市场竞争结构、农业社会化服务供给与农户福利改善

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英文篇名：Market Competition Structure, the Supply of Agricultural Services and Farmers' Welfare Improvement 作者：杨丹 英文作者：YANG Dan;Southwest University; 关键词：农业社会化服务 ; 农民合作社 ; 市场竞争结构 ; 福利 英文关键词：Agricultural Services;;Farmers' Cooperatives;;Market Competition Structure;;Farmers' Welfare 中文刊名：JJXD 英文刊名：Economic Perspectives 机构：西南大学经济管理学院;西南大学农村经济与管理研究中心; 出版日期：2019-04-18 出版单位：经济学动态 年：2019 期：No.698 基金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“农村新型合作组织的扶贫效应及相关政策研究”(16CGL036);国家社会科学基金重大项目“三权分置、农地流转与农民承包权益保护研究”(15ZDA023);; 重庆市教委人文社会科学研究重点项目“重庆市实施乡村振兴战略的路径和策略研究”(18SKSJ003)资助 语种：中文; 页：JJXD201904006 页数：17 CN：04 ISSN：11-1057/F 分类号：65-81

摘要

农业社会化服务的有效供给是农业经营效率提升和农户福利改善的重要保障,合作社和企业是农业社会化服务的重要市场供给主体。本文基于合作社与企业不同的目标函数构建两阶段价格竞争理论模型,采用逆推归纳法分析不同市场竞争结构下不同供给主体的服务价格、市场份额与农户的福利差异;并采用中国橙业市场的多个典型案例进行分析,比较不同竞争结构下的农户福利差异。研究表明,农业社会化服务市场会逐步形成多主体竞争性供给格局,随着合作社实力不断增强,能以更低的价格和更高的效用提升效应,争夺企业的市场份额,提升农户福利,同时迫使企业降低价格,提升惠顾农户的福利,并有助于农户总体福利的提升。本研究能够为中国农民合作社的规范发展、农业社会化服务体系的完善以及农户福利提升等相关政策的制定提供参考。
        The effective supply of agricultural services is an important guarantee for the improvement of agricultural operation efficiency and farmers' welfare, while both cooperatives and enterprises are important market suppliers of agricultural services. Based on the different objective functions of cooperatives and enterprises, this paper constructs a theoretical model of two-stage price competition, and analyzes the differences in price and market share of different suppliers as well as differences in farmers' welfare under various market competition structures with the backward induction method. In addition, typical cases of different competition structures in Chinese orange markets were used for empirical analysis. Research results show that the pattern of competition among several supplies will come into being in the agricultural service market. Farmers' cooperatives can compete for the market share of enterprises with lower prices and higher utility improvement effect, leading to the increase in farmers' welfare. At the same time, cooperatives force enterprises to reduce prices and then improve farmers' utility, and contribute to the overall welfare of farmers. This study provides an important reference for China to improve the agricultural service system and increase the welfare of farmers.

引文

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    (1)需要说明的是,由于具有公共品性质的农业服务主要由公共部门提供,具有一定的特殊性,本文仅考虑具有私人品和准公共品性质的农业服务的竞争性供给,这类农业服务的供给主要来自农业企业和农民合作社。
    (2)据原国家工商总局统计,截至2018年10月底,全国依法登记的农民专业合作社达到214.8万家,入社农户占全国农户总数比例达到18.5%,成为提供农业服务、引领小农户实现农业现代化的主要力量。
    (3)研究主题为私人品性质和准公共品性质的农业服务的竞争性供给,因此没有分析由公共部门供给的公共品性质的农业服务。为简化分析,本文假定农业社会化服务的供给主体只有企业和合作社,进而分析这两个供给主体之间的竞争情况和农户福利差异。
    (4)物理性质相同的农业服务是指物理性质相似的同类农业服务,这些农业服务之间具有很强的替代性,但不能完全替代,这往往是经典的伯川德模型的假定方式(Gibbons,1992)。
    (5)这里用*号上标来标记合作社与企业混合寡头竞争结构。此时的均衡结果可以视为企业和合作社混合寡头市场结构下的均衡结果,后文会基于此进行比较分析。不同市场结构的均衡解证明过程详见《经济学动态》网站工作论文附录。
    (6)这里的“变为”并不是指企业转变为合作社,而是为了表明一种竞争结构中是企业和企业竞争,另一种竞争结构中是企业和合作社竞争。当然,国外不乏企业和合作社之间相互转化的案例,如Fulton & Larson(2009)分析了加拿大合作社Saskatchewan Wheat Pool转变为企业Viterra的案例;阿根廷也有工人们接管了布宜诺斯艾利斯的羊毛清洁工厂并将其变为合作社的案例等。只是中国目前这种相互转化案例还比较少见。
    (7)这里用上标1来标记市场1中的企业纯寡头竞争结构。
    (8)这里用上标2标记市场2中的合作社纯寡头竞争结构。
    (9)需要说明的是,本文的理论分析是在较为理想的规范合作社假定基础上进行,在案例分析佐证的过程中,我们不仅需要意识到中国目前的合作社发展情况与之存在一定的差异,但同时也应该注意到中国的合作社正在从高速发展阶段转为规范和完善的关键阶段,终将发展成为和企业抗衡的重要市场力量。因此,本文的研究对于中国合作社发展具有前瞻性指导作用。
    (10)这里的混合结构往往表现为合作社理事长同时也是企业董事长,或者合作社成员中包括企业单位成员等情况。