中国劳动收入占比变化的制度解释：1952-2009
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摘要
本文旨在从制度变迁的角度对中国劳动收入占GDP的变化进行解释。合约是制度分析的基本单位，也是本文研究的切入点。本文首先利用“支出倒推法”核算了1952-2009年中国要素收入分配格局，发现从1952到2009年中国劳动收入占比呈现倒U型变化。
合约治理分为两个阶段：签约前治理和签约后治理。劳动收入占比变化主要由签约后治理模式决定的。即，劳动收入占比由剩余控制权的配置决定。笔者根据主要劳动合约的不签约后治理模式把中国经济发展分为三段不同的历史时期，利用“理论预测法”解释了中国1952-2009年的劳动收入占比变化。1952-1978年为中国的计划经济时期。中国的劳动合约主要是国家资本主导的劳动合约，这种合约由国家为个人提供保障（抵押），是一种终身制的无风险劳动合约。合约的剩余控制权由“组织”掌握，劳动收入理论上来说可以降到维持生存的工资水平，劳动收入占比较低（均值58%）。1978-1995年为中国的承包经济时期。改革开放后，劳动合约由单一的国家合约，转变为企业承包合约、农户、个体户、小型民营企业和乡镇企业共存。主要的劳动合约是企业承包制。相对于国家合约的其他劳动合约，此类合约中劳动者的剩余控制权提高，劳动收入占比增大（均值59%），并且波动较小。1996-2009年为中国社会主义市场经济的完善期。民营企业的雇佣合约发展迅速，并形成了多种多样的劳动参与模式，提高了劳动者参与市场生产的机会，劳动收入的绝对值上升。与此同时，国有企业改革，国家终身合约数量大幅度减少。整体来看，资本主导的劳动合约称为主流，资本方在合约治理中占据了绝对优势，劳动者的权利地位迅速下降，劳动收入占比下降（均值52%）。根据本各个阶段不同劳动合约的特征和构成比例，笔者推断了各个阶段的劳动收入占比变化，发现真实的劳动收入占比变化和笔者的推断基本吻合。
为了进一步验证本文的解释，笔者利用统计年鉴的宏观时间序列数据以及上市公司的微观面板数据对本文推论分别进行了计量分析，都验证了本文的推论，证明本文的解释是可靠的。最后，本文从宏观制度环境、合约治理模式和个体意识形态角度提出了相关政策建议。
This paper explains the change of China labor revenue to GDP. The contract isthe basic unit of the institution analysis as well as the point-cut of creating this paper.This paper firstly accounts the China factor distribution construction by means of theBack Push Expending from1952to2009. I discover that the proportion of the Chinalabor income presents the changing of inverted U curve from1952to2009.
The control of contract is divided into two phases: controlling before signing thecontract and controlling after signing the contract. The change of China labor incomein proportion is mainly determined by the controlling after signing the contract. Inother words, it is determined by the configuration of residual control rights. Accordingto the governing after no sign model of the main labor contract, the development ofChina economy is divided into three different historical periods and the writerinterprets the change of the labor income in proportion from1952to1978with thetheory prediction method. The years from1952to1978were the period of Chinaplanned economy. China labor contract was mainly the official capital-led laborcontracts. The contract provides safe-guard for the individual by the country and it isa kind of lifelong risk-free labor contract and the residual control rights of the contractare mastered by the organization. The labor income theoretically regard as the level ofwages which can be degenerated as a means of subsistence. The labor incomeaccounted for a relatively low proportion of about52%in a long period. The yearsfrom1978to1955were the period of the contracted economic. After the reform andopening-up policy, the labor contract was turned into the co-existing contract of thenation, peasant household, household of individual business, small private enterpriseand the township enterprise. The main labor contract is the contracted responsibilitysystem. Comparing to the other labor contract of the national contract, in this type ofcontract, the residual control rights of the laborers have been improved so that thelabor income share increased as well as less volatile. The period of the years from1996to2009is the perfecting stage of the socialist market economy. The employmentcontract of the private enterprise develop in a rapid speed and has formed variousmodel, having increased the opportunity of the laborer participating the marketproduction, and then the absolute value of the labor income in proportion has beenelevated. Meanwhile, due to the reforming of the national enterprise, the number ofthe lifelong contract was greatly deduced and the capital-led labor contract was themainstream. The capital side in the governance of the contract is overwhelmingly dominated by the rapid decline in the status of the rights of workers. The labor incomeshare fall—mean of52%. According to the characteristics and the proportions ofdifferent labor contracts in various stages of this paper, the writher deduces the changein proportion of the labor income in various stages and discovered that the change inproportion of the real labor income was basically corresponded with the writer’sdeduce.
To further validate the interpretation of this article, the writer carries out thequantitative analysis with the macro data of the statistical yearbook and micro data ofthe pubic company for deducing the paper and all demonstrates the deduce andproved that the interpretation of this paper was right. At last, from the macro-institutional environment, governance model of the contract and individualideological point of view, this paper has proposed the relative policies and advices.
合约治理分为两个阶段：签约前治理和签约后治理。劳动收入占比变化主要由签约后治理模式决定的。即，劳动收入占比由剩余控制权的配置决定。笔者根据主要劳动合约的不签约后治理模式把中国经济发展分为三段不同的历史时期，利用“理论预测法”解释了中国1952-2009年的劳动收入占比变化。1952-1978年为中国的计划经济时期。中国的劳动合约主要是国家资本主导的劳动合约，这种合约由国家为个人提供保障（抵押），是一种终身制的无风险劳动合约。合约的剩余控制权由“组织”掌握，劳动收入理论上来说可以降到维持生存的工资水平，劳动收入占比较低（均值58%）。1978-1995年为中国的承包经济时期。改革开放后，劳动合约由单一的国家合约，转变为企业承包合约、农户、个体户、小型民营企业和乡镇企业共存。主要的劳动合约是企业承包制。相对于国家合约的其他劳动合约，此类合约中劳动者的剩余控制权提高，劳动收入占比增大（均值59%），并且波动较小。1996-2009年为中国社会主义市场经济的完善期。民营企业的雇佣合约发展迅速，并形成了多种多样的劳动参与模式，提高了劳动者参与市场生产的机会，劳动收入的绝对值上升。与此同时，国有企业改革，国家终身合约数量大幅度减少。整体来看，资本主导的劳动合约称为主流，资本方在合约治理中占据了绝对优势，劳动者的权利地位迅速下降，劳动收入占比下降（均值52%）。根据本各个阶段不同劳动合约的特征和构成比例，笔者推断了各个阶段的劳动收入占比变化，发现真实的劳动收入占比变化和笔者的推断基本吻合。
为了进一步验证本文的解释，笔者利用统计年鉴的宏观时间序列数据以及上市公司的微观面板数据对本文推论分别进行了计量分析，都验证了本文的推论，证明本文的解释是可靠的。最后，本文从宏观制度环境、合约治理模式和个体意识形态角度提出了相关政策建议。
This paper explains the change of China labor revenue to GDP. The contract isthe basic unit of the institution analysis as well as the point-cut of creating this paper.This paper firstly accounts the China factor distribution construction by means of theBack Push Expending from1952to2009. I discover that the proportion of the Chinalabor income presents the changing of inverted U curve from1952to2009.
The control of contract is divided into two phases: controlling before signing thecontract and controlling after signing the contract. The change of China labor incomein proportion is mainly determined by the controlling after signing the contract. Inother words, it is determined by the configuration of residual control rights. Accordingto the governing after no sign model of the main labor contract, the development ofChina economy is divided into three different historical periods and the writerinterprets the change of the labor income in proportion from1952to1978with thetheory prediction method. The years from1952to1978were the period of Chinaplanned economy. China labor contract was mainly the official capital-led laborcontracts. The contract provides safe-guard for the individual by the country and it isa kind of lifelong risk-free labor contract and the residual control rights of the contractare mastered by the organization. The labor income theoretically regard as the level ofwages which can be degenerated as a means of subsistence. The labor incomeaccounted for a relatively low proportion of about52%in a long period. The yearsfrom1978to1955were the period of the contracted economic. After the reform andopening-up policy, the labor contract was turned into the co-existing contract of thenation, peasant household, household of individual business, small private enterpriseand the township enterprise. The main labor contract is the contracted responsibilitysystem. Comparing to the other labor contract of the national contract, in this type ofcontract, the residual control rights of the laborers have been improved so that thelabor income share increased as well as less volatile. The period of the years from1996to2009is the perfecting stage of the socialist market economy. The employmentcontract of the private enterprise develop in a rapid speed and has formed variousmodel, having increased the opportunity of the laborer participating the marketproduction, and then the absolute value of the labor income in proportion has beenelevated. Meanwhile, due to the reforming of the national enterprise, the number ofthe lifelong contract was greatly deduced and the capital-led labor contract was themainstream. The capital side in the governance of the contract is overwhelmingly dominated by the rapid decline in the status of the rights of workers. The labor incomeshare fall—mean of52%. According to the characteristics and the proportions ofdifferent labor contracts in various stages of this paper, the writher deduces the changein proportion of the labor income in various stages and discovered that the change inproportion of the real labor income was basically corresponded with the writer’sdeduce.
To further validate the interpretation of this article, the writer carries out thequantitative analysis with the macro data of the statistical yearbook and micro data ofthe pubic company for deducing the paper and all demonstrates the deduce andproved that the interpretation of this paper was right. At last, from the macro-institutional environment, governance model of the contract and individualideological point of view, this paper has proposed the relative policies and advices.
引文
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