中国房地产市场主体博弈分析与政策选择
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摘要
本论文旨在用理性预期和博弈论的基本原理探寻房地产市场运行和发展的微观机理,并在此基础上提出我国房地产市场和谐发展的政府政策,以期对我国房地产市场的健康发展具有一定的指导意义。
房地产市场的运行和发展是房地产市场主体相互作用的结果。房地产市场主体具有理性预期特征和在理性预期基础上的博弈行为,这种博弈既有合作的也有非合作的。房地产市场主体博弈具有内在的逻辑演进规律。
我国房地产市场受政策影响而呈现不同的发展阶段。中国房地产市场的发展为满足消费者对房地产商品的需求,为城市、地区和国家的经济增长,为城市建设和城市化进程做出了重要贡献。但是,我国房地产市场在发展过程中也存在着市场波动较大、价格过高、宏观调控效果不理想等问题。这些问题的产生是房地产主体博弈的结果。
房地产商和消费者之间的博弈是房地产市场主体博弈的核心。房地产商与消费者讨价还价的合作解受市场竞争性、个体讨价还价能力和公平认识的影响。房地产商面对刚性需求者具有索取高价的市场势力。投机性购房者构成市场不稳定的重要因素。房地产商与政府之间在土地买卖关系的合作博弈在实现拍卖效率的同时可以降低土地的出让价格。政府经济利益的存在,使得政府对开发商的管理往往成为空头威胁。消费者的监督无力,使得政府调控房价的承诺往往成为无效承诺。消费者之间的竞争助推房价上涨,房地产商之间或明或暗的合作使得高房价企高不下。地方经济利益的追逐和信息不对称的存在,导致中央政府的调控政策不能得到地方政府的积极执行。
银行与借款人之间的博弈仍然具有交易博弈的合作特性。银行对借款人具有不完全和不对称的信息,在利用利率筛选项目质量时面临逆向选择。在自利的驱使下,在信息不对称的条件下,银行有动机不积极执行政府的调控政策,而这种不积极的表现之一就是对贷款标准的降低。
政府对经济利益的过分追逐,是房地产市场调控乏力的主要原因,因此必须对政府行为给以合理的定位。为了房地产市场的和谐发展,政府应该制定和实施合理的土地政策、税收政策、金融政策、保障政策、交易政策、信息政策和文化教育政策。
This thesis aims to use Rational Expectation Theory and Game Theory to explore the micro mechanism of how the real estate market operates and develops, and, based on the analysis, proposes governmental policies to help China's real estate market to develop harmoniously, in expectation of providing guidance for China's real estate market to develop healthily.
The movement and development of real estate market are the results of the interaction among the principal parts of the market. Principal parts have the attribute of rational expectation and actions of gaming on the basis of rational expectation. There are both cooperative games and uncooperative games. Games among the Main parts of real estate market have an intrinsic lawof logical evolution.
Influenced by policies, China's real estate market has gone through deferent stages. The development of China's real estate market has make a significant contribution in terms of meeting the housing demand of consumers, accelerating the economic growth and the urbanization of cities, regions and the country. However, in the process of development, we have been facing some problems such as too mach fluctuation, excessive high price and general control failure etc. these problems are the results of gaming by the principal part of the real estate market.
Game between Real estate developers and consumers is the core of the game played by the principal part of the market. The cooperative solutions for the bargaining between developers and consumers are influenced by the market competiveness, individual bargaining power and fair knowledge. Real estate developers have strong bargaining power over consumers who have rigid housing demand. The speculative buyers are the important unstable factors in the market. Cooperative games for land trading between developers and governments improve the efficiency and lower the land prices. The existence of the economic interests of government often makes the supervision on developers have no effectiveness. Consumers have a little supervisory power; it makes the Government's promise of controlling the housing prices become invalid. Competitions among consumers push the prices to rise. The cooperation, publicly or privately, between developers makes the housing prices hard to fall. Pursuit of local economic interests and Information asymmetry makes local governments to implement Central Government's controlling policies inactively.
Games between banks and borrowers still have the cooperative attribute as trading games. Borrowers have incomplete asymmetry information compared with banks. Banks face reversed choices when using interest rate to sift the quality of projects. On the condition of information asymmetry, banks have the motivation to implement the controlling policies inactively when they are driven by their own interests. Lower the lending standard is one of the expressions of this inactivity.
The excessive pursuit of economic interest is the main reason for the ineffectiveness of the control on the real estate market. Therefore, the activities governments should be reasonably positioned. The subprime crisis provides us with a deep lesson that in order to make the real estate market to develop harmoniously, the Government should formulate and implement reasonable policy on land, tax, finance, welfare, trading,information and cultural education.
房地产市场的运行和发展是房地产市场主体相互作用的结果。房地产市场主体具有理性预期特征和在理性预期基础上的博弈行为,这种博弈既有合作的也有非合作的。房地产市场主体博弈具有内在的逻辑演进规律。
我国房地产市场受政策影响而呈现不同的发展阶段。中国房地产市场的发展为满足消费者对房地产商品的需求,为城市、地区和国家的经济增长,为城市建设和城市化进程做出了重要贡献。但是,我国房地产市场在发展过程中也存在着市场波动较大、价格过高、宏观调控效果不理想等问题。这些问题的产生是房地产主体博弈的结果。
房地产商和消费者之间的博弈是房地产市场主体博弈的核心。房地产商与消费者讨价还价的合作解受市场竞争性、个体讨价还价能力和公平认识的影响。房地产商面对刚性需求者具有索取高价的市场势力。投机性购房者构成市场不稳定的重要因素。房地产商与政府之间在土地买卖关系的合作博弈在实现拍卖效率的同时可以降低土地的出让价格。政府经济利益的存在,使得政府对开发商的管理往往成为空头威胁。消费者的监督无力,使得政府调控房价的承诺往往成为无效承诺。消费者之间的竞争助推房价上涨,房地产商之间或明或暗的合作使得高房价企高不下。地方经济利益的追逐和信息不对称的存在,导致中央政府的调控政策不能得到地方政府的积极执行。
银行与借款人之间的博弈仍然具有交易博弈的合作特性。银行对借款人具有不完全和不对称的信息,在利用利率筛选项目质量时面临逆向选择。在自利的驱使下,在信息不对称的条件下,银行有动机不积极执行政府的调控政策,而这种不积极的表现之一就是对贷款标准的降低。
政府对经济利益的过分追逐,是房地产市场调控乏力的主要原因,因此必须对政府行为给以合理的定位。为了房地产市场的和谐发展,政府应该制定和实施合理的土地政策、税收政策、金融政策、保障政策、交易政策、信息政策和文化教育政策。
This thesis aims to use Rational Expectation Theory and Game Theory to explore the micro mechanism of how the real estate market operates and develops, and, based on the analysis, proposes governmental policies to help China's real estate market to develop harmoniously, in expectation of providing guidance for China's real estate market to develop healthily.
The movement and development of real estate market are the results of the interaction among the principal parts of the market. Principal parts have the attribute of rational expectation and actions of gaming on the basis of rational expectation. There are both cooperative games and uncooperative games. Games among the Main parts of real estate market have an intrinsic lawof logical evolution.
Influenced by policies, China's real estate market has gone through deferent stages. The development of China's real estate market has make a significant contribution in terms of meeting the housing demand of consumers, accelerating the economic growth and the urbanization of cities, regions and the country. However, in the process of development, we have been facing some problems such as too mach fluctuation, excessive high price and general control failure etc. these problems are the results of gaming by the principal part of the real estate market.
Game between Real estate developers and consumers is the core of the game played by the principal part of the market. The cooperative solutions for the bargaining between developers and consumers are influenced by the market competiveness, individual bargaining power and fair knowledge. Real estate developers have strong bargaining power over consumers who have rigid housing demand. The speculative buyers are the important unstable factors in the market. Cooperative games for land trading between developers and governments improve the efficiency and lower the land prices. The existence of the economic interests of government often makes the supervision on developers have no effectiveness. Consumers have a little supervisory power; it makes the Government's promise of controlling the housing prices become invalid. Competitions among consumers push the prices to rise. The cooperation, publicly or privately, between developers makes the housing prices hard to fall. Pursuit of local economic interests and Information asymmetry makes local governments to implement Central Government's controlling policies inactively.
Games between banks and borrowers still have the cooperative attribute as trading games. Borrowers have incomplete asymmetry information compared with banks. Banks face reversed choices when using interest rate to sift the quality of projects. On the condition of information asymmetry, banks have the motivation to implement the controlling policies inactively when they are driven by their own interests. Lower the lending standard is one of the expressions of this inactivity.
The excessive pursuit of economic interest is the main reason for the ineffectiveness of the control on the real estate market. Therefore, the activities governments should be reasonably positioned. The subprime crisis provides us with a deep lesson that in order to make the real estate market to develop harmoniously, the Government should formulate and implement reasonable policy on land, tax, finance, welfare, trading,information and cultural education.
引文
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