信息服务平台市场规模与定价关系研究——兼析信息服务平台合并的市场影响
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摘要
近年来,信息服务业平台发展迅速,对人民生活的影响越来越大。本文在互联网平台以出售信息服务为主要盈利模式的背景下,从信息影响营销能力角度出发,建立一个双边平台对信息服务的定价模型,探讨平台合并对市场规模的影响。结论表明:其他条件不变的情况下,平台的用户规模越大,其对信息服务的定价越高。进一步,我们发现负交叉网络外部性的平台之间合并,相对于正交叉网络外部性,更有利于提升市场规模。平台间的用户重合度越高,合并后的市场规模越小。平台合并对获取和处理信息的能力提升越大,市场规模的提升也越大。
In recent years, the information service industry platform has developed rapidly and has an increasingly important impact on people's lives. In the context of the Internet platform selling information service as the main profit model, this paper establishes a pricing model of information service from bilateral platforms from the perspective of information impact marketing capability, and discusses the impact of platform consolidation on market size. The conclusions show that the larger the user size of the platform and the other conditions, the higher the pricing of the information service. Further, we find that the merger between platforms with negative cross-network externalities is more conducive to increasing market size than the cross-network externalities. The higher the user overlap between platforms, the smaller the market size after the merger. The greater the ability of platform consolidation to acquire and process information, the greater the market size.
In recent years, the information service industry platform has developed rapidly and has an increasingly important impact on people's lives. In the context of the Internet platform selling information service as the main profit model, this paper establishes a pricing model of information service from bilateral platforms from the perspective of information impact marketing capability, and discusses the impact of platform consolidation on market size. The conclusions show that the larger the user size of the platform and the other conditions, the higher the pricing of the information service. Further, we find that the merger between platforms with negative cross-network externalities is more conducive to increasing market size than the cross-network externalities. The higher the user overlap between platforms, the smaller the market size after the merger. The greater the ability of platform consolidation to acquire and process information, the greater the market size.
引文
[1]Rochet J C, Tirole J. Platform competition in two‐sided markets[J]. Journal of the european economic association, 2003(4).
[2]Rochet J C, Tirole J. Two‐sided markets:a progress report[J]. The RAND journal of economics, 2006(3).
[3]Armstrong M. Competition in two‐sided markets[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics,2006(3).
[4]Evans D S, Schmalensee R. The antitrust analysis of multi-sided platform businesses[R].National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.
[5]Tucker D, Wellford H. Big mistakes regarding big data[J]. Antitrust Source, American Bar Association, 2014.
[6]Grunes A P, Stucke M E. No mistake about it:The important role of antitrust in the era of big data[J]. University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 269. 2015. Available at SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2600051
[7]高红玉,雷万云.大数据背景下我国药品信息共享平台建设研究[J].价格理论与实践,2015(3).
[8]Haucap J, Stühmeier T. Competition and antitrust in internet markets[J]. Handbook on the Economics of the Internet, Edward Elgar:Cheltenham, 2016.
[9]Makarov A N, Khusainova S V, Makarov E A. Informational business activity:Features of pricing and transformations of a network effect[J]. Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research, 2016.
[10]Hovenkamp H. Antitrust and Information Technologies[J]. Fla. L. Rev., 2016.
[11]Turban E, Outland J, King D, et al. Electronic commerce 2018:a managerial and social networks perspective[M]. Springer, 2017.
[12]Brinson N H, Eastin M S. Mobile commerce and the consumer information paradox:A review of practice, theory, and a research agenda[M]//Frontiers in Data Science. CRC Press,2017.
[13]张荣齐、杜辉、李英爽.数字化服务平台定价模型研究———基于数字化服务平台与小前端点对点定价模型构建[J].价格理论与实践,2018(7).
(1)当α=γ时,由于θ和ρ独立产生且期望均为0,所以E[m-(θ-p)~2]=Eθ~2-E[(θ-0)(P-0)]=m-V_θ-V_p。
(2)线性假设一方面可以让本文可以更清晰的分析核心问题;另一方面,在现实中企业和广告代理通常需要用户的信息越多好,吸引的消费者越多越好,而不存在边际递减的情况,所以线性的假设也符合现实的情况。
(3)可以看出,在满足上一个注释中的反馈约束条件的情况下,定价t永远为正。
[2]Rochet J C, Tirole J. Two‐sided markets:a progress report[J]. The RAND journal of economics, 2006(3).
[3]Armstrong M. Competition in two‐sided markets[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics,2006(3).
[4]Evans D S, Schmalensee R. The antitrust analysis of multi-sided platform businesses[R].National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.
[5]Tucker D, Wellford H. Big mistakes regarding big data[J]. Antitrust Source, American Bar Association, 2014.
[6]Grunes A P, Stucke M E. No mistake about it:The important role of antitrust in the era of big data[J]. University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 269. 2015. Available at SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2600051
[7]高红玉,雷万云.大数据背景下我国药品信息共享平台建设研究[J].价格理论与实践,2015(3).
[8]Haucap J, Stühmeier T. Competition and antitrust in internet markets[J]. Handbook on the Economics of the Internet, Edward Elgar:Cheltenham, 2016.
[9]Makarov A N, Khusainova S V, Makarov E A. Informational business activity:Features of pricing and transformations of a network effect[J]. Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research, 2016.
[10]Hovenkamp H. Antitrust and Information Technologies[J]. Fla. L. Rev., 2016.
[11]Turban E, Outland J, King D, et al. Electronic commerce 2018:a managerial and social networks perspective[M]. Springer, 2017.
[12]Brinson N H, Eastin M S. Mobile commerce and the consumer information paradox:A review of practice, theory, and a research agenda[M]//Frontiers in Data Science. CRC Press,2017.
[13]张荣齐、杜辉、李英爽.数字化服务平台定价模型研究———基于数字化服务平台与小前端点对点定价模型构建[J].价格理论与实践,2018(7).
(1)当α=γ时,由于θ和ρ独立产生且期望均为0,所以E[m-(θ-p)~2]=Eθ~2-E[(θ-0)(P-0)]=m-V_θ-V_p。
(2)线性假设一方面可以让本文可以更清晰的分析核心问题;另一方面,在现实中企业和广告代理通常需要用户的信息越多好,吸引的消费者越多越好,而不存在边际递减的情况,所以线性的假设也符合现实的情况。
(3)可以看出,在满足上一个注释中的反馈约束条件的情况下,定价t永远为正。
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