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行业特征、知识外部性与企业自主创新
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摘要
企业的自主创新对其生存与发展至关重要,然而中国企业却普遍存在研究与开发投资不足的现状。创新的外部性导致知识外溢,从而造成创新收益的损失,是中国企业研究与开发投资不足的重要原因之一。而创新外部性的大小、企业研究与开发投资行为以及专利行为都存在显著的行业差异。因此本文结合外部性理论、产业组织理论、专利竞赛理论,从市场结构因素的差异以及行业内不同企业之间的策略互动的角度,在行业间和行业内部两个研究层面,对企业研究与开发投资行为与专利行为的影响因素进行理论分析。
     实证研究部分,本文以2007-2010年披露研究与开发投资的上市公司作为研究对象,在理论分析的基础上,基于行业特征中的市场结构因素,构建行业知识产权风险体系,并实证检验行业知识产权风险对企业研究与开发投资和企业专利行为的影响。研究表明知识产权风险具有显著的行业差异,行业知识产权风险对企业研究与开发投资具有显著的负面影响;中国上市公司的专利行为也存在显著的行业差异,企业采取不同类型的专利申请行为应对不同类别的行业知识产权风险。在行业内部的研究层面,本文在分行业描述性统计的基础上判断不同行业的专利竞赛类型,测算并建立竞争距离权重矩阵,运用空间滞后模型,实证检验五大制造业与信息技术业中,不同竞争地位的企业间,研究与开发投资和专利行为的策略互动性及影响效果。研究表明,中国上市公司所处行业中,存在三类典型的专利竞赛的格局,体现出绝对先占权型、ε-先占权型和无领导型专利竞赛的不同特征。
     本文的创新在于,在行业间的研究层面,结合知识外部性,分析影响企业研究与开发投资的市场结构因素,并构建行业知识产权风险体系;在行业内部的研究层面,结合企业专利竞赛中的策略互动性,分析行业内竞争企业及领导企业的研究与开发投资行为、专利申请行为,对企业自身研究与开发投资的影响,并首次运用新的变量衡量体系与空间计量方法开展相应的实证研究。
Independent innovation is essential to corporate survival and development. However, under-investmentin R&D of Chinese companies is widespread.One of the important reasons for that is the externality ofinnovation which leads to knowledge spillover, resulting in the loss of innovation revenue. And there aresignificant industrial differences among the size of the innovation externality, the corporate R&Dinvestment behaviors and patent behaviors. So this paper theoretically analyzes the influencing factors ofcorporate R&D investment behaviors and patent behaviors at both the inter-industry and intra-industry level,basing on the theory of externality, the industrial organization theory and the patent race theory, from theperspectives of the differences in market structure elements and the strategic interaction between differentcompanies in a certain industry.
     In the empirical research part, this paper constructs the industrial intellectual property risk system basingon the market structure elements of industry characteristic, and empirically tests the impact of the industrialintellectual property risk on corporate R&D investment and patent applications, using the sample of Chineselisted companies that disclose the data of R&D investment in2007-2010. Results show that there aresignificant differences among industries in the intellectual property risk and the industrial intellectual propertyrisk has a significant negative impact on corporate R&D investment; Chinese listed companies take differenttypes of patent application behaviors to respond to different types of industrial intellectual property risk.In theintra-industry level, this paper determines the types of patent race of different industries basing on thedescriptive statistics, and then calculating the competitive-distance weight matrix, using the spatial lag model,empirically tests the strategic interaction of R&D investment and patent behaviors of companies with differntcompetitive positions in five manufacturing industries and the IT industry. Results show that in the mainindustries, there are three typical patterns of the patent race, reflecting different patent race characteristic of theabsolute preemptive model, theε-preemptive model and the non-leadership model.
     The innovation of this paper concludes: First, in the research level of inter-industry, this paper combinesthe theory of knowledge externality and the industrial organization theory, to analyze the market structureelements that affect corporate R&D investment, and constructs the industrial intellectual property risk system.Second, in the research level of intra-industry, this paper analyzes the impact of the interaction of R&Dinvestment and patent application behaviors among competitive companies and leading companies oncorporate R&D investment, and for the first time using new measuring system and spatial econometricmethods in the related empirical research to test this topic.
引文
1邹薇(2002)论述了专利的“信号桩”作用。“专利其实是一种“信号桩”(sign-post)体系,它间接约束着均衡市场上产品的数量、种类以及可能发生纠纷的解决。”“如果把专利视为一个“信号桩”系统,即使它并未认定某种产品的生产是违规的,但它的存在意味着一个很强的信号,即进入者对已获专利产品的侵犯越大,则预期的惩罚越大。”
    2生产性努力即一个人为了获得收入而进行的创造新财富的活动,分配性努力即一个人将别人已有的财富转变为自己财富的活动。
    3包括专利申请量或专利授权量指标。
    4本文在此处的理论分析中,专利成本只包括由于由于模仿等知识产权风险所导致的被动专利成本,不包括企业因为创新成果丰富而主动申请的专利量,在后文的实证分析中,企业的主动专利申请倾向通过加入企业R&D投资和其他变量加以控制。
    5专利成本只包括由于由于模仿等知识产权风险所导致的被动专利成本,不包括企业因为创新成果丰富而主动申请的专利量,企业的主动专利申请倾向通过加入企业R&D投资和其他变量加以控制。
    6企业职工平均薪酬未能区分高科技人才、管理人员、及普通员工的薪酬水平,因此未能有效地反映进入障碍的大小,本文未采用。而高科技人才的薪酬水平缺少相关的数据。本文职工总薪酬来表示薪酬进入障碍。
    7专利授权数更能够体现专利圈地的作用,但受制于专利审核部门的主观因素影响,因此本文将国外专利授权占总专利授权的比例,作为替代变量进行稳健性检验。由于发明专利更具有新颖性,研发难度更高,因此发明专利更能体现专利布局的特点,本文采用国外发明专利申请占总申请数的比例作为主要变量,国外专利申请占总申请数进行稳健性检验。所得结果均不影响本文结论。
    8本文未采取专利授权数作为被解释变量,是因为本文考察的是上市公司针对行业知识产权风险,所采取专利申请的应对行为,属于企业“主观”层面的专利行为,而专利授权的获得则较多受到“客观”因素的影响,受到专利审核部门的行政程序、行政效率的限制。本文只将其作为描述性统计分析的对象。
    9在表4-11及后续的分行业统计分析、回归分析的表格中,均未剔除000063“中兴通讯”,因为该上市公司在所在行业中处于绝对领导者地位,属于回归分析中的研究范畴;并且在分行业统计分析中,无论是否剔除该公司,不影响统计分析的结论。
    10如安徽科大讯飞信息科技股份有限公司(002230)是一家专业从事智能语音及语言技术研究、软件及芯片产品开发、语音信息服务及电子政务系统集成的软件企业。浪潮软件(600756)致力于成为中国领先的云计算解决方案供应商,基于浪潮企业、行业、政务信息化软件、终端产品和解决方案,全面支撑企业云、行业云、政务云建设。
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