“互联网+”环境下考虑消费者行为的资源回收策略
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摘要
在"互联网+回收"环境下,考虑人们对传统回收渠道以及网络回收渠道的态度,建立基于不同消费者行为的回收模型,研究传统回收商、网络回收商和再制造商对再生资源的回收策略.研究结果表明:在竞争回收时,网络消费者比例和普通消费者对网络回收渠道的接受程度同时影响定价决策,且网络消费者比例越高回收价格越低,普通消费者对网络回收渠道的接受程度越高回收价格越低;在联盟回收时,回收价格不受网络消费者比例和普通消费者接受程度的影响,回收商收益增加,但再制造商的收益受损.再制造商为了减少损失,可以设计收益分配机制与回收商进行合作,增加供应链收益.根据模型分析,认为联盟回收是最佳回收方式,政府应整合上下游企业,推动"互联网+回收"平台化、规模化发展.
Under the circumstance of "Internet + recycling", considering different preferences of consumers for the traditional recycling channels and the online recycling channels, the recycling models based on the behaviors of different consumer groups are built. The pricing strategies of traditional recyclers, online recyclers and remanufacturers for renewable resources are discussed. The results show that when recyclers compete with each other, the proportion of consumers preferring for "Internet + recycling"and the acceptability of the consumers for online recycling channel affect the pricing decision. With the increase of the proportion of Internet consumers, the recycling price is reduced; with the increase of the acceptability of the consumers for online recycling channel, the recycling price is also reduced. when there is a recycling coalition, the proportion of consumers preferring for "Internet+ recycling"and the acceptability of the online recycling channel have no effect on pricing decision, but the profits of the recyclers will increase and the remanufacturers' will decrease. In order to reduce the loss, the remanufacturers will design profits allocation to cooperate with recyclers, and then the profits of the supply chain can be better. According to the analysis of the model, it is proved that recycling coalition is the best way. The government should integrate the upstream and downstream enterprises to promote platform and scale development of "Internet+ recycling".
Under the circumstance of "Internet + recycling", considering different preferences of consumers for the traditional recycling channels and the online recycling channels, the recycling models based on the behaviors of different consumer groups are built. The pricing strategies of traditional recyclers, online recyclers and remanufacturers for renewable resources are discussed. The results show that when recyclers compete with each other, the proportion of consumers preferring for "Internet + recycling"and the acceptability of the consumers for online recycling channel affect the pricing decision. With the increase of the proportion of Internet consumers, the recycling price is reduced; with the increase of the acceptability of the consumers for online recycling channel, the recycling price is also reduced. when there is a recycling coalition, the proportion of consumers preferring for "Internet+ recycling"and the acceptability of the online recycling channel have no effect on pricing decision, but the profits of the recyclers will increase and the remanufacturers' will decrease. In order to reduce the loss, the remanufacturers will design profits allocation to cooperate with recyclers, and then the profits of the supply chain can be better. According to the analysis of the model, it is proved that recycling coalition is the best way. The government should integrate the upstream and downstream enterprises to promote platform and scale development of "Internet+ recycling".
引文
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[13]Sheu J B,Gao X Q.Alliance or no alliance-Bargaining power in competing reverse supply chains[J].European Jof Operational Research,2014,233(2):313-325.
[14]魏洁.废弃电器电子产品“互联网+”回收模式构建[J].科技管理研究,2016,36(21):230-234.(Wei J.Construction research on the“internet+”recycling mode in waste electrical and electronic equipment recovery[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2016,36(21):230-234.)
[15]刘一非.互联网+废旧手机回收模式研究[D].天津:天津理工大学管理学院,2016.(Liu Y F.Research on internet+used mobile phone recycling mode[D].Tianjin:School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,2016.)
[16]韩芳旭.电子废弃物网络回收模式与机制研究[D].天津:天津理工大学管理学院,2015.(Han F X.Research on modes and mechanism of network recycling of WEEE[D].Tianjing:School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,2015.)
[17]李春发,杨琪琪,韩芳旭.基于C2B的废弃电器电子产品网络回收系统利益相关者关系研究[J].科技管理研究,2014(23):233-239.(Li C F,Yang Q Q,Han F X.Study on the relationship of stakeholders of WEEE network recycling system based on C2B[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2014(23):233-239.)
[18]邹雅玲.消费者废旧手机网络回收意愿影响因素研究[D].天津:天津理工大学管理学院,2015.(Zou Y L.Research on the Influencing Factors of Consumers’Used Mobile Phones Network Recycling Willingness[D].Tianjin:School of Management Tianjin University of Technology,2015.)
[19]Feng L,Govindan K,Li C.Strategic planning:Design and coordination for dual-recycling channel reverse supply chain considering consumer behavior[J].European J of Operational Research,2017,260(2):601-612.
[20]Chiang W Y K,Chhajed D,Hess J D.Direct marketing,indirect profits:A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design[J].Management Science,2003,49(1):1-20.
[2]商务部.中国再生资源回收行业发展报告(2016)[J].再生资源与循环经济,2016,9(6):15-21.(Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China.Report on the development of renewable resources recycling industry in China(2016)[J].Recyclable Resources and Circular Economy,2016,9(6):15-21.)
[3]Rahman S,Subramanian N.Factors for implementing end-of-life computer recycling operations in reverse supply chains[J].Int J of Production Economics,2012,140(1):239-248.
[4]Jena S K,Sarmah S P.Price competition and co-operation in a duopoly closed-loop supply chain[J].Int J of Production Economics,2014,156(10):346-360.
[5]He Y.Acquisition pricing and remanufacturing decisions in a closed-loop supply chain[J].Int J of Production Economics,2015,163(5):48-60.
[6]李响,李勇建.多再制造商回收定价竞争博弈[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(2):72-76.(Li X,Li Y J.A non-cooperative game on the acquisition pricing of multiple remanufacturers[J].J of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2012,26(2):72-76.)
[7]Cai X,Lai M,Li X,et al.Optimal acquisition and production policy in a hybrid manufacturing/remanufacturing system with core acquisition at different quality levels[J].European J of Operational Research,2014,233(2):374-382.
[8]Liu H,Lei M,Deng H,et al.A dual channel,quality-based price competition model for the WEEErecycling market with government subsidy[J].Omega,2016,59(3):290-302.
[9]郭军华,李帮义,倪明.WTP差异下再制造闭环供应链的回收模式选择[J].管理学报,2015,12(1):142-147.(Guo J H,Li B Y,Ni M.The selection of take-back model of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain based on WTP differentiation[J].Chinese J of Management,2015,12(1):142-147.)
[10]刘东霞,谭德庆.基于消费者效用模型的耐用品垄断商回购与再制造决策研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(4):134-141.(Liu D X,Tan D Q.Durables monopoly’s buy-back and remanufacturing decision based on the consumer’s utility model[J].Chinese J of Management Science,2014,22(4):134-141.)
[11]Zeng A Z.Coordination mechanisms for a threestage reverse supply chain to increase profitable returns[J].Naval Research Logistics,2013,60(1):31-45.
[12]孙多青,马晓英.基于博弈论的多零售商参与下逆向供应链定价策略及利润分配[J].计算机集成制造系统,2012,18(4):867-874.(Sun D Q,Ma X Y.Pricing strategies and cooperative profit distribution based on game theory for reverse supply chains with multi-retailer participants[J].Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems,2012,18(4):867-874.)
[13]Sheu J B,Gao X Q.Alliance or no alliance-Bargaining power in competing reverse supply chains[J].European Jof Operational Research,2014,233(2):313-325.
[14]魏洁.废弃电器电子产品“互联网+”回收模式构建[J].科技管理研究,2016,36(21):230-234.(Wei J.Construction research on the“internet+”recycling mode in waste electrical and electronic equipment recovery[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2016,36(21):230-234.)
[15]刘一非.互联网+废旧手机回收模式研究[D].天津:天津理工大学管理学院,2016.(Liu Y F.Research on internet+used mobile phone recycling mode[D].Tianjin:School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,2016.)
[16]韩芳旭.电子废弃物网络回收模式与机制研究[D].天津:天津理工大学管理学院,2015.(Han F X.Research on modes and mechanism of network recycling of WEEE[D].Tianjing:School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,2015.)
[17]李春发,杨琪琪,韩芳旭.基于C2B的废弃电器电子产品网络回收系统利益相关者关系研究[J].科技管理研究,2014(23):233-239.(Li C F,Yang Q Q,Han F X.Study on the relationship of stakeholders of WEEE network recycling system based on C2B[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2014(23):233-239.)
[18]邹雅玲.消费者废旧手机网络回收意愿影响因素研究[D].天津:天津理工大学管理学院,2015.(Zou Y L.Research on the Influencing Factors of Consumers’Used Mobile Phones Network Recycling Willingness[D].Tianjin:School of Management Tianjin University of Technology,2015.)
[19]Feng L,Govindan K,Li C.Strategic planning:Design and coordination for dual-recycling channel reverse supply chain considering consumer behavior[J].European J of Operational Research,2017,260(2):601-612.
[20]Chiang W Y K,Chhajed D,Hess J D.Direct marketing,indirect profits:A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design[J].Management Science,2003,49(1):1-20.
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