基于分簇的战术互联网安全关键技术研究
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摘要
战术互联网是网络中心战在局部战场的体现,是现代化战争中保障数字化部队进行机动作战的战场信息基础设施。战术互联网的安全缺失将直接导致战役战斗的失败,战术互联网的安全是信息化战争体系安全中最直接最现实的部分。
战术互联网中命令控制、态势感知和语音协作等信息的流动具有整体纵向、局部横向的特点,节点具有目的性、协作性和策略性的组移动特点。以行动小组为基础进行分簇,可以使得网络结构不仅与部队实际编成相一致,而且能够减少局部子网间的通信量,并有利于安全子域的划分和安全技术的实现,从而提高网络的效率和安全性。
本文对基于行动小组进行分簇的战术互联网的安全框架及其关键实现技术进行了研究,该安全框架是结合网络模型、信任模型和安全操作的分层次的综合实现方案。网络以行动小组为基础划分为若干簇,并以簇为单元建立簇内信任和簇间信任,簇内和簇间信任为安全管理、安全路由、保密通信等安全操作提供了信任基础。依据战术互联网干线网络和末端子网的应用特点,提出了在干线网络采用带冗余的CA集群和在末端子网采用分布式CA相结合的认证方案。末端子网中,由选定的簇首组建一个分布式CA作为簇间的认证基础,而在簇内通过预先共享密钥来实现快速认证。
因为战术互联网的分布性、动态性,不仅使得分布式CA在战术互联网安全问题的解决方案中占有重要的位置,同时也要求分布式CA的组成结构要适应网络的不断变化以保证CA服务的效率等。移动敌人的攻击迫使分布式CA不断地更换私钥,以保证自身安全。因此,分布式CA服务的响应时间、丢失概率、成功概率和自身的安全性是实际应用中不能不考虑的问题。本文从随机概率分析的角度对这些问题进行了研究,并在此基础上,以平均响应时间为优化目标,以服务成功概率、安全性概率和服务申请平均丢失概率为约束条件,建立了最优化模型,给出了相应的求解过程。
信任评估是网络安全活动的重要决策依据,其目的是通过排除内部的消极节点和恶意节点来提高网络的效率、可靠性和安全性等。在分析了基于小组分簇的战术互联网中信任管理的特点后,本文提取了数据转发、数据篡改、拒绝服务攻击和分布式CA证书服务作为信任值计算的依据,它们或者通过邻居节点监视或者通过对分布式CA服务节点提供的证书分量的鉴别来获得。提出了新的节点信任值评价模型,该模型以可拓综合评价方法和层次分析法为基础,并建立了适合基于小组分簇的战术互联网特点的关联函数和关联度计算方法。
分簇的初衷在于提高网络的效率和可扩充性,路由是与分簇紧密结合在一起的。因此,研究与基于小组的分簇网络结构和战术互联网业务信息传递特点、节点移动特点相适应的路由协议是战术互联网分簇的内在要求。路由的安全在无线网络中尤为重要,基于分簇结构的认证方案为保障路由信息的安全提供了必要的基础。结合应用于先应式和后应式路由协议的安全策略,本文提出了基于小组的安全分簇与路由协议,其基本思想是小组自然成簇并在簇内通过定期交换信息维持簇内拓扑信息以减少时延使之符合簇内语音协作信息传递的要求,而在簇间通过“有限洪泛”按需启动路由发现以减少消耗并提高网络的可扩展性,并通过簇内对称密钥来保护簇内定期交换信息和通过簇间分布式CA来保护路由请求、回复等消息的安全,达到保护路由维护信息的完整性和网络结构的隐秘性,为后续的保密通信提供坚实的基础。在NS2环境中实现了该协议,实验结果显示在与战术互联网相似的设定场景中具有较满意的性能。
Tactical internet is the application of network-centric warfare in local battlefield. In modern warfare, tactical internet is information infrastructure of local battlefield to ensure digital army to fight smoothly. The security defects of tactical internet will lead to being defeated in battle. The security of tactical internet is the directly reflect of the security of informationized war’s architecture.
In tactical internet, the flow of command control and situational awareness information charactized as vertical mobility in whole, while the flow of collaborating voice information charactized as horizontal mobility in local. Those nodes who have the same goal move as a team. Dividing the network into clusters will reduce traffic during the routing process. Clustering based on combat unit will not only make the network structure correspond with the formation of soldiers but also reduce the communication between clusters. It can be in favor of the realization of security technologies.
Researches of security framework and the key technologies of it for tactical internet, clustered based on combat unit, have been done in this paper. This security framework is an integrated realization scheme, which combined network model, trust model and secure operations in different levels. The network is clustered according to battle unit. Trust between nodes from the same cluster and different clusters are built up in different ways. The built trust provides the basement of security management, secure routing, secrete communication, and so on. According to the characters of trunk net and terminal subnet, an authentication scheme of tactical internet is presented in this paper. The main idea of this authentication scheme is that an assembly of redundant CA (Certificate Authority) is applied in trunk net and a distributed CA is applied in terminal subnets. In a terminal subnet, a distributed CA is built in a set of CHs (Cluster Heads) is the basement for authentication between clusters and a cluster-wide symmetric key is used to authenticate each other for nodes in the cluster.
Distributed CA is important for the scheme of tactical internet security for the reason that tactical internet is a distributed and dynamic net. On other hands, the construct of distributed CA needs to adapt the changes of tactical net. Distributed CA has to change their private key to resist mobile attackers. So, the mean response time, the loss probability and the service success probability of application from other nodes to distributed CA and secure probability of itself are very important for its application. In this paper, those problems are analyzed by random-probability analysis and based on these analyses an optimizing model is set up and resolved.
The purpose of trust evaluation is to improve the efficiency, reliability and security of tactical internet by getting rid of inactive and malevolence nodes. After the analysis of trust management applied in clustered tactical internet, the packet untransmitting and falsifying, denial of service attack, and the validity of distributed CA services are chosen as the proofs to compute the node’s trust value. A model is set up to evaluate the trust value, which is based on extension multi-factorial evaluation method. In this model, link functions are built to suit characters of tactical internet and the weights of factors are decided by analytic hierarchy process.
The routing protocol based on clustered network structure need to suit the flow of data and the movement of nodes in tactical internet. Security is especially important for wireless network. A new secure routing protocol, based on authentication scheme, is presented. In this secure routing protocol, nodes exchange their information at fixed period to refresh node topology inner clusters for transmitting of collaborating voice information and the on demand route discovery is used between clusters to suit the demand of reducing traffic. The exchanged information inner clusters can be protected by pre-shared symmetric key and routing information between clusters can be protected by distributed CA. The routing protocol is realized in NS2 and the result of experiments show that the performance is approving under the scene same as tactical internet.
战术互联网中命令控制、态势感知和语音协作等信息的流动具有整体纵向、局部横向的特点,节点具有目的性、协作性和策略性的组移动特点。以行动小组为基础进行分簇,可以使得网络结构不仅与部队实际编成相一致,而且能够减少局部子网间的通信量,并有利于安全子域的划分和安全技术的实现,从而提高网络的效率和安全性。
本文对基于行动小组进行分簇的战术互联网的安全框架及其关键实现技术进行了研究,该安全框架是结合网络模型、信任模型和安全操作的分层次的综合实现方案。网络以行动小组为基础划分为若干簇,并以簇为单元建立簇内信任和簇间信任,簇内和簇间信任为安全管理、安全路由、保密通信等安全操作提供了信任基础。依据战术互联网干线网络和末端子网的应用特点,提出了在干线网络采用带冗余的CA集群和在末端子网采用分布式CA相结合的认证方案。末端子网中,由选定的簇首组建一个分布式CA作为簇间的认证基础,而在簇内通过预先共享密钥来实现快速认证。
因为战术互联网的分布性、动态性,不仅使得分布式CA在战术互联网安全问题的解决方案中占有重要的位置,同时也要求分布式CA的组成结构要适应网络的不断变化以保证CA服务的效率等。移动敌人的攻击迫使分布式CA不断地更换私钥,以保证自身安全。因此,分布式CA服务的响应时间、丢失概率、成功概率和自身的安全性是实际应用中不能不考虑的问题。本文从随机概率分析的角度对这些问题进行了研究,并在此基础上,以平均响应时间为优化目标,以服务成功概率、安全性概率和服务申请平均丢失概率为约束条件,建立了最优化模型,给出了相应的求解过程。
信任评估是网络安全活动的重要决策依据,其目的是通过排除内部的消极节点和恶意节点来提高网络的效率、可靠性和安全性等。在分析了基于小组分簇的战术互联网中信任管理的特点后,本文提取了数据转发、数据篡改、拒绝服务攻击和分布式CA证书服务作为信任值计算的依据,它们或者通过邻居节点监视或者通过对分布式CA服务节点提供的证书分量的鉴别来获得。提出了新的节点信任值评价模型,该模型以可拓综合评价方法和层次分析法为基础,并建立了适合基于小组分簇的战术互联网特点的关联函数和关联度计算方法。
分簇的初衷在于提高网络的效率和可扩充性,路由是与分簇紧密结合在一起的。因此,研究与基于小组的分簇网络结构和战术互联网业务信息传递特点、节点移动特点相适应的路由协议是战术互联网分簇的内在要求。路由的安全在无线网络中尤为重要,基于分簇结构的认证方案为保障路由信息的安全提供了必要的基础。结合应用于先应式和后应式路由协议的安全策略,本文提出了基于小组的安全分簇与路由协议,其基本思想是小组自然成簇并在簇内通过定期交换信息维持簇内拓扑信息以减少时延使之符合簇内语音协作信息传递的要求,而在簇间通过“有限洪泛”按需启动路由发现以减少消耗并提高网络的可扩展性,并通过簇内对称密钥来保护簇内定期交换信息和通过簇间分布式CA来保护路由请求、回复等消息的安全,达到保护路由维护信息的完整性和网络结构的隐秘性,为后续的保密通信提供坚实的基础。在NS2环境中实现了该协议,实验结果显示在与战术互联网相似的设定场景中具有较满意的性能。
Tactical internet is the application of network-centric warfare in local battlefield. In modern warfare, tactical internet is information infrastructure of local battlefield to ensure digital army to fight smoothly. The security defects of tactical internet will lead to being defeated in battle. The security of tactical internet is the directly reflect of the security of informationized war’s architecture.
In tactical internet, the flow of command control and situational awareness information charactized as vertical mobility in whole, while the flow of collaborating voice information charactized as horizontal mobility in local. Those nodes who have the same goal move as a team. Dividing the network into clusters will reduce traffic during the routing process. Clustering based on combat unit will not only make the network structure correspond with the formation of soldiers but also reduce the communication between clusters. It can be in favor of the realization of security technologies.
Researches of security framework and the key technologies of it for tactical internet, clustered based on combat unit, have been done in this paper. This security framework is an integrated realization scheme, which combined network model, trust model and secure operations in different levels. The network is clustered according to battle unit. Trust between nodes from the same cluster and different clusters are built up in different ways. The built trust provides the basement of security management, secure routing, secrete communication, and so on. According to the characters of trunk net and terminal subnet, an authentication scheme of tactical internet is presented in this paper. The main idea of this authentication scheme is that an assembly of redundant CA (Certificate Authority) is applied in trunk net and a distributed CA is applied in terminal subnets. In a terminal subnet, a distributed CA is built in a set of CHs (Cluster Heads) is the basement for authentication between clusters and a cluster-wide symmetric key is used to authenticate each other for nodes in the cluster.
Distributed CA is important for the scheme of tactical internet security for the reason that tactical internet is a distributed and dynamic net. On other hands, the construct of distributed CA needs to adapt the changes of tactical net. Distributed CA has to change their private key to resist mobile attackers. So, the mean response time, the loss probability and the service success probability of application from other nodes to distributed CA and secure probability of itself are very important for its application. In this paper, those problems are analyzed by random-probability analysis and based on these analyses an optimizing model is set up and resolved.
The purpose of trust evaluation is to improve the efficiency, reliability and security of tactical internet by getting rid of inactive and malevolence nodes. After the analysis of trust management applied in clustered tactical internet, the packet untransmitting and falsifying, denial of service attack, and the validity of distributed CA services are chosen as the proofs to compute the node’s trust value. A model is set up to evaluate the trust value, which is based on extension multi-factorial evaluation method. In this model, link functions are built to suit characters of tactical internet and the weights of factors are decided by analytic hierarchy process.
The routing protocol based on clustered network structure need to suit the flow of data and the movement of nodes in tactical internet. Security is especially important for wireless network. A new secure routing protocol, based on authentication scheme, is presented. In this secure routing protocol, nodes exchange their information at fixed period to refresh node topology inner clusters for transmitting of collaborating voice information and the on demand route discovery is used between clusters to suit the demand of reducing traffic. The exchanged information inner clusters can be protected by pre-shared symmetric key and routing information between clusters can be protected by distributed CA. The routing protocol is realized in NS2 and the result of experiments show that the performance is approving under the scene same as tactical internet.
引文
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