收益共享契约下供应链渠道协调研究
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摘要
随着外部市场竞争的加剧以及传统渠道弊端的凸显,供应链渠道作为一种新的渠道模式显现的优势逐步得到业界认可。但由于供应链渠道系统是由利益相对独立的多个企业通过联盟或合作组成的分散式组织,各个渠道主体在追求自身收益最大化的同时,往往忽略了对其他联盟成员的影响,就会出现所谓的“双重边际”现象。另一方面,在供应链研究中,收益共享契约作为一种新的协调机制逐步引起研究者关注。实践中,Blocbuster公司和亚马逊应用收益共享契约,使得其市场份额显著上升,供应商和零售商的绩效明显得以改善。于此,论文尝试将收益共享契约引入到供应链渠道协调中。而对这一新领域,需要深入探讨其面临的一些新问题,如收益共享契约如何对供应链渠道产生均衡协调机制,如何通过协调制订双方可以接受的批发价格、最优订货数量、收益分配比例,以及如何对收益共享契约下供应链渠道协调进行决策等。
论文所有章节的讨论均是在收益共享契约下进行的,贯穿的主线是供应链渠道主体间协调涉及到的帕累托改善、合作博弈、经济理性、成本、风险和满意度。研究的逻辑是先建立理论框架,后用模型论证,再到决策分析,直至最后的案例应用。全文主体共有五部分组成,第一部分旨在将收益共享契约和供应链渠道有效嫁接,以形成论文的理论基础和研究框架。接下来三部分紧紧围绕收益共享契约中的三个参数(价格、订货量和收益分配因子)对供应链渠道协调展开讨论,第五部分则是对收益共享契约下供应链渠道协调决策进行分析。主要部分的研究内容和相应结论如下：
第一部分先对前人关于收益共享契约和供应链渠道协调的文献梳理。论文认为,收益共享契约形成的外部动因是市场环境竞争的加剧和消费者主权的增加,内部原因是供应链系统的目标冲突和“双重边际”效应；从收益共享契约基本模型入手,分析其对供应链渠道关系的重构和作用机制,得出收益共享契约是一种利益均衡的供应链渠道协调机制的结论。
在批发价格协调研究中,通过理论分析得出的研究结果是,收益共享契约下供应链渠道批发价格协调要以整体收益最大化为目标,以提高渠道主体收益为基准,以提升渠道竞争力为目的；运用蛛网理论构造了供应商和零售商关于批发价格震荡系统,建立了收敛模型并给出收敛条件,认为收益共享契约可以通过协调,在供应商和零售商之间形成一个双方可接受的均衡批发价格；在批发价格与收益分配协调的模型和批发价格与未售出产品剩余补贴因子的协调模型中得出的研究结论是,收益共享契约可以在供应链渠道中选择出合适的批发价和收益分配因子组合,使得在协调供应链渠道的同时,实现供应链总收益在供应商与零售商之间的合理划分；假定零售商的需求函数为乘数模式,并且该产品的市场需求为富有弹性,通过与简单批发价格契约对比,求出了批发价格可行区间。
关于订货协调方面,将收益共享契约引入到报童模型中,在订货协调时主要考虑需求分布和时间两大要素；在考虑需求分布时,通过建立的边际收益模型,分析出的结论是,无论是连续均匀的需求分布,还是指数需求分布,需求的标准差和需求期望均与供应链渠道的收益有负相关关系,且收益共享契约下的订货量大于没有收益共享契约时的订货量,收益共享契约下无论是单个渠道主体,还是整个供应链渠道的收益均高于没有收益共享契约时的收益；若将时间因素加入到收益共享契约下的供应链渠道订货协调中,模型研究表明市场需求预测的均值增大,最佳订货点向前推移,当市场需求预测的精度增加,最佳订货时点向后推移；仿真结果则进一步佐证了模型研究的结论。
在进行收益分配协调的讨论时,分别考虑了信息共享度、风险承担、努力水平、资源投入和贡献大小等5大参与收益分配要素下,收益共享契约的供应链渠道如何进行收益分配协调,并用数学模型进行了论证；利用合作博弈模型分析了渠道主体关于收益分配的讨价还价过程,结论是双方要充分利用自己的占先优势；总结出收益分配存在的冲突,将TOPSIS法和欧氏距离法结合起来,为解决收益分配冲突提供了一种新思路；在收益分配激励时,通过对相关文献内容进行分析、提炼主题概念、抽象出收益共享要素的具体判别因子,再建立一个激励框架,并将激励因子加入到收益分配中,以更好地体现收益分配的公平、合理原则。
有关协调决策方面,基于收益共享契约下供应链渠道协调过程中存在的局限和主要问题,结合收益共享契约和供应链渠道交叉点,分离出收益共享契约下供应链渠道协调决策的成本视角、效率视角和满意度视角,构建一个决策理论模型；据此,从成本、效率、满意度三个视角建立了10个二级决策指标,43个三级指标,给出部分指标的定量计算方法,并提出了GAHP的决策方法。
案例研究部分则从一家企业里搜集到一类产品的数据,结合构建的决策指标,借助yaahp0.52软件进行计算,得出的结果与前面理论研究结论不谋而合。
论文通过以上研究,希望能在以下方面有所创新和贡献,基于成熟的收益共享契约模型,将其应用到供应链渠道协调中,其中涉及的研究思路和研究设计将为这一新领域研究提供借鉴；对收益共享契约中的3个参数分别展开讨论,并尽可能细化研究,试图为该契约下供应链渠道协调深入探讨提供研究起点；在收益分配协调时,提炼分配要素的判别因子,并加入分配模型中,这是收益分配激励研究的新尝试；建立了收益共享契约下供应链渠道协调决策新的视角和新的指标体系,以尽力让该契约下供应链渠道协调决策过程中规避一些可能出现的问题,为管理实践提供理论参考；通过案例研究和仿真分析,尽可能将理论模型引入到供应链渠道协调实践中,力图体现理论研究的应用价值。
With the intense external market competition and the highlight the defects of traditional channels, supply chain channel model as a new channel was gradually recognized by the industry insiders. However, due to supply chain channel system was composed of decentralized organizations from relatively many independent enterprises through alliances or partnerships. When the various channels members pursued their own maximum interests, it would often overlook the interests of the other alliance members. This was the so-called "double marginalization." On the other hand, in the supply chain research field, revenue sharing contract as a coordination form has been gradually risen great concern by the researchers. In the management practice, Blocbuster companies and Amazon applied revenue sharing contract to their business and made their market share increase significantly and the performance of suppliers and retailers improve greatly. Therefore, the paper tried to introduce revenue sharing contract into the supply chain channel coordination. And for this new field, we need to discuss some new problems that we face, such as how the revenue sharing contract produce balanced and coordinated mechanisms to the supply chain channel, how to set acceptable wholesale price, the optimal order quantity and how to determine the distribution of income ratio to both sides by coordination. And how to evaluate the effect of the supply chain channel coordination based on revenue sharing contract.
There are5main components of the paper. The first part of the paper tries to form the theoretical basis and research framework. Then the following parts closely around to discuss the three parameters (price, order quantity and income distribution factor) of supply chain channel coordination based on the revenue sharing contract. The fifth part will give an evaluation to the supply chain channel coordination based on revenue sharing contract. The contents of the main parts of the paper are as follows:
The first part of the paper has carded out the previous literature of the revenue sharing contract and the supply chain channel coordination. The thesis thought that the formation of revenue sharing contract is motivated by the intense competition of external market environment of and increased consumer sovereignty. And the internal reason is the objective conflict because of and "double marginalization" effect. From the basic model of revenue sharing contract, we reveal it reconstructs the relationship with the supply chain channel members and its equilibrium mechanism to the supply chain channel. And we draw the conclusion that revenue sharing contract is a balance mechanism to the supply chain channel coordination.
In the price coordination part, by academic analysis we thought the objective of wholesale price coordination was maximizing the overall benefits of the whole supply chain and the purpose was to increase the chain competition. By the use of Cobweb theory, we construct a price shocks system between the suppliers and the retailers. From the model we find it can create a mutually acceptable wholesale price between the equilibrium. in the coordination model of wholesale prices and income distribution, wholesale price subsidies for unsold products. We draw conclusion that the supply of revenue sharing contract chain channel can select the appropriate which combination of wholesale price and revenue between sharing factor, which can realize the reasonable revenue distribution between the supplier and the retailer while at the same time it can make the supply chain channel coordination. Assuming that the retailer demand function was the multiplier mode and the demand of the products in the market is elastic, by comparing with the wholesale price contract, we obtained feasible extent of the wholesale price.
For the product order coordination, we introduce the revenue sharing contract to the newsboy model. We considered elements of demand distribution and time when ordering the product. In considering the demand distribution, the constructed marginal revenue model show that demand for both continuous and uniform distribution or exponential demand distribution, the standard deviation and demand expectation both are with a negative correlation with supply chain revenue. And the orders amount with revenue sharing contract is larger than without revenue sharing contract, the revenue of the supplier retailer and the whole supply chain is more them without revenue sharing contract If the time factor to order coordination is considered, the larger the forecast mean market demand, the more onward of the order point will be. The more accuracy for the forecast market demand, the more backward of the order point will be. The simulation result further supports the conclusions of the model.
In the coordination of the revenue distribution, we summed up the five factors of information sharing, risk commitment, effort level, resources input and contribution which impact revenue distribution. And by using of mathematical models we demonstrated and the former3factors were. With cooperative game model we analyzed bargaining process of the revenue distribution e, and draw the conclusion that during the revenue distribution of the negotiation process to make full use of its own preemptive advantage is much more important. Owing to existence of revenue distribution conflict, we put forward the TOPSIS method combined with the Euclidean distance income distribution, and by this way we provided a new idea to solve the conflict. In the revenue distribution incentive, through content analysis of relevant literature refining the concept of the theme and abstracting out specific discriminating factors of revenue sharing, and then create an incentive framework and put motivating factors into the revenue distribution. We thought it will better reflect fair and reasonable principles when distributing the gained revenue.
For the coordination evaluation of supply chain channel based on revenue sharing contract, on the basis of the problem of the revenue sharing contract in supply chain coordination with the main problems the process, combined with cross section of revenue sharing contract and the evaluation of the supply chain channel, we separated out cost, efficiency and satisfaction as evaluation perspective, and build a theoretical model of evaluation. Accordingly, from the cost, efficiency, satisfaction we established10secondary indicators,43sub-indicators and quantitative calculation for some indicators are given in this part. With GAHP method and third-party evaluation mechanism, and with the help of yaahp0.52software, we calculated out the results and found that they coincided with the previous theoretical conclusions.
Through the above research, we hope to do innovative and contributive work in the following areas. Based on the proven models of revenue sharing contract based on, we applied it to the supply.chain channel coordination, which involves research ideas and research design would provide reference for this new field. To discuss on the three parameters in revenue sharing contract was attempting to explore further study to this field. In the revenue distribution coordination, putting the extracted discriminative factor distribution elements to the distribution model would be a new-revenue distribution and incentive mechanism. We also established a new evaluation prospective and index system for the supply chain channel coordination based the revenue sharing contract. The purpose was to try to avoid possible problems in applying supply chain channel coordination tried to achieve the coordination goals and provide a theoretical reference for the management practice. Through case studies and simulation tried to apply the channel coordination model into practice as far as possible and to reflect the value of theoretical research as much as possible.
论文所有章节的讨论均是在收益共享契约下进行的,贯穿的主线是供应链渠道主体间协调涉及到的帕累托改善、合作博弈、经济理性、成本、风险和满意度。研究的逻辑是先建立理论框架,后用模型论证,再到决策分析,直至最后的案例应用。全文主体共有五部分组成,第一部分旨在将收益共享契约和供应链渠道有效嫁接,以形成论文的理论基础和研究框架。接下来三部分紧紧围绕收益共享契约中的三个参数(价格、订货量和收益分配因子)对供应链渠道协调展开讨论,第五部分则是对收益共享契约下供应链渠道协调决策进行分析。主要部分的研究内容和相应结论如下：
第一部分先对前人关于收益共享契约和供应链渠道协调的文献梳理。论文认为,收益共享契约形成的外部动因是市场环境竞争的加剧和消费者主权的增加,内部原因是供应链系统的目标冲突和“双重边际”效应；从收益共享契约基本模型入手,分析其对供应链渠道关系的重构和作用机制,得出收益共享契约是一种利益均衡的供应链渠道协调机制的结论。
在批发价格协调研究中,通过理论分析得出的研究结果是,收益共享契约下供应链渠道批发价格协调要以整体收益最大化为目标,以提高渠道主体收益为基准,以提升渠道竞争力为目的；运用蛛网理论构造了供应商和零售商关于批发价格震荡系统,建立了收敛模型并给出收敛条件,认为收益共享契约可以通过协调,在供应商和零售商之间形成一个双方可接受的均衡批发价格；在批发价格与收益分配协调的模型和批发价格与未售出产品剩余补贴因子的协调模型中得出的研究结论是,收益共享契约可以在供应链渠道中选择出合适的批发价和收益分配因子组合,使得在协调供应链渠道的同时,实现供应链总收益在供应商与零售商之间的合理划分；假定零售商的需求函数为乘数模式,并且该产品的市场需求为富有弹性,通过与简单批发价格契约对比,求出了批发价格可行区间。
关于订货协调方面,将收益共享契约引入到报童模型中,在订货协调时主要考虑需求分布和时间两大要素；在考虑需求分布时,通过建立的边际收益模型,分析出的结论是,无论是连续均匀的需求分布,还是指数需求分布,需求的标准差和需求期望均与供应链渠道的收益有负相关关系,且收益共享契约下的订货量大于没有收益共享契约时的订货量,收益共享契约下无论是单个渠道主体,还是整个供应链渠道的收益均高于没有收益共享契约时的收益；若将时间因素加入到收益共享契约下的供应链渠道订货协调中,模型研究表明市场需求预测的均值增大,最佳订货点向前推移,当市场需求预测的精度增加,最佳订货时点向后推移；仿真结果则进一步佐证了模型研究的结论。
在进行收益分配协调的讨论时,分别考虑了信息共享度、风险承担、努力水平、资源投入和贡献大小等5大参与收益分配要素下,收益共享契约的供应链渠道如何进行收益分配协调,并用数学模型进行了论证；利用合作博弈模型分析了渠道主体关于收益分配的讨价还价过程,结论是双方要充分利用自己的占先优势；总结出收益分配存在的冲突,将TOPSIS法和欧氏距离法结合起来,为解决收益分配冲突提供了一种新思路；在收益分配激励时,通过对相关文献内容进行分析、提炼主题概念、抽象出收益共享要素的具体判别因子,再建立一个激励框架,并将激励因子加入到收益分配中,以更好地体现收益分配的公平、合理原则。
有关协调决策方面,基于收益共享契约下供应链渠道协调过程中存在的局限和主要问题,结合收益共享契约和供应链渠道交叉点,分离出收益共享契约下供应链渠道协调决策的成本视角、效率视角和满意度视角,构建一个决策理论模型；据此,从成本、效率、满意度三个视角建立了10个二级决策指标,43个三级指标,给出部分指标的定量计算方法,并提出了GAHP的决策方法。
案例研究部分则从一家企业里搜集到一类产品的数据,结合构建的决策指标,借助yaahp0.52软件进行计算,得出的结果与前面理论研究结论不谋而合。
论文通过以上研究,希望能在以下方面有所创新和贡献,基于成熟的收益共享契约模型,将其应用到供应链渠道协调中,其中涉及的研究思路和研究设计将为这一新领域研究提供借鉴；对收益共享契约中的3个参数分别展开讨论,并尽可能细化研究,试图为该契约下供应链渠道协调深入探讨提供研究起点；在收益分配协调时,提炼分配要素的判别因子,并加入分配模型中,这是收益分配激励研究的新尝试；建立了收益共享契约下供应链渠道协调决策新的视角和新的指标体系,以尽力让该契约下供应链渠道协调决策过程中规避一些可能出现的问题,为管理实践提供理论参考；通过案例研究和仿真分析,尽可能将理论模型引入到供应链渠道协调实践中,力图体现理论研究的应用价值。
With the intense external market competition and the highlight the defects of traditional channels, supply chain channel model as a new channel was gradually recognized by the industry insiders. However, due to supply chain channel system was composed of decentralized organizations from relatively many independent enterprises through alliances or partnerships. When the various channels members pursued their own maximum interests, it would often overlook the interests of the other alliance members. This was the so-called "double marginalization." On the other hand, in the supply chain research field, revenue sharing contract as a coordination form has been gradually risen great concern by the researchers. In the management practice, Blocbuster companies and Amazon applied revenue sharing contract to their business and made their market share increase significantly and the performance of suppliers and retailers improve greatly. Therefore, the paper tried to introduce revenue sharing contract into the supply chain channel coordination. And for this new field, we need to discuss some new problems that we face, such as how the revenue sharing contract produce balanced and coordinated mechanisms to the supply chain channel, how to set acceptable wholesale price, the optimal order quantity and how to determine the distribution of income ratio to both sides by coordination. And how to evaluate the effect of the supply chain channel coordination based on revenue sharing contract.
There are5main components of the paper. The first part of the paper tries to form the theoretical basis and research framework. Then the following parts closely around to discuss the three parameters (price, order quantity and income distribution factor) of supply chain channel coordination based on the revenue sharing contract. The fifth part will give an evaluation to the supply chain channel coordination based on revenue sharing contract. The contents of the main parts of the paper are as follows:
The first part of the paper has carded out the previous literature of the revenue sharing contract and the supply chain channel coordination. The thesis thought that the formation of revenue sharing contract is motivated by the intense competition of external market environment of and increased consumer sovereignty. And the internal reason is the objective conflict because of and "double marginalization" effect. From the basic model of revenue sharing contract, we reveal it reconstructs the relationship with the supply chain channel members and its equilibrium mechanism to the supply chain channel. And we draw the conclusion that revenue sharing contract is a balance mechanism to the supply chain channel coordination.
In the price coordination part, by academic analysis we thought the objective of wholesale price coordination was maximizing the overall benefits of the whole supply chain and the purpose was to increase the chain competition. By the use of Cobweb theory, we construct a price shocks system between the suppliers and the retailers. From the model we find it can create a mutually acceptable wholesale price between the equilibrium. in the coordination model of wholesale prices and income distribution, wholesale price subsidies for unsold products. We draw conclusion that the supply of revenue sharing contract chain channel can select the appropriate which combination of wholesale price and revenue between sharing factor, which can realize the reasonable revenue distribution between the supplier and the retailer while at the same time it can make the supply chain channel coordination. Assuming that the retailer demand function was the multiplier mode and the demand of the products in the market is elastic, by comparing with the wholesale price contract, we obtained feasible extent of the wholesale price.
For the product order coordination, we introduce the revenue sharing contract to the newsboy model. We considered elements of demand distribution and time when ordering the product. In considering the demand distribution, the constructed marginal revenue model show that demand for both continuous and uniform distribution or exponential demand distribution, the standard deviation and demand expectation both are with a negative correlation with supply chain revenue. And the orders amount with revenue sharing contract is larger than without revenue sharing contract, the revenue of the supplier retailer and the whole supply chain is more them without revenue sharing contract If the time factor to order coordination is considered, the larger the forecast mean market demand, the more onward of the order point will be. The more accuracy for the forecast market demand, the more backward of the order point will be. The simulation result further supports the conclusions of the model.
In the coordination of the revenue distribution, we summed up the five factors of information sharing, risk commitment, effort level, resources input and contribution which impact revenue distribution. And by using of mathematical models we demonstrated and the former3factors were. With cooperative game model we analyzed bargaining process of the revenue distribution e, and draw the conclusion that during the revenue distribution of the negotiation process to make full use of its own preemptive advantage is much more important. Owing to existence of revenue distribution conflict, we put forward the TOPSIS method combined with the Euclidean distance income distribution, and by this way we provided a new idea to solve the conflict. In the revenue distribution incentive, through content analysis of relevant literature refining the concept of the theme and abstracting out specific discriminating factors of revenue sharing, and then create an incentive framework and put motivating factors into the revenue distribution. We thought it will better reflect fair and reasonable principles when distributing the gained revenue.
For the coordination evaluation of supply chain channel based on revenue sharing contract, on the basis of the problem of the revenue sharing contract in supply chain coordination with the main problems the process, combined with cross section of revenue sharing contract and the evaluation of the supply chain channel, we separated out cost, efficiency and satisfaction as evaluation perspective, and build a theoretical model of evaluation. Accordingly, from the cost, efficiency, satisfaction we established10secondary indicators,43sub-indicators and quantitative calculation for some indicators are given in this part. With GAHP method and third-party evaluation mechanism, and with the help of yaahp0.52software, we calculated out the results and found that they coincided with the previous theoretical conclusions.
Through the above research, we hope to do innovative and contributive work in the following areas. Based on the proven models of revenue sharing contract based on, we applied it to the supply.chain channel coordination, which involves research ideas and research design would provide reference for this new field. To discuss on the three parameters in revenue sharing contract was attempting to explore further study to this field. In the revenue distribution coordination, putting the extracted discriminative factor distribution elements to the distribution model would be a new-revenue distribution and incentive mechanism. We also established a new evaluation prospective and index system for the supply chain channel coordination based the revenue sharing contract. The purpose was to try to avoid possible problems in applying supply chain channel coordination tried to achieve the coordination goals and provide a theoretical reference for the management practice. Through case studies and simulation tried to apply the channel coordination model into practice as far as possible and to reflect the value of theoretical research as much as possible.
引文
3在本文中后面几个章节,可能会因考虑构建模型的方便,对假设条件进行调整,因此基本模型也会随之改变,但其基本内涵式一样的。
4合作关系属于供应链协调中的隐性契约,它主要包括品牌价值、营销网络、客户满意度、关系建构和维护等。关于这部分内容本文将在第六章第一节和第七章进行详细讨论。
5本章的研究内容中,价格协调若没有特殊指明,主要是收益共享契约中的供应商的批发价格w,而不是指零售商的零售价p。本章主要探讨w与收益分配因子φ的协调,与剩余补贴因子v的协调,以及与p的动态调整。
6与传统渠道相比,收益共享契约下供应链渠道中的博弈关系会从原来的非合作博弈转化为合作博弈。
Amazon的经营模式分为分权与集权式商店两种情况,在分权式商店模式通路下,供货商先制定商品之零售价,再由Amazon制定商品的收益分享比例,当Amazon将商品售出后,会将所得一部分给供货商,然在集权式商店模式通路下,商品售价由Amazon与供货商一同制订。
8为叙述和论证方便,此处关于价格弹性的定义与传统定义稍有区别。
9本文主要和具有双重边际化的批发价格契约相比较来进行论证
10很多分布函数具有IGFR性质,如正态分布、Gamma分布、Weibull分布以及指数分布等。
11w=φc是收益共享契约实现完美协调的必要条件之一,在后面两章分析订货数量协调和收益分配协调都会用到这一基本条件。
12因为本文只探讨由供应商和零售商组成的二阶层供应链渠道,可以简单认为i=1,2。
13需求价格弹性值>1意味着价格的变动在比例上将引起需求量较大变化,零售商降低价格会使其收益增加。
14当然零售商可以通过自己以往的销售数据、销售经验或其它的渠道掌握需求量的随机规律。
15经济订货批量通过平衡供应商和零售商的采购进货成本和保管仓储成本核算,以实现总库存成本最低的最佳订货量。经济订货批量是固定订货批量模型的一种,可以用来确定企业一次订货(外购或自制)的数量。当企业按照经济订货批量来订货时,可实现订货成本和储存成本之和最小化。
16因为某些商品本身时效性特征,商品价格会随市场需求变化而波动,假如转移到下一期,讨论起来更为复杂。
17否则,在t=0时点,出现市场需求预测X<0,这样就与实际情况相背离。
18本文沿用以前研究文献对零售商的努力水平往往是无法证实的假设。
19显示原理是在参与者掌握私人信息时进行博弈设计的重要工具,其基本原理是任何贝叶斯纳什均衡都可以重新表示为一个激励相容的直接机制。显示原理的提出降低了机制设计问题的复杂程度,把很多复杂的社会选择问题转化为博弈论可处理的不完全信息博弈,并缩小了筛选范围。
22 Harsanyi提出的合作博弈定义为,如果在一个博弈中,义务、协议、承诺和威胁具有完全约束力,并且是可强制执行的,则该博弈称为是合作的。
23因为在收益共享契约中,批发价格确立、零售商订货量的选择与收益分配比例是相互关联的,所以这两个参数的制订也是合作博弈过程。
25因为本文只探讨由供应商和零售商组成的二阶层供应链渠道,可以简单认为i=1,2。
26欧氏距离也称欧几里得距离,它是一个通常采用的距离定义,表示在m维空间中两个点之间的真实距离。
27当然,广告频度并非越高越能产生效益。一般而言,建立以竞争对手为标杆频度的参考框架是较为常用的广告策略。
28需要说明的是,在实际应用过程中,为使评价更具有可操作性,指标体系的设计并没有如此复杂。本文为了研究的需要,尽可能设计比较完备的指标体系,在应用中可以根据供应链渠道的实际情况,选择其中一些评价指标即可。
29因这一部分成本与前面的交易成本是相同的,在成本计算时,可以直接计入交易成本,以避免出现成本的重复计算。
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4合作关系属于供应链协调中的隐性契约,它主要包括品牌价值、营销网络、客户满意度、关系建构和维护等。关于这部分内容本文将在第六章第一节和第七章进行详细讨论。
5本章的研究内容中,价格协调若没有特殊指明,主要是收益共享契约中的供应商的批发价格w,而不是指零售商的零售价p。本章主要探讨w与收益分配因子φ的协调,与剩余补贴因子v的协调,以及与p的动态调整。
6与传统渠道相比,收益共享契约下供应链渠道中的博弈关系会从原来的非合作博弈转化为合作博弈。
Amazon的经营模式分为分权与集权式商店两种情况,在分权式商店模式通路下,供货商先制定商品之零售价,再由Amazon制定商品的收益分享比例,当Amazon将商品售出后,会将所得一部分给供货商,然在集权式商店模式通路下,商品售价由Amazon与供货商一同制订。
8为叙述和论证方便,此处关于价格弹性的定义与传统定义稍有区别。
9本文主要和具有双重边际化的批发价格契约相比较来进行论证
10很多分布函数具有IGFR性质,如正态分布、Gamma分布、Weibull分布以及指数分布等。
11w=φc是收益共享契约实现完美协调的必要条件之一,在后面两章分析订货数量协调和收益分配协调都会用到这一基本条件。
12因为本文只探讨由供应商和零售商组成的二阶层供应链渠道,可以简单认为i=1,2。
13需求价格弹性值>1意味着价格的变动在比例上将引起需求量较大变化,零售商降低价格会使其收益增加。
14当然零售商可以通过自己以往的销售数据、销售经验或其它的渠道掌握需求量的随机规律。
15经济订货批量通过平衡供应商和零售商的采购进货成本和保管仓储成本核算,以实现总库存成本最低的最佳订货量。经济订货批量是固定订货批量模型的一种,可以用来确定企业一次订货(外购或自制)的数量。当企业按照经济订货批量来订货时,可实现订货成本和储存成本之和最小化。
16因为某些商品本身时效性特征,商品价格会随市场需求变化而波动,假如转移到下一期,讨论起来更为复杂。
17否则,在t=0时点,出现市场需求预测X<0,这样就与实际情况相背离。
18本文沿用以前研究文献对零售商的努力水平往往是无法证实的假设。
19显示原理是在参与者掌握私人信息时进行博弈设计的重要工具,其基本原理是任何贝叶斯纳什均衡都可以重新表示为一个激励相容的直接机制。显示原理的提出降低了机制设计问题的复杂程度,把很多复杂的社会选择问题转化为博弈论可处理的不完全信息博弈,并缩小了筛选范围。
22 Harsanyi提出的合作博弈定义为,如果在一个博弈中,义务、协议、承诺和威胁具有完全约束力,并且是可强制执行的,则该博弈称为是合作的。
23因为在收益共享契约中,批发价格确立、零售商订货量的选择与收益分配比例是相互关联的,所以这两个参数的制订也是合作博弈过程。
25因为本文只探讨由供应商和零售商组成的二阶层供应链渠道,可以简单认为i=1,2。
26欧氏距离也称欧几里得距离,它是一个通常采用的距离定义,表示在m维空间中两个点之间的真实距离。
27当然,广告频度并非越高越能产生效益。一般而言,建立以竞争对手为标杆频度的参考框架是较为常用的广告策略。
28需要说明的是,在实际应用过程中,为使评价更具有可操作性,指标体系的设计并没有如此复杂。本文为了研究的需要,尽可能设计比较完备的指标体系,在应用中可以根据供应链渠道的实际情况,选择其中一些评价指标即可。
29因这一部分成本与前面的交易成本是相同的,在成本计算时,可以直接计入交易成本,以避免出现成本的重复计算。
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