资本充足率监管的有效性分析
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摘要
随着1988年巴塞尔协议的实施和新巴塞尔协议的即将出台，资本充足率监管逐渐成为全球银行业共同遵守的准则与银行审慎监管的一项核心制度安排。但作为如此重要的一种银行监管手段，其实施是否有效这一关键问题在理论和实践中却存疑已久。有鉴于此，本文对有关资本充足率监管有效性的理论和实证检验进行了梳理和归纳。
论文分四章对资本充足率监管实施的理由、是否有效的理论探讨和实证检验以及监管的实践进行了综述。第一章综述了资本充足监管存在的理由，分析了两个方面的问题：首先是银行作为一般企业和有特性的企业时，市场对银行持有资本存在哪些约束，其次是存在市场对银行的资本约束的情况下，为什么监管者还要求银行持有资本。在资本充足率监管有必要存在的前提下，论文的第二章对资本充足率监管是否有效的理论探讨进行了综述，具体可分为三个方面：一是从外部代理角度、将资本充足率放在银行监管框架内分析其有效性的理论及其主要观点；二是同时考虑内、外部代理的角度分析资本充足率监管有效性的理论及其主要观点；三是从激励角度分析资本充足率监管有效性的理论及其主要观点。但是这三类理论对于资本充足率监管是否有效并没有统一的观点，因而论文的第三章对资本充足率监管有效性的实证研究成果进行了综述，实证结果分为三类：一是资本充足监管实施后对资本和风险的实证研究结果；二是资本监管实施后的资本比率、风险、效率三者相互关系的实证研究结果；三是资本充足监管实施后是否造成信贷紧缩的实证研究成果。从理论和实证检验结果来看，资本充足率监管的有效性是不足的，因此，论文的第四章就如何提高资本充足率监管的有效性进行了分析，具体分为两部分，第一部分就如何提高资本充足率监管的有效性做了理论上的探讨，强调了理想的资本充足率监管方式以及与市场约束和其他监管方式的配合；第二部分结合新巴塞尔协议说明了资本充足率监管在实践中的新发展。
The Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) supervision has gradually been the norm complied to by global banking industry in common and the core arrangement of the prudential supervision institution on bank with the enforcement of 1988 Basel Accord and the coming forth of New Basel Accord. But in theoretic and practical field, there has long doubt about the effectiveness of the CAR supervision as one of banking supervision methods with such significance, so this paper makes an overview on theory and empirical test about the effectiveness of Capital Adequacy Ratio supervision.
The paper is divided into four parts and surveys the existing theoretic foundation, the theoretic probe into the effectiveness, the empirical test results and the practice of the CAR supervision. The first chapter surveys the existing theoretic foundation of the CAR regulation and analyses two questions. Firstly, why does market require bank, as general and peculiar firm, to hold capital; secondly, why does regulator require bank to hold capital in the case of the market requirements. The second chapter surveys the theoretic probe into the question that the CAR supervision is effective or not and the involved theory is divided into three groups. The first one is the theories and their main points from the angel of external agents and put the CAR supervision into bank supervision frame. The second one is the theories and their main points considering of external and internal agents simultaneously, and the last one is from incentive points. Whereas no consentaneous conclusion is drawn from the theoretic analys
is, so the empirical test results of the CAR supervision is set forth in the third chapter of the paper and are classified into three types: the empirical test results on the capital level and risk taking, the inherent relationship between capital ratio, risk level and effectiveness, the credit crunch hypothesis after the enforcement of CAR regulation. But the theoretic and empirical conclusion are disappointing, so the last and fourth chapter analyses the question that how to improve the effectiveness of CAR supervision. The fourth chapter includes two parts, the first one make theoretic probe into the improving path of the CAR supervision and the second part accounts for practical innovation of CAR regulation with the improvement of New Basel Accord.
论文分四章对资本充足率监管实施的理由、是否有效的理论探讨和实证检验以及监管的实践进行了综述。第一章综述了资本充足监管存在的理由，分析了两个方面的问题：首先是银行作为一般企业和有特性的企业时，市场对银行持有资本存在哪些约束，其次是存在市场对银行的资本约束的情况下，为什么监管者还要求银行持有资本。在资本充足率监管有必要存在的前提下，论文的第二章对资本充足率监管是否有效的理论探讨进行了综述，具体可分为三个方面：一是从外部代理角度、将资本充足率放在银行监管框架内分析其有效性的理论及其主要观点；二是同时考虑内、外部代理的角度分析资本充足率监管有效性的理论及其主要观点；三是从激励角度分析资本充足率监管有效性的理论及其主要观点。但是这三类理论对于资本充足率监管是否有效并没有统一的观点，因而论文的第三章对资本充足率监管有效性的实证研究成果进行了综述，实证结果分为三类：一是资本充足监管实施后对资本和风险的实证研究结果；二是资本监管实施后的资本比率、风险、效率三者相互关系的实证研究结果；三是资本充足监管实施后是否造成信贷紧缩的实证研究成果。从理论和实证检验结果来看，资本充足率监管的有效性是不足的，因此，论文的第四章就如何提高资本充足率监管的有效性进行了分析，具体分为两部分，第一部分就如何提高资本充足率监管的有效性做了理论上的探讨，强调了理想的资本充足率监管方式以及与市场约束和其他监管方式的配合；第二部分结合新巴塞尔协议说明了资本充足率监管在实践中的新发展。
The Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) supervision has gradually been the norm complied to by global banking industry in common and the core arrangement of the prudential supervision institution on bank with the enforcement of 1988 Basel Accord and the coming forth of New Basel Accord. But in theoretic and practical field, there has long doubt about the effectiveness of the CAR supervision as one of banking supervision methods with such significance, so this paper makes an overview on theory and empirical test about the effectiveness of Capital Adequacy Ratio supervision.
The paper is divided into four parts and surveys the existing theoretic foundation, the theoretic probe into the effectiveness, the empirical test results and the practice of the CAR supervision. The first chapter surveys the existing theoretic foundation of the CAR regulation and analyses two questions. Firstly, why does market require bank, as general and peculiar firm, to hold capital; secondly, why does regulator require bank to hold capital in the case of the market requirements. The second chapter surveys the theoretic probe into the question that the CAR supervision is effective or not and the involved theory is divided into three groups. The first one is the theories and their main points from the angel of external agents and put the CAR supervision into bank supervision frame. The second one is the theories and their main points considering of external and internal agents simultaneously, and the last one is from incentive points. Whereas no consentaneous conclusion is drawn from the theoretic analys
is, so the empirical test results of the CAR supervision is set forth in the third chapter of the paper and are classified into three types: the empirical test results on the capital level and risk taking, the inherent relationship between capital ratio, risk level and effectiveness, the credit crunch hypothesis after the enforcement of CAR regulation. But the theoretic and empirical conclusion are disappointing, so the last and fourth chapter analyses the question that how to improve the effectiveness of CAR supervision. The fourth chapter includes two parts, the first one make theoretic probe into the improving path of the CAR supervision and the second part accounts for practical innovation of CAR regulation with the improvement of New Basel Accord.
引文
1. Aggarwal, R., and K. Jacques, 1998, "A Simultaneous Equations Estimation of the Impact of Prompt Corrective Action on Bank Capital and Risk, ", Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, pp, 23-32.
2. Berger, A. N., R. J. Herring & G. P. Szego, 1995, "The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions, " Journal of Banking and Finance 19 (1995), 393—430
3. Berger, A. N. and G. F. Udell, 1993, " Securitization, Risk and the Liquidity Problem in Banking, " Structral Changes in Banking, Irwin Publishing, Homewood, IL, 227-291
4. Bernanke, B. S. and M. Gertler, 1995, "Insider the Bank Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission, ' Journal of Economic Perspective, 9, 27-48
5. Bernanke, B. S. and Lown, 1991, "The Credit Crunch, " Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 205-39
Besanko, D. and G. Kanatas(1996): The Regulation of Bank Capital: Do Capital Standards Promote Bank Safety?, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 5, 160, 83.
6. BIS, 1999, "Capital Requirement and Bank Behaviour; The Impact of the Basel Accord, " Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Papers, Bank of International Settlements, 1
7. BIS, 2001, "The New Basel Accord, " Basel Committee on. Banking Supervision Consultative Document, Bank of International Settlements
8. Carey, M. S. 1993, Snacking and Smoothing: Gains Trading of Investment Account Securities by Commercial Banks, " Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Working Paper, 6
9. Blum, J., and M. Hellwig, 1995, "The Macroeconomic Implication of Capital Adequacy Requirements for Banks, " European Economic Review, 39, 739-49
10. Calem, P. S., and R. Rob, 1996, "The Impact of Capital Based Regulation on Bank Risk-Taking: A Dynamic Model, " Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 12.
11. Chan, Yuk-Shee, Stuart Ⅰ. Greenbum, and Anjan v. Thakor, 1992 "Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?", Journal of Finance, Vol. 47. No. 1, P 227-245
12. Chiuri, M. C., G, Ferri, and G. Majnoni, 2001, "The Macroeconomic Impact of Bank Capital Requirements in Emerging Economics, " World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2605.
13. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, and Enrica Detragiache, "Market Discipline and Financial Safety Net Design", Policy Research Paper No. 2183, World Bank., 1999
14. Dewatripont, M., and J. Tirole, 1994, The Prudential Regulation of Banks. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
15. Diamond, D. and P. H. Dybvig, 1983, "Bank runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, " Journal of Political Economy 91, 401-409
16. Diamond. Douglas W. and Rajan. Raghuram G., 2000, "A theory of Bank Capital"., Journal of Finance, 55, 2431-65
17. Ediz, T., I. Michael, and W. Perrraudin, 1998, "The Impact of Capital Requirements on U. K. Bank Behaviour, " Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, October, 15-22
18. Edward S. Prescott, 2001, "Regulating Bank Capital Structure to Control Risk", Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Volume 87/3
19. FDIC, 2003, "Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving Forward, Looking Back", FDIC, January 14.
20. Flannery. M. 1998, "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U. S. Empirical Evidence", Journal of Banking and Financing, Vol. 30, 273-305
21. Freixas. X. and Rochet, J. C. 1996, "Microeconomics of Banking", MIT Press
22. Furfine, C., 2000, "Evidence on the Response of US Banks to Changes in Capital Requirements, ", Bank of International Settlements Working Paper, 88.
23. Furlong, F. T. and M. C. Keeley, 1998, "Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking: A Note", Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 441-468
24. Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Patrick, 1999, "Beyond Capital Ideals: Restoring Banking Stability", World Bank.
25. Gorton, G. ., and A. Winton, 1995, "Bank Regulation in General Equilibrium, " NBER Working Paper, 5244
26. Hancock, D., J. A. Laing and J. A. Wilox, 1995, Bank Capital Shocks: Dynamics
Effects on Securities, Loans, and Capital, " Journal of Banking and Finance, 19, 6, 661-677
27. Hellmarm. T. F; K. Murdock ; J. Stiglitz, 2000, "Libelization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirement Enough?", American Economic Review, Vol. 90, 147-165
28. Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole, 1997, "Risk-Based Capital, Portfolio Risk and Bank Capital Regulaion, " Journal of Finance, 43, 1219-33
29. Honder, Y., 2002, "The Effects of the Basel Accord on Bank Credit: The Case of Japan, " Applied Economics, 34, 1233-39
30. Ito, T., and Y. N. Sasaki, 1998, "Impacts of the Basel Capital Standard on Japanese Bank' Behavior, " NBER Working Paper, 6730
31. Jacques, K. T., and P. Nigro, 1997, "Risk-Based Capital, Portfolio Risk and Bank Capital: A Simultaneous Equations Approach, " Journal of Economics and Business, pp. 533-47
32. Jagtiani, J., Lemieux, 2001, "Market Discipline Prior to Bank Failure", Journal of Economics and Business Vol. 48, 313-324
33. Jesen, Michael C., and Willian H. Meckling, 1976, 'Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, ' Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, p305-360
34. Jona A C. Santos, 2000, "Bank Capital Regulation In Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of The Literature", BIS Working Papers.
35. Kahane, Y, 1977, Capital Adequacy and the Regulation of Financial Intermediaries", Journal of Banking and Finance 1, 207-218
36. Keeley, Michael. 1900, "Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking, " American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 5, p1183-1200
37. Kim, S. B., and R. Moreno, 1994, "Stock Prices and Bank Lending Behavior in Japan, " Federal Reserve Bank of San. Francisco Economic Review, 1, 31-42
38. Kim, D, and A. M. Santomero, 1988, "Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation", Journal of Finance 43, 1219-1233
39. Maclachlan, F., C. 2001, "Market Discipline in Bank Regulation", Independent Review, Vol. 6, 17-45
40. Marshall, D. A. and E. S. Prescott, 2000, "Bank Capital Regulation With and Without State-Contingent Penalties, " Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper, 10.
41. Mayers, S, C., and N. S. Majluf, 1984, "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not, " Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221
42. Modigliani, F. and M. Miller, 1958, "The cost of capital, Corporate Finance, and the theory of Investment", American Economic Review 48, 261-297
43. Peek, J., and E. Rosengren, 1995, "Bank Regulation and the Credit Crunch, " Journal of Banking and Finance. 19, 679-92
44. Rime, B., 2001, "Capital Requirements and Bank Behavior: Empirical Evidence for Switzerland, " Journal of Banking and Finance. 25, 789-805
45. Robert Bichsel and Jvrg Blum "The Relationship Between risk and Capital in Swiss Commercial Bank :A Panel Report", Working Paper. NO. 02. 04
46. Rochet, J. C., 1992, "Capital Requirements and Bank Behavior of Commercial Banks, " European Economic Review, 36, 1137-78
47. Santos, J. A. C., 2000, "Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the literature, " Bank of International Working Settlements Working Papers, 90
48. Shrieves, R. E., and D. Dahl, 1992, "The Relationship Between Risk and Capital in Commercial Banks, " Journal of Banking and Finance, 16, 439-57
49. Thomson, J, 1990, "Using Market Incentive to Reform Bank Regulation and Federal Deposit Insurance", Economic Review, Vol. 26, 28-32
50. Wall, L. D., and D. R. Peterson, 1995, "Bank Holding Company Capital Targets in the Early 1990s: The Regulation Versus the Markets, " Journal of Banking and Finance, 19, 563-74
51. Woo, D., 1999, "In Search of Capital Crunch. Supply Factors Behind the Credit Slowdown in Japan, " IMF Working Paper. 3.
52. Yudisstria, 2003, "The Impact of Bank Capital Requirements in Indonesia", Directorate of Banking Research and Regulation, Bank Indonesia.
53．巴曙松，2003，《新版神圣公约—巴塞尔新资本协议框架及风险管理新进展》，《国际贸易》，第6期，P52-55
54．何光辉，《存款保险制度研究》，中国金融出版社，2003年9月
55．黄迪，2003，《从可持续发展角度看国有商业银行的资本充足率》，《财经科学》，第5期，
56．蒋海、刘少波，2003：《银行资本监管理论及其新进展》，《当代经济科学》，第5期，P27-32
57．王亮，2003，《新巴塞尔协议下我国国有银行的资本充足率水平及对策研究》，《统计研究》，第1期，P18-21
58．张杰，《经济变迁中的金融中介与国有银行》，山西经济出版社，2003年9月
59．张杰，2003，《中国国有银行的资本谜团》，《经济研究》第4期，P30-36
60．周好文，2003，《“国家信誉”应从国有银行淡出》，《当代经济科学》，第1期，P33-39
61．余元全，2003，《银行资本充足管制的有效性探讨》，《重庆工商大学学报》，P81-85
2. Berger, A. N., R. J. Herring & G. P. Szego, 1995, "The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions, " Journal of Banking and Finance 19 (1995), 393—430
3. Berger, A. N. and G. F. Udell, 1993, " Securitization, Risk and the Liquidity Problem in Banking, " Structral Changes in Banking, Irwin Publishing, Homewood, IL, 227-291
4. Bernanke, B. S. and M. Gertler, 1995, "Insider the Bank Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission, ' Journal of Economic Perspective, 9, 27-48
5. Bernanke, B. S. and Lown, 1991, "The Credit Crunch, " Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 205-39
Besanko, D. and G. Kanatas(1996): The Regulation of Bank Capital: Do Capital Standards Promote Bank Safety?, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 5, 160, 83.
6. BIS, 1999, "Capital Requirement and Bank Behaviour; The Impact of the Basel Accord, " Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Papers, Bank of International Settlements, 1
7. BIS, 2001, "The New Basel Accord, " Basel Committee on. Banking Supervision Consultative Document, Bank of International Settlements
8. Carey, M. S. 1993, Snacking and Smoothing: Gains Trading of Investment Account Securities by Commercial Banks, " Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Working Paper, 6
9. Blum, J., and M. Hellwig, 1995, "The Macroeconomic Implication of Capital Adequacy Requirements for Banks, " European Economic Review, 39, 739-49
10. Calem, P. S., and R. Rob, 1996, "The Impact of Capital Based Regulation on Bank Risk-Taking: A Dynamic Model, " Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 12.
11. Chan, Yuk-Shee, Stuart Ⅰ. Greenbum, and Anjan v. Thakor, 1992 "Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?", Journal of Finance, Vol. 47. No. 1, P 227-245
12. Chiuri, M. C., G, Ferri, and G. Majnoni, 2001, "The Macroeconomic Impact of Bank Capital Requirements in Emerging Economics, " World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2605.
13. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, and Enrica Detragiache, "Market Discipline and Financial Safety Net Design", Policy Research Paper No. 2183, World Bank., 1999
14. Dewatripont, M., and J. Tirole, 1994, The Prudential Regulation of Banks. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
15. Diamond, D. and P. H. Dybvig, 1983, "Bank runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, " Journal of Political Economy 91, 401-409
16. Diamond. Douglas W. and Rajan. Raghuram G., 2000, "A theory of Bank Capital"., Journal of Finance, 55, 2431-65
17. Ediz, T., I. Michael, and W. Perrraudin, 1998, "The Impact of Capital Requirements on U. K. Bank Behaviour, " Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, October, 15-22
18. Edward S. Prescott, 2001, "Regulating Bank Capital Structure to Control Risk", Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Volume 87/3
19. FDIC, 2003, "Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving Forward, Looking Back", FDIC, January 14.
20. Flannery. M. 1998, "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U. S. Empirical Evidence", Journal of Banking and Financing, Vol. 30, 273-305
21. Freixas. X. and Rochet, J. C. 1996, "Microeconomics of Banking", MIT Press
22. Furfine, C., 2000, "Evidence on the Response of US Banks to Changes in Capital Requirements, ", Bank of International Settlements Working Paper, 88.
23. Furlong, F. T. and M. C. Keeley, 1998, "Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking: A Note", Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 441-468
24. Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Patrick, 1999, "Beyond Capital Ideals: Restoring Banking Stability", World Bank.
25. Gorton, G. ., and A. Winton, 1995, "Bank Regulation in General Equilibrium, " NBER Working Paper, 5244
26. Hancock, D., J. A. Laing and J. A. Wilox, 1995, Bank Capital Shocks: Dynamics
Effects on Securities, Loans, and Capital, " Journal of Banking and Finance, 19, 6, 661-677
27. Hellmarm. T. F; K. Murdock ; J. Stiglitz, 2000, "Libelization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirement Enough?", American Economic Review, Vol. 90, 147-165
28. Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole, 1997, "Risk-Based Capital, Portfolio Risk and Bank Capital Regulaion, " Journal of Finance, 43, 1219-33
29. Honder, Y., 2002, "The Effects of the Basel Accord on Bank Credit: The Case of Japan, " Applied Economics, 34, 1233-39
30. Ito, T., and Y. N. Sasaki, 1998, "Impacts of the Basel Capital Standard on Japanese Bank' Behavior, " NBER Working Paper, 6730
31. Jacques, K. T., and P. Nigro, 1997, "Risk-Based Capital, Portfolio Risk and Bank Capital: A Simultaneous Equations Approach, " Journal of Economics and Business, pp. 533-47
32. Jagtiani, J., Lemieux, 2001, "Market Discipline Prior to Bank Failure", Journal of Economics and Business Vol. 48, 313-324
33. Jesen, Michael C., and Willian H. Meckling, 1976, 'Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, ' Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, p305-360
34. Jona A C. Santos, 2000, "Bank Capital Regulation In Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of The Literature", BIS Working Papers.
35. Kahane, Y, 1977, Capital Adequacy and the Regulation of Financial Intermediaries", Journal of Banking and Finance 1, 207-218
36. Keeley, Michael. 1900, "Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking, " American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 5, p1183-1200
37. Kim, S. B., and R. Moreno, 1994, "Stock Prices and Bank Lending Behavior in Japan, " Federal Reserve Bank of San. Francisco Economic Review, 1, 31-42
38. Kim, D, and A. M. Santomero, 1988, "Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation", Journal of Finance 43, 1219-1233
39. Maclachlan, F., C. 2001, "Market Discipline in Bank Regulation", Independent Review, Vol. 6, 17-45
40. Marshall, D. A. and E. S. Prescott, 2000, "Bank Capital Regulation With and Without State-Contingent Penalties, " Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper, 10.
41. Mayers, S, C., and N. S. Majluf, 1984, "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not, " Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221
42. Modigliani, F. and M. Miller, 1958, "The cost of capital, Corporate Finance, and the theory of Investment", American Economic Review 48, 261-297
43. Peek, J., and E. Rosengren, 1995, "Bank Regulation and the Credit Crunch, " Journal of Banking and Finance. 19, 679-92
44. Rime, B., 2001, "Capital Requirements and Bank Behavior: Empirical Evidence for Switzerland, " Journal of Banking and Finance. 25, 789-805
45. Robert Bichsel and Jvrg Blum "The Relationship Between risk and Capital in Swiss Commercial Bank :A Panel Report", Working Paper. NO. 02. 04
46. Rochet, J. C., 1992, "Capital Requirements and Bank Behavior of Commercial Banks, " European Economic Review, 36, 1137-78
47. Santos, J. A. C., 2000, "Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the literature, " Bank of International Working Settlements Working Papers, 90
48. Shrieves, R. E., and D. Dahl, 1992, "The Relationship Between Risk and Capital in Commercial Banks, " Journal of Banking and Finance, 16, 439-57
49. Thomson, J, 1990, "Using Market Incentive to Reform Bank Regulation and Federal Deposit Insurance", Economic Review, Vol. 26, 28-32
50. Wall, L. D., and D. R. Peterson, 1995, "Bank Holding Company Capital Targets in the Early 1990s: The Regulation Versus the Markets, " Journal of Banking and Finance, 19, 563-74
51. Woo, D., 1999, "In Search of Capital Crunch. Supply Factors Behind the Credit Slowdown in Japan, " IMF Working Paper. 3.
52. Yudisstria, 2003, "The Impact of Bank Capital Requirements in Indonesia", Directorate of Banking Research and Regulation, Bank Indonesia.
53．巴曙松，2003，《新版神圣公约—巴塞尔新资本协议框架及风险管理新进展》，《国际贸易》，第6期，P52-55
54．何光辉，《存款保险制度研究》，中国金融出版社，2003年9月
55．黄迪，2003，《从可持续发展角度看国有商业银行的资本充足率》，《财经科学》，第5期，
56．蒋海、刘少波，2003：《银行资本监管理论及其新进展》，《当代经济科学》，第5期，P27-32
57．王亮，2003，《新巴塞尔协议下我国国有银行的资本充足率水平及对策研究》，《统计研究》，第1期，P18-21
58．张杰，《经济变迁中的金融中介与国有银行》，山西经济出版社，2003年9月
59．张杰，2003，《中国国有银行的资本谜团》，《经济研究》第4期，P30-36
60．周好文，2003，《“国家信誉”应从国有银行淡出》，《当代经济科学》，第1期，P33-39
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