并购中层级结构设置对收购方终极控股股东融资能力影响的研究
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摘要
企业集团的终极控股股东在实施并购过程中,既可以由其直接并购目标方企业,形成向水平方向发展的组织结构形态,即水平结构。也可以由终极控股股东所控制的企业集团下属各级企业实施并购,从而形成多层级的企业组织形态。实践中复杂的多层级企业组织形态的出现和发展一直是理论界关注的焦点。传统观点认为层级结构的设置是为了分离控制权与现金流权；“掠夺与支持”的观点在一定程度上解释了多层级结构的形成。而从层级结构功能性的角度如收益优势、融资优势来解释其产生的原因及其带来的影响更具有说服力。层级结构设置的杠杆效应就是指终极控股股东通过建立企业集团的多层级结构,可以利用较少的资源控制多倍于自身的资源,从而有利于促进企业集团的快速增长。基于杠杆效应,本文从资源有效控制的角度研究并购中层级结构设置对收购方终极控股股东融资能力的影响。为达到该研究目标,本文沿着以下思路进行了分析：
首先,从正反两个方面分析了层级结构的经济功能及其局限性。其次,从内部资本市场、杠杆效应、公司治理的角度分析了层级结构设置对收购方终极控股股东融资能力产生的影响。同时,为研究并购中企业集团的终极控股股东应如何配置层级结构才能有效发挥层级结构的杠杆效应,本文利用数理分析和规范分析相结合的方法从收购方、目标方、并购相关以及制度因素四个层面,分析了并购交易中层级结构设置的策略选择问题。最后,选取2007-2009年的76起控制权实际发生转移的并购事件为样本,应用多元回归模型对层级结构对终极控股股东融资能力的影响及并购中层级结构设置策略的选择进行了实证研究。结合实证分析的结果,对企业集团终极控股股东在并购过程中层级结构设置策略提出一些政策和建议。
从研究内容及科技查新的结果看,本文是国内外首次就并购中收购方终极控股股东层级结构设置相关问题的系统性研究,创新点表现在以下方面：第一,进一步完善了层级结构与企业融资问题研究的理论分析体系。该项创新可以细化为两个方面：一是本文把层级结构构建方式研究由新建企业拓展到并购交易,在一定程度上完善了层级结构研究的分析框架。二是,对层级结构设置与企业融资问题的研究,已有国内外文献较多地从内部资本市场的视角展开分析,而本文从杠杆效应与公司治理相结合的视角研究并购中层级结构设置对收购方终极控股股东融资能力的影响。第二,本文从并购交易的视角出发,综合考虑外部环境因素影响,提出了收购方终极控股股东在设置层级结构时应遵循的相关规律。从收购方来看,相关因素包括收购方规模、融资约束程度、所有权性质；从目标方来看,包括目标方的盈利水平、目标方的资产负债率两个方面；与并购交易直接相关的因素包含并购规模、并购双方产业资源的相关性、并购支付方式等；此外,本文还从制度环境层面进行了分析,研究了各地区市场化程度和投资者保护程度对层级结构设置的影响。从上述多层面研究企业集团终极控股股东在并购中层级结构设置的策略选择问题是现有文献中相对较为完善的研究。第三,首次运用并购中层级数设置、终极控股股东融资能力、并购交易特征、制度环境等方面的综合数据进行了实证研究,并得出了一系列有指导和借鉴意义的结论。
When the ultimate controlling shareholder of enterprise groups in the implement the M&A process, either they can control the target enterprise directly to forming the organization morphology of horizontal direction, or they can arrangement lower level corporate in their group to control the target enterprise so as to forming the organization morphology of multi-level. In practice, the emergence and development of complex multi-level form of business organization has been the focus of attention of the theorists. The traditional theory explained corporate layer setting based on the separation of cash flow rights and control rights. To some extent, the point of "Propping and Tunneling" can explain the formation of the layer structure. At present, it is more persuasive to explain the formation of the layer structure from the perspective of the function of the structure like the yield advantage or financing advantage. The leverage effect in corporate layer setting of the ultimate controlling shareholder is that, through the establishment of a multi-level structure, enterprise group can use less resources to control times resources of their own. And thus, this helps to promote the rapid growth of the enterprise group.From the angle of effectively control on resources, based on the leverage effect theory, this article researched the effect of corporate layer setting in M&A on ultimate controlling shareholder's financing capability. In order to achieve the objectives of the study, this article analyzed along the following lines:
First, this article analyzed both positive and negative aspects of the economic functions of the hierarchy and its limitations. Second, this article analyzed the impact of hierarchy setting on the ultimate controlling shareholder's financing capacity, from the perspective of internal capital market, leverage effect, and corporate governance. Secondly, for the study of ultimate controlling shareholder's hierarchy setting tactics of Enterprise Group in M&A in order to play hierarchy leverage effect, this paper used mathematical analysis and normative analysis, from the acquirer, target corporate, acquisition-related and system factors to researched the hierarchy setting tactics in M&A transactions. Finally, this article selected76M&A events as samples from the year2007-2009, in which the actual controllers had been changed, used multivariate regression model to perform an empirical study on the level structure's influence of the ultimate controlling shareholder's financing capacity and it's M&A hierarchy setting strategy selection. Combining the results of empirical analysis, this article put forward hierarchy setting policy and recommendations in M&A process for the ultimate controlling shareholder of enterprise group.
From the result of the research contents and the novelty at home and abroad, this paper is firstly done a Systematic research on the relative issues on ultimate controlling shareholder's corporate layer setting in M&A. The notable contents are as following: First, this article improved the theoretical analysis system of the correlation research between hierarchy and corporate finance. The innovations can be subdivided into two aspects:On the one hand, this paper expanded the hierarchy built methods'research from forming new enterprises to M&A transactions, which to some extent, improved the analytical framework of hierarchy setting. On the other hand. Most of the domestic and foreign literature on the hierarchy set and corporate finance issues from the perspective of internal capital market. But in this article, we did some new research on hierarchy setting's influence on the financing ability of ultimate controlling shareholder from the leverage effect and corporate governance.Second, considering the external environmental factors, we proceed the law that the ultimate controlling shareholder should follow in the hierarchy setting from the perspective of M&A transactions. The paper analyzes the affect factors from the perspective of the following levels:acquiring enterprise, target side, factors of M&A, and the institutional factors. Relevant factors of acquiring enterprise include the size of the acquiring party, the degree of financing constraints, the nature of ownership; factors of target side concerns asset-liability ratio and profitability; factors of M&A includes the following items:size of M&A, correlation of the industries and the payments; the institutional factors are the degree of marketization and investor protection. The hierarchy setting selection strategy from the ultimate controlling shareholder of enterprise groups in the M&A is relatively comprehensive study among the existing literature.Thirdly, the paper firstly make the empirical research using the datus of layer structure, acquiring enterprise and the corporate governance, and draw a series of guidance and meaningful conclusions.
首先,从正反两个方面分析了层级结构的经济功能及其局限性。其次,从内部资本市场、杠杆效应、公司治理的角度分析了层级结构设置对收购方终极控股股东融资能力产生的影响。同时,为研究并购中企业集团的终极控股股东应如何配置层级结构才能有效发挥层级结构的杠杆效应,本文利用数理分析和规范分析相结合的方法从收购方、目标方、并购相关以及制度因素四个层面,分析了并购交易中层级结构设置的策略选择问题。最后,选取2007-2009年的76起控制权实际发生转移的并购事件为样本,应用多元回归模型对层级结构对终极控股股东融资能力的影响及并购中层级结构设置策略的选择进行了实证研究。结合实证分析的结果,对企业集团终极控股股东在并购过程中层级结构设置策略提出一些政策和建议。
从研究内容及科技查新的结果看,本文是国内外首次就并购中收购方终极控股股东层级结构设置相关问题的系统性研究,创新点表现在以下方面：第一,进一步完善了层级结构与企业融资问题研究的理论分析体系。该项创新可以细化为两个方面：一是本文把层级结构构建方式研究由新建企业拓展到并购交易,在一定程度上完善了层级结构研究的分析框架。二是,对层级结构设置与企业融资问题的研究,已有国内外文献较多地从内部资本市场的视角展开分析,而本文从杠杆效应与公司治理相结合的视角研究并购中层级结构设置对收购方终极控股股东融资能力的影响。第二,本文从并购交易的视角出发,综合考虑外部环境因素影响,提出了收购方终极控股股东在设置层级结构时应遵循的相关规律。从收购方来看,相关因素包括收购方规模、融资约束程度、所有权性质；从目标方来看,包括目标方的盈利水平、目标方的资产负债率两个方面；与并购交易直接相关的因素包含并购规模、并购双方产业资源的相关性、并购支付方式等；此外,本文还从制度环境层面进行了分析,研究了各地区市场化程度和投资者保护程度对层级结构设置的影响。从上述多层面研究企业集团终极控股股东在并购中层级结构设置的策略选择问题是现有文献中相对较为完善的研究。第三,首次运用并购中层级数设置、终极控股股东融资能力、并购交易特征、制度环境等方面的综合数据进行了实证研究,并得出了一系列有指导和借鉴意义的结论。
When the ultimate controlling shareholder of enterprise groups in the implement the M&A process, either they can control the target enterprise directly to forming the organization morphology of horizontal direction, or they can arrangement lower level corporate in their group to control the target enterprise so as to forming the organization morphology of multi-level. In practice, the emergence and development of complex multi-level form of business organization has been the focus of attention of the theorists. The traditional theory explained corporate layer setting based on the separation of cash flow rights and control rights. To some extent, the point of "Propping and Tunneling" can explain the formation of the layer structure. At present, it is more persuasive to explain the formation of the layer structure from the perspective of the function of the structure like the yield advantage or financing advantage. The leverage effect in corporate layer setting of the ultimate controlling shareholder is that, through the establishment of a multi-level structure, enterprise group can use less resources to control times resources of their own. And thus, this helps to promote the rapid growth of the enterprise group.From the angle of effectively control on resources, based on the leverage effect theory, this article researched the effect of corporate layer setting in M&A on ultimate controlling shareholder's financing capability. In order to achieve the objectives of the study, this article analyzed along the following lines:
First, this article analyzed both positive and negative aspects of the economic functions of the hierarchy and its limitations. Second, this article analyzed the impact of hierarchy setting on the ultimate controlling shareholder's financing capacity, from the perspective of internal capital market, leverage effect, and corporate governance. Secondly, for the study of ultimate controlling shareholder's hierarchy setting tactics of Enterprise Group in M&A in order to play hierarchy leverage effect, this paper used mathematical analysis and normative analysis, from the acquirer, target corporate, acquisition-related and system factors to researched the hierarchy setting tactics in M&A transactions. Finally, this article selected76M&A events as samples from the year2007-2009, in which the actual controllers had been changed, used multivariate regression model to perform an empirical study on the level structure's influence of the ultimate controlling shareholder's financing capacity and it's M&A hierarchy setting strategy selection. Combining the results of empirical analysis, this article put forward hierarchy setting policy and recommendations in M&A process for the ultimate controlling shareholder of enterprise group.
From the result of the research contents and the novelty at home and abroad, this paper is firstly done a Systematic research on the relative issues on ultimate controlling shareholder's corporate layer setting in M&A. The notable contents are as following: First, this article improved the theoretical analysis system of the correlation research between hierarchy and corporate finance. The innovations can be subdivided into two aspects:On the one hand, this paper expanded the hierarchy built methods'research from forming new enterprises to M&A transactions, which to some extent, improved the analytical framework of hierarchy setting. On the other hand. Most of the domestic and foreign literature on the hierarchy set and corporate finance issues from the perspective of internal capital market. But in this article, we did some new research on hierarchy setting's influence on the financing ability of ultimate controlling shareholder from the leverage effect and corporate governance.Second, considering the external environmental factors, we proceed the law that the ultimate controlling shareholder should follow in the hierarchy setting from the perspective of M&A transactions. The paper analyzes the affect factors from the perspective of the following levels:acquiring enterprise, target side, factors of M&A, and the institutional factors. Relevant factors of acquiring enterprise include the size of the acquiring party, the degree of financing constraints, the nature of ownership; factors of target side concerns asset-liability ratio and profitability; factors of M&A includes the following items:size of M&A, correlation of the industries and the payments; the institutional factors are the degree of marketization and investor protection. The hierarchy setting selection strategy from the ultimate controlling shareholder of enterprise groups in the M&A is relatively comprehensive study among the existing literature.Thirdly, the paper firstly make the empirical research using the datus of layer structure, acquiring enterprise and the corporate governance, and draw a series of guidance and meaningful conclusions.
引文
①陈云华.企业并购与新建投资使用边界研究：以发电企业为例[D].北京交通大学博士学位论文.2006.
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②作者所称的“一控多”是指,国有、民营或者外资实体,控股或实际控制两家以上(含两家)上市公司,且.其中至少一家为境内上市公司的情况,市场上通常将此种情况称为“××系”。控股或实际控制是指以下两种情形：①直接或间接控股上市公司,并且拥有实际控制权；②不构成上市公司的直接或间接控股股东,但以间接方式实际控制上市公司。证券公司、证券投资基金等机构通过二级市场买入而重仓持有某儿只股票所形成“系”的情形不在此列。
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②由于终极控股股东是否为上市公司的因素,作者在进行实证研究的过程中,鉴于终极控股股东为非上市公司所带来的数据可得性的影响,把样本分成了两类,一类是上市公司控制集团的样本,另一类是全部的样本；对于上市公司控制的企业集团,盈利能力和控股股东持股比例对层级设置的多寡并无显著影响；对于最终控制人控制集团的样本,盈利能力对层级设置有显著的负面影响,控股股东持股比例对层级设置有显著的正向影响。因此,作者称盈利能力和控股股东持股比例的影响是不稳定的。
③李增泉,辛显刚,于旭辉.金融发展、债务融资约束与金字塔结构——来自民营企业集团的证据[J].管理世界.2008(1)：123-135.
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⑤韩志丽,史浩江.民营企业选择金字塔结构的影响因素研究——理论模型与经验证据[J].管理工程学报.2009(2)：26-31.
①股权分置改革前的公司定义为0,股权分置改革后的公司定义为1.
②张文龙,郭泽光.融资约束、控制权私利与金字塔结构——来自中国中小民营上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报.2009(5)：60-65.
③作者在该文中将证监会分类的13大行业划分为两类：一类是保护性行业,包括采掘业、水电煤气业以及仓储业;第二类是非保护性行业,包括制造业等10个行业。
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①其数据来源于香港、印度尼西亚、日本、韩国、马来西亚、非律宾、新加坡、台湾、泰国。
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①对于与第四章实证研究中相一致的变量LAYER、SIZE等,在此不再进行描述。
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