企业经理人业绩评价与激励机制研究

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作者：曾繁英 论文级别：硕士 学科专业名称：企业管理 学位年度：2002 导师：金式容 学科代码：120202 学位授予单位：华侨大学 论文提交日期：2002-11-01

摘要

在现代企业治理结构中，股东将企业托付给具有经营管理专长的经理人进行经营，两者间形成“一旦委托，全权负责”的代理关系。但在理性自利原则下，经理人一方面追求股东资本效用最大化，另一方面追求自身利益最大化；且当这两者利益相冲突时，经理人倾向于利用职权及信息优势，作出有利于自己的行为决策。因此，管理实践中出现了经理人的“败德”行为和“逆向选择”行为，导致股东的代理成本上升、利益下降。为了防止经理人侵害股东利益并充分调动其经营积极性，股东必须对经理人实施有效的业绩评价与激励。业绩评价是激励机制的基石，激励机制影响业绩评价的重点与意义。
     本文通过分析比较，认为经济增加值是评价经理人业绩的理想指标。经济增加值(Economic Value Added，简称EVA)是美国著名学者Stewart提出的概念，指资本报酬与资本成本之差，用以衡量股东财富价值的增长情况。用公式表示如下：
     EVA=NOPAT-Kw×(NA)式中，Kw是企业的加权平均资本成本，NA是企业报告期初资产的经济价值，NOPAT是经过调整的营业净利润。
     经济增加值从实质上揭示了经理人为股东赚取了多少财富。运用EVA指标衡量经理人业绩和股东财富是否增值的思路是：股东可以自由地将他们的投资资本变现，并将其投资于其他资产。因此投资者至少应该从企业获得其投资的机会成本，从经营利润中扣除按投资资本计算的机会成本，才是股东从经营活动中得到的增值收益。EVA能将股东资本的保值增值要求与经理人的经营结果巧妙地结合起来，能将企业经营利润中股东资本所作出的贡献与经理人智力资本所作出的贡献巧妙地区分开来，能客观合理地反映经理人的智力资本为企业创造的价值和股东获取超额利润的水平。经济增加值具有考虑全部资本成本、不受公认会计原则的约束、最能反映当期的经营业绩、有利于促使经理人员追求股东价值及简单、清晰、易于接受和沟通等特点。
     本文认为经理人业绩评价标准是董事会预算的EVA目标值。董事会计算出经理人在报告期内实际实现的经济增加值后，与事先确定的EVA预算数作比较，确定差异，以便对经理人业绩状况作出客观、公正的最终评价。
     业绩评价是约束经理人经营行为的手段，并直接为实施经理人激励提供客观依据。本文将经理人激励机制构建于科学合理的EVA业绩评价基础之上，提出以EVA为业绩评价基础的预算激励模型。该模型为：
     当A＞B时，R=W+K_1B+K_2(A-B)
     当A＜B时，K_1=0，R=W+K_1B+K_3(A-B)
     式中，A：EVA实际数，B：EVA预算数，R：报酬总额，W：年固定工资，K_1、K_2为奖励系数，K_3为惩罚系数；K_1B为年度奖金，只要经理人实现了预算数就可获得，以便及时肯定经理人的努力；K_2(A-B)及K_3(A-B)为远期收入。该模型的激励结果是：若经理人实际完成的A大于应完成的B时，经理人可以获得年度奖金及远期收益双重奖励；如果经理人实际完成的A小于应完成的B时，经理人的奖金总数为负数；当经理人实际完成的EVA等于预算数时，经理人只能获得较小的年度奖金收入，不能获得远期收入。由此体现董事会预算的刚性要求，约束经理人行为。
     从经理人激励方式上看，本文主张以长期股权激励为主，同时辅之以年度奖金形式的短期激励。具体为：根据EVA预算激励模型计算经理人远期收入，建立奖金库；同时将奖金库中的奖金运用延期支付计划、虚拟股票或帐面价值增值权等方式，与企业股权相连系，最终实现经理人个体利益与企业利益、股东利益紧密相联，搭建起经理人与股东双赢的经营平台，最充分地调动经理人经营积极性，促使企业可持续发展。
It's well-acknowledged that there is the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. Shareholders rely on managers as their agents to adopt policies that maximize the value of their shares. However, like other human beings, managers tend to engage in the activities that increase their own well-being and less likely to act in the best interest of the shareholders' if appropriate incentives aren't given and their activities aren't monitored. So one of the most critical roles of the board of directors is to create incentives, to find out how to monitor its agents and how to evaluate the performance of management.
    From my point of view, EVA that is the capital return less the cost of capital is the best measure of the management performance., In formula form we have:
    EVA=NOPAT-Kw ×X (NA)
    Where EVA is the economic value added, NOPAT is the net operating profit after tax,NA is the net assets .EVA method should be employed with for it compares the capital return to the capital cost. In estimating EVA, when it is zero or more, it means the capital return exceeds the investment's opportunity cost. And then it can be found out whether managers perform well enough to create the value added that the shareholders expect.
    To evaluate managers' performance and figure out the rewards, the board of directors should establish performance standards firstly-the EVA objectives. Second, appropriate the actual EVA in a given period. The actual EVA minus objectives will leave the result if managers meet the target or not. Performance management system is a process of establishing performance appraisals and evaluating performance in order to monitor and motivate firm agents. Obviously, EVA model turns out a scientific appraisals to motivate the managers. The EVA model can be illustrated as:
    when A> B R=W +K1B +K2(A-B)
    when A    where A is the actual EVA, B is the budget EVA, R is the rewards and W is the annual wages. K1 and K2 is the coefficient of rewards, and k3 is the coefficient of penalties. K2(A-B) and K3(A-B) refer to long-term rewards.
    Managers earn annual bonuses-K1B if they meets the EVA objectives. When A is greater than B, managers can gain the annual bonuses coupled with long-term rewards. If A is less than B, the bonuses will be minus. If the actual EVA is equal to the budget, there are only less annual bonuses without any long-term awards at the managers' disposal.
    Furthermore, as for a workable incentives plan, I think, it is appropriate to combine long-term stock option with short-term monitor, i.e., annual bonuses. By linked to the firm and being motivated properly, managers will feel involved and be likely to achieve performance targets that are in their best interest and in the firm's best interest. For them, a good incentive plan creates a sense of ownership and significantly increases their commitment and loyalty to the company.