nonlinear state estimation[C]// Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy,October 28,2016,Vienna,Austria:81-92.
[9] 赵俊华,梁高琪,文福拴,等.乌克兰事件的启示:防范针对电网的虚假数据注入攻击[J].电力系统自动化,2016,40(7):149-151.ZHAO Junhua,LIANG Gaoqi,WEN Fushuan,et al.Lessons learnt from the Ukrainian blackout:protecting power grids against false data injection attacks[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2016,40(7):149-151.
[10] 王以良.智能电网虚假数据攻击检测及防范研究[D].北京:华北电力大学,2014.WANG Yiliang.A detection and prevention study on false data injection attack for power grid[D].Beijing:North China Electric Power University,2014.
[11] HUG G,GIAMPAPA J A.Vulnerability assessment of AC state estimation with respect to false data injection cyber-attacks[J].IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2012,3(3):1362-1370.
[12] ASHOK A,GOVINDARASU M,AJJARAPU V.Online detection of stealthy false data injection attacks in power system state estimation[J].IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2016,99:1-11.
[13] YUAN Y,LI Z,REN K.Modeling load redistribution attacks in power systems[J].IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2011,2(2):382-390.
[14] YUAN Y,LI Z,REN K.Quantitative analysis of load redistribution attacks in power systems[J].IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems,2012,23(9):1731-1738.
[15] 樊磊.网络攻击威胁下电力系统脆弱性分析模型与方法[D].北京:华北电力大学,2015.FAN Lei.Analysis of power system vulnerability under cyber attack threat[D].Beijing:North China Electric Power University,2015.
[16] CHIN W L,LEE C H,JIANG T.Blind false data attacks against AC state estimation based on geometric approach in smart grid communications[J].IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2018,9(6):6298-6306.
[17] ANWAR A,MAHMOOD A N,PICKERING M.Modeling and performance evaluation of stealthy false data injection attacks on smart grid in the presence of corrupted measurements[J].Journal of Computer and System Sciences,2017,83(1):58-72.
[18] 田猛,王先培,董政呈,等.基于拉格朗日乘子法的虚假数据攻击策略[J].电力系统自动化,2017,41(11):26-32.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20161225004.TIAN Meng,WANG Xianpei,DONG Zhengcheng,et al.Injected attack strategy for false data based on Lagrange multipliers method[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2017,41(11):26-32.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20161225004.
[19] TAWARMALANI M,SAHINIDIS N V.GAMS/BARON:a tutorial and empirical performance analysis[M].New York:Springer,2002.
[20] ZIMMERMAN R D,MURILLO-SANCHEZ C E,GAN D.MATPOWER:a MATLAB power system simulation package[M].New York:Cornell University PSERC,1997.
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