基于公司治理的农业上市公司经营绩效研究
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摘要
农业是国民经济的基础，其发展状况直接影响我国国民经济的运行状况。如何确保农业有效发展始终是国家经济社会发展的重要内容。虽然改革开放后实施的家庭联产承包经营责任制调动了广大农民的生产积极性，推动了中国农业的迅速发展，农业产业化经营实现了农业产业结构的有效升级，为我国农业的持续发展进行了有益的探索，但资金短缺问题制约了农业产业化的发展，同时阶段性的相关问题依然存在。农业上市公司将现代企业制度引入农业发展中，是农业发展史上第一次与现代证券市场相适应的企业组织，为农业企业提供了有效的直接融资渠道。这种企业组织形式充分利用资本市场来解决农业发展资金短缺问题，提升了农业产业化经营层次，增强了我国农业国际竞争力，从而加快我国农业现代化进程。但是农业上市公司的管理基础和竞争优势仍然较为薄弱，制约了农业上市公司的有效发展，这些问题的根源在于农业上市公司治理这一制度的相关缺陷。公司治理是现代企业制度运行的核心，对公司的经营发展具有重要的推动作用。它通过董事会监督管理层的过程、结构和联系，作用于公司管理来影响公司绩效，是公司绩效的基本制度保障。因此研究农业上市公司治理及其对公司经营绩效的影响具有重要的意义。
本研究立足于农业上市公司的行业特点，重点分析了农业上市公司治理的现状、农业上市公司经营绩效的现状、公司治理对于农业上市公司经营绩效的实际影响。针对实证分析结果，提出了完善农业上市公司内部治理机制的几个关键点：建立适度与有效相结合的激励机制，创新监事会的监督机制和健全监事会的监督职能，完善以决策权分配为核心的决策机制等，并从治理生态层面提出了农业上市公司治理的生态控制措施。在本研究的论证和分析中，一是通过定性分析与定量分析相结合的方法，运用熵权法和统计回归分析方法来研究农业上市公司综合经营绩效以及公司治理对其经营绩效的影响；二是运用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法，对公司治理理论和实证分析结果进行论证，界定了农业上市公司、公司治理、公司绩效、农业上市公司治理的生态环境及生态环境控制的概念。并以农业类板块A股为例分析了农业上市公司治理存在的问题，提出了完善农业上市公司治理结构的对策；三是比较分析方法。立足于我国农业上市公司的现状，分别从不同年份的公司治理指标变动情况进行比较，分析了农业上市公司治理的变动趋势和演进情况，从中反映出制度变迁中的农业上市公司治理特征，并与全部上市公司治理进行了比较。在分析公司治理对农业上市公司绩效的作用机理的基础上，运用公司治理的相关指标，实证分析和评价了公司治理对农业上市公司经营绩效的相关影响。
通过论证分析，本研究提出了以下结论和观点：一是公司治理对农业上市公司经营绩效影响的行业性。结合农业上市公司的行业特征，分析了影响农业上市公司治理水平的内因和外因：公司治理的内部控制机制和公司治理的生态控制机理。二是公司治理对于农业上市公司经营绩效具有重要的影响，但各个层面的治理指标影响程度不尽相同，且实证分析结果的显著性存在差异。反映了农业上市公司治理的实践运行存在着诸多方面的薄弱和缺陷，提出了适应我国农业上市公司发展的公司治理基本框架和关键要素。三是综合经营绩效指标更有利于体现公司治理对于农业上市公司经营绩效的影响。运用熵权法分析农业上市公司综合经营绩效，从整体上反映农业上市公司的经营绩效，并研究农业上市公司治理指标与其综合经营绩效的关系。克服了现有研究以单一的财务指标作为上市公司经营绩效指标的缺陷，从而在更深层次上反映问题，揭示原因，提出对策。四是提出了农业上市公司治理的“生态控制”观点。公司治理的生态及其控制为农业上市公司内部治理机制提供支撑，是农业上市公司经营绩效实现的保障，对于公司治理促进农业上市公司经营绩效提高发挥起着基础条件和作用。而且对于不同行业的上市公司来说，公司治理的生态控制会不尽相同。必须构建良好的公司治理生态，为农业上市公司治理机制运行提供基础，从而促进农业上市公司的有效发展和经营绩效提高。
Agriculture is the foundation of the national economy, effecting the healthy developmentof our national economy. How to ensure the effective development of agriculture is always theimportant part of the national economic and social development. Although after the reformand opening,the implementation of Family-based Contracted Responsibility System transferthe majority of the farmers' enthusiasm for production, promote the rapid development ofChina's agriculture, at the same time, Agricultural Industrialization Achieve effective upgradeof agricultural industrial structure, and the sustainable development of China's agriculturaluseful exploration, but the constraints of Agricultural Industrialization Development is ashortage of funds, while Periodic problems still persist. Agricultural listed companies is acorporate organization which introduces the modern enterprise system to agriculturaldevelopment, adapting to the modern enterprise in the history of agricultural development forthe first time, providing direct financing channels for agricultural enterprises. The form ofbusiness organization can take full advantage of the capital market to solve the shortage offunds in agricultural development, enhance the level of Agricultural IndustrializationDevelopment and the international competitiveness of China's agricultural, speeding up theprocess of agricultural modernization in China. However, the basis of the management andcompetitive advantage of agricultural listed companies is still relatively weak, restricted theeffective development of agricultural listed companies. The root of these problems lies inagriculture listed corporate governance system defects. Corporate governance is the core ofthe modern enterprise system running, and has an important role in promoting thedevelopment of the company's operating. In the course of it, the Board supervise themanagement process, structure and linkages, affect the company's performance by Acting onCompany management. Corporate governance is the basic institutional guarantee for thecompany's performance. Therefore, it is very important to study on the corporate governanceof agricultural listed companies and its impact on improving corporate performance inachieving business performance.
This study analyses the current situation of the agricultural governance and the operatingperformance of agricultural listed companies, the actual impact on the operating performancefrom corporate governance performance, based on the industry characteristics of agricultural listed companies. From the analysis of Empirical results, bring out several key points toimprove the internal governance mechanisms of agricultural listed companies: theestablishing a moderate and effective incentives mechanisms, Innovativing oversight mechanisms,sounding functions of the Supervisory Committee, improving decision-making mechanism forthe core of the decision-making power, and bringing up the ecological control measures ofcorporate governance. In this study, some methods are used. First is the combination ofqualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. Through using Entropy Method and statisticalregression analysis method, it study the operating performance of the agricultural listedcompanies as well as the effect of corporate governance acting on its operating performance;Second is the combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis, analyzing ofcorporate governance theory and the current situation of empirical analysis, defining Conceptof agricultural listed companies, corporate governance, corporate performance, ecologicalenvironment and ecological environment control of agriculture Listed Companies; Third is theuse of the theory with the actual method. It uses relative indicators, based on analyzing themechanism of corporate governance acting on corporate performance, empirical analyzingand evaluating the affection on Operating Performance from corporate governance of listedagricultural companies.
In this study, some conclusions and perspectives are proposed. First, the effect ofcorporate governance acting on corporate performance is influenced by industry. Combinedwith the agricultural industry characteristics listed companies, internal control mechanismsand ecological control mechanism of corporate governance are the internal and externalfactors which improve the corporate governance level of agricultural listed company. Secondis that Corporate governance has an important impact on agricultural listed companiesoperating performance, but the degree of influence from different levels of governanceindicators is not the same at all. At the same time, the results of empirical analysis issignificant different. It reflects the weak and defective of governance practice in agriculturallisted companies, bringing out the governance framework and key elements which adapt tothe development of China's agricultural listed companies. Third is that Consolidated operatingperformance indicators is more conducive to reflect the impact of corporate governance on theperformance of listed agricultural companies. It analyzes the comprehensive operatingperformance of agricultural listed companies by entropy method, and studies the relationshipbetween agricultural listed company governance indicators and its operating performance,overcoming the defects of the single financial indicators of the operating performance,revealing the reason and proposing a solution. The forth is that the view of “Ecologicalcontrol” is put forward in corporate governance of agricultural listed companies. Ecology and its control of corporate governance provide support for the governance of agricultural listedcompanies, playing a fundamental conditions and the role of promoting the operatingperformance of the agricultural listed companies. For listed companies of different industries,ecological control will vary. The good ecology is the support of the corporate governanceefficiency, has an important strategic significance for the sustained and prudent developmentof agricultural listed companies.
本研究立足于农业上市公司的行业特点，重点分析了农业上市公司治理的现状、农业上市公司经营绩效的现状、公司治理对于农业上市公司经营绩效的实际影响。针对实证分析结果，提出了完善农业上市公司内部治理机制的几个关键点：建立适度与有效相结合的激励机制，创新监事会的监督机制和健全监事会的监督职能，完善以决策权分配为核心的决策机制等，并从治理生态层面提出了农业上市公司治理的生态控制措施。在本研究的论证和分析中，一是通过定性分析与定量分析相结合的方法，运用熵权法和统计回归分析方法来研究农业上市公司综合经营绩效以及公司治理对其经营绩效的影响；二是运用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法，对公司治理理论和实证分析结果进行论证，界定了农业上市公司、公司治理、公司绩效、农业上市公司治理的生态环境及生态环境控制的概念。并以农业类板块A股为例分析了农业上市公司治理存在的问题，提出了完善农业上市公司治理结构的对策；三是比较分析方法。立足于我国农业上市公司的现状，分别从不同年份的公司治理指标变动情况进行比较，分析了农业上市公司治理的变动趋势和演进情况，从中反映出制度变迁中的农业上市公司治理特征，并与全部上市公司治理进行了比较。在分析公司治理对农业上市公司绩效的作用机理的基础上，运用公司治理的相关指标，实证分析和评价了公司治理对农业上市公司经营绩效的相关影响。
通过论证分析，本研究提出了以下结论和观点：一是公司治理对农业上市公司经营绩效影响的行业性。结合农业上市公司的行业特征，分析了影响农业上市公司治理水平的内因和外因：公司治理的内部控制机制和公司治理的生态控制机理。二是公司治理对于农业上市公司经营绩效具有重要的影响，但各个层面的治理指标影响程度不尽相同，且实证分析结果的显著性存在差异。反映了农业上市公司治理的实践运行存在着诸多方面的薄弱和缺陷，提出了适应我国农业上市公司发展的公司治理基本框架和关键要素。三是综合经营绩效指标更有利于体现公司治理对于农业上市公司经营绩效的影响。运用熵权法分析农业上市公司综合经营绩效，从整体上反映农业上市公司的经营绩效，并研究农业上市公司治理指标与其综合经营绩效的关系。克服了现有研究以单一的财务指标作为上市公司经营绩效指标的缺陷，从而在更深层次上反映问题，揭示原因，提出对策。四是提出了农业上市公司治理的“生态控制”观点。公司治理的生态及其控制为农业上市公司内部治理机制提供支撑，是农业上市公司经营绩效实现的保障，对于公司治理促进农业上市公司经营绩效提高发挥起着基础条件和作用。而且对于不同行业的上市公司来说，公司治理的生态控制会不尽相同。必须构建良好的公司治理生态，为农业上市公司治理机制运行提供基础，从而促进农业上市公司的有效发展和经营绩效提高。
Agriculture is the foundation of the national economy, effecting the healthy developmentof our national economy. How to ensure the effective development of agriculture is always theimportant part of the national economic and social development. Although after the reformand opening,the implementation of Family-based Contracted Responsibility System transferthe majority of the farmers' enthusiasm for production, promote the rapid development ofChina's agriculture, at the same time, Agricultural Industrialization Achieve effective upgradeof agricultural industrial structure, and the sustainable development of China's agriculturaluseful exploration, but the constraints of Agricultural Industrialization Development is ashortage of funds, while Periodic problems still persist. Agricultural listed companies is acorporate organization which introduces the modern enterprise system to agriculturaldevelopment, adapting to the modern enterprise in the history of agricultural development forthe first time, providing direct financing channels for agricultural enterprises. The form ofbusiness organization can take full advantage of the capital market to solve the shortage offunds in agricultural development, enhance the level of Agricultural IndustrializationDevelopment and the international competitiveness of China's agricultural, speeding up theprocess of agricultural modernization in China. However, the basis of the management andcompetitive advantage of agricultural listed companies is still relatively weak, restricted theeffective development of agricultural listed companies. The root of these problems lies inagriculture listed corporate governance system defects. Corporate governance is the core ofthe modern enterprise system running, and has an important role in promoting thedevelopment of the company's operating. In the course of it, the Board supervise themanagement process, structure and linkages, affect the company's performance by Acting onCompany management. Corporate governance is the basic institutional guarantee for thecompany's performance. Therefore, it is very important to study on the corporate governanceof agricultural listed companies and its impact on improving corporate performance inachieving business performance.
This study analyses the current situation of the agricultural governance and the operatingperformance of agricultural listed companies, the actual impact on the operating performancefrom corporate governance performance, based on the industry characteristics of agricultural listed companies. From the analysis of Empirical results, bring out several key points toimprove the internal governance mechanisms of agricultural listed companies: theestablishing a moderate and effective incentives mechanisms, Innovativing oversight mechanisms,sounding functions of the Supervisory Committee, improving decision-making mechanism forthe core of the decision-making power, and bringing up the ecological control measures ofcorporate governance. In this study, some methods are used. First is the combination ofqualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. Through using Entropy Method and statisticalregression analysis method, it study the operating performance of the agricultural listedcompanies as well as the effect of corporate governance acting on its operating performance;Second is the combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis, analyzing ofcorporate governance theory and the current situation of empirical analysis, defining Conceptof agricultural listed companies, corporate governance, corporate performance, ecologicalenvironment and ecological environment control of agriculture Listed Companies; Third is theuse of the theory with the actual method. It uses relative indicators, based on analyzing themechanism of corporate governance acting on corporate performance, empirical analyzingand evaluating the affection on Operating Performance from corporate governance of listedagricultural companies.
In this study, some conclusions and perspectives are proposed. First, the effect ofcorporate governance acting on corporate performance is influenced by industry. Combinedwith the agricultural industry characteristics listed companies, internal control mechanismsand ecological control mechanism of corporate governance are the internal and externalfactors which improve the corporate governance level of agricultural listed company. Secondis that Corporate governance has an important impact on agricultural listed companiesoperating performance, but the degree of influence from different levels of governanceindicators is not the same at all. At the same time, the results of empirical analysis issignificant different. It reflects the weak and defective of governance practice in agriculturallisted companies, bringing out the governance framework and key elements which adapt tothe development of China's agricultural listed companies. Third is that Consolidated operatingperformance indicators is more conducive to reflect the impact of corporate governance on theperformance of listed agricultural companies. It analyzes the comprehensive operatingperformance of agricultural listed companies by entropy method, and studies the relationshipbetween agricultural listed company governance indicators and its operating performance,overcoming the defects of the single financial indicators of the operating performance,revealing the reason and proposing a solution. The forth is that the view of “Ecologicalcontrol” is put forward in corporate governance of agricultural listed companies. Ecology and its control of corporate governance provide support for the governance of agricultural listedcompanies, playing a fundamental conditions and the role of promoting the operatingperformance of the agricultural listed companies. For listed companies of different industries,ecological control will vary. The good ecology is the support of the corporate governanceefficiency, has an important strategic significance for the sustained and prudent developmentof agricultural listed companies.
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