农业水利基础设施运行机制研究
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摘要
“三农”问题一直是困扰我国经济发展的首要问题,阻碍着我国综合实力迅速腾飞。虽然政府为此采取了多项措施,并取得了一定的成效,但是农村落后的生产生活方式还远没有从根本上得以改变。围绕发展农业生产、提高农业综合生产能力和提高农民生活水平,加强我国新农村基础设施建设,改善农村基础设施缺乏、薄弱的现状,是我国新农村建设的核心内容,是牵一发而动全局的根本问题,对于加快农村与城市建设的经济接轨,从根本上解决“三农”问题具有重大的现实意义。
我国水资源总量虽然丰富,位居世界第六位,但是我国人口众多,人均水资源不到世界人均水资源的四分之一。我国有15个省(市、自治区)的人均水资源量低于2000立方米的严重缺水线,5个省(市、自治区)的人均水资源量低于1000立方米的生存起码条件。随着城市和工业的扩张、人口的增长,水资源短缺已成为经济发展和人民生活的重要制约因素。而且我国水资源时空分布不均,造成洪涝和干旱灾情频繁交替出现的局面；各地水资源数相差十分悬殊,长江流域以南,耕地占全国的38%,水资源占全国70%。长江以北,黄河、淮河、辽河、海河以9%的淡水资源供给42%的耕地。
建国以来,我国进行了规模空前的农业水利基础设施建设,灌溉面积从1949年的1593万公顷扩大到1995年的9497万公顷,为农业的发展提供了灌溉水源。这些巨大成就为保障我国农业经济迅速发展和社会长期稳定创造了条件。但是由于种种原因,农业水利基础设施发展的模式基本属于粗放型,至今未能建立起良性运行机制。不少农业水利设施建设质量较差,配套设施不全,灌溉用水效率不高、用水浪费严重。近年来农村公共基础设施建设的投入总体呈下滑趋势。特别是农村税费改革逐步取消“两工”后,农民群众的投工投劳数量呈大幅度减少趋势,农业水利基础设施得不到及时的维护和更新,致使渠道渗漏、冲淤及设施老化、破损等现象十分严重,造成有效灌溉面积逐渐衰减,实灌面积不断萎缩。
鉴于上述情况,本文以山东省临沂市农业水利基础设施为例,运用规范分析与实证分析相结合的方法,通过定量和定性的研究,具体分析了设施运行主体、运行的组织制度、运行的市场机制三个方面,探讨了如何运用更有效的制度和政策工具来提高灌区农业水利设施的运行效率。根据研究的目的,论文提出假设并建立了相应的理论框架。
为了达到研究目的,笔者在山东省临沂市进行了农业供水单位及其主管单位层次的调查、村组层次的农户调查和灌区干、支渠用水量及收费情况的调查。在临沂市费县大田庄乡,笔者注重考察了市场化程度提高对用水农户合作组织合作行为的影响。在莒南县,笔者选择陡山水库灌区的农业水利基础设施运行状况作为调查对象,围绕陡山灌区水利基础设施的运行状况,沿着陡山水库引水后干渠的走向,根据笔者对灌溉组织制度及灌溉水价、水权制度的关注,在陡山灌溉公司及乡镇有关人员的协助下,随机选取了六个乡镇作为样本乡镇,在样本乡镇中又分别随机地选择了两个样本村,进行了相关的深入农户调查,同时与临沂市水利局、莒南县水利局、莒南县农业局、莒南县陡山水库管理处、陡山水库灌区灌溉公司等单位工作人员进行了相应的访谈。
研究表明,陡山灌溉公司经理与上级水利主管部门之间存在的双重博弈的激励机制导致了供水组织只对上级领导负责,而不是对灌区农户负责,公司经理任免权是一种行政权力,而非基于资本逻辑的所有者权力,由于缺乏来自企业组织内部所有者通过法人治理结构对经理的监督约束以及来自经理市场的竞争约束,造成农业水利基础设施毁损、老化等问题严重。
研究表明,水资源稀缺程度、收入水平、灌区规模以及技术进步、市场化程度等因素对农户合作提供农业水利设施维护产生影响。实证分析了陡山农业水利设施的组织制度改革在提高水费收缴率、提高灌溉水运送质量等方面发挥的作用,提出将乡村社区的整体利益与农户的个人利益联结在一起,以互补性制度供给参与社区供水环境治理,汇合不同的激励约束,放松灌溉博弈的激励约束以及通过政府干预等完善农业水利基础设施组织制度的思路。
研究表明,提供灌溉水的耗费能够得到足额、及时、均衡的补偿往往决定着农业水利基础设施是否能够有效运行。本文以陡山灌区主要作物冬小麦为例,通过实地调研与问卷调查获取相关数据,对陡山灌溉公司的经营成本和完全成本、陡山水库灌区用水农户支付意愿以及推导的节水灌溉水价进行分析,笔者认为目前陡山灌区灌溉水价偏低,过低的灌溉水价使得节水投资成本大大超过节水收益,难以引导农户改进落后的灌溉方式,难以促进农业水利设施的有效运行。在陡山水库灌区用水农户支付意愿范围内应适当提高水价,改变陡山灌区单一的收费方式,按照季节实行浮动水价。
研究表明,陡山灌区提高水价虽然对节水略有促进,但难以产生有力的节水激励。因此,除了适当提高水价外,针对灌溉水权模糊进行制度创新,实施用水定额制度,根据多年作物的灌溉用水定额真正赋予陡山灌区各支渠用水者协会或农户一定水量的用水权。实施可交易的水权制度,实现水权的流动和转让,使用水协会和农户能够获取节省灌溉水出售后的收益,协会或农户的节水积极性最高,对灌溉水的利用效率也最高,所投入的灌溉水量要小于以上其他情况下的投入量,节约的灌溉水也是最多的,对节水设施的投入额度也最大,有效的促进水利设施的运行。
总的来说,从运行服务主体、运行服务对象以及两者之间的相互关系三个方面,本研究实证性地回答了影响陡山农业水利基础设施运行机制的原因,从而基本验证了本文所提出的理论假设。研究结论表明,在承认个人的决策行为权力的前提下,现有农业水利基础设施的运行机制难以实现激励相容和决策的分散化是农业水利设施运行低效的主要原因。本文提出从根本上改变公司的弱激励主体地位,使国有灌溉公司真正成为农业水利基础设施的运行服务主体；汇合不同的激励约束,放松灌溉博弈的激励约束；在用水农户支付意愿范围内适当提高水价,改变单一的收费方式；在确定恰当水价的基础上明晰水权,实施可交易水权制度等优化农业水利基础设施运行机制政策建议。
"Three Rural Issues" is the most important issue that has troubled China's economic development, impeded China's comprehensive strength taking off rapidly. Although the Government has taken a number of measures that have achieved some results, the backward rural areas of production and lifestyle is far from fundamentally change. Around the development of agricultural production, raising the comprehensive agricultural production capacity and improving farmers living standards, strengthening our new building of rural infrastructure to improve the lack and weak status quo of rural construction is the core content of China's new rural construction and fundamental issue over all. The building of rural infrastructure construction is of great practical significance for speeding up the construction of rural and urban economic convergence, and solving the "three rural" fundamentally.
Although China's total water resources is rich, ranking sixth in the world, China has a large population, the per capita water resources less than a quarter of the world's per capita water resources.15provinces (municipalities and autonomous regions) of water resources per capita is less than2,000cubic meters of serious water shortage, and five provinces (municipalities and autonomous regions) of water resources per capita is less than1,000cubic meters of the minimum conditions for survival in China. With urban and industrial expansion, the growth of population, shortage of water resources has become an important factor that restricting economic development and people's lives improvement.
China is a monsoon climate, resulting in frequent floods and droughts alternating disaster situation. The difference is the disparity between the number of water resources, South of the Yangtze River basin, the country's total arable land of38%,70%of the nation's water resources.While the north of Yellow River, Huaihe River, Liaohe River, the Haihe River, which rely on9%of the fresh water resources to supply42percent of the arable land.
China has carried out an unprecedented scale agriculture and irrigation infrastructure construction since1949. Irrigated area from1949to15.93million hectares in1995expanded to94.97million hectares for the development of agricultural irrigation water. These tremendous achievements create the conditions that protect China's rapid economic development and the agricultural community for long-term stability. However, due to various reasons, the development model of agriculture and irrigation infrastructure failed to establish a sound operational mechanism so far. Many agriculture and irrigation infrastructure construction is of poor quality, incomplete facilities, and the efficiency of irrigation water is not high, a serious waste of water. In recent years, the development of rural public infrastructure investment is of a general downward trend. Especially rural tax-for-fee reform has gradually abolish the "two jobs", the masses of peasants vote with their labor was a significant decrease which resulting channel leakage, erosion and deposition and aging facilities, the irrigation area is continuously shrinking.
Given this situation, in this paper, irrigation infrastructure in Linyi City, Shandong Province is as an example. Combining the method of standardized analysis and empirical analysis, through quantitative and qualitative research, this paper analysis the impact of efficiency that is affected by the property rights, the organization, the price of water and provide the empirical basis for reform. According to the purpose of the study, the paper proposes the establishment of assumptions and the corresponding theoretical framework.
In order to achieve research goal, in the Shandong Province Linyi city, the author has carried on the agricultural water supply unit and the master unit level investigation, the village group level peasant household investigation and the branch canal water consumption and the charge situation investigation. In the Datianzhuang Town of Linyi Fei County, the author paid great attention to inspect the influence caused by marketability degree enhanced on the cooperation behavior of water used peasant household Cooperative organization. In Junan County, the author chooses the agricultural water conservation infrastructure in steep mountain reservoir irrigation area as the investigation object, regarding water conservation infrastructure movement condition, after steep mountain reservoir pilot main channel's trend, to the organization system and the irrigation price, the water rights system's attention according to the author, in the irrigation company and under the villages and towns concerned personnel's assistance, selects six villages and towns to take the sample villages and towns stochastically, distinguished in the sample villages and towns to choose two sample villages stochastically, carried on the related thorough peasant household to investigate. The author has also carried on the corresponding interview with staves in Linyi Water conservancy bureau, the Junan County water conservancy bureau, the Junan County bureau of agriculture, the Junan County steep mountain reservoir administrative office and steep hill Irrigation Company.
Flows the degree aggravating along with countryside opening degree's enlargement with the peasant household, the village no longer is in the situation which seals up completely, Through the village community's overall benefit and peasant household's personal interest joins in together, by complementarily system supplies participation community water supply environment government, through fruits market trade fair this platform, The Datianzhuang Town successfully realized being loaf villagers'pursuit in view of irrigation gambling, causing the triggering agriculture water association's penalty into one kind threat to be possible to believe, causing the peasant household to transfer cooperation gambling from non-cooperation gambling. Thus avoided the irrigation system falling into the convict difficult position and has safeguarded irrigation system's effective movement.
The incentive mechanism of the double game between the manager of Steep Hill irrigation company and superior department in charge of water led to water supply organizations only pay responsible for higher-level organization in charge, rather than irrigation farmers. Power to appoint and dismiss the manager is an administrative authority, rather than the logic of capital-based owner of power. In the absence of supervision and restraint of competition, as well as constraints, resulting in damage to agriculture and water infrastructure, such as the aging problem.
Research shows that the scarcity of water resources, income levels, size of the irrigation area, as well as technological progress, market-oriented factors have an impact on the maintenance of water facilities between farmers. The paper analysis the improvement of collection rate for water and improvement of the delivery of irrigation water quality since the reform of organization. The paper put forward ideas such as putting the interests of rural communities as a whole and the individual interests of the farmers together to complement each other to participate in community water supply system and through government intervention to improve the organization of agricultural infrastructure.
Whether the consumption of providing irrigation water can be obtained full amount, promptly and balanced often decide the operating efficiency of agriculture water conservation infrastructure. This paper takes the main crops winter wheat in steep hill irrigation area as an example, through investigates and studies on the spot and the questionnaire survey gain correlation data. The paper analysis the cost of operation and the complete cost of the steep mountain irrigation company, the payment wish of water used peasant household as well as the inferential reasoning saving irrigation water price. The author thought the present steep mountain irrigation area irrigation price is somewhat low, the excessively low irrigation price causes the saving water investment cost to surpass the saving water income greatly, guiding the peasant household to improve the backward irrigation way with difficulty, promoting agriculture water conservancy facilities effective movement with difficulty. The author believes that the price should be enhanced suitably in the payment wish of water used peasant household and the sole charge way should be changed and the fluctuation price according to the season should be implemented.
The research indicated that enhancing the price has promote slightly to save water, but has the powerful saving water drive with difficulty in the steep hill irrigation area. Therefore, besides enhances the price suitably, carries on the system innovation fuzzily in view of the irrigation water rights, implement water used system of rating, truly entrusts with the steep hill irrigation area various branch canals water used association or the peasant household certain water volume water right according to many year crops' irrigation water used fixed quantity. The implementation of the transaction water rights system and the realization of water rights flowing and the transfer, the use water association and the peasant household can gain saves after the irrigation water sell. The association or peasant household's saving water enthusiasm is highest and the use efficiency of irrigates water is also highest, the irrigation water volume must be smaller than in other situation, the frugal irrigation water also is most and is also biggest to the saving water facility investment, which effectively promote the water conservancy facilities movement.
Overall, from the three aspects:the main service running, running clients, as well as the inter-relationship between the two, the study empirically answer the impact reasons behind the system that affected steep Reservoir agriculture and irrigation infrastructure's operational efficiency, which basically proved the theoretical assumptions. The conclusion of the study showed that main reasons affected agricultural water conservancy facilities operating system inefficient are that the existing operational mechanism of agriculture water infrastructure cannot achieve incentive compatibility and decentralized decision-making.this paper give corresponding recommendations to Optimize the operational mechanism:change the company's dominant position, converge different incentive and restrictive, relax irrigation game of incentive and restriction, raise the price of water appropriately, clear water rights and implement tradable water rights system.
我国水资源总量虽然丰富,位居世界第六位,但是我国人口众多,人均水资源不到世界人均水资源的四分之一。我国有15个省(市、自治区)的人均水资源量低于2000立方米的严重缺水线,5个省(市、自治区)的人均水资源量低于1000立方米的生存起码条件。随着城市和工业的扩张、人口的增长,水资源短缺已成为经济发展和人民生活的重要制约因素。而且我国水资源时空分布不均,造成洪涝和干旱灾情频繁交替出现的局面；各地水资源数相差十分悬殊,长江流域以南,耕地占全国的38%,水资源占全国70%。长江以北,黄河、淮河、辽河、海河以9%的淡水资源供给42%的耕地。
建国以来,我国进行了规模空前的农业水利基础设施建设,灌溉面积从1949年的1593万公顷扩大到1995年的9497万公顷,为农业的发展提供了灌溉水源。这些巨大成就为保障我国农业经济迅速发展和社会长期稳定创造了条件。但是由于种种原因,农业水利基础设施发展的模式基本属于粗放型,至今未能建立起良性运行机制。不少农业水利设施建设质量较差,配套设施不全,灌溉用水效率不高、用水浪费严重。近年来农村公共基础设施建设的投入总体呈下滑趋势。特别是农村税费改革逐步取消“两工”后,农民群众的投工投劳数量呈大幅度减少趋势,农业水利基础设施得不到及时的维护和更新,致使渠道渗漏、冲淤及设施老化、破损等现象十分严重,造成有效灌溉面积逐渐衰减,实灌面积不断萎缩。
鉴于上述情况,本文以山东省临沂市农业水利基础设施为例,运用规范分析与实证分析相结合的方法,通过定量和定性的研究,具体分析了设施运行主体、运行的组织制度、运行的市场机制三个方面,探讨了如何运用更有效的制度和政策工具来提高灌区农业水利设施的运行效率。根据研究的目的,论文提出假设并建立了相应的理论框架。
为了达到研究目的,笔者在山东省临沂市进行了农业供水单位及其主管单位层次的调查、村组层次的农户调查和灌区干、支渠用水量及收费情况的调查。在临沂市费县大田庄乡,笔者注重考察了市场化程度提高对用水农户合作组织合作行为的影响。在莒南县,笔者选择陡山水库灌区的农业水利基础设施运行状况作为调查对象,围绕陡山灌区水利基础设施的运行状况,沿着陡山水库引水后干渠的走向,根据笔者对灌溉组织制度及灌溉水价、水权制度的关注,在陡山灌溉公司及乡镇有关人员的协助下,随机选取了六个乡镇作为样本乡镇,在样本乡镇中又分别随机地选择了两个样本村,进行了相关的深入农户调查,同时与临沂市水利局、莒南县水利局、莒南县农业局、莒南县陡山水库管理处、陡山水库灌区灌溉公司等单位工作人员进行了相应的访谈。
研究表明,陡山灌溉公司经理与上级水利主管部门之间存在的双重博弈的激励机制导致了供水组织只对上级领导负责,而不是对灌区农户负责,公司经理任免权是一种行政权力,而非基于资本逻辑的所有者权力,由于缺乏来自企业组织内部所有者通过法人治理结构对经理的监督约束以及来自经理市场的竞争约束,造成农业水利基础设施毁损、老化等问题严重。
研究表明,水资源稀缺程度、收入水平、灌区规模以及技术进步、市场化程度等因素对农户合作提供农业水利设施维护产生影响。实证分析了陡山农业水利设施的组织制度改革在提高水费收缴率、提高灌溉水运送质量等方面发挥的作用,提出将乡村社区的整体利益与农户的个人利益联结在一起,以互补性制度供给参与社区供水环境治理,汇合不同的激励约束,放松灌溉博弈的激励约束以及通过政府干预等完善农业水利基础设施组织制度的思路。
研究表明,提供灌溉水的耗费能够得到足额、及时、均衡的补偿往往决定着农业水利基础设施是否能够有效运行。本文以陡山灌区主要作物冬小麦为例,通过实地调研与问卷调查获取相关数据,对陡山灌溉公司的经营成本和完全成本、陡山水库灌区用水农户支付意愿以及推导的节水灌溉水价进行分析,笔者认为目前陡山灌区灌溉水价偏低,过低的灌溉水价使得节水投资成本大大超过节水收益,难以引导农户改进落后的灌溉方式,难以促进农业水利设施的有效运行。在陡山水库灌区用水农户支付意愿范围内应适当提高水价,改变陡山灌区单一的收费方式,按照季节实行浮动水价。
研究表明,陡山灌区提高水价虽然对节水略有促进,但难以产生有力的节水激励。因此,除了适当提高水价外,针对灌溉水权模糊进行制度创新,实施用水定额制度,根据多年作物的灌溉用水定额真正赋予陡山灌区各支渠用水者协会或农户一定水量的用水权。实施可交易的水权制度,实现水权的流动和转让,使用水协会和农户能够获取节省灌溉水出售后的收益,协会或农户的节水积极性最高,对灌溉水的利用效率也最高,所投入的灌溉水量要小于以上其他情况下的投入量,节约的灌溉水也是最多的,对节水设施的投入额度也最大,有效的促进水利设施的运行。
总的来说,从运行服务主体、运行服务对象以及两者之间的相互关系三个方面,本研究实证性地回答了影响陡山农业水利基础设施运行机制的原因,从而基本验证了本文所提出的理论假设。研究结论表明,在承认个人的决策行为权力的前提下,现有农业水利基础设施的运行机制难以实现激励相容和决策的分散化是农业水利设施运行低效的主要原因。本文提出从根本上改变公司的弱激励主体地位,使国有灌溉公司真正成为农业水利基础设施的运行服务主体；汇合不同的激励约束,放松灌溉博弈的激励约束；在用水农户支付意愿范围内适当提高水价,改变单一的收费方式；在确定恰当水价的基础上明晰水权,实施可交易水权制度等优化农业水利基础设施运行机制政策建议。
"Three Rural Issues" is the most important issue that has troubled China's economic development, impeded China's comprehensive strength taking off rapidly. Although the Government has taken a number of measures that have achieved some results, the backward rural areas of production and lifestyle is far from fundamentally change. Around the development of agricultural production, raising the comprehensive agricultural production capacity and improving farmers living standards, strengthening our new building of rural infrastructure to improve the lack and weak status quo of rural construction is the core content of China's new rural construction and fundamental issue over all. The building of rural infrastructure construction is of great practical significance for speeding up the construction of rural and urban economic convergence, and solving the "three rural" fundamentally.
Although China's total water resources is rich, ranking sixth in the world, China has a large population, the per capita water resources less than a quarter of the world's per capita water resources.15provinces (municipalities and autonomous regions) of water resources per capita is less than2,000cubic meters of serious water shortage, and five provinces (municipalities and autonomous regions) of water resources per capita is less than1,000cubic meters of the minimum conditions for survival in China. With urban and industrial expansion, the growth of population, shortage of water resources has become an important factor that restricting economic development and people's lives improvement.
China is a monsoon climate, resulting in frequent floods and droughts alternating disaster situation. The difference is the disparity between the number of water resources, South of the Yangtze River basin, the country's total arable land of38%,70%of the nation's water resources.While the north of Yellow River, Huaihe River, Liaohe River, the Haihe River, which rely on9%of the fresh water resources to supply42percent of the arable land.
China has carried out an unprecedented scale agriculture and irrigation infrastructure construction since1949. Irrigated area from1949to15.93million hectares in1995expanded to94.97million hectares for the development of agricultural irrigation water. These tremendous achievements create the conditions that protect China's rapid economic development and the agricultural community for long-term stability. However, due to various reasons, the development model of agriculture and irrigation infrastructure failed to establish a sound operational mechanism so far. Many agriculture and irrigation infrastructure construction is of poor quality, incomplete facilities, and the efficiency of irrigation water is not high, a serious waste of water. In recent years, the development of rural public infrastructure investment is of a general downward trend. Especially rural tax-for-fee reform has gradually abolish the "two jobs", the masses of peasants vote with their labor was a significant decrease which resulting channel leakage, erosion and deposition and aging facilities, the irrigation area is continuously shrinking.
Given this situation, in this paper, irrigation infrastructure in Linyi City, Shandong Province is as an example. Combining the method of standardized analysis and empirical analysis, through quantitative and qualitative research, this paper analysis the impact of efficiency that is affected by the property rights, the organization, the price of water and provide the empirical basis for reform. According to the purpose of the study, the paper proposes the establishment of assumptions and the corresponding theoretical framework.
In order to achieve research goal, in the Shandong Province Linyi city, the author has carried on the agricultural water supply unit and the master unit level investigation, the village group level peasant household investigation and the branch canal water consumption and the charge situation investigation. In the Datianzhuang Town of Linyi Fei County, the author paid great attention to inspect the influence caused by marketability degree enhanced on the cooperation behavior of water used peasant household Cooperative organization. In Junan County, the author chooses the agricultural water conservation infrastructure in steep mountain reservoir irrigation area as the investigation object, regarding water conservation infrastructure movement condition, after steep mountain reservoir pilot main channel's trend, to the organization system and the irrigation price, the water rights system's attention according to the author, in the irrigation company and under the villages and towns concerned personnel's assistance, selects six villages and towns to take the sample villages and towns stochastically, distinguished in the sample villages and towns to choose two sample villages stochastically, carried on the related thorough peasant household to investigate. The author has also carried on the corresponding interview with staves in Linyi Water conservancy bureau, the Junan County water conservancy bureau, the Junan County bureau of agriculture, the Junan County steep mountain reservoir administrative office and steep hill Irrigation Company.
Flows the degree aggravating along with countryside opening degree's enlargement with the peasant household, the village no longer is in the situation which seals up completely, Through the village community's overall benefit and peasant household's personal interest joins in together, by complementarily system supplies participation community water supply environment government, through fruits market trade fair this platform, The Datianzhuang Town successfully realized being loaf villagers'pursuit in view of irrigation gambling, causing the triggering agriculture water association's penalty into one kind threat to be possible to believe, causing the peasant household to transfer cooperation gambling from non-cooperation gambling. Thus avoided the irrigation system falling into the convict difficult position and has safeguarded irrigation system's effective movement.
The incentive mechanism of the double game between the manager of Steep Hill irrigation company and superior department in charge of water led to water supply organizations only pay responsible for higher-level organization in charge, rather than irrigation farmers. Power to appoint and dismiss the manager is an administrative authority, rather than the logic of capital-based owner of power. In the absence of supervision and restraint of competition, as well as constraints, resulting in damage to agriculture and water infrastructure, such as the aging problem.
Research shows that the scarcity of water resources, income levels, size of the irrigation area, as well as technological progress, market-oriented factors have an impact on the maintenance of water facilities between farmers. The paper analysis the improvement of collection rate for water and improvement of the delivery of irrigation water quality since the reform of organization. The paper put forward ideas such as putting the interests of rural communities as a whole and the individual interests of the farmers together to complement each other to participate in community water supply system and through government intervention to improve the organization of agricultural infrastructure.
Whether the consumption of providing irrigation water can be obtained full amount, promptly and balanced often decide the operating efficiency of agriculture water conservation infrastructure. This paper takes the main crops winter wheat in steep hill irrigation area as an example, through investigates and studies on the spot and the questionnaire survey gain correlation data. The paper analysis the cost of operation and the complete cost of the steep mountain irrigation company, the payment wish of water used peasant household as well as the inferential reasoning saving irrigation water price. The author thought the present steep mountain irrigation area irrigation price is somewhat low, the excessively low irrigation price causes the saving water investment cost to surpass the saving water income greatly, guiding the peasant household to improve the backward irrigation way with difficulty, promoting agriculture water conservancy facilities effective movement with difficulty. The author believes that the price should be enhanced suitably in the payment wish of water used peasant household and the sole charge way should be changed and the fluctuation price according to the season should be implemented.
The research indicated that enhancing the price has promote slightly to save water, but has the powerful saving water drive with difficulty in the steep hill irrigation area. Therefore, besides enhances the price suitably, carries on the system innovation fuzzily in view of the irrigation water rights, implement water used system of rating, truly entrusts with the steep hill irrigation area various branch canals water used association or the peasant household certain water volume water right according to many year crops' irrigation water used fixed quantity. The implementation of the transaction water rights system and the realization of water rights flowing and the transfer, the use water association and the peasant household can gain saves after the irrigation water sell. The association or peasant household's saving water enthusiasm is highest and the use efficiency of irrigates water is also highest, the irrigation water volume must be smaller than in other situation, the frugal irrigation water also is most and is also biggest to the saving water facility investment, which effectively promote the water conservancy facilities movement.
Overall, from the three aspects:the main service running, running clients, as well as the inter-relationship between the two, the study empirically answer the impact reasons behind the system that affected steep Reservoir agriculture and irrigation infrastructure's operational efficiency, which basically proved the theoretical assumptions. The conclusion of the study showed that main reasons affected agricultural water conservancy facilities operating system inefficient are that the existing operational mechanism of agriculture water infrastructure cannot achieve incentive compatibility and decentralized decision-making.this paper give corresponding recommendations to Optimize the operational mechanism:change the company's dominant position, converge different incentive and restrictive, relax irrigation game of incentive and restriction, raise the price of water appropriately, clear water rights and implement tradable water rights system.
引文
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