基于图模型的冲突局中人偏好认知模型构建
详细信息 查看官网全文
- 英文论文题名：Preference Cognitive Model of Players Based on Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
- 论文作者：赵金帅 ; 徐海燕 ; 杨保华
- 英文论文作者：ZHAO Jin shuai ; XU Hai-yan ; YANG Bao-hua ; College of Economics and Management ; Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics ; College of Computer ; Jiangsu Normal University ; Business School of Jiangsu Normal University
- 年：2016
- 作者机构：南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院;江苏师范大学计算机学院;江苏师范大学商学院;
- 论文关键词：偏好认知 ; 偏好值分布信息熵 ; 图模型 ; 局中人
- 英文论文关键词：preference cognitive ; preference value distribution information entropy ; graph model ; players
- 会议召开时间：2016-11-12
- 会议录名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会论文集
- 英文会议录名称：Proceedings of the 18th Chinese Annual Conference on Management Science
- 语种：中文
- 分类号：C93
- 学会代码：ZHYJ
- 会议名称：第十八届中国管理科学学术年会
- 会议地点：中国陕西西安
- 主办单位：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会、西安交通大学、中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院、《中国管理科学》编辑部
- 学会名称：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
- 页数：9
- 文件大小：605k
- 原文格式：O
- 会议级别：全国
摘要
在冲突博弈过程中,能通过适当的方式获取对手的偏好认知信息对提升自身利益将起着不可估量的作用。本文依据冲突分析图模型理论,建立了冲突局中人的偏好认知模型。该模型通过逻辑分析首先得出某个局中人的理想冲突结局一定是其冲突对手不想看到的结果,即对手一定希望在该结局的偏好值越小越好;其次给出了Nash和SEQ稳定性的最小偏好值的求解方法,并利用反问题求解模型得到了在该值下分别满足相应稳定性的偏好序集;然后构建偏好序分布信息熵对该偏好序集中包含的信息进行挖掘,得到维持理想冲突结局稳定需要特别关注的对手的偏好信息。最后,以"古巴导弹危机"为例,通过偏好认知模型解析,得出美国要想在其理想冲突结局取得Nash和SEQ均衡,需要首先关注的可行状态以及采取的相应策略;同时也验证了该方法的有效性和优越性。偏好认知模型可以从战略层面为冲突中的一方提供决策依据。
In the process of a conflict,it is very important to obtain the preference information of its opponent in a appropriate way to improve its own interests.Based on the theory of graph model for conflict resolutions model is established about player's preference cognitive in a conflict.Firstly,through logical analysis,it is gained that a player's ideal outcome is not its opponent's definitely,namely,its opponent hopes that the preference value of this outcome the smaller the better.Secondly,a method is presented to acquire the minimum preference value of the outcome above.Then inverse problem model is used to get preference order sets which satisfy Nash and SEQ stable respectively.Finally,the distribution of preference information entropy is constructed for mining the information contained in the preference sets.Then the preference information of opponent for maintaining the stable of ideal state can be obtained.The proposed model is employed to "Cuban Missile Crisis" conflict in which there are two main players;US and USSR.Through the analysis of preference cognitive model of preference,it is concluded that the feasible state and its corresponding strategies needs to be concerned if the US wants to obtain the Nash and SEQ equilibrium in its ideal conflict outcome.At the same time,the effectiveness and superiority of the model is verified.The preference cognitive model can provide a decision gist for a player from strategic level.
In the process of a conflict,it is very important to obtain the preference information of its opponent in a appropriate way to improve its own interests.Based on the theory of graph model for conflict resolutions model is established about player's preference cognitive in a conflict.Firstly,through logical analysis,it is gained that a player's ideal outcome is not its opponent's definitely,namely,its opponent hopes that the preference value of this outcome the smaller the better.Secondly,a method is presented to acquire the minimum preference value of the outcome above.Then inverse problem model is used to get preference order sets which satisfy Nash and SEQ stable respectively.Finally,the distribution of preference information entropy is constructed for mining the information contained in the preference sets.Then the preference information of opponent for maintaining the stable of ideal state can be obtained.The proposed model is employed to "Cuban Missile Crisis" conflict in which there are two main players;US and USSR.Through the analysis of preference cognitive model of preference,it is concluded that the feasible state and its corresponding strategies needs to be concerned if the US wants to obtain the Nash and SEQ equilibrium in its ideal conflict outcome.At the same time,the effectiveness and superiority of the model is verified.The preference cognitive model can provide a decision gist for a player from strategic level.
引文
[1]Hipel K W,Ben-Hain Y.Decision making in an uncertain world:information-gap modelling in water resources management[J].IEEE Transactions n Systems Man&Cybernetics Part C:Applications&Reviews,1999,29(4):506-517.
[2]Gharesifard B,Cortes J.Evolution of players'misperception in hypergames under perfect observations[J].IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,2012,57(7):1627-1640.
[3]Fraser N M.Conflict analysis:models and resolutions[M].North-Holland,1984.
[4]Ben H,Hipel K W.The graph model for conflict resolution with information-gap uncertainty in preferences[J].Applied mathematics and computation,2002,126(2):319-340.
[5]宋业新,黄登斌,肖鹏.基于超对策偏好认知信息沟的均衡结局鲁棒性分析[J].系统工程与电子技术,2013,35(2):362-365.
[6]刘德海,周婷婷.基于认知差异的恐怖主义袭击误对策分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(10):2646-2656.
[7]徐选华,万奇锋,陈晓红,等.一种基于区间直觉梯形模糊数偏好的大群体决策冲突测度研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(8):115-122.
[8]熊国强;张婷;王海涛情绪影响下群体性冲突的RDEU博弈模型分析,熊国强,张婷,王海涛.情绪影响下群体性冲突的RDEU博弈模型分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(9):162-170.
[9]刘勇,王育红,钱吴永.基于马尔科夫链的动态冲突分析模型[J].中国管理科学,2015,(S1):325-332.
[10]Sakakibara H,Okada N.Nakase D.The application of robustness analysis to the conflict with incomplete information[J].IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics part C:Applications and Reviews,2002,32(1):14-23.
[11]Fang L P,Hipel K W.Kilgour D M.Interactive decision making-the graph model for conflict resolution[M].John Wiley&Sons:Wiley Interscience,1993.
[12]Kinsara R A,Kilgour D M,Hipel K W.Inverse approach to the graph model for conflict resolution[J].IEEE Transactions on Systems,Man&Cybernetics:Systems,2015,45(5):734-742.
[13]赵金帅,徐海燕.基于图模型理论有序偏好下的冲突反问题研究[J].运筹与管理(录用)
[14]Shannon C E.A mathematical theory of communication[J].Bell Technical Journal,1948,27:379-423.
[15]Cuban Missice Crisis[EB/OL]en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis
[2]Gharesifard B,Cortes J.Evolution of players'misperception in hypergames under perfect observations[J].IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,2012,57(7):1627-1640.
[3]Fraser N M.Conflict analysis:models and resolutions[M].North-Holland,1984.
[4]Ben H,Hipel K W.The graph model for conflict resolution with information-gap uncertainty in preferences[J].Applied mathematics and computation,2002,126(2):319-340.
[5]宋业新,黄登斌,肖鹏.基于超对策偏好认知信息沟的均衡结局鲁棒性分析[J].系统工程与电子技术,2013,35(2):362-365.
[6]刘德海,周婷婷.基于认知差异的恐怖主义袭击误对策分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(10):2646-2656.
[7]徐选华,万奇锋,陈晓红,等.一种基于区间直觉梯形模糊数偏好的大群体决策冲突测度研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(8):115-122.
[8]熊国强;张婷;王海涛情绪影响下群体性冲突的RDEU博弈模型分析,熊国强,张婷,王海涛.情绪影响下群体性冲突的RDEU博弈模型分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(9):162-170.
[9]刘勇,王育红,钱吴永.基于马尔科夫链的动态冲突分析模型[J].中国管理科学,2015,(S1):325-332.
[10]Sakakibara H,Okada N.Nakase D.The application of robustness analysis to the conflict with incomplete information[J].IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics part C:Applications and Reviews,2002,32(1):14-23.
[11]Fang L P,Hipel K W.Kilgour D M.Interactive decision making-the graph model for conflict resolution[M].John Wiley&Sons:Wiley Interscience,1993.
[12]Kinsara R A,Kilgour D M,Hipel K W.Inverse approach to the graph model for conflict resolution[J].IEEE Transactions on Systems,Man&Cybernetics:Systems,2015,45(5):734-742.
[13]赵金帅,徐海燕.基于图模型理论有序偏好下的冲突反问题研究[J].运筹与管理(录用)
[14]Shannon C E.A mathematical theory of communication[J].Bell Technical Journal,1948,27:379-423.
[15]Cuban Missice Crisis[EB/OL]en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |