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英国政府决策与执行体制研究
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摘要
英国中央政府的决策体制以核心行政为主导。核心行政是在中央政府上层存在的一个复杂的网络,各主体之间有着相应的分工,同时又有很强的相互依赖和协调关系。首相和内阁作为最高决策机构主要依靠宪法惯例行使职权,制定法通常将具体的政府管理职能授予部长而不是作为整体行政机关的部,部长负责本部内具体事务的决策,同时在内阁中就政府管理中的重大问题进行集体决策,涉及部与部之间关系或者冲突的决策提交内阁决定,内阁办公厅、首相办公厅、内阁委员会、以及财政部在决策过程中起着重要的协调作用。但近年来,随着多层治理结构的不断演进,核心行政的权力逐渐向上向国际、欧盟层面转移,向下向分权政府、地方政府、执行机构等层面转移,表现出了明显的分权化特征。同时,较为全面的决策咨询机制——包括政府内的特别顾问、咨询性非部级公共机构、高级文官和政府外的智库——有助于将各种专业性意见带入决策过程中,而较为广泛的社会参与(压力集团、公众意见等)也有助于政府决策吸收民意、回应社会需求。
     1988年撒切尔政府发动下一步行动改革,将中央政府的决策与执行职能从组织机构上分开,执行职能从部中剥离出去,交给新设立的执行局,而决策仍保留给核心部。执行局是一种半自治机构,仍被作为部的一部分,但没有正式的法律地位,由一名执行局长领导,在主管部所设定的政策和资源框架内运行,在日常管理、人事、财务等方面享有不受部干预的一定程度上的自由。主管部对执行局保留一定的控制手段,包括为执行局制定框架文件、任命执行局长、设定财务和绩效任务指标等。执行局长就执行局的绩效表现对主管部长负责,主管部长就执行局的表现最终对议会负责。执行局的发展给英国中央政府带来了一场管理革命,不仅重塑了中央行政组织,也改变了传统的管理方式和管理文化,在今天,执行局依然是中央政府服务的主要提供者。
     除执行局之外,还有多种半自治机构承担中央政府服务提供的职能,其中最为主要的是执行性非部级公共机构,它与执行局最大的区别在于,其依据制定法设立,具有正式的法律地位,独立于部长控制的程度更高。在下一步行动改革后,政府将执行局的许多管理制度扩展适用到了执行性非部级公共机构上,使得二者的区别性变小。
     总体上,英国政府实行大部制集中决策和专业化分散执行的分离体制,有助于促使各机构专注于自己的核心业务,保证决策与执行的质量。执行机构的专业化和独立地位有利于在执行工作中去除政治干扰、增加管理上的自由度、使政府获得外部技能和专业服务、加强与社会互动等。但是,英国经验也揭示了这种体制所可能带来的问题,一是分散执行所带来的政府工作零散化后果,以及执行机构之间存在资源争夺、职能重叠的问题。这提示建立协调机制以及联合政府概念的重要意义;二是如何建立和平衡决策部门与执行机构之间的独立和控制关系。在英国各部发现难以与其所主管的执行机构建立一种成熟的或战略性的关系,通常要么是独裁式地过度介入微观管理,要么是完全不干预;三是如何合理分配执行机构与决策部门之间的责任承担。英国用于控制决策者的部长责任制惯例在实践中时常落空,而决策与执行的划分更成为部长们对执行失误拒绝承担责任的强硬理由。因此,人们建议议会应当通过更多的立法,使得执行机构的设立更难,并通过立法为执行机构设置清晰、一致且透明的治理框架。这些也许都可以给我国的政府体制改革提供一定的启示。
Policy making at central governmental level in the United Kingdom is dominated by the core executive, which is a complex network existing on the top of the central government. It contains the key institutions and actors with separate roles as well as strong inter-dependent and coordianting relationships. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet are the top policy makers acting in accordance with constitutional conventions rather than statutes. Usually statutes confer governmental functions on individual ministers but not the entire departments. Ministers decide policies concerning the business falling within their respective areas, and participate in cabinet to collectivelly decide major policies for the government. Business concerning different departments or conflicts between departments must be referred to cabinet for decision. The Prime Minister's Office, the Cabinet Office, cabinet committees and Treasury play important coordinating roles in the policy process. In recent years, however, with the evolution of multi-level governance, powers of the core executive have increasingly shifted upwards to international and European arean, and downwards to devolved administrations, local governments, agencies, quangos, and etc., indicating a clear trend of decentralization. In addition, the British government has developed an extensive advisory system for policy making, including those within the government such as special advisors, senior civil service, adisory non-departmental public bodies, and outside of the government such as think tanks. These advisors are useful in bringing expert opinion into the government's policy making. Comprehensive social participation in policy process by pressure groups and mass media also helps to take public opinion into account in policy making and fast respond to the demand of the society.
     In 1988, Mrs. Thatcher launched the Next Steps Initiative to hive off executive functions from the departments and conferred it upon the newly created executive agencies, while the policy making remained with the core departments. Executive agencies are semi-autonomous organizations and remain as parts of their departments without formal legal status. Led by a Chief Executive, executive agency operates within the policy and resource framework set by its parent department, and enjoys some autonomy in management, personnal and finance. But parent departments still remain control over executive agencies by developing framework documents, appointing chief executives, setting financial and performance targets, and etc. Chief Executives are personally accountable to ministers for operational performance, and ministers are accountable ultimately to the Parliament for the executive agencies' performance. The rise of executive agencies brought a managerial revolution to the British central government, not only by reshaping the structure of the central government but also by changing the traditional management methods and culture. Executive agencies today continue to be the principal service delivery agents for the central government.
     In addition to executive agencies, there are a variety of semi-autonomous public bodies carrying out service delivery for central government, among them the most important are executive non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs). The main difference between executive agencies and executive NDPBs is that executive NDPBs usually are created by statutes with formal legal status and more independent from the control of ministers. After the Next Steps Initiative, the government extended some governing measures used in executive agencies to executive NDPBs, which resulted in narrower difference between them.
     In general, the system of separation of executive functions performed by specialized executive bodies from policy making controlled by core departments has helped focus attention on the organizations' core business, and ensure the quality of policy making and executive activities. Specialization and independent status of executive bodies can help remove political intervention in executive activities, increase managerial autonomy, bring external expertise and skills into government, and increase the interaction between government and society. The British experience, however, also reveals possible difficulties caused by this system. The first is fragment resulted by individual executive bodies, and turf-wars between agencies with overlapping responsibilities, which indicate the importance of coordinating mechanism in government’s operation and the concept of joint-up government. The second is how to establish and balance the relationship of independence and control between the executive bodies and the policy makers. In UK, the departments found it difficult to adopt an adult or strategic relationship with their executive bodies, often either resorting to authoritarian over-controlling micromanagement, or a hands-off approach. The third is how to allocate the accountability between the executive bodies and policy makers. In UK, the constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility developed to control the policy makers is frequently frustrated in reality, while the separation of policy making and executive functions also provides ministers with another execuse to refuse taking accountability for operational problems. Consequently, it is suggested that more legislation should be enacted by Parliament to make the creation of executive bodies more difficult, and set up a clear, unified and transparent governing framework for executive bodies. These all may provide some enlightenment for the administrative reform in China.
引文
1 Mark Ryan, Chris Turner, Jacqueline Martin, Unlocking Constitutional and Administrative Law, Hodder Education, 2007, pp. 289-294.
    2在英国政府中,部长是个统称,一般在各部中有三个等级:作为内阁成员并领导一个部的,为最高级别的部长,一般称大臣[Secretary of State],下面为国务大臣[Minister of State],再下面为议会副大臣[Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State]。国务大臣和副大臣都是次级部长。大臣是传统的官僚称谓,与部长同义,在本文中使用部长更多一些。
    1枢密院是现代内阁的前身,但其行政职能已被内阁取代,不过还可以使得政府通过发布枢密院君令[Order in Council来进行某些行为,如管理文官部门。1998年《人权法》[Human Rights Act]规定行使国王特权而发布的枢密院君令属于基本立法[primary legislation],因此,法院不能根据该法确认其无效。
    2国王特权传统上是指一系列习惯性权力[authority]、特权[prerogative]和豁免[immunity],为普通法所承认,专属于国王。今天,绝大部分特权由国王授权部长直接行使,主要的领域包括管理文官部门、外交与国防政策的某些方面、任命官员和授予荣誉。这些权力不在议会的控制范围之内。
    3 F. W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908, p.387.
    4 William Wade, Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law, 9th Ed., Oxford University Press, 2004, p.47.
    1 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, p.308.
    2 Tom Gash et al, Read Before Burning: Arm’s Length Government for a New Administration, Institute for Government, 2010, p.5.
    3 Lucinda Maer, Quangos, Parliament and Constitutional Centre, House of Commons Library, 2011.
    1 Alasdair S. Roberts, Public Works and Government Services: Beautiful Theory Meets Ugly Reality, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996, p.3.
    2 Barry J. O'Toole & Grant Jordan, Next Steps--Improving Management in Government? Hants: Dartmouth, 1994; Oliver James, The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall, Hampshire, 2003.
    1 Cabinet Office, Next Steps Report 1998.
    2 Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, Hampshire: Palgrave, 1999.
    3 O. James, A. Moseley, Agencification in the UK, in K. Verhoest (eds), Government Agencies in Europe and Beyond: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
    4 Andrew Limb, What Lessons Can We Learn From the UK's Next Steps Model, Statskontoret, 2001; Jonathan Boston, Lessons from the Antipodes, in Barry J. O'Toole & Grant Jordan (eds), Next Steps--Improving Management in Government? Dartmouth, 1994.
    5 Sandra van Thiel & CRIPO Team,The Rise of Executive Agencies: Comparing the Agencification of 25 Tasks in 21 Countries, paper at EGPA conference, 2009, Malta.
    1 William Wade, Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law, 9th Ed., Oxford University Press, 2004, pp.46-47.
    2 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, pp.95-120.
    3刘峰、舒绍福著:《中外行政决策体制比较研究》,国家行政学院出版社,2008
    4周志忍:《英国执行机构改革及其对我们的启示》,《中国行政管理》,2004年第7期。
    5杜运巧、郑曙村:《中西方“行政三分制”改革比较》,《行政管理改革》,2011年第3期。
    1 Office of Public Services Reform and HM Treasury, Better Government Services: Executive Agencies in the 21st Century, London: The Cabinet Office, 2002.
    1 Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, Hampshire: Palgrave, 1999, pp. 9-11.
    1 Michael Moran, Politics and Governance in the UK, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillian, 2005, pp. 115-116.
    2 Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, Hampshire: Palgrave, 1999, pp.5-6.
    1 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, pp. 182-183.
    2 William Wade, Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law, 9th Ed., Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 46.
    1 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, pp. 98-100.
    2大臣、国务大臣、议会副大臣统称为部长[ministers],国务大臣和议会副大臣属于次级部长[junior ministers],他们都属于政治职位系列,区别于保持中立的文官职位[civil service]。
    1 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, pp. 183-184.
    1 Mark Ryan, Chris Turner, Jacqueline Martin, Unlocking Constitutional and Administrative Law, Hodder Education, 2007, p. 305.
    2 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, pp. 184-185.
    1这是布莱尔改革的结果,之前为每周两次,每次15分钟。
    2 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, pp. 185-188.
    1 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, p.104.
    2 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, p. 189.
    3 P. Hennessy, The British Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders since 1945, Allen Lane, 2000, p.504.
    4 www.direct.gov.uk, 2011-08-10.
    
    1 Bill Jones, Dennis Kavanagh, Michael Moran, Philip Norton, Politics UK, 6th Ed., Pearson, 2007, p.502.
    2 P. Hennessy, The British Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders since 1945, Allen Lane, 2000, p.481.
    3 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, p. 191.
    4 Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, Hampshire: Palgrave, 1999, p. 7.
    1 P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, I. Holliday, Developments in British Politics, 6th Ed., Palgrave, 2002, p.94.
    2 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, p.103.
    1 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, p.104.
    2 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, pp. 192-193.
    1 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, pp. 107-108.
    1 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, pp.106-107.
    2 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, p.193.
    1 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, p.107.
    1 G. W. Jones, The United Kingdom, in William Plowden (ed.), Advising the Rulers, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, p.36.
    2 Ferdinand Mount, The British Constitution Now: Recovery or Decline? London: Heinemann, 1992, p.149.
    1 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, p.125.
    
    1 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, pp.219-221.
    2 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, p.215.
    1 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, pp.135-136.
    1 Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, Hampshire: Palgrave, 1999, p.7.
    1 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, pp.108.
    1 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, pp.112-115.
    1 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, p.200.
    2 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007,
    1 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, p.348.
    2 Robert Leach, Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins, British Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilline, 2006, p.284.
    3 Brian W. Hogwood, David Judge, Murry Mcvicar, Agencies, Ministers and Civil Servants in Britain, paper for Politicians, Bureaucrats and Institutional Reform, 1999, Mannheim, Germany.
    1 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, pp.286-292.
    1 Toby Helm and Christopher Hope, The Top Twelve Think Tanks in Britain,The Telegraph, 24 Jan 2008.
    2剑桥和牛津的毕业生曾是文官选拨的唯一来源,后因受到批评,文官招募才开始向一些红砖大学和新式大学开放。
    3 Bill Jones, Dennis Kavanagh, Michael Moran, Philip Norton, Politics UK, 6th Ed., Pearson, 2007, pp.632-635.
    1 Bill Jones, Dennis Kavanagh, Michael Moran, Philip Norton, Politics UK, 6th Ed., Pearson, 2007, pp.632-643.
    1 House of Lords, Public Service Committee Report, Session 1997-98, January 1998.
    2按照PP. Craig教授的解释,agency一词目前在英国行政法上为一个概括名称,并无专门含义,亦并非专指某一机构,而是泛指众多承担具有政府工作性质的职能、但存在于传统的中央各部[departments]框架之外的机构。见PP. Craig, Administrative Law (5th Ed.) , Sweet &Maxwell, 2003, p.96。
    3作为英国中央政府权力下放[devolution]改革的结果,在苏格兰、威尔士和北爱尔兰分别成立了相应的区域议会和政府,根据英国议会的授权行使权力、管理本区域事务。其名称分别是苏格兰议会和苏格兰政府[Scottish Parliament and Executive](1997)、威尔士国民议会和威尔士政府[National Assembly for Wales and Welsh Assembly Government](1998)、北爱尔兰议会和北爱尔兰政府[Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive](1999,2003年暂停,2007年恢复)。
    1 O. James, A. Moseley, Agencification in the UK, in K. Verhoest (eds), Government Agencies in Europe and Beyond: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011.
    2 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.91.
    3 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007,p.140.
    1 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.92.
    2 Ian Budge, David Mckay, Ken Newton, John Bartle, The New British Politics, 4th Ed., Essex: Pearson, 2007, p.140.
    1全称为《改善政府管理:下一步行动》[Improving Government Management: Next Steps](又称Ibbs报告)
    2 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.94.
    1 Office of Public Services Reform and HM Treasury, Better Government Services: Executive Agencies in the 21st Century, London: The Cabinet Office, 2002.
    2 John R. Greenwood, David Jack Wilson,Public administration in Britain today, 2nd Ed., Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1989, pp.30-33.
    3 Patricia Greer, Transforming Central Government: The Next Steps Initiative, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994, p.6.
    1 Barry J. O'Toole & Grant Jordan, Next Steps--Improving Management in Government? Hants: Dartmouth, 1994, p.7.
    2 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.94.
    3 Office of Public Services Reform and HM Treasury, Better Government Services: Executive Agencies in the 21st Century, London: The Cabinet Office, 2002.
    4 Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Eight report: Progress in the next steps initiative, HC 481 Session 1989-90, London: HMSO.
    5 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.95.
    
    1 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.92.
    2 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.95.
    1 O. James, A. Moseley, Agencification in the UK, in K. Verhoest (eds), Government Agencies in Europe and Beyond: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
    1 Cabinet Office, Next Steps Report 1998.
    2 Office of Public Services Reform and HM Treasury, Better Government Services: Executive Agencies in the 21st Century, London: The Cabinet Office, 2002.
    1 Andrew Limb, What Lessons Can We Learn From the UK's Next Steps Model, Statskontoret, 2001.
    2 Office of Public Services Reform and HM Treasury, Better Government Services: Executive Agencies in the 21st Century, London: The Cabinet Office, 2002.
    3 Cabinet Office, Next Steps Report 1997.
    4 Cabinet Office, Next Steps Report 1998.
    1 O. James, A. Moseley, Agencification in the UK, in K. Verhoest (eds), Government Agencies in Europe and Beyond: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011
    1 O. James, A. Moseley, Agencification in the UK, in K. Verhoest (eds), Government Agencies in Europe and Beyond: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
    1 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments, chapter 9:Reviewing a Public Body, 2006.
    1 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments, chapter 10: Dissolving a NDPB, 2006.
    1 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments, 2006.
    2 Cabinet Office, Next Steps Report 1997.
    1 O. James, A. Moseley, Agencification in the UK, in K. Verhoest (eds), Government Agencies in Europe and Beyond: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
    
    1 Andrew Limb, What Lessons Can We Learn From the UK's Next Steps Model, Statskontoret, 2001.
    2 Andrew Limb, What Lessons Can We Learn From the UK's Next Steps Model, Statskontoret, 2001.
    1 2004年与假释委员会合并为国家罪犯管理局[National Offenders Management Service],2007年转属于新设立的司法部。
    2 Andrew Limb, What Lessons Can We Learn From the UK's Next Steps Model, Statskontoret, 2001.
    1 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.111.
    1 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.104.
    2 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.104.
    3 Office of Public Services Reform and HM Treasury, Better Government Services: Executive Agencies in the 21st Century, London: The Cabinet Office, 2002.
    
    1 Cabinet Office, Executive Agencies: A Guide for Department, 2006.
    2 Oliver James, The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall, Hampshire, 2003, p.56.
    1 Cabinet Office, Executive Agencies: A Guide for Department, 2006.
    2 Office of Public Services Reform and HM Treasury, Better Government Services: Executive Agencies in the 21st Century, London: The Cabinet Office, 2002.
    3 Andrew Limb, What Lessons Can We Learn From the UK's Next Steps Model, Statskontoret, 2001.
    1 Andrew Limb, What Lessons Can We Learn From the UK's Next Steps Model, Statskontoret, 2001.
    1 Alex Carroll, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 2nd Ed., Pearson, 2002, p.515.
    
    1 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, pp.111-112.
    2 Cabinet Office, Executive Agencies: A Guide for Department, 2006.
    1 Andrew Limb, What Lessons Can We Learn From the UK's Next Steps Model, Statskontoret, 2001.
    1 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies: A Guide for Departmens, 2006.
    1 Office of Public Services Reform and HM Treasury, Better Government Services: Executive Agencies in the 21st Century, London: The Cabinet Office, 2002.
    1 Oliver James, The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall, Hampshire, 2003.
    2 C.Talbot, Executive Agencies: Have They Improved Management in Government? Public Money and Management, 2004 24 (2), pp. 104 - 112.
    3 Oliver James, The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall, Hampshire, 2003.
    4 M. Flinders, Delegated governance and the British state: Walking Without Order. Oxford University Press, 2008.
    1 Brian W. Hogwood, David Judge, Murry Mcvicar, Agencies, Ministers and Civil Servants in Britain, paper for Politicians, Bureaucrats and Institutional Reform, 1999, Mannheim, Germany.
    2 Office of Public Services Reform and HM Treasury, Better Government Services: Executive Agencies in the 21st Century, London: The Cabinet Office, 2002.
    3 C.Talbot, Executive Agencies: Have They Improved Management in Government? Public Money and Management,2004 24 (2), p. 106.
    1 House of Lords, Select Committee on Public Service Report 1998.
    2 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.105.
    1 O. James, A. Moseley, Agencification in the UK, in K. Verhoest (eds), Government Agencies in Europe and Beyond: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
    2 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.107.
    1 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.104.
    2 [英]彼得·莱兰、戈登·安东尼著,杨伟东译:《英国行政法教科书》(第五版),北京大学出版社,2007,第44-45页。
    1 Brian W. Hogwood, David Judge, Murry Mcvicar, Agencies, Ministers and Civil Servants in Britain, paper for Politicians, Bureaucrats and Institutional Reform, 1999, Mannheim, Germany.
    2 House of Commons, Public Administration Committee, Written Evidence to Smaller Government: Shrinking the Quango State, 2011.
    1 House of Commons, Public Administration Committee, Written Evidence to Smaller Government: Shrinking the Quango State, 2011.
    2 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.96.
    1 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies 2001—2007.
    2 House of Commons, Public Administration Select Committee, Smaller Government: Shrinking the Quango State, fifth report of session 2010-2011.
    1 Tom Gash et al, Read Before Burning: Arm’s Length Government for a New Administration, Institute for Government, 2010.
    2 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments, 2006.
    3 HM Treasury, Reforming Arm’s Length Bodies, 2010.
    4 Tom Gash et al, Read Before Burning: Arm’s Length Government for a New Administration, Institute for Government, 2010.
    1 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.96.
    2 Tom Gash et al, Read Before Burning: Arm’s Length Government for a New Administration, Institute for Government, 2010.
    3 Lucinda Maer, Quangos, Parliament and Constitution Centre, House of Commons Library, 2011.
    4 Lucinda Maer, Quangos, Parliament and Constitution Centre, House of Commons Library, 2011.
    1 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies 2009.
    2 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.96.
    1虽然本章的主要研究对象是执行性NDPBs,但由于它也是各种独立于政府部长的控制之外运行的独立机构[ALBs]中的一种(非常重要的一种,在所有ALBs中公共开支最多),其有些特征也是其他NDPBs、甚至更多的ALBs所共有的,加之当前英国政府对于公共机构的改革也是将ALBs作为一个整体来对待的,所以,在本章的论述中,有些地方的内容所针对的对象并不仅限于执行性NDPBs,但确定的是,执行性NDPBs包括在其中。
    2 Tom Gash et al, Read Before Burning: Arm’s Length Government for a New Administration, Institute for Government, 2010.
    3 M. Flinders, Delegated Governance and the British State: Walking Without Order, Oxford University Press, 2008.
    1 Tom Gash et al, Read Before Burning: Arm’s Length Government for a New Administration, Institute for Government, 2010.
    1 Tom Gash et al, Read Before Burning: Arm’s Length Government for a New Administration, Institute for Government, 2010.
    2 1995 48 Parliamentary Affairs 207. 209.
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    2 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies 2007.
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    2 Office of Public Services Reform and HM Treasury, Better Government Services: Executive Agencies in the 21st Century, London: The Cabinet Office, 2002.
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    2 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies 2009.
    3 Lucinda Maer, Quangos, Parliament and Constitutional Centre, House of Commons Library, 2011.
    1 Taxpayers Alliance, ACA to YJB: A Guide to the UK’s Semi-Autonomous Public Bodies 2007-08.
    1 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments, 2006.
    1 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments, 2006.
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    1 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.98.
    2 Lucinda Maer, Quangos, Parliament and Constitutional Centre, House of Commons Library, 2011.
    3 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.99.
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    1 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments, 2006.
    2 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.99.
    1 Colin Turpin, Adam Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution, 6th Ed., Cambridge University Press, 2007,p.412.
    1 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.100.
    2 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments, 2006.
    3 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.101.
    1 Tom Gash et al, Read Before Burning: Arm’s Length Government for a New Administration, Institute for Government, 2010.
    2 M. Flinders, Delegated Governance and the British State: Walking Without Order , Oxford University Press, 2008, p.69.
    1 M. Flinders, Delegated Governance and the British State: Walking Without Order , Oxford University Press, 2008, p.86.
    2 HM Government, Putting the Frontline First: Smarter Government, 2009.
    3 HM Treasury, Reforming Arm's Length Bodies, 2010.
    
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    2 Conservative Party, An Invitation to Join the Government of Britain, 2010.
    3 HM Government, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, 2010.
    
    1 House of Commons, Deb 9 June 2010.
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    1 Public Bodies Bill: Impact Assessment.
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    2 HM Treasury, Reforming Arm's Length Bodies, 2010.
    1 Tom Gash et al, Read Before Burning: Arm’s Length Government for a New Administration, Institute for Government, 2010.
    2 Tom Gash et al, Read Before Burning: Arm’s Length Government for a New Administration, Institute for Government, 2010.
    1 Tom Gash et al, Read Before Burning: Arm’s Length Government for a New Administration, Institute for Government, 2010.
    2 House of Commons, Public Administration Select Committee, Smaller Government: Shrinking the Quango State, 2011.
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    1 [英]特伦斯·丹提斯、阿兰·佩兹著,刘刚、江菁、轲翀译:《宪制中的行政机关——结构、自治与内部控制》,高等教育出版社,2006,第40-41页。
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    1 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.106.
    2 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 5th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, p.107.
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