管理者权力、薪酬差距与公司价值
|
摘要
现代企业所有权与经营权的分离产生股东与管理者之间的委托代理问题（Jensen andMeckling,1976），作为解决代理问题的重要公司治理机制，薪酬契约的有效性决定着管理者薪酬设计是否具有相应的激励效应，进而影响管理者的努力程度与公司价值。作为薪酬激励结构的重要内容，薪酬差距的设置是否具有相应的价值激励效应直接决定薪酬政策的制定是否有效。现有文献对薪酬差距与公司价值关系的研究多选择公司内部内部薪酬差距进行研究，且并未得出一致结论，管理者作为自利的经济人，不仅会将自身薪酬水平与公司内部员工进行比较，还会将自身薪酬水平与同行进行比较，而现有对外部薪酬差距的研究还很缺乏。基于此，本文以最优契约理论和委托代理理论为理论基础，将规范的研究方法与实证研究方法相结合，基于管理者权力的角度，从内部薪酬差距和外部薪酬差距两个方面对薪酬差距与公司价值之间的关系进行系统的研究。此外，鉴于我国新兴/转轨的制度背景，上市公司的国有性质、上市公司所在地区市场化进程的发展情况以及所在行业的竞争情况不仅显著影响薪酬差距的价值激励效应，还进一步影响管理者权力对薪酬差距价值激励效应的影响，本文结合我国上市公司的不同股权性质、不同地区的市场化程度及不同行业的竞争程度对管理者权力、薪酬差距与公司价值之间关系做了进一步深入研究。
具体来说，本文的研究可以分为以下八章：
第一章为绪论。主要介绍本文的研究背景、意义、论文的内容与框架、研究方法及论文创新点，此外对本文的相关概念进行界定。
第二章为理论基础与相关理论适用性分析。本章首先对委托代理理论、最优契约理论及管理者权力理论进行了回顾，为本文的研究奠定了理论基础；其次，基于代理理论、契约理论及中国企业制度的变革和管理者薪酬激励政策的演变出发分析管理者权力理论在中国上市公司的适用性。
第三章为文献综述。本章主要分为三部分，第一部分对管理者权力和薪酬差距的相关文献进行回顾，发现研究的切入点；第二部分对薪酬差距与公司价值的关系的相关理论进行回顾和文献综述；第三部分则对基于管理者权力的薪酬差距和公司价值的关系的文献进行评述，确定研究趋势和研究框架。
第四章为管理者权力、内部薪酬差距与公司价值的实证研究。
本章对内部薪酬差距价值激励效应及管理者权力对内部薪酬差距价值激励效应的影响研究发现：我国上市公司内部的管理者与员工薪酬差距与公司价值正相关，内部薪酬差距具有正面的价值激励效应，支持锦标赛理论，但是管理者权力的存在抑制了内部薪酬差距激励效应的发挥。对管理者权力与内部薪酬差距影响公司价值的内在机理进行研究，结果发现，内部薪酬差距能够提高管理者的薪酬-业绩敏感性，但管理者权力抑制了内部薪酬差距对薪酬-业绩敏感性的提高。
第五章为管理者权力、外部薪酬差距与公司价值的实证研究。本章对外薪酬差距价值激励效应及管理者权力对外薪酬差距价值激励效应的影响研究发现：我国上市公司外部薪酬差距与公司价值正相关，外部薪酬差距具有正面的价值激励效应，而管理者权力减弱了外部薪酬差距的正面价值激励效应。对管理者权力与外部薪酬差距影响公司价值的机理分析发现，外部薪酬差距能够提升公司价值的原因在于，外部薪酬差距有效地抑制了管理者对具有负面价值效应的在职消费的追求，而管理者权力弱化了外部薪酬差距对在职消费的抑制作用。
第六章为不同股权性质下管理者权力、薪酬差距与公司价值的实证研究。本章分别从内、外部薪酬差距两个方面实证检验不同股权性质下管理者权力、薪酬差距与公司价值的关系。研究发现：上市公司的国有性质抑制了薪酬差距正面价值激励效应的发挥，并且强化了管理者权力对薪酬差距正面价值激励效应的抑制作用。
第七章为不同治理环境下管理者权力、薪酬差距与公司价值的实证研究。本章分别从内部薪酬差距、外部薪酬差距两个方面研究不同治理环境下管理者权力、薪酬差距与公司价值的关系。研究发现，上市公司所在地区的市场化程度不仅对薪酬差距的价值激励效应产生重要影响，还进一步影响管理者权力与薪酬差距价值激励效应的关系，在市场化程度越高的地区，薪酬差距的正面价值激励效应越强，并且市场化进程弱化了管理者权力对薪酬差距正面价值激励效应的抑制作用；行业竞争程度的不同也使得上市公司所处的外部治理环境截然不同，进而影响管理者权力、薪酬差距与公司价值的关系，与处于竞争性行业的上市公司相比，保护性行业的上市公司，薪酬差距的正面价值激励效应较弱，并且管理者权力对薪酬差距正面价值激励效应的抑制作用更强。
第八章为主要结论与局限性。本章通过对以上理论及实证分析结论的总结，指出本研究的局限性和未来的研究方向。第一节是全文的研究结论，第二节指出本文研究的局限与不足之处，指出未来研究方向。
The separation of ownership and management lead to the agency conflictbetween shareholders and managers in modern enterprise (Jensen and Meckling,1976). As an important corporate governance mechanism to solve the problem ofprincipal-agent problem, the effectiveness of compensation contracts depends onwhether the design of management compensation has the corresponding incentiveeffect, and then influence the degree of effort of managers and firm value.
As the compensation dispersion is an important content of incentive structure,whether the setting of compensation dispersion has the corresponding incentive effectdirectly determine the effectiveness of compensation policy formulation. Most of theexisting literature about the relationship between compensation dispersion and thefirm value choose the company internal compensation dispersion, and have notreached consensus conclusion till now. As self-interest agent, managers not only willmake a comparison between their own compensation with internal staff, but also willmake a comparison between their own compensation and peer compensation, and theexternal compensation dispersion is still lack of research among the existing literature.So, this paper uses the most optimal contract theory and principal-agent theory as thetheoretical basis, combines the standard research methods and empirical researchmethod, based on the managerial power theory, make a system research of therelationship between compensation dispersion and firm value from the two aspects ofinternal compensation dispersion and external compensation dispersion. In addition,in view of our emerging/transition system background, the state-owned property oflisted companies, the extent of marketization development of the region where thelisted companies is, and the industry competition which industries the listedcompanies belongs, all these are not only significant influence the incentive effect ofcompensation dispersion, but also further influence how the managerial powerinfluence the incentive effect of compensation dispersion, so our paper make a furtherresearch on managerial power, compensation dispersion and firm value combinedwith different equity properties, the marketization degree of different areas anddifferent industry competition degree.
Specifically, this study can be divided into the following eight chapters:
Chapter1is introduction. This chapter mainly introduces the researchbackground, significance, the content of the thesis and framework, the researchmethods and our innovation points, in addition, we make a definition of the relevantconcepts of this article.
Chapter2gives the theoretical basis and applicability analysis of the relevanttheory. This chapter first describes the principal-agent theory, the optimal contracttheory and the managerial power theory, all these in this paper laid a theoreticalfoundation; Secondly, based on agency theory, contract theory, the inform of China'senterprise system and the evolution of the executive compensation incentive policy, we analyse the applicability of managerial power theory in China.
Chapter3gives a literature review. This chapter is divided into three parts, thefirst part is a literature review about managerial power and compensation dispersion,and through the review we found the research starting point; The second part is therelated theory and literature review about the relationship between compensationdispersion and firm value；The third part is the literature review about managerialpower and the incentive effect of compensation dispersion, and then determine theresearch trend and research framework.
Chapter4is the empirical analysis on managerial power, internal compensationdispersion and firm value. This chapter we make an empirical research on the valueincentive effect of internal compensation dispersion and how managerial powerinfluences the value incentive effect of internal compensation dispersion. The resultsfind that, the internal compensation dispersion between managers and staff is positivewith firm value. The compensation dispersion has positive incentive effect, whichsupports the tournament theory, but the managerial power will curb the incentiveeffect of compensation dispersion. Besides, we study about the influence mechanismbehind the relationships we have studied, and we find that, the mechanisms howmanagerial power and internal compensation dispersion influence firm value may bethat the higher internal compensation dispersion can raise the pay-performancesensitivity, but the managerial power will curb this effect.
Chapter5is the empirical analysis on managerial power, external compensationdispersion and firm value. This chapter we make an empirical research on the valueincentive effect of external compensation dispersion and how managerial powerinfluences the value incentive effect of external compensation dispersion. The resultsfind that, the external compensation dispersion of Chinese listed companies is positivewith firm value. The external compensation dispersion has positive incentive effect,but managerial power will curb the incentive effect of external compensationdispersion. We make a further study about the influence mechanism behind therelationships we have studied, and we find that, the mechanisms how managerialpower and external compensation dispersion influence firm value may be that thehigher external compensation dispersion can curb the level of executive perquisites,and the executive perquisites destroys firm value. But managerial power weakens theinhibitory effect of external compensation dispersion to executive perquisites.
Chapter6is the empirical analysis on managerial power, compensationdispersion and firm value based on different nature of property. This chapter we makean empirical examination on managerial power, compensation dispersion and firmvalue based on different nature of property from the internal compensation dispersionand external compensation dispersion respectively. we find that the state-ownednature not only curb the incentive effect of compensation dispersion, but alsostrengthen the inhibitory effect of managerial power to the incentive effect ofcompensation dispersion.
Chapter7is the empirical analysis on managerial power, compensationdispersion and firm value based on different institutional environment. This chapter we make an empirical examination on managerial power, compensation dispersionand firm value based on different institutional environment from the internalcompensation dispersion and external compensation dispersion respectively. Theresults find that, the marketization of the region where the listed companies is notonly influence the incentive effect of compensation dispersion, but also furtherinfluence the relationship between the managerial power and the incentive effect ofcompensation dispersion, the marketization strengthen the positive incentive effect ofcompensation dispersion, besides the marketization weaken the inhibitory effect ofmanagerial power to the positive incentive effect of compensation dispersion; Thedifferent degree of industry competition also lead to different institutionalenvironment, and then influence the relationship of managerial power, compensationdispersion and firm value, compared to the companies which belong to a competitiveindustry, the incentive effect of compensation dispersion is weaker and the inhibitoryeffect of managerial power to the incentive effect of compensation dispersion isstronger in listed companies which belong to a protected industry.
Chapter8is the main conclusion and prospects for future research. According tothe above theory discussion and empirical analysis, this chapter pointed out thelimitations of this study and the future directions of the research. The first part is theresearch conclusions of the whole paper, the second part points out the limitations anddeficiency of this paper, and points out the future research direction.
具体来说，本文的研究可以分为以下八章：
第一章为绪论。主要介绍本文的研究背景、意义、论文的内容与框架、研究方法及论文创新点，此外对本文的相关概念进行界定。
第二章为理论基础与相关理论适用性分析。本章首先对委托代理理论、最优契约理论及管理者权力理论进行了回顾，为本文的研究奠定了理论基础；其次，基于代理理论、契约理论及中国企业制度的变革和管理者薪酬激励政策的演变出发分析管理者权力理论在中国上市公司的适用性。
第三章为文献综述。本章主要分为三部分，第一部分对管理者权力和薪酬差距的相关文献进行回顾，发现研究的切入点；第二部分对薪酬差距与公司价值的关系的相关理论进行回顾和文献综述；第三部分则对基于管理者权力的薪酬差距和公司价值的关系的文献进行评述，确定研究趋势和研究框架。
第四章为管理者权力、内部薪酬差距与公司价值的实证研究。
本章对内部薪酬差距价值激励效应及管理者权力对内部薪酬差距价值激励效应的影响研究发现：我国上市公司内部的管理者与员工薪酬差距与公司价值正相关，内部薪酬差距具有正面的价值激励效应，支持锦标赛理论，但是管理者权力的存在抑制了内部薪酬差距激励效应的发挥。对管理者权力与内部薪酬差距影响公司价值的内在机理进行研究，结果发现，内部薪酬差距能够提高管理者的薪酬-业绩敏感性，但管理者权力抑制了内部薪酬差距对薪酬-业绩敏感性的提高。
第五章为管理者权力、外部薪酬差距与公司价值的实证研究。本章对外薪酬差距价值激励效应及管理者权力对外薪酬差距价值激励效应的影响研究发现：我国上市公司外部薪酬差距与公司价值正相关，外部薪酬差距具有正面的价值激励效应，而管理者权力减弱了外部薪酬差距的正面价值激励效应。对管理者权力与外部薪酬差距影响公司价值的机理分析发现，外部薪酬差距能够提升公司价值的原因在于，外部薪酬差距有效地抑制了管理者对具有负面价值效应的在职消费的追求，而管理者权力弱化了外部薪酬差距对在职消费的抑制作用。
第六章为不同股权性质下管理者权力、薪酬差距与公司价值的实证研究。本章分别从内、外部薪酬差距两个方面实证检验不同股权性质下管理者权力、薪酬差距与公司价值的关系。研究发现：上市公司的国有性质抑制了薪酬差距正面价值激励效应的发挥，并且强化了管理者权力对薪酬差距正面价值激励效应的抑制作用。
第七章为不同治理环境下管理者权力、薪酬差距与公司价值的实证研究。本章分别从内部薪酬差距、外部薪酬差距两个方面研究不同治理环境下管理者权力、薪酬差距与公司价值的关系。研究发现，上市公司所在地区的市场化程度不仅对薪酬差距的价值激励效应产生重要影响，还进一步影响管理者权力与薪酬差距价值激励效应的关系，在市场化程度越高的地区，薪酬差距的正面价值激励效应越强，并且市场化进程弱化了管理者权力对薪酬差距正面价值激励效应的抑制作用；行业竞争程度的不同也使得上市公司所处的外部治理环境截然不同，进而影响管理者权力、薪酬差距与公司价值的关系，与处于竞争性行业的上市公司相比，保护性行业的上市公司，薪酬差距的正面价值激励效应较弱，并且管理者权力对薪酬差距正面价值激励效应的抑制作用更强。
第八章为主要结论与局限性。本章通过对以上理论及实证分析结论的总结，指出本研究的局限性和未来的研究方向。第一节是全文的研究结论，第二节指出本文研究的局限与不足之处，指出未来研究方向。
The separation of ownership and management lead to the agency conflictbetween shareholders and managers in modern enterprise (Jensen and Meckling,1976). As an important corporate governance mechanism to solve the problem ofprincipal-agent problem, the effectiveness of compensation contracts depends onwhether the design of management compensation has the corresponding incentiveeffect, and then influence the degree of effort of managers and firm value.
As the compensation dispersion is an important content of incentive structure,whether the setting of compensation dispersion has the corresponding incentive effectdirectly determine the effectiveness of compensation policy formulation. Most of theexisting literature about the relationship between compensation dispersion and thefirm value choose the company internal compensation dispersion, and have notreached consensus conclusion till now. As self-interest agent, managers not only willmake a comparison between their own compensation with internal staff, but also willmake a comparison between their own compensation and peer compensation, and theexternal compensation dispersion is still lack of research among the existing literature.So, this paper uses the most optimal contract theory and principal-agent theory as thetheoretical basis, combines the standard research methods and empirical researchmethod, based on the managerial power theory, make a system research of therelationship between compensation dispersion and firm value from the two aspects ofinternal compensation dispersion and external compensation dispersion. In addition,in view of our emerging/transition system background, the state-owned property oflisted companies, the extent of marketization development of the region where thelisted companies is, and the industry competition which industries the listedcompanies belongs, all these are not only significant influence the incentive effect ofcompensation dispersion, but also further influence how the managerial powerinfluence the incentive effect of compensation dispersion, so our paper make a furtherresearch on managerial power, compensation dispersion and firm value combinedwith different equity properties, the marketization degree of different areas anddifferent industry competition degree.
Specifically, this study can be divided into the following eight chapters:
Chapter1is introduction. This chapter mainly introduces the researchbackground, significance, the content of the thesis and framework, the researchmethods and our innovation points, in addition, we make a definition of the relevantconcepts of this article.
Chapter2gives the theoretical basis and applicability analysis of the relevanttheory. This chapter first describes the principal-agent theory, the optimal contracttheory and the managerial power theory, all these in this paper laid a theoreticalfoundation; Secondly, based on agency theory, contract theory, the inform of China'senterprise system and the evolution of the executive compensation incentive policy, we analyse the applicability of managerial power theory in China.
Chapter3gives a literature review. This chapter is divided into three parts, thefirst part is a literature review about managerial power and compensation dispersion,and through the review we found the research starting point; The second part is therelated theory and literature review about the relationship between compensationdispersion and firm value；The third part is the literature review about managerialpower and the incentive effect of compensation dispersion, and then determine theresearch trend and research framework.
Chapter4is the empirical analysis on managerial power, internal compensationdispersion and firm value. This chapter we make an empirical research on the valueincentive effect of internal compensation dispersion and how managerial powerinfluences the value incentive effect of internal compensation dispersion. The resultsfind that, the internal compensation dispersion between managers and staff is positivewith firm value. The compensation dispersion has positive incentive effect, whichsupports the tournament theory, but the managerial power will curb the incentiveeffect of compensation dispersion. Besides, we study about the influence mechanismbehind the relationships we have studied, and we find that, the mechanisms howmanagerial power and internal compensation dispersion influence firm value may bethat the higher internal compensation dispersion can raise the pay-performancesensitivity, but the managerial power will curb this effect.
Chapter5is the empirical analysis on managerial power, external compensationdispersion and firm value. This chapter we make an empirical research on the valueincentive effect of external compensation dispersion and how managerial powerinfluences the value incentive effect of external compensation dispersion. The resultsfind that, the external compensation dispersion of Chinese listed companies is positivewith firm value. The external compensation dispersion has positive incentive effect,but managerial power will curb the incentive effect of external compensationdispersion. We make a further study about the influence mechanism behind therelationships we have studied, and we find that, the mechanisms how managerialpower and external compensation dispersion influence firm value may be that thehigher external compensation dispersion can curb the level of executive perquisites,and the executive perquisites destroys firm value. But managerial power weakens theinhibitory effect of external compensation dispersion to executive perquisites.
Chapter6is the empirical analysis on managerial power, compensationdispersion and firm value based on different nature of property. This chapter we makean empirical examination on managerial power, compensation dispersion and firmvalue based on different nature of property from the internal compensation dispersionand external compensation dispersion respectively. we find that the state-ownednature not only curb the incentive effect of compensation dispersion, but alsostrengthen the inhibitory effect of managerial power to the incentive effect ofcompensation dispersion.
Chapter7is the empirical analysis on managerial power, compensationdispersion and firm value based on different institutional environment. This chapter we make an empirical examination on managerial power, compensation dispersionand firm value based on different institutional environment from the internalcompensation dispersion and external compensation dispersion respectively. Theresults find that, the marketization of the region where the listed companies is notonly influence the incentive effect of compensation dispersion, but also furtherinfluence the relationship between the managerial power and the incentive effect ofcompensation dispersion, the marketization strengthen the positive incentive effect ofcompensation dispersion, besides the marketization weaken the inhibitory effect ofmanagerial power to the positive incentive effect of compensation dispersion; Thedifferent degree of industry competition also lead to different institutionalenvironment, and then influence the relationship of managerial power, compensationdispersion and firm value, compared to the companies which belong to a competitiveindustry, the incentive effect of compensation dispersion is weaker and the inhibitoryeffect of managerial power to the incentive effect of compensation dispersion isstronger in listed companies which belong to a protected industry.
Chapter8is the main conclusion and prospects for future research. According tothe above theory discussion and empirical analysis, this chapter pointed out thelimitations of this study and the future directions of the research. The first part is theresearch conclusions of the whole paper, the second part points out the limitations anddeficiency of this paper, and points out the future research direction.
引文
[1]步丹璐,蔡春,叶建明.高管薪酬公平性问题研究——基于综合理论分析的量化方法思考[J].会计研究,2010(5):39-46.
[2]陈震,张鸣.高管层内部的级差报酬研究[J].中国会计评论,2006,4(1):15-28.
[3]陈震,丁忠明.基于管理层权力理论的垄断企业高管薪酬研究[J].中国工业经济,2011(9):119-129.
[4]陈震,张鸣.业绩指标、业绩风险与高管人员报酬的敏感性[J].会计研究,2008(3):47-54.
[5]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].2005(2):92-101.
[6]陈冬华,梁上坤,蒋德权.不同市场化进程下高管激励契约的成本与选择：货币薪酬与在职消费[J].会计研究,2010(11):56-64.
[7]杜兴强,王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究,会计研究[J].2007(1):58-93.
[8]代彬,刘星,郝颖.高管权力、薪酬契约与国企改革——来自国有上市公司的实证研究[J].当代经济科学，2011,33(4):90-98.
[9]代彬,彭程,郝颖.国企高管控制权、审计监督与会计信息透明度[J].财经研究，2011,37(11):113-123.
[10]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?[J].经济研究,2009(3):110-124.
[11]方军雄.高管权力与企业薪酬变动的非对称性[J].经济研究,2011(4):107-120.
[12]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2009年报告.北京:经济科学出版社,2010.
[13]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告.北京:经济科学出版社,2012.
[14]高文亮,罗宏,程培先.管理层权力与高管薪酬粘性[J].经济经纬,2011(6):82-86.
[15]洪峰.管理层权力、治理结构与薪酬业绩敏感度[J].云南财经大学学报，2010(5):97-104.
[16]黄辉,张博,许宏.管理层权力、国有控股与高管薪酬激励[J].经济问题,2013(1):91-96.
[17]江伟.负债的代理成本与管理层薪酬——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].经济科学,2008(4):110-123.
[18]江伟.行业薪酬基准与管理者薪酬增长——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].金融研究,2010(4):144-159.
[19]江伟.市场化程度、行业竞争与管理者薪酬增长[J].南开管理评论,2011,14(5):58-67.
[20]刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003,(3):35-39.
[21]刘星,谢斯静.股权集中、行业竞争与薪酬业绩牵扯：由我国上市公司生发[J].改革,2011(4):116-122.
[22]刘星,代彬,郝颖.高管控制权、资本扩张与企业财务风险——来自国有上市公司的经验证据.中国会计学会2011年会计学术会议论文集，2011.
[23]刘星,代彬,郝颖.高管权力与公司治理效率——基于国有上市公司高管变更的视角[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(1):1-12.
[24]刘星.徐光伟.政府管制、管理层权力与国企高管薪酬刚性[J].经济科学,2012(1):86-102.
[25]刘春,孙亮.薪酬差距与企业绩效:来自国企上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2010,13(2):30-39.
[26]刘宁,张正堂.企业内部薪酬差距的效应:研究评述[J].管理学报,2007,4(6):839-843.
[27]吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权力的解释[J].管理世界,2008(11):99-109.
[28]卢锐.管理层权力、薪酬差距与绩效[J].南方经济,2007(7):60-70.
[29]卢锐.管理层权力视角下薪酬激励的代理问题分析[J].现代管理科学,2007(7):40-42.
[30]卢锐.管理层权力、薪酬与业绩敏感性分析——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].当代财经,2008(7):107-112.
[31]卢锐,魏明海.薪酬制定的管理层权力理论进展[J].经济管理,2008(1):90-93.
[32]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,11(5):85-92.
[33]罗宏,黄文华.国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008(9):139-148.
[34]李维安,刘绪光,陈靖涵.经理才能、公司治理与契约参照点——中国上市公司高管薪酬决定因素的理论与实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2010,13(2):4-15.
[35]李维安,张国萍.经理层治理评价指数与相关绩效的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(11):87-98.
[36]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(1):24-30.
[37]李科,徐龙炳.资本结构，行业竞争与外部治理环境[J].经济研究，2009(6):116-128.
[38]李建伟.公司治理中法律作用的局限性及其破解[J].商业经济与管理，2008(7):55-61.
[39]刘凤委,孙铮,李增泉.政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007(9):76-84.
[40]林俊清,黄祖辉,孙永祥.高管团队内薪酬差距、公司绩效和治理结构[J]经济研究,2003(4):31-40.
[41]雷光勇，李帆，金鑫。股权分置改革、经理薪酬与会计业绩敏感度[J].中国会计评论，2010，8(1):17-30.
[42]南开大学公司治理评价课题组.中国公司治理评价与指数报告——基于2007年1162家上市公司[J].管理世界,2008,(1):145-151.
[43]权小锋,吴世农.CEO权力强度、信息披露质量与公司业绩的波动性——基于深交所上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2010,13(4):142-153.
[44]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-86.
[45]谌新民,刘善敏.上市公司经营者报酬结构性差异的实证研究[J].经济研究,2003(8):55-63.
[46]邵平,刘林,孔爱国.高管薪酬与公司业绩的敏感性因素分析——金融业的证据(2000～2005年)[J].财经研究,2008,34(1):94-105.
[47]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营业绩[J].经济研究,2000(3):32-39.
[48]吴育辉,吴世农.企业高管自利行为及其影响因素研究——基于我国上市公司股权激励草案的证据[J].管理世界,2010(5):141-149.
[49]吴联生,林景艺,王亚平.薪酬外部公平性、股权性质与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2010(3):117-126.
[50]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值[J].管理世界,2006(9):101-116.
[51]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(7):111-119.
[52]王怀明,史晓明.高管-员工薪酬差距对企业绩效影响的实证分析[J].经济与管理研究,2009(8):23-27.
[53]胥佚萱.企业内部薪酬差距、经营业绩与公司治理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2010(7):86-93.
[54]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007(8):110-122.
[55]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革、企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究,2009(11):68-80
[56]徐晓东,陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J].经济研究.2003(2):64-74.
[57]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5):40-51.
[58]杨蕾,卢锐.独立董事与高管薪酬——基于中国证券市场的经验证据[J].当代财经,2009(5):110-115.
[59]闫威,杨金兰.锦标赛理论研究综述[J].华东经济管理,2010,24(8):135-138.
[60]杨兴全,张照南.制度背景、股权性质与公司持有现金价值[J].经济研究，2008(12):111-123.
[61]杨兴全,曾义,吴昊旻.市场化进程、终极股东控制与公司资本投资价值[J].商业经济与管理,2011(3):34-43.
[62]杨兴全,张丽平,吴昊旻.控股股东控制、管理层激励与公司过度投资[J].商业经济与管理，2012(10):28-39.
[63]张丽平,杨兴全.管理者权力、管理层激励与过度投资[J].软科学,2012,26(10):107-112.
[64]中山大学管理学院课题组.控股股东性质与公司治理结构安排——来自珠江三角洲地区非上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2008(6):118-126.
[65]张敏,姜付秀.机构投资者、企业产权与薪酬契约[J].世界经济,2010(8):43-58.
[66]张正堂.企业内部薪酬差距对组织未来绩效影响的实证研究[J].会计研究,2008(9):81-87.
[67]张正堂,李欣.高层管理团队核心成员薪酬差距与企业绩效的关系[J].经济管理,2007,29(2):16-25.
[68]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9):29-34.
[69] Albuquerque, Rui., J Miao. CEO Power, Compensation, and Governance.2007, SSRNWorking Paper.
[70] Aggarwal, R., and Samwick, A.. Empire Builders and Shirkers: Investment, Firm Performance,and Managerial Incentives [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):489-515.
[71] Adams, J. S.. Towards an Understanding of Inequity [J]. Journal of Abnormal and SocialPsychology,1963,67(5):422-436.
[72] Ahimud, Y., and B. Lev. Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers[J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1981,12(2):605-617.
[73] Agrawal, A., and C.R. Knoeber. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control AgencyProblems between Managers and Shareholders [J]. Journal of Financial and QuantitativeAnalysis,1996,31(3):377-397.
[74] Berle, Adolf A., Jr. and Gardner C. Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M].Macmillan, New York, NY,1932.
[75] Bloom, M., and G.T. Milkovich. Relationships Among Risk, Incentive Pay, and OrganizationalPerformance[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1998,41(3):283-297.
[76] Bizjak, J., Lemmon, M., Naveen, L. Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher Pay andLess Efficient Compensation?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,90(2):152-168.
[77] Bertrand, M., and K.F. Hallock. The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs [J]. Industrial andLabor Relations Review,2001,55(1):3-21.
[78] Baker G P, Jensen M C, Murphy K J. Compensation and incentives: Practice vs. theory[J].Journal of Finance,1988,43(3):593-616.
[79] Baron D P, Besanko D. Regulation, asymmetric information, and auditing[J]. The RANDJournal of Economics,1984,(15)4:447-470.
[80] Boyd, B. Board control and CEO compensation[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1994,15:335-344.
[81] Bishop J. The recognition and reward of employee performance[J]. Journal of LaborEconomics,1987,5(4):36-56.
[82] Bertrand M, Mullainathan S. Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001,116(3):901-932.
[83] Bergstresser, D., Philippon, T.. CEO incentives and earnings management[J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics,2006,80:511–529.
[84] Bebchuk L., Fried J. M.,2003, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem [J]. Journal ofEconomics Perspective,17(3):71-92
[85] Bebchuk L., Fried J.. Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executivecompensation.2004, Harvard University Press
[86] Bebchuk L., Fried J.. Pay without performance: overview of the issues[J]. Acadamy ofManagement Perspective,2006,20(1):5-24
[87] Bebchuk L., Fried J. M., and Walker, D.I. Managerial power and rent extraction in the designof executive compensation[J]. University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69:751-846
[88] Bebchuk, L. A., Y. Grinstein and U. Peyer. Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors[J]. Journal ofFinance,2009.
[89] Carpenter, J. N. and B. Remmers. Executive Stock Option Exercises and Inside Information[J].Journal of Business,2001,74:513-534.
[90] Core, J., R. Holthausen and D. Larcker. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive OfficerCompensation and Firm Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51:371-406.
[91] Core J., Guay W., Larcker D. F.. The power of pen and executive compensation[J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics,2008,88(1):1-25.
[92] Core J, Guay W. The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation:A revised comment[J]. Available at SSRN292955,2002.
[93] Conyon M J, Murphy K J. The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States andUnited Kingdom[J]. The Economic Journal,2002,110(467):640-671.
[94] Crystal G. In search of excess: the over-compensation of American executives[J].New York:Norton.1991.
[95] Conyon M J, Peck S I. Board control, remuneration committees, and top managementcompensation[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1998,41(2):146-157.
[96] Conyon M J, Peck S I, Sadler G V. Corporate tournaments and executive compensation:Evidence from the UK[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2001,22(8):805-815.
[97] Cyert R M, Kang S H, Kumar P. Corporate governance, takeovers, and top-managementcompensation: Theory and evidence[J]. Management Science,2002,48(4):453-469.
[98] Cowherd D. M., Levine D. I., Product Quality and Pay Equity Between Lower-LevelEmployees and Top Management: An Investigation of Distributive Justice Theory [J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1992,37(2):302-320.
[99] Chen, Donghua, Li, Oliver Zhen, Liang, Shangkun. Do Managers Perform for Perks?.2010,Working paper of Nanjing University.
[100] Cheng S, Indjejikian R J. The Market for Corporate Control and CEO Compensation:Complements or Substitutes?[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2009,26(3):701-728.
[101] Claessens, S., Djankov, S.. Enterprise performance and management turnover in CzechRepublic European Economic Review,1999,43(4-6),1115-1124.
[102] Demski J S, Feltham G A. Economic incentives in budgetary control systems[J]. AccountingReview,1978,53(2):336-359.
[103] Demsetz H. Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, The[J]. JL&Econ,1983,26:375.
[104] Dow J, Raposo C C. CEO compensation, change, and corporate strategy[J]. The Journal ofFinance,2005,60(6):2701-2727.
[105] Duffhues P, Kabir R. Is the pay–performance relationship always positive?: Evidence fromthe Netherlands[J]. Journal of multinational financial management,2008,18(1):45-60.
[106] Denis Diane K., McConnell John J. International corporation governance[J]. Journal ofFinancial&Quantatitive Analysis,2003,38(3):1-36.
[107] Dixit, A.. Power of incentives in private versus public organization. AEA Papers andProceddings,1997,87(2),378-382.
[108] Dur, R., Glazer, A.,2008,“Optimal contracts when a worker envies his boss”, The Journal ofLaw, Economics, and Organization,24(1):120-137.
[109] Edmans A., Gabaix X.,2008. Is CEO pay really inefficient? A survey of new optimalcontracting theories, Working paper, SSRN No.1265067.
[110] Eriksson T. Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on DanishData[J].Journal of Labour Economics,1999,17(2):224-242.
[111] Eisenhardt K M, Bourgeois III L J. Politics of strategic decision making in high-velocityenvironments: Toward a midrange theory[J]. Academy of management journal,1988,31(4):737-770.
[112] Fahlenbrach R. Shareholder rights, boards, and CEO compensation[J]. Review of Finance,2009,13(1):81-113.
[113] Fama, Eugene F.. Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of PoliticalEconomics,1980,88(4),288-307.
[114] Faulkender, M., Yang, J.. Insider the Black Box: the Role and Composition of CompensationPeer Groups [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2010,96(2):257-270.
[115] Festinger, L.. A theory of social comparison processes[J]. Human Relations,1954,7:117-140.
[116] Firth, M., Fung, P. M. Y., Rui, O. M.. Corporate performance and CEO compensation inChina[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12:693-714.
[117] Finkelstein, S. Power in Top Management Teams: Dimensions, Measurement, andValidation[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1992,35(3):505-538.
[118] Fredrickson, J., D. Hambrick, and S. Baumrin. A Model of CEO Dismissal[J]. Academy ofManagement Review,1988,13,255-270.
[119] Grinstein, Y. and Y. Valles. Separating the CEO from the Chairman Position: Determinantsand Changes after the New Corporate Governance Regulation,2008, Working Paper.
[120] Greenberg, J.. Ataxonomy of organizational justice theories[J]. Academy of ManagementReview,1987,12:9-22.
[121] Greenberg, J.. Creating Unfairmess by Mandationg Fair Procedures: The Hidden Hazards ofa Pay-for-performance Plan[J]. Human Resource Management Review,2003,13:41-57.
[122] Grossman S J, Hart O D. An analysis of the principal-agent problem[J]. Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1983,51(1):7-45.
[123] Hall B J, Liebman J B. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats?[J]. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics,1998,113(3):653-691.
[124] Hart, Oliver D. Financial Contracting[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,2001,39(4),1079-1100.
[125] Hart O. Corporate governance: some theory and implications[J]. The Economic Journal,1995,105(4):678-689.
[126] Hallock K F. Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1997,32(03):331-344.
[127] Harris M, Raviv A. Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information[J]. Journal ofEconomic Theory,1979,20(2):231-259.
[128] Henderson A D, Fredrickson J W. Information-Processing Demands as a Determinant of CEOCompensation[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1996,39(3):575-606.
[129] Henderson A D, Fredrickson J W. Top Management Team Coordination Needs and the CEOPay Gap: A Competitive Test of Economic and Behavioral Views[J]. Academy ofManagement Journal,2001,44(1):96-117.
[130] Hoskisson R E, Hitt M A, Hill C W L. Managerial risk taking in diversified firms: Anevolutionary perspective[J]. Organization Science,1991,2(3):296-314.
[131] H lmstrom B. Moral hazard and observability [J]. The Bell Journal of Economics,1979:74-91.
[132] Holmstrom B. Agency costs and innovation[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1989,12(3):305-327.
[133] Holmstrom B, Kaplan S N. The state of US corporate governance: what's right and what'swrong?[R]. National Bureau of Economic Research,2003.
[134] Holmstr m B. Pay without performance and the managerial power hypothesis: A comment[J].Available at SSRN899096,2006.
[135] Hambrick D C, Finkelstein S. The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: Thecase of CEO pay[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1995,16(3):175-193.
[136] Hongbin Cai, Hanming Fang and Lixin Colin Xu.,2005,“Eat, Drink, Firms and Government:An Investigation of Corruption from Entertainment Expenditures of Chinese Firms”, WorkingPaper, www.ssrn.com.
[137] Jensen, M.C., and Meckling, W.H.. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costsand Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[138] Jensen M.. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeover[J]. AmericanEconomic Review,1986,76:323-329.
[139] Jensen M.C., Murphy K. J.. Performance pay and top-management incentives[J]. Journal ofPolitical Economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[140] Jensen, M. C., Murphy, K. J., Wruck, E.. Remuneration: Where We’ ve been, How We Got toHere, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them.2004, Working Paper, HarvardUniversity and the European Corporate Governance Institute.
[141] Kato, T., and C.X. Long.2008. Tournaments and Managerial Incentives in China’s ListedFirms: New Evidence.
[142] Krishnan H A, Park D. Effects of top management team change on performance in downsizedUS companies[J]. MIR: Management International Review,1998,38(4):303-319.
[143] Kochan T A, McKersie R B, Cappelli P. Strategic choice and industrial relations theory[J].Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society,1984,23(1):16-39.
[144] Kaplan R S, Cooper R. Cost&effect: using integrated cost systems to drive profitability andperformance[M]. Harvard Business Press,1997.
[145] Kuhnen C, Zwiebel J. Executive pay, hidden compensation and managerial entrenchment[J].Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper,2008(16).
[146] Leventhal G S. What should be done with equity theory? New approaches to the study offairness in social relationships[J].1976.
[147] Leventhal G S, Karuza J, Fry W R. Beyond fairness: A theory of allocation preferences[J].Justice and social interaction,1980,3:167-218.
[148] Lambert, R., Larcker, D. and Weigelt, K.. The structure of organizational incentives[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1993,38:438-461.
[149] Kim, T., Leung, K.. Forming and Reacting to Overall Fairness: A Cross-culture Comparison,Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,2007,104(1):83-95.
[150] Lazear, E., and Rosen, S. Rank-order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts[J]. Journalof Political Economy,1981,89(5):841-864.
[151] Lin, C., W. Shen, and D. Su.2005. Corporate Tournament and Executive Compensation in aTransition Economy: Evidence from Publicly Listed Firms in China: SSRN.
[152] Luo, Wei, Zhang,Yi, Zhu, Ning. Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites: New Evidencefrom an Emerging Market. Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):352-370.
[153] Milkovich, G., and J. M. Newman,1996, Compensation(5th ed.), Homewood, IL: Irwin.
[154] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J.. Economic analysis of social institutions: an economic approachto influence activities in organizations.1988,94. Supplement, pp.S154-S179.
[155] Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts,1992, Economics, Organization and Management, EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
[156] Miller, D., and J. Shamsie. Learning across the Life Cycle[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2001,22,725-745.
[157] Mincer J. The distribution of labor incomes: a survey with special reference to the humancapital approach[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,1970,8(1):1-26.
[158] Murphy K J. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis[J].Journal of accounting and economics,1985,7(1):11-42.
[159] Murphy K J. Incentives, learning, and compensation: A theoretical and empiricalinvestigation of managerial labor contracts[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,1986,17(1):59-76.
[160] Main B G M, O'Reilly III C A, Wade J. Top executive pay: Tournament or teamwork?[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1993,11(4):606-628.
[161] Murphy, K.. Executive Compensation”, In: Ashenfelter, O., Card, D.(Eds.), Handbook ofLabor Economics, North Holland, Amsterdam,1999,3:2485—2563.
[162] Murphy K. J.. Explaining executive compensation: managerial power versus the perceivedcost of stock options[J]. University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):847-869.
[163] Morse A, Nanda V, Seru A. Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs?[J]. TheJournal of Finance,2011,66(5):1779-1821.
[164] Morse A, Nanda V, Seru A. Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? WorkingPaper, University of Chicago working paper.
[165] O’Reilly, C.A., Main, B.G., Crystal, G. S.. CEO compensation as tournament and socialcompensation: a tale of two theories[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1988,33:257-274.
[166] Pfeffer J. and Davis-Blake.Salary dispersion. Location in the salary distribution，and turnoveramong college adminstrators[J]. Industrial and labor relations review,1992,45(4):753-763.
[167] Pfeffer J, Langton N. The Effect of Wage Dispersion on Satisfaction, Productivity, andWorking Collaboratively: Evidence from College and University Faculty[J].AdministrativeScience Quarterly,1993,38(3):382-407.
[168] Pfeffer J.,1994, Competitive Advantage through People: Unleashing the Power of the WorkForce, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
[169] Pillai, R., E. S. Williams, Tan, J. J.. Are the Scales Tipped in Favor of Procedural orDistributive Justice? An Investigation of the U.S., India, Germany, and Hong Kong(China),International Journal of Conflict Management,2001,12:312-332.
[170] Rajan, R.G., Wulf, J.. Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?[J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,2006,79(1):1-33.
[171] Ross S A. The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing[M]. Rodney L. White Center forFinancial Research, University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School,1973.
[172] Rosen S. Authority, control and the distribution of earnings[J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1982,10(13):311-323.
[173] Rosen S. Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments[J]. American Economic Review,1986,76:701-715.
[174] Rosen, S.. Contracts and the market for executives. In Werinand Wijkander(Eds.), ContractEconomics. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell,1992.
[175] Shirley, Mary and Patrick Walsh,2000, Public vs. private ownership: the current state of thedebate, Working Paper, The World Bank.
[176] Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.. Politicians and Firms[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics1994,109:995-1025.
[177] Shleifer A, Vishny R. A Survey of Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Finance1997,52:737-783.
[178] Shavell S. On moral hazard and insurance[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1979,93(4):541-562.
[179] Sloan R G. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation[J]. Journal of accountingand Economics,1993,16(1):55-100.
[180] Shivdasani A, Yermack D. CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: Anempirical analysis[J]. The Journal of Finance,2002,54(5):1829-1853.
[181] Vickers, John and George Yarrow. Economic Perspectives on Privatization[J]. Journal ofEconomic Perspectives,1991,5(2):111-132.
[182] Yermack D. Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholderreturns[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):211-242.
[183] Yermack D. Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news announcements[J].Journal of Finance,1997,52(2),449-476.
[2]陈震,张鸣.高管层内部的级差报酬研究[J].中国会计评论,2006,4(1):15-28.
[3]陈震,丁忠明.基于管理层权力理论的垄断企业高管薪酬研究[J].中国工业经济,2011(9):119-129.
[4]陈震,张鸣.业绩指标、业绩风险与高管人员报酬的敏感性[J].会计研究,2008(3):47-54.
[5]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].2005(2):92-101.
[6]陈冬华,梁上坤,蒋德权.不同市场化进程下高管激励契约的成本与选择：货币薪酬与在职消费[J].会计研究,2010(11):56-64.
[7]杜兴强,王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究,会计研究[J].2007(1):58-93.
[8]代彬,刘星,郝颖.高管权力、薪酬契约与国企改革——来自国有上市公司的实证研究[J].当代经济科学，2011,33(4):90-98.
[9]代彬,彭程,郝颖.国企高管控制权、审计监督与会计信息透明度[J].财经研究，2011,37(11):113-123.
[10]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?[J].经济研究,2009(3):110-124.
[11]方军雄.高管权力与企业薪酬变动的非对称性[J].经济研究,2011(4):107-120.
[12]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2009年报告.北京:经济科学出版社,2010.
[13]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告.北京:经济科学出版社,2012.
[14]高文亮,罗宏,程培先.管理层权力与高管薪酬粘性[J].经济经纬,2011(6):82-86.
[15]洪峰.管理层权力、治理结构与薪酬业绩敏感度[J].云南财经大学学报，2010(5):97-104.
[16]黄辉,张博,许宏.管理层权力、国有控股与高管薪酬激励[J].经济问题,2013(1):91-96.
[17]江伟.负债的代理成本与管理层薪酬——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].经济科学,2008(4):110-123.
[18]江伟.行业薪酬基准与管理者薪酬增长——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].金融研究,2010(4):144-159.
[19]江伟.市场化程度、行业竞争与管理者薪酬增长[J].南开管理评论,2011,14(5):58-67.
[20]刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003,(3):35-39.
[21]刘星,谢斯静.股权集中、行业竞争与薪酬业绩牵扯：由我国上市公司生发[J].改革,2011(4):116-122.
[22]刘星,代彬,郝颖.高管控制权、资本扩张与企业财务风险——来自国有上市公司的经验证据.中国会计学会2011年会计学术会议论文集，2011.
[23]刘星,代彬,郝颖.高管权力与公司治理效率——基于国有上市公司高管变更的视角[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(1):1-12.
[24]刘星.徐光伟.政府管制、管理层权力与国企高管薪酬刚性[J].经济科学,2012(1):86-102.
[25]刘春,孙亮.薪酬差距与企业绩效:来自国企上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2010,13(2):30-39.
[26]刘宁,张正堂.企业内部薪酬差距的效应:研究评述[J].管理学报,2007,4(6):839-843.
[27]吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权力的解释[J].管理世界,2008(11):99-109.
[28]卢锐.管理层权力、薪酬差距与绩效[J].南方经济,2007(7):60-70.
[29]卢锐.管理层权力视角下薪酬激励的代理问题分析[J].现代管理科学,2007(7):40-42.
[30]卢锐.管理层权力、薪酬与业绩敏感性分析——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].当代财经,2008(7):107-112.
[31]卢锐,魏明海.薪酬制定的管理层权力理论进展[J].经济管理,2008(1):90-93.
[32]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,11(5):85-92.
[33]罗宏,黄文华.国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008(9):139-148.
[34]李维安,刘绪光,陈靖涵.经理才能、公司治理与契约参照点——中国上市公司高管薪酬决定因素的理论与实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2010,13(2):4-15.
[35]李维安,张国萍.经理层治理评价指数与相关绩效的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(11):87-98.
[36]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(1):24-30.
[37]李科,徐龙炳.资本结构，行业竞争与外部治理环境[J].经济研究，2009(6):116-128.
[38]李建伟.公司治理中法律作用的局限性及其破解[J].商业经济与管理，2008(7):55-61.
[39]刘凤委,孙铮,李增泉.政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007(9):76-84.
[40]林俊清,黄祖辉,孙永祥.高管团队内薪酬差距、公司绩效和治理结构[J]经济研究,2003(4):31-40.
[41]雷光勇，李帆，金鑫。股权分置改革、经理薪酬与会计业绩敏感度[J].中国会计评论，2010，8(1):17-30.
[42]南开大学公司治理评价课题组.中国公司治理评价与指数报告——基于2007年1162家上市公司[J].管理世界,2008,(1):145-151.
[43]权小锋,吴世农.CEO权力强度、信息披露质量与公司业绩的波动性——基于深交所上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2010,13(4):142-153.
[44]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-86.
[45]谌新民,刘善敏.上市公司经营者报酬结构性差异的实证研究[J].经济研究,2003(8):55-63.
[46]邵平,刘林,孔爱国.高管薪酬与公司业绩的敏感性因素分析——金融业的证据(2000～2005年)[J].财经研究,2008,34(1):94-105.
[47]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营业绩[J].经济研究,2000(3):32-39.
[48]吴育辉,吴世农.企业高管自利行为及其影响因素研究——基于我国上市公司股权激励草案的证据[J].管理世界,2010(5):141-149.
[49]吴联生,林景艺,王亚平.薪酬外部公平性、股权性质与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2010(3):117-126.
[50]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值[J].管理世界,2006(9):101-116.
[51]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(7):111-119.
[52]王怀明,史晓明.高管-员工薪酬差距对企业绩效影响的实证分析[J].经济与管理研究,2009(8):23-27.
[53]胥佚萱.企业内部薪酬差距、经营业绩与公司治理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2010(7):86-93.
[54]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007(8):110-122.
[55]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革、企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究,2009(11):68-80
[56]徐晓东,陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J].经济研究.2003(2):64-74.
[57]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5):40-51.
[58]杨蕾,卢锐.独立董事与高管薪酬——基于中国证券市场的经验证据[J].当代财经,2009(5):110-115.
[59]闫威,杨金兰.锦标赛理论研究综述[J].华东经济管理,2010,24(8):135-138.
[60]杨兴全,张照南.制度背景、股权性质与公司持有现金价值[J].经济研究，2008(12):111-123.
[61]杨兴全,曾义,吴昊旻.市场化进程、终极股东控制与公司资本投资价值[J].商业经济与管理,2011(3):34-43.
[62]杨兴全,张丽平,吴昊旻.控股股东控制、管理层激励与公司过度投资[J].商业经济与管理，2012(10):28-39.
[63]张丽平,杨兴全.管理者权力、管理层激励与过度投资[J].软科学,2012,26(10):107-112.
[64]中山大学管理学院课题组.控股股东性质与公司治理结构安排——来自珠江三角洲地区非上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2008(6):118-126.
[65]张敏,姜付秀.机构投资者、企业产权与薪酬契约[J].世界经济,2010(8):43-58.
[66]张正堂.企业内部薪酬差距对组织未来绩效影响的实证研究[J].会计研究,2008(9):81-87.
[67]张正堂,李欣.高层管理团队核心成员薪酬差距与企业绩效的关系[J].经济管理,2007,29(2):16-25.
[68]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9):29-34.
[69] Albuquerque, Rui., J Miao. CEO Power, Compensation, and Governance.2007, SSRNWorking Paper.
[70] Aggarwal, R., and Samwick, A.. Empire Builders and Shirkers: Investment, Firm Performance,and Managerial Incentives [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(3):489-515.
[71] Adams, J. S.. Towards an Understanding of Inequity [J]. Journal of Abnormal and SocialPsychology,1963,67(5):422-436.
[72] Ahimud, Y., and B. Lev. Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers[J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1981,12(2):605-617.
[73] Agrawal, A., and C.R. Knoeber. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control AgencyProblems between Managers and Shareholders [J]. Journal of Financial and QuantitativeAnalysis,1996,31(3):377-397.
[74] Berle, Adolf A., Jr. and Gardner C. Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M].Macmillan, New York, NY,1932.
[75] Bloom, M., and G.T. Milkovich. Relationships Among Risk, Incentive Pay, and OrganizationalPerformance[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1998,41(3):283-297.
[76] Bizjak, J., Lemmon, M., Naveen, L. Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher Pay andLess Efficient Compensation?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,90(2):152-168.
[77] Bertrand, M., and K.F. Hallock. The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs [J]. Industrial andLabor Relations Review,2001,55(1):3-21.
[78] Baker G P, Jensen M C, Murphy K J. Compensation and incentives: Practice vs. theory[J].Journal of Finance,1988,43(3):593-616.
[79] Baron D P, Besanko D. Regulation, asymmetric information, and auditing[J]. The RANDJournal of Economics,1984,(15)4:447-470.
[80] Boyd, B. Board control and CEO compensation[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1994,15:335-344.
[81] Bishop J. The recognition and reward of employee performance[J]. Journal of LaborEconomics,1987,5(4):36-56.
[82] Bertrand M, Mullainathan S. Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001,116(3):901-932.
[83] Bergstresser, D., Philippon, T.. CEO incentives and earnings management[J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics,2006,80:511–529.
[84] Bebchuk L., Fried J. M.,2003, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem [J]. Journal ofEconomics Perspective,17(3):71-92
[85] Bebchuk L., Fried J.. Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executivecompensation.2004, Harvard University Press
[86] Bebchuk L., Fried J.. Pay without performance: overview of the issues[J]. Acadamy ofManagement Perspective,2006,20(1):5-24
[87] Bebchuk L., Fried J. M., and Walker, D.I. Managerial power and rent extraction in the designof executive compensation[J]. University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69:751-846
[88] Bebchuk, L. A., Y. Grinstein and U. Peyer. Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors[J]. Journal ofFinance,2009.
[89] Carpenter, J. N. and B. Remmers. Executive Stock Option Exercises and Inside Information[J].Journal of Business,2001,74:513-534.
[90] Core, J., R. Holthausen and D. Larcker. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive OfficerCompensation and Firm Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51:371-406.
[91] Core J., Guay W., Larcker D. F.. The power of pen and executive compensation[J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics,2008,88(1):1-25.
[92] Core J, Guay W. The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation:A revised comment[J]. Available at SSRN292955,2002.
[93] Conyon M J, Murphy K J. The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States andUnited Kingdom[J]. The Economic Journal,2002,110(467):640-671.
[94] Crystal G. In search of excess: the over-compensation of American executives[J].New York:Norton.1991.
[95] Conyon M J, Peck S I. Board control, remuneration committees, and top managementcompensation[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1998,41(2):146-157.
[96] Conyon M J, Peck S I, Sadler G V. Corporate tournaments and executive compensation:Evidence from the UK[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2001,22(8):805-815.
[97] Cyert R M, Kang S H, Kumar P. Corporate governance, takeovers, and top-managementcompensation: Theory and evidence[J]. Management Science,2002,48(4):453-469.
[98] Cowherd D. M., Levine D. I., Product Quality and Pay Equity Between Lower-LevelEmployees and Top Management: An Investigation of Distributive Justice Theory [J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1992,37(2):302-320.
[99] Chen, Donghua, Li, Oliver Zhen, Liang, Shangkun. Do Managers Perform for Perks?.2010,Working paper of Nanjing University.
[100] Cheng S, Indjejikian R J. The Market for Corporate Control and CEO Compensation:Complements or Substitutes?[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2009,26(3):701-728.
[101] Claessens, S., Djankov, S.. Enterprise performance and management turnover in CzechRepublic European Economic Review,1999,43(4-6),1115-1124.
[102] Demski J S, Feltham G A. Economic incentives in budgetary control systems[J]. AccountingReview,1978,53(2):336-359.
[103] Demsetz H. Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, The[J]. JL&Econ,1983,26:375.
[104] Dow J, Raposo C C. CEO compensation, change, and corporate strategy[J]. The Journal ofFinance,2005,60(6):2701-2727.
[105] Duffhues P, Kabir R. Is the pay–performance relationship always positive?: Evidence fromthe Netherlands[J]. Journal of multinational financial management,2008,18(1):45-60.
[106] Denis Diane K., McConnell John J. International corporation governance[J]. Journal ofFinancial&Quantatitive Analysis,2003,38(3):1-36.
[107] Dixit, A.. Power of incentives in private versus public organization. AEA Papers andProceddings,1997,87(2),378-382.
[108] Dur, R., Glazer, A.,2008,“Optimal contracts when a worker envies his boss”, The Journal ofLaw, Economics, and Organization,24(1):120-137.
[109] Edmans A., Gabaix X.,2008. Is CEO pay really inefficient? A survey of new optimalcontracting theories, Working paper, SSRN No.1265067.
[110] Eriksson T. Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on DanishData[J].Journal of Labour Economics,1999,17(2):224-242.
[111] Eisenhardt K M, Bourgeois III L J. Politics of strategic decision making in high-velocityenvironments: Toward a midrange theory[J]. Academy of management journal,1988,31(4):737-770.
[112] Fahlenbrach R. Shareholder rights, boards, and CEO compensation[J]. Review of Finance,2009,13(1):81-113.
[113] Fama, Eugene F.. Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of PoliticalEconomics,1980,88(4),288-307.
[114] Faulkender, M., Yang, J.. Insider the Black Box: the Role and Composition of CompensationPeer Groups [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2010,96(2):257-270.
[115] Festinger, L.. A theory of social comparison processes[J]. Human Relations,1954,7:117-140.
[116] Firth, M., Fung, P. M. Y., Rui, O. M.. Corporate performance and CEO compensation inChina[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12:693-714.
[117] Finkelstein, S. Power in Top Management Teams: Dimensions, Measurement, andValidation[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1992,35(3):505-538.
[118] Fredrickson, J., D. Hambrick, and S. Baumrin. A Model of CEO Dismissal[J]. Academy ofManagement Review,1988,13,255-270.
[119] Grinstein, Y. and Y. Valles. Separating the CEO from the Chairman Position: Determinantsand Changes after the New Corporate Governance Regulation,2008, Working Paper.
[120] Greenberg, J.. Ataxonomy of organizational justice theories[J]. Academy of ManagementReview,1987,12:9-22.
[121] Greenberg, J.. Creating Unfairmess by Mandationg Fair Procedures: The Hidden Hazards ofa Pay-for-performance Plan[J]. Human Resource Management Review,2003,13:41-57.
[122] Grossman S J, Hart O D. An analysis of the principal-agent problem[J]. Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1983,51(1):7-45.
[123] Hall B J, Liebman J B. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats?[J]. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics,1998,113(3):653-691.
[124] Hart, Oliver D. Financial Contracting[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,2001,39(4),1079-1100.
[125] Hart O. Corporate governance: some theory and implications[J]. The Economic Journal,1995,105(4):678-689.
[126] Hallock K F. Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1997,32(03):331-344.
[127] Harris M, Raviv A. Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information[J]. Journal ofEconomic Theory,1979,20(2):231-259.
[128] Henderson A D, Fredrickson J W. Information-Processing Demands as a Determinant of CEOCompensation[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1996,39(3):575-606.
[129] Henderson A D, Fredrickson J W. Top Management Team Coordination Needs and the CEOPay Gap: A Competitive Test of Economic and Behavioral Views[J]. Academy ofManagement Journal,2001,44(1):96-117.
[130] Hoskisson R E, Hitt M A, Hill C W L. Managerial risk taking in diversified firms: Anevolutionary perspective[J]. Organization Science,1991,2(3):296-314.
[131] H lmstrom B. Moral hazard and observability [J]. The Bell Journal of Economics,1979:74-91.
[132] Holmstrom B. Agency costs and innovation[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1989,12(3):305-327.
[133] Holmstrom B, Kaplan S N. The state of US corporate governance: what's right and what'swrong?[R]. National Bureau of Economic Research,2003.
[134] Holmstr m B. Pay without performance and the managerial power hypothesis: A comment[J].Available at SSRN899096,2006.
[135] Hambrick D C, Finkelstein S. The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: Thecase of CEO pay[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1995,16(3):175-193.
[136] Hongbin Cai, Hanming Fang and Lixin Colin Xu.,2005,“Eat, Drink, Firms and Government:An Investigation of Corruption from Entertainment Expenditures of Chinese Firms”, WorkingPaper, www.ssrn.com.
[137] Jensen, M.C., and Meckling, W.H.. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costsand Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[138] Jensen M.. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeover[J]. AmericanEconomic Review,1986,76:323-329.
[139] Jensen M.C., Murphy K. J.. Performance pay and top-management incentives[J]. Journal ofPolitical Economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[140] Jensen, M. C., Murphy, K. J., Wruck, E.. Remuneration: Where We’ ve been, How We Got toHere, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them.2004, Working Paper, HarvardUniversity and the European Corporate Governance Institute.
[141] Kato, T., and C.X. Long.2008. Tournaments and Managerial Incentives in China’s ListedFirms: New Evidence.
[142] Krishnan H A, Park D. Effects of top management team change on performance in downsizedUS companies[J]. MIR: Management International Review,1998,38(4):303-319.
[143] Kochan T A, McKersie R B, Cappelli P. Strategic choice and industrial relations theory[J].Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society,1984,23(1):16-39.
[144] Kaplan R S, Cooper R. Cost&effect: using integrated cost systems to drive profitability andperformance[M]. Harvard Business Press,1997.
[145] Kuhnen C, Zwiebel J. Executive pay, hidden compensation and managerial entrenchment[J].Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper,2008(16).
[146] Leventhal G S. What should be done with equity theory? New approaches to the study offairness in social relationships[J].1976.
[147] Leventhal G S, Karuza J, Fry W R. Beyond fairness: A theory of allocation preferences[J].Justice and social interaction,1980,3:167-218.
[148] Lambert, R., Larcker, D. and Weigelt, K.. The structure of organizational incentives[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1993,38:438-461.
[149] Kim, T., Leung, K.. Forming and Reacting to Overall Fairness: A Cross-culture Comparison,Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,2007,104(1):83-95.
[150] Lazear, E., and Rosen, S. Rank-order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts[J]. Journalof Political Economy,1981,89(5):841-864.
[151] Lin, C., W. Shen, and D. Su.2005. Corporate Tournament and Executive Compensation in aTransition Economy: Evidence from Publicly Listed Firms in China: SSRN.
[152] Luo, Wei, Zhang,Yi, Zhu, Ning. Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites: New Evidencefrom an Emerging Market. Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):352-370.
[153] Milkovich, G., and J. M. Newman,1996, Compensation(5th ed.), Homewood, IL: Irwin.
[154] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J.. Economic analysis of social institutions: an economic approachto influence activities in organizations.1988,94. Supplement, pp.S154-S179.
[155] Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts,1992, Economics, Organization and Management, EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
[156] Miller, D., and J. Shamsie. Learning across the Life Cycle[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2001,22,725-745.
[157] Mincer J. The distribution of labor incomes: a survey with special reference to the humancapital approach[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,1970,8(1):1-26.
[158] Murphy K J. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis[J].Journal of accounting and economics,1985,7(1):11-42.
[159] Murphy K J. Incentives, learning, and compensation: A theoretical and empiricalinvestigation of managerial labor contracts[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,1986,17(1):59-76.
[160] Main B G M, O'Reilly III C A, Wade J. Top executive pay: Tournament or teamwork?[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1993,11(4):606-628.
[161] Murphy, K.. Executive Compensation”, In: Ashenfelter, O., Card, D.(Eds.), Handbook ofLabor Economics, North Holland, Amsterdam,1999,3:2485—2563.
[162] Murphy K. J.. Explaining executive compensation: managerial power versus the perceivedcost of stock options[J]. University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):847-869.
[163] Morse A, Nanda V, Seru A. Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs?[J]. TheJournal of Finance,2011,66(5):1779-1821.
[164] Morse A, Nanda V, Seru A. Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? WorkingPaper, University of Chicago working paper.
[165] O’Reilly, C.A., Main, B.G., Crystal, G. S.. CEO compensation as tournament and socialcompensation: a tale of two theories[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1988,33:257-274.
[166] Pfeffer J. and Davis-Blake.Salary dispersion. Location in the salary distribution，and turnoveramong college adminstrators[J]. Industrial and labor relations review,1992,45(4):753-763.
[167] Pfeffer J, Langton N. The Effect of Wage Dispersion on Satisfaction, Productivity, andWorking Collaboratively: Evidence from College and University Faculty[J].AdministrativeScience Quarterly,1993,38(3):382-407.
[168] Pfeffer J.,1994, Competitive Advantage through People: Unleashing the Power of the WorkForce, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
[169] Pillai, R., E. S. Williams, Tan, J. J.. Are the Scales Tipped in Favor of Procedural orDistributive Justice? An Investigation of the U.S., India, Germany, and Hong Kong(China),International Journal of Conflict Management,2001,12:312-332.
[170] Rajan, R.G., Wulf, J.. Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?[J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,2006,79(1):1-33.
[171] Ross S A. The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing[M]. Rodney L. White Center forFinancial Research, University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School,1973.
[172] Rosen S. Authority, control and the distribution of earnings[J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1982,10(13):311-323.
[173] Rosen S. Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments[J]. American Economic Review,1986,76:701-715.
[174] Rosen, S.. Contracts and the market for executives. In Werinand Wijkander(Eds.), ContractEconomics. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell,1992.
[175] Shirley, Mary and Patrick Walsh,2000, Public vs. private ownership: the current state of thedebate, Working Paper, The World Bank.
[176] Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.. Politicians and Firms[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics1994,109:995-1025.
[177] Shleifer A, Vishny R. A Survey of Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Finance1997,52:737-783.
[178] Shavell S. On moral hazard and insurance[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1979,93(4):541-562.
[179] Sloan R G. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation[J]. Journal of accountingand Economics,1993,16(1):55-100.
[180] Shivdasani A, Yermack D. CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: Anempirical analysis[J]. The Journal of Finance,2002,54(5):1829-1853.
[181] Vickers, John and George Yarrow. Economic Perspectives on Privatization[J]. Journal ofEconomic Perspectives,1991,5(2):111-132.
[182] Yermack D. Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholderreturns[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):211-242.
[183] Yermack D. Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news announcements[J].Journal of Finance,1997,52(2),449-476.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |